Tag Archive for: uncrewed systems

AI is changing Indo-Pacific naval operations

Artificial intelligence is poised to significantly transform the Indo-Pacific maritime security landscape. It offers unprecedented situational awareness, decision-making speed and operational flexibility. But without clear rules, shared norms and mechanisms for risk reduction, AI could act as a destabilising force—particularly in contested waters where tensions are already high.

In the Indo-Pacific, larger countries are adopting AI to monitor and respond to threats. But the unclear nature of AI decisions risks escalation in contested spaces. Additionally, smaller states without the technological capacity risk being left behind. Furthermore, the lack of clear legal guidelines means there is no agreement on responsible use, risking further escalation.

Indo-Pacific partners must work together to develop standards of AI use in naval operations to avoid escalation and conflict in the region.

At the operational level, AI offers substantial enhancements in the ability to monitor, track and interpret activities across oceanic spaces. AI-powered systems can rapidly analyse satellite imagery, sonar data and automatic identification system signals to identify naval deployments, ships surreptitiously engaged in illicit activities, or civilian vessels used for strategic deception. These capabilities could bolster maritime law enforcement, countering illegal fishing, smuggling or grey-zone coercion. They could also support real-time monitoring of strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea.

China is committed to integrating AI into its maritime strategy. Its navy and coast guard are using AI to enhance unmanned surface and underwater vessel operations, automate maritime surveillance across disputed waters and support rapid data fusion in joint maritime command centres. Beijing’s use of AI to combine satellite and oceanographic data allows it to monitor adversaries and assert maritime claims with greater confidence and persistence. This increases regional navies’ concerns about China’s ability to dominate the decision-making cycle in contested waters.

The United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea and India are responding with their own AI-enabled initiatives. The US Navy’s Project Overmatch and Australia’s Ghost Shark undersea drone project are examples of efforts to integrate AI into distributed maritime operations, autonomous platforms and decision-support tools. AI-driven swarming technology, cooperative autonomous undersea systems and real-time target classification are likely to become central to allied force postures across the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, AI-powered centres for combining data, such as India’s Information Fusion Centre—Indian Ocean Region, are being used to coordinate multinational responses to maritime threats in real time.

However, these technological advancements are not without risks. Integration of AI into maritime systems increase the possibility of escalation through automation and miscalculation. In contested zones, such as the South China Sea, naval and paramilitary forces from multiple countries already operate in close proximity. Autonomous vessels or decision-support algorithms in such places could misinterpret intent or escalate incidents due to flawed pattern recognition, bias in data sets, or overly aggressive operational parameters. The lack of transparency into the decision-making processes of AI systems—particularly those based on deep learning—may complicate efforts to attribute actions, assign responsibility, or de-escalate tensions once a confrontation begins.

The proliferation of AI in the maritime sphere poses challenges for smaller states with limited technological capacity. Southeast Asian nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam may find themselves at a disadvantage as larger powers deploy AI-enhanced naval assets that can dominate surveillance, disrupt communications, or project force with fewer personnel and faster reaction times. Without regional frameworks to ensure transparency, interoperability, or norms of conduct, the Indo-Pacific could devolve into a tiered security environment where technological inequality exacerbates strategic asymmetry.

Moreover, the lack of international regulation on the use of AI in naval systems creates a dangerous legal vacuum. Key questions remain unanswered: what constitutes appropriate human control over AI-enabled maritime systems? How should accountability be assigned for incidents involving autonomous vessels? Can existing rules on the use of force at sea be adapted to AI-enhanced environments?

Without coordinated answers, states may pursue national strategies that prioritise speed and advantage over safety and stability.

To mitigate these risks, regional and extra-regional powers must consider developing a set of AI-focused maritime confidence-building measures. These could include pre-notification of autonomous vessel deployments, joint AI stress-testing exercises to assess the reliability and behaviour of unmanned systems in shared waters and regional agreements on minimum levels of human oversight. Multilateral forums, including the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, and even informal groupings such as the Quad, could serve as platforms for these discussions.

The future of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific will not only be shaped by the size of navies or the reach of fleets but increasingly by the logic—and the limits—of the algorithms guiding them.

More than ever, airpower will depend on sharing data. Watch Sweden

A growing consensus holds that the future of airpower, and of defense technology in general, involves the interplay of crewed and uncrewed vehicles.

Such teaming means that more-numerous, less-costly, even expendable uncrewed vehicles can bring more weapons to the fight and force the adversary to deal with more targets. More-expensive and survivable crewed vehicles, meanwhile, can stand back, offering human supervision of the entire formation.

But none of that will work without maintaining real-time common operational pictures. Everyone and everything in a team needs to know what the others know—about each other and about the enemy.

