Tag Archive for: Terrorism

India-Pakistan crisis: military operations intensify before ceasefire

The past 36 hours on the India-Pakistan front have been tumultuous. Where the confrontation is headed is unclear.

Although things seemed to be calming down early on Friday, May 9, intense developments followed. A series of attacks occurred on Friday and Saturday, though their sequence is difficult to disentangle. Then Donald Trump on Saturday announced a ceasefire that took effect at 5pm Indian time on that day.

Before it did, escalating attacks by both sides had targeted civilian and military sites. Pakistani aircraft and drone attacks had spread from Kashmir as far south as Gujarat. Most attacks have been closer to the border, by artillery and short-range drones. The most intense seem to have come in the Kashmir region in Jammu, though Indian officials named around 26 locations that had been targeted.

The ceasefire has reportedly been violated. As of this writing on Sunday morning, both sides appear to be re-establishing it. Whether this will lead to further talks on any substantive issue is unclear. Though the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested this might happen, India has ruled out more substantive talks, at least for the time being.

Casualties do not appear to have been heavy. A senior official of the Jammu and Kashmir state was killed in his home in Jammu, but there is no reason to think he was specifically targeted.

There is some confusion about a series of attacks on Amritsar, a city in the Indian Punjab that is the centre of the Sikh religion. A very late-night Pakistani military briefing on Thursday suggested that several ballistic missile attacks had hit Amritsar, but no more has been heard of this.

The most serious Pakistani attack was by a Fateh-1 missile that seems either to have targeted an Indian air force base in Sirsa, near Delhi, or to have targeted Delhi and, as social media posts suggest, been intercepted at Sirsa. If it was fired at Sirsa, the reason for attacking just one Indian air base is unclear.

Though the sequence remains uncertain, India also launched a series of attacks on Pakistani air bases, including Rafiqui, Murid, Chaklala and Rahim Yar Khan. Most notably, another was Nur Khan air base, outside Islamabad. Hitting it may have been intended not to achieve an operational effect but to send a signal to the Pakistani high command. Combat aircraft are not thought to have been at this base. It is used mainly for transportation, including for government officials.

Two other air bases that India targeted are thought to be those of Pakistan’s China-built fighters. Since the fighting began, Pakistan has said it has shot down five Indian aircraft, including three Dassault Rafale fighters from France. US officials have told Reuters that a China-built Chengdu J-10 fighter shot down at least two Indian aircraft on the night of May 7, of which at least one was a Rafale. India has acknowledged no aircraft losses.

Much later on Friday, there were reports that India had attacked Pakistan’s Sargodha air base complex. Pakistan is thought to store nuclear weapons at Sargodha.

Because we don’t know which attacks followed which, we cannot say which, if any, was a retaliation for another. Second, we do not know how exactly they were carried out. Some presumably used missiles or drones, because there is no indication that combat aircraft on either side have crossed the border to make attacks. Even air-to-air firing could conceivably have occurred from one side of the border to the other.

Third, there is considerable confusion about some attacks, particularly on the Sirsa and Nur Khan air bases.

As well as pilots apparently keeping on their own sides of the border, there is no indication of involvement by ground forces except for firing across the border and the Line of Control in Kashmir. No involvement by naval forces is evident.

But the intensity of attacks in the day before the ceasefire was far greater than anybody had expected, especially as the situation seemed to have been winding down on Thursday.

Fighting was sufficiently serious to prompt a global reaction. The G7 countries put out a joint statement calling for de-escalation, and few hours later, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the chief of staff of the Pakistan Army, General Asim Munir, and Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar.

Before Rubio acted, the US had indicated that it would not intervene, with Vice President JD Vance saying that the India-Pakistan confrontation was ‘fundamentally none of our business.’

There are also reports that Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan has talked to the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers. China has also urged restraint on both sides.