One nation has longer experience in automatic sharing of data among aircraft. Thirty years ago, its interceptors could perform a radar-silent engagement by mind-melding the radars of two fighters tens of kilometres apart. Every pilot in a group of four aircraft knew the position, fuel state and remaining weapons of the other aircraft. For many years, this was one of the least reported stories in military aerospace (which was no accident).

What that nation is doing now is highly relevant to the crewed-and-uncrewed future. It isn’t the United States, Russia, France, Israel or Britain. It’s Sweden.

In a lobby on the Saab campus in Linkoping in southern Sweden, a blue-and-white mural of a spring sky covers one wall and extends across a white-framed door. Behind that door, Peter Nilsson, a former pilot of mighty JA 37 Viggen fighters, heads Saab’s low-profile future combat aircraft program.

Nilsson and his colleagues have been talking with growing confidence about plans for a Sweden-led future combat air system, now supported by contracts from Swedish procurement agency FMV. Saab chief executive Micael Johansson said in a 7 February earnings call that Saab expected to fly several uncrewed aircraft in the coming years.

Nilsson showed concepts in a Swedish TV interview in late 2024 that included a future piloted stealth fighter and a tailless stealth uncrewed aircraft with a striking resemblance to Saab’s J 35 Draken, the fighter that showed in the mid-1950s that Sweden’s aviation expertise was in the top tier.

Sweden’s knowledge of stealth today should likewise not be underrated. Saab has insisted that its current fighter, the JAS 39E/F Gripen, has a balance of reduced signature and countermeasures, though the company keeps details close. Its technology has roots in 1963 when, in a little-known deal, US Air Force stealth guru Bill Bahret traveled to Sweden and advised Saab on reducing the radar cross-section of the Viggen.

The final design for the Swedish system that’s in the works may not have been settled, but it’s leaning towards a combination of uncrewed and expendable systems, initially to extend the capabilities of the Gripen. Then a new crewed fighter would arrive in service after 2040.

In August, Saab acquired Blue Bear, a small British company specialising in the control and coordination of drone swarms. In earlier briefings, Saab has discussed putting elements of the JAS 39E/F’s electronic warfare system in a decoy based on the British Spear 3 missile.

That’s to say, pieces are being put together.

Saab’s long leadership in mission computers and datalinks demands attention to what it’s doing now. The first military aircraft with a central mission computer based on integrated circuits? The AJ 37 Viggen, first flight 1967.

Four decades later, Saab said that what was then the future Gripen (now JAS 39E/F) would have a mission computer partitioned from flight-critical systems, to make upgrading software easier and faster. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery: the architectures of the Northrop Grumman B-21 and the Rafale F4 followed Saab’s pattern.

History is in order when it comes to datalinks, too. The Swedish air force realised in the 1950s that Russian jammers about 400 kilometres from Sweden would make voice communications impossible. The J 35F Draken had a simple but robust ground-to-air datalink, and it was much more valuable if the bad guys did not know about it. Mentioning the datalink on the air was forbidden, and the datalink indicator in the cockpit was ingeniously disguised as a backup instrument. Even a friendly guest pilot would not know it was there.

The Viggen, replacing the Draken in 1979, had a four-ship link that was unrivaled until the F-22 entered service in 2005: it was far faster than NATO’s standard Link 16. Two JA 37s could use their radars in passive mode to perform a silent missile attack. The datalink made it possible to integrate the bearing and elevation from both aircraft in real time and generate a track precise enough for firing weapons.

The next-generation Gripen datalink added the ability to share fuel and weapons status and generate a common operational picture on the glass cockpit displays—20 years before a comparable capability arrived on the F-35.

Saab operations adviser Jussi Halmetoja brought the story up to date in a recent video.  ‘The big transitional change now, he said, is that ‘mission data is your greatest weapon—how you collect it, how you transform it, how you datalink it.’

Halmetoja describes the operation of a four-aircraft Gripen E/F formation: ‘Each aircraft has 40 different antennas, providing spherical passive detection, and every Gripen collects terabytes of data. You share the data at high rate across the four-ship to create situational awareness.’

Significantly, when you think of extending this philosophy to unmanned vehicles, the link-dependent functions are automated. The goal is a pilot who ‘trusts the system. Don’t go and do a lot of button-pressing’—for example, to control the radar of his or her own aircraft—‘because you can mess up the data fusion. The system monitors the track quality, and if it gets really bad it can use the active radar.’ But the algorithms driving the system will decide which aircraft’s radar to use in the group.

Halmetoja adds that ‘people raise their eyebrows when I say that every track is wrong, and every coordinate is wrong. It’s one of the greatest challenges.’ On the Gripen, to get the greatest possible fidelity, ‘we do the fusion at the lowest level, on the platform.’ (An earlier paper makes the point that this also reduces volume of traffic on the datalink.)

But there are still errors, says Halmetoja, ‘and to manage that you need networked smart weapons’ such as the MBDA Meteor ramjet-powered air-to-air missile. Those weapons need datalink support, but he adds that it does not have to come from the aircraft that fired the missile.

Saab produces the Gripen’s Arexis EW system, which uses the advanced technology of phased-array gallium-nitride antennas for precise tracking, jamming and deception. The company has long taken the view that electronic warfare and reduction of radar cross section are complementary, not alternatives, and that stealth is not a panacea.

Sweden has, for now, elected not to join either the British-Japanese-Italian Global Combat Aircraft Program or the parallel Franco-German-Spanish effort called FCAS. Says Nilsson: ‘The best solution for Sweden to create national ownership is that we do the same as with Gripen. That we have many partners, but that we decide on the design ourselves.’

Darwin is well-placed for an uncrewed systems hub

Australia often relies on overseas facilities for uncrewed systems’ maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), exposing the country to operational delays, escalating costs and potential security risks. To address this vulnerability, it should establish an MRO facility for uncrewed systems in Darwin.

Uncrewed systems, including drones, uncrewed aerial vehicles and uncrewed underwater vehicles, are transforming Australia’s defence, security and commercial sectors. They have a range of applications in defence operations, border security, environmental monitoring and industrial applications such as extraction of natural resources, including natural gas.

Darwin’s strategic location, existing infrastructure and proximity to major defence and commercial partners mean it is the ideal hub for maintaining these vital assets.

The city’s strategic significance, long recognised by Australia’s defence planners, makes it the natural location for a dedicated MRO facility. As the gateway to the Indo-Pacific, Darwin’s proximity to regional and global markets, particularly Asia, provides an unparalleled advantage for servicing domestic and international clients.

This places Darwin at the crossroads of Australia’s defence and commercial interests in the region, with clear benefits for its role as a logistics and maintenance hub for uncrewed systems. Furthermore, the city’s established infrastructure, including air and sea ports, rail connections and utilities, already supports large-scale defence operations and the growing defence footprint in the region, making it primed for expansion into a world-class MRO hub for uncrewed systems.

Australian uncrewed systems are largely serviced overseas, leaving them vulnerable to extended downtimes, longer repair times and increased risk in transportation. This reliance on foreign facilities compromises Australia’s operational readiness. It hampers the efficiency of industries, such as resource extraction, that rely heavily on uncrewed technology for monitoring, inspections and surveillance.

As the Australian Defence Force and commercial sectors increasingly deploy uncrewed systems, it is essential to ensure they can be maintained and repaired promptly to avoid delays in operations, whether they involve national security, disaster response or remote infrastructure management.

As uncrewed systems are central to the future of defence operations, creating an MRO facility in Darwin would strengthen Australia’s position as a key partner in the region, with the ability to service not only its own uncrewed systems but also those of allied nations. This strategic advantage would provide a competitive edge in defence readiness and international collaborations.

Moreover, Darwin’s potential MRO facility could support other government agencies, such as the Australian Federal Police, Home Affairs and the Australian Border Force. They all use uncrewed systems for surveillance, border protection and law enforcement.

The ability to rapidly repair and maintain these systems would improve agencies’ responsiveness and availability of capabilities, ensuring that they are always equipped to respond to emerging threats. Darwin could thus play a greater role in Australia’s broader security architecture, providing reliable, homegrown support to key domestic and international partners.

From a commercial perspective, establishing an MRO facility in Darwin would be commercially viable and a boon for local businesses.

With the growing demand for uncrewed systems in industries such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), telecommunications and mining, establishing a local MRO facility would significantly reduce the reliance on overseas service providers. This would cut transport costs and ensure faster turnaround of repairs, improving the operational efficiency of these industries.

It would also create a thriving commercial ecosystem around uncrewed systems in the Northern Territory. Local businesses would be able to engage with the growing global market for uncrewed systems, contributing to job creation and the region’s economic growth.

For this MRO facility to be commercially successful, it should be designed as a multi-use facility, capable of supporting not only defence and government sectors but also commercial enterprises. This approach would ensure financial sustainability through a diversified revenue stream.

Partnerships with commercial operators in the LNG, mining, and telecommunications sectors could provide steady demand for services.

Moreover, collaborations with international partners—such as the United States, Japan and other Indo-Pacific nations—could provide further opportunities for industry growth, turning Darwin into a regional centre for uncrewed system innovation and service.

Such collaborations could include joint research and development projects, knowledge sharing and training programs, further enhancing the facility’s global relevance.

Establishing an MRO facility in Darwin would have significant strategic, economic and operational benefits. It would enhance Australia’s defence readiness, reduce its reliance on overseas maintenance services and foster closer collaboration with key regional partners. A local MRO facility would strengthen Australia’s ability to respond to threats, contribute to the security of the Indo-Pacific region and support industries that rely on uncrewed systems.