Where the situation will move from here is unclear—especially whether the ceasefire will hold. Not just two countries are involved; there are also non-state terror groups on Pakistan’s side of the border.

But neither India nor Pakistan wants to antagonise Trump. That will encourage them to move cautiously.

India and Pakistan must manage escalation after Pahalgam attack

India has launched a retaliatory strike against the Pakistan-based groups responsible for a terrorist attack in Indian Kashmir two weeks ago.

The Indian government released a press statement announcing that the armed forces had launched Operation Sindoor in the early hours of 7 May. The operation targeted terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. According to the Indian government, nine terrorist sites were hit.

The government also noted that it has engaged in a ‘focused, measured and non-escalatory’ manner to ensure that the strikes were controlled. The statement also outlined that India exercised ‘considerable restraint in selection of targets and method of execution’ and didn’t target any Pakistani military facilities.

After the strikes, India briefed the US, British, United Arab Emirates and Russian governments.

The strikes were retaliation for a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Indian Kashmir, in which 25 Indians and one Nepali civilian were killed. Previous major terrorist attacks in Kashmir in 2016 and 2019 targeted Indian security forces. The Pahalgam attack, however, specifically targeted civilians, resulting in widespread anger in India and leading the government to respond.

According to initial reports, the Pahalgam terror attack was carried out by the relatively unknown Kashmir Resistance Front, which India maintains is a proxy for the better-known Pakistan-backed terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba. While it is unclear which group was responsible, the fact that it was a Pakistan-based group—with extensive support from Pakistan military—is undisputed.

This is not the first time that India and Pakistan have engaged in such clashes. In the past decade, India has suffered two major terrorist attacks resulting in retaliatory strikes against Pakistan. For a long time, India has struggled to develop an effective response to Pakistan’s use of cross-border terrorism as a state policy. Such attacks are clearly designed to keep India off-balance, but India’s response has also slowly become harsher.

Traditionally, India hasn’t responded with military force. The December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi led to a military mobilisation, but no clashes. In 2008, the Indian government ruled out any military response to the terrorist attack on Mumbai. But the September 2016 Uri terrorist attack, which targeted an Indian army infantry base and killed 18 Indian soldiers, led to a change in India’s response. This attack came in the wake of another major terror attack in January 2016 on the Indian air force base in Pathankot. After two major strikes, the Indian leadership was presented with a dilemma, and it responded with what was called a ‘surgical strike’—a commando attack—on Pakistani terror hideouts.

In 2019, India suffered another major terrorist attack in Pulwama, killing dozens of Central Reserve Police Force personnel. This showed Pakistan escalating the strikes, not only in scale; it was also an escalation in messaging, considering the bold, open claim by Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based terrorist group, that it carried out the terror strikes. Worried that its 2016 surgical strikes didn’t have the necessary deterrence effect, India escalated, launching air strikes on a terrorist base in Balakot, Pakistan. This was the first time that Indian combat planes had attacked Pakistani territory since the 1971 India-Pakistan war.

This radical shift was the result of India’s conclusion that non-military measures were having no effect on Pakistan. India had previously responded to terrorist attacks with diplomatic punishment, including curtailing talks or limiting diplomatic interaction with Pakistan. In addition, New Delhi usually sought international diplomatic pressure to constrain Pakistan. Such policy measures failed to change Pakistan’s policy on state-sponsored terrorism. India’s lack of effective and forceful options led Pakistan to dangerously misread India’s possible responses.

Now that India has carried out retaliatory strikes on Pakistan, there is a strong likelihood that Pakistan will respond in some limited fashion to satisfy its domestic constituency. But it is highly unlikely that the two sides will intentionally escalate the current crisis to a prolonged series of clashes.

Though both states are nuclear-armed powers, nuclear weapons are unlikely to play any direct role in these clashes. Nevertheless, given their proximity to one another, one cannot rule out escalation dynamics. Pakistan will likely try to leverage this, invoking such scenarios to put international diplomatic pressure on India. This may have worked in previous conflicts, but as tensions heighten globally, foreign powers are unlikely to be as invested in talking the two sides down.

Australia’s quiet counterterrorism wins are being missed. That’s a problem

In early April, Victorian Supreme Court Justice James Elliot ruled that Abdul Nacer Benbrika—Australia’s most notorious terrorist and the architect of a planned mass-casualty attack on the Melbourne Cricket Ground in 2005—continued to pose an ‘unacceptable risk’ to Australians.

Yet this ruling generated almost no media coverage or political commentary.

Australians live in one of the safest countries in the world, but they are vulnerable to a profound misperception: that terrorism is either a thing of the past or a threat that only matters in moments of crisis. It’s easy to see why when updates to major terrorist cases such as Benbrika’s receive little public attention. Selective national attention undermines our understanding of risk, our confidence in the government, and our preparedness for a persistent and evolving challenge.

Australia’s National Terrorism Threat Level remains at Probable. In other words, credible intelligence indicates that individuals or groups have the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia. Yet counterterrorism barely features in political discourse or media headlines unless there’s blood on the pavement.

Elliot determined that while Benbrika appears to have adopted a non-violent ideology, any apparent change is recent and fragile. There is still a risk that Benbrika may radicalise others to religiously inspired violence.

Notably, the court placed further restrictions on Benbrika through a new extended supervision order (ESO), aiming to improve community safety and facilitate his rehabilitation. This demonstrated our comprehensive counterterrorism system at work.

The media silence speaks volumes. In an era when the threat of terrorism has become more diffuse but no less real, the absence of meaningful public engagement is a dangerous gap in national security strategy. Australia must not only manage terrorism—it must do so visibly and explain its counterterrorism actions.

Since 2000, Australia has developed one of the world’s most robust and nuanced counterterrorism systems. Few nations have evolved such a sophisticated toolkit from legislative frameworks to operational coordination. This system enables post-sentencing controls such as continuing detention orders (CDOs) and ESOs—extraordinary legal mechanisms designed to manage high-risk terrorist offenders. But their use is rarely explained to the public, leaving them hidden in the bureaucratic background.

That’s a mistake. When it comes to maintaining community confidence, perception matters. If the public only hears about terrorism during moments of tragedy or controversy, fear is reinforced and trust is eroded. Communicating security successes, like the most recent ESO against Benbrika, helps build national resilience.

Post-sentencing controls are not punitive tools used recklessly. They are evidence-based, court-approved measures governed by rigorous legal thresholds. In Benbrika’s case, the state has applied a CDO and multiple ESOs since 2020. These measures reflect a cold truth—some offenders may not deradicalise, or at least not in the timeframe required to ensure public safety.

The most recent ESO, imposed on 8 April, followed a disturbing pattern of behaviour. Despite earlier psychological assessments suggesting progress, Benbrika’s communications—uncovered through police surveillance—told a different story. Police uncovered conversations with extremist associates; discussions of blasphemy, bullets and declaring others as infidels; and evidence that Benbrika had deliberately deceived his caseworkers. These all revealed a calculated attempt to mask continued radical intent.

While complicated by issues of due process, psychologist Andrew Ellis’s analysis concluded that a risk management approach, including an ESO, surveillance and an extended firearm prohibition order, remained necessary to address the risks Benbrika posed.

The Australian Federal Police provided evidence in court, including Benbrika’ s communications with criminal offender Joshua Clavell, his former co-conspirator Aimen Joud, and extremist preacher Wissam Haddad. The AFP findings were particularly damning and demonstrated the ongoing national security risks.

The system is precisely designed to combine expert assessment and surveillance evidence—layering intelligence, expertise and legal oversight to ensure that liberty is only restricted when justified.

But this sophisticated response drew little attention. There was no ministerial press release, no media explanation of how Australia’s system protected the public without breaching human rights, and no effort to reaffirm to Australians that their safety is underpinned by one of the most mature counterterrorism regimes in the world.