By capitalising on Darwin’s strategic location, existing infrastructure and growing importance in regional security, Australia can establish a world-class facility that meets its future needs and reinforces its role as a key player in the Indo-Pacific.

Faster, please: the ADF needs to catch up on uncrewed-aircraft technologies

The rapidly deteriorating strategic environment necessitates a shift in defence strategies and capabilities. The Australian Defence Force (ADF), like many military forces globally, must acknowledge that uncrewed systems will play an important role in future conflicts. It must accelerate its processes for developing their capability.

Russia’s war against Ukraine and fighting in the Red Sea have demonstrated a rapid proliferation of high volume, low-cost technologies that are now indispensable on the battlefield. In light of this, the ADF should further develop and implement strategies for uncrewed aerial systems (UASs) and counter-uncrewed aerial systems (C-UASs).

These strategies should provide clear guidelines on accelerating ADF access to UASs across air, land and sea; investments in and collaboration with the UAS industry; defining roles of civil and military authorities; and ways to counter drone threats.

The 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and associated spending plan, the Integrated Investment Program, recognise the importance of enhancing Australia’s drone and counter-drone capabilities. The Defence Department does include UASs in ‘robotics, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence’, one of its sovereign industrial capability priorities, but this covers only limited aspects of UASs, not the technology’s full breadth of capability and the need for large-scale manufacturing. Moreover, there is no evidence of recently developed or released strategies specifically addressing UASs and C-UASs.

By contrast, Australia’s allies, including the United States, Britain, France and South Korea, have already developed or revised their strategies. These are based in part on observations of the use of drones in Ukraine and understanding the need to protect against them. For example, the US released a C-UAS strategy in early December. Britain launched a new UAS strategy in February 2024 highlighting clear directions for enhancing UAS capabilities and for spending for the next decade. The ADF can similarly provide clear directions to accelerate access to UASs and C-UAS across air, land and sea by developing its own strategies.

The NDS calls for integrating existing and emerging technologies and for boosting military-industrial capacity with secure supply chains. The war in Ukraine has shown that a country needs to develop its own supply chain, manufacturing capabilities and stocks. The Australian industry is highly skilled and capable of doing this, but it needs direction through clear policy guidelines.

The ADF must recognise the need to balance between investing in complex, highly capable systems and high-volume, low-cost technologies that can provide quick and simple solutions for a range of security challenges.

The Integrated Investment Program includes spending on a range of uncrewed and autonomous systems. The ADF plans to spend more than $10 billion on drones, with at least $4.3 billion on uncrewed aerial systems and $690 million on uncrewed tactical systems for the army.

So far, Australia’s spending on UASs has focused on complex aircraft, such as the Boeing MQ-28A Ghost Bat, designed to operate alongside crewed aircraft or to independently increase aircraft numbers in combat. The air force has begun receiving MQ-4C Tritons, an unarmed, high-altitude and long-endurance uncrewed aircraft.

The ADF will spend more than $100 million on 110 drones from the Australian manufacturers SYPAQ and Quantum-Systems. While it considers the delivery of the limited number of systems in 2025 to express ‘an intent to enhance at speed’, other nations spend far more on ensuring that warfighters have such systems and, most importantly, are protected against them.

It must also acknowledge that UASs with high-end capabilities are highly vulnerable and must be protected. The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that large UAS have become targets that are easy to detect and destroy. For example, TB2 Bayraktars, celebrated in 2022 for their performance, are no longer frequently used. Similarly, the Russian fleet has had to relocate from parts of the Black Sea due to drone threats, such as the one in November when Ukrainian drone boats motored over 1000km and blasted three Russian warships in one blow.

Furthermore, the government must better understand the relationship between civil and military authorities and their roles and responsibilities in counteracting UAS threats.

In peacetime, civil law enforcement agencies are responsible for defence against UAS, but responsibilities may overlap in relation to military installations and critical infrastructure. Moreover, civil agencies may require military support since only the armed forces have the equipment to detect, identify and engage UAS. The government must encourage close cooperation between civil and military organisations in order to maintain an effective level of interoperability.

Regardless of how the ADF develops its own UAS, it must prepare to defend against them. Every soldier must be aware of UAS threats, learn how to use a UAS, how to counter them for self-defence and to protect others and costly equipment. As UAS technologies evolve, so do C-UAS capabilities.

As evident from Russia’s war against Ukraine, the UAS are already threats, and they are here to stay. Australia must keep up with the rapid pace of innovation in this field. It needs to demonstrate commitment to stay ahead in the development of drone technology and ensure that its armed forces are prepared in the fast-changing security landscape.