This matters because public safety is both real and perceived. If Australians are unaware of the capabilities quietly protecting them, they are more likely to feel vulnerable and susceptible to panic during hoaxes or misinformation events, such as the Dural caravan case in January.

Australia doesn’t need to just manage terrorism; it needs to explain how it does so. The Attorney-General’s Department, state governments and political leaders must start telling these stories—not to breed fear but to build trust. The aim is not to politicise terrorism, but to create awareness that the system is functioning, adaptive and focused on prevention.

This communication gap is not new, but it is widening. The Wakeley church stabbing in April 2024 was a rare moment where the public was forced to reckon with the enduring reality of extremist violence. In contrast, legal decisions such as Benbrika’s ESO go unnoticed, even though they reflect pre-emptive, legally sound and publicly beneficial action.

Australia’s counterterrorism strategy must go beyond intelligence and law enforcement to include strategic communication. When orders such as ESOs and CDOs are implemented, authorities should explain why the decision was made, how the process protects civil liberties and what it says about the evolving threat landscape.

We have the legislative architecture and the operational capability. We now need the political courage to speak to the public—not only when things go wrong, but also when they go right. Politicians and officials responsible for counterterrorism should be transparent with the Australian public. They should clearly communicate the threat that actors such as Benbrika pose, while also providing confidence that countermeasures are in place.

Because the next time we face a real terrorist threat, it will not be enough to have done the work behind closed doors. The public must already believe that the system works, that the threat is being managed, and that national security is a shared responsibility—not a last-minute scramble.

If we fail to tell that story now, we risk losing the public’s trust when it matters most.

From home to horror: the association between domestic violence and terrorism

Domestic violence is an under-recognised early indicator of terrorism. It is not a reliable solitary indicator, but when observed alongside risk factors, it can prompt authorities to take a closer look at a potential terrorist.

So far as can be demonstrated so far by data, the connection is correlative, not causative: the two behaviours overlap. But knowing this is still valuable. Recognising the link could enhance public safety and national security.

Research from the UK’s Project Starlight shines a light on this issue. In 2019, an analysis of 3045 individuals referred to the Prevent program—designed to prevent extremism—revealed that more than a third had a link to domestic abuse, either as victims, perpetrators, or witnesses. This figure is far above the general population’s 5.7 percent rate of domestic abuse.

Alarmingly, many of those referred were victims or witnesses of domestic violence, not perpetrators.

Studies in Pakistan have also found that individuals who experienced domestic abuse were more likely to gravitate toward extremist ideologies. The study looked at 562 young people aged 16 to 25 and found a clear link between growing up with domestic violence and later supporting extremist beliefs.

So, we should think of domestic violence as a risk factor in someone’s conversion to violent extremism, just as doctors know that some things point to a risk of disease even though medical research hasn’t yet found out why.

Two examples, among many that could be cited, illustrate the association. Omar Mateen, who carried out the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, had a history of domestic violence. His violent behaviour toward his ex-wife included physical and verbal abuse. Likewise, Khalid Masood, who was responsible for the  2017 Westminster attack in London, had a record of abusive behaviour toward his partners.

Though the data does not show a causative relationship, we can reasonably theorise on the drivers. Research shows that domestic violence and radicalisation are both promoted by a deep need for control and identity—things extremist groups readily exploit. Survivors of domestic abuse, especially those who experienced trauma in childhood, often find these needs unmet in their lives. By searching for belonging and purpose, they become targets for groups that promise power, community and meaning. Recognising this is the first step towards intervening.

Central to both domestic violence and terrorism is moral disengagement—the process by which perpetrators view their harmful actions as necessary or justified. Whether it’s in the home or through terrorist acts, violence is rationalised as a legitimate tool to exert power and control.

In Australia, positive steps are being taken to address each issue. Though they are not coordinated with each other, they happen to align. The National Plan to End Violence Against Women and Children (2022-2032) addresses domestic violence and gender-based violence, with an understanding of the complex social and psychological drivers at play. The plan is a vital first step in reducing violence and promoting the wellbeing of all Australians. Similarly, the Living Safe Together initiative aims to prevent violent extremism and provides support for individuals at risk of radicalisation.

While these efforts remain separate, they share strikingly similar goals. Both recognise the underlying trauma and vulnerability that can fuel violent behaviour—whether in the form of domestic abuse or extremism. Early intervention, community support and collaborative efforts between social services and national security agencies are core elements of both programs.

Australia should pursue a more coordinated approach—one that treats the prevention of domestic violence and radicalisation as complementary goals. Law enforcement, social services and national security agencies should collaborate to identify early warning signs of vulnerability and intervene before individuals are drawn into extremist ideologies.

 

This article has been corrected to say that research shows domestic violence and radicalisation are promoted by a need for control and identity. It has also been corrected to say that separate policies addressing domestic violence and risks of radicalisation are not coordinated with each other.

Stopping anti-Semitic terrorism in Australia

In the next six months there is a greater than 50 per cent chance of a terrorist attack being planned and possibly carried out in Australia. The Director-General of Security told us so on August 5, 2024, when the terrorist threat level was raised to “probable”. The Jewish Australian community has every right to be gravely concerned that Jewish people and places, such as synagogues, might be the targets of such an attack. That this is even a possibility should shock all Australians.

We can be very confident that ASIO, the AFP, state and territory police and other agencies will do everything in their power to stop such an attack. However, history shows that while many terrorist attacks are stopped, some attempts succeed. Afterwards, commissions of inquiry typically find that governmental structures and processes were deficient, responsibilities were not clearly assigned, and information flows had broken down. Those were the lessons, for instance, of the institutional failures that occurred in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks.

We must not minimise the gravity of this situation by thinking that this threat has little to do with the lives of Australians generally. Were a mass casualty terrorist attack to occur, perhaps on the scale of the bombing of the Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires in July 1994, which killed 85 people, Australia would never be the same again afterwards. Our idea of Australia as being a peaceful and cohesive society would be transformed overnight, for the worst.

The federal government is charged with the defence of the nation, the protection of its sovereignty, and the maintenance of the “peace, order, and good government” of the commonwealth, the latter phrase being contained in the Constitution. If the government fails in any of these first duties of state, no amount of success in other fields will protect it from condemnation, today and in history’s enduring judgment.

While police and security intelligence officers, and other officials, have to grapple at the operational coalface with the complex challenge of counter-terrorism work, it is the government that has the higher and prior responsibility to prevent matters developing to the point where the nation is being riven by polarisation and social fractures, and where there is a risk that hateful beliefs might be acted upon through terroristic violence.

As in war, countering terrorism requires active and involved ministerial leadership, and the wielding of the power of ministerial office to ensure that institutional failures are remedied before tragedy strikes, and not in the aftermath.

In counter-terrorism work, it is vitally important that the architecture of roles and responsibilities is clear, especially in a federation, that governmental structures reflect this clarity, that functions are distributed accordingly, and that there is integration and unity of effort across agencies and jurisdictions. Institutional failures are more likely to occur when the assignment of roles and responsibilities lacks clarity. Reporting lines become tangled. Information flows are impaired. Coherence of effort breaks down.

At the most foundational level, it is not even clear who is the lead federal minister of the government. Under the current Administrative Arrangements Order, the document that sets out the responsibilities of ministerial departments of state, the responsibility for “law enforcement policy and operations” is vested with the Attorney-General, while the responsibility for “national security policy and operations” is vested with the Minister for Home Affairs. So, who is the minister for counter-terrorism?

This blurring of responsibilities, and the associated transfer since May 2022 of the AFP, other law enforcement agencies, and then ASIO from the Home Affairs ministry to the Attorney-General’s, were retrograde steps. They unravelled the clarity and unification of effort that had been put in place by the Turnbull government in December 2017, when the Department of Home Affairs was established in its modern form. Were there to be a major terrorist attack, this blurring of responsibilities, and the consequential weakening of the nation’s counter-terrorism machinery, would be key exhibits in any resultant commission of inquiry.

In the same way that the Minister for Defence would be expected to take the day-to-day lead in matters of war – and we would not have separate ministers for the navy, the army, and the air force pulling in different directions – the Minister for Home Affairs should lead in all matters of domestic security and federal law enforcement. The minister should have “authority over the whole scene”, as Winston Churchill used to say.

Sound arrangements were in place during the period December 2017 to May 2022, when the minister, the department, and ASIO, the AFP, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and AUSTRAC were able to work together as a cohesive team, with the minister having “authority over the whole scene”.

This is not a theoretical claim. It was our lived experience. The relevant machinery of government was integrated. Information flows were seamless. Effort was unified. Australia was safer.

In the absence of a senior minister having such authority, and the information, so that they are able to set strategic directions and to give lawful directions as might be necessary, too much of the burden of accountability in counter-terrorism is being borne by officers who, while being highly diligent and resolutely determined in their work, are not charged with being accountable to the parliament, and the people.

Only an empowered minister who has full command of all of the facts of an evolving situation can probe, question, nudge and – at times – overrule, subject to having the legal authority to do so.

This is the basis for the successful governance of Operation Sovereign Borders. It is how we would fight a war. Why is counter-terrorism being treated differently? It should not be.

Here is what needs to be done, without delay. These measures might strike the reader as being concerned with technical matters of governmental machinery. They are. Getting the machinery and processes of counter-terrorism right keeps us safe, and it is precisely these matters that any future commission of inquiry into a major terrorist attack would have to examine in painstaking detail.

First, the AAO should be amended this afternoon, assigning explicit ministerial responsibility for counter-terrorism to the Minister for Home Affairs. Accompanying instructions should be issued, also this afternoon, to the Director-General of Security and the AFP Commissioner directing them to report to the minister with immediate effect. In due course, the Department of Home Affairs should be reconstituted fully.

Second, the Prime Minister, consulting with first ministers, should declare the existence of a National Terrorist Situation, under the provisions of the National Counter-Terrorism Plan. That plan is the agreed national arrangement for dealing with terrorism, and it should be fully activated, without the government waiting for an attack to succeed. Some might quibble that a “terrorist incident” has not yet occurred. Let them. They can answer before the judgment of history.

The declaration of an NTS would open the way for the commonwealth to assume full strategic leadership of the overall anti-Semitism effort.

The states and territories have vital supporting roles to play in this regard, as they would in any national crisis. However, the severity of the situation has reached a point where the commonwealth now has to lead. Imagine no one bothering to tell Churchill in 1940 that German-speaking parachutists had landed in Sussex, because detective chief superintendent Foyle had the matter in hand!

Had the recent caravan bomb plot succeeded, it would have been an attack on Australia, not an attack on an individual state.

Accordingly, and third, the government should immediately establish a multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional taskforce within the Centre for Counter-Terrorism Co-ordination in the Department of Home Affairs. This should include state and territory officials. The taskforce should be led by the commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator within Home Affairs. The office of Co-ordinator was established in the wake of the Martin Place siege of December 2014, and the subsequent review that was undertaken of Australia’s counter-terrorism machinery.

The taskforce should be built around these three missions: “prevent and protect” (led by Home ­Affairs); “intelligence” (led by ASIO, working with the AFP, ACIC, AUSTRAC, and other intelligence agencies); and “disruption” (led by the AFP, working with ASIO and state and territory police). This model would mirror the successful Operation Sovereign Borders model that has been in place since late 2013, with a key additional element being the integration of state and territory police, who would retain primacy for the investigation of offending that was related to state and territory laws, under the umbrella of the disruption mission.

The “battle rhythm” of the taskforce should be driven by the provision by the co-ordinator of a daily situation report to the minister, which would provide him with the latest information regarding the threat picture and the operational situation. Nothing more focuses the mind of officers than the need to work to the steady beat of ministerial oversight. This is what happens in war, and in other domestic security crises such as dealing with illegal boat arrivals. It should drive action here too. The report should be suitably classified and constructed such that those few with a comprehensive need to know everything would be able to be fully informed, while those with a lesser need to know would be informed of only those matters that fell within their responsibility. On advice, but in the end exercising his own judgment, the minister should decide what should be said publicly, and when – always balancing the obligation to inform and reassure the public with the imperative to protect operations.

Fourth, national cabinet should agree to the establishment of a national crisis committee of relevant state and territory ministers, to be led by the Minister for Home Affairs. This committee should meet weekly, or more frequently as might be necessary. It would provide a regular opportunity for the co-ordinator and others to brief ministers, and to act as required on any collective decisions that they might take. National cabinet should be primed to meet urgently, as circumstances require it.

Fifth, the co-ordinator should develop a strategy for a national community engagement campaign, in consultation with commonwealth departments and agencies, the first secretaries of the states and territories, the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, and others with particular expertise in the field. Special Anti-Semitism Envoy Jillian Segal should be appointed to be the principal strategic adviser to the co-ordinator and the taskforce in this and all other regards, while retaining her direct reporting line to the Prime Minister and the Home Affairs Minister. She should be given special intelligence and other briefings so she can better perform her functions.

Drawing on the best practice in countering violent extremism, and combatinganti-Semitism, including by way of better Holocaust education, the aim of the campaign would be to counter the very particular and pernicious narratives and ideologies that underpin and sustain anti-Jewish hatred.

Success in this regard will not be achieved by generalised anti-racism and anti-discrimination efforts, and well-meaning pleas for the maintenance of social cohesion, as important as these are. Anti-Semitism has to be countered specifically at the level of narrative and ideology, having regard to the particulars of this ancient hatred. Such a campaign should expose and challenge anti-Jewish tropes, memes, conspiracy narratives, signifiers, and so on. It would have to be mounted across a wide array of social media platforms, and it would ideally involve prominent Australians, including faith leaders, calling out this hatred, and standing with Jewish Australians.

Sixth, the taskforce should work with technology companies and other data providers to generate a better online “dragnet” of anti-­Semitic content, built on more powerful, lawful AI-assisted searches for such material, to address the data problems that were recently identified by Mike Kelly in these pages.

A better “dragnet” would generate more leads for intelligence and investigative work, support takedown efforts by the eSafety Commissioner, and assist in the shaping and targeting of the community engagement campaign.

Seventh, the co-ordinator, working in conjunction with the commonwealth Department of Education and the vice-chancellors of universities, should prepare a plan for the minister’s consideration on making our universities safe for Jewish staff and students. Some universities have become hotbeds of hatred. This should not be tolerated. Perpetrators should be dealt with decisively. Sit-ins and encampments should be shut down. This is not an issue of free speech. It is intimidation that has no place in civil discourse.

Eighth, the minister should convene an urgent meeting of the Five Country Ministerial grouping, which brings together the security ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Britain and the US. This forum has worked very effectively to crack tough domestic security and public safety issues, doing so on the basis of the very highly classified intelligence that is shared among the Five Eyes partners. The Five Country Ministerial group should focus especially on the foreign state and other actors who are almost certainly operating in the shadows to seed and amplify anti-Jewish hatred. Special attention should be paid to Iran, which has a record of sponsoring attacks against Jewish people and places around the world. The FBI and MI5 warned of the threat of Iranian-backed terrorism in the immediate wake of the October 7 attack on Israel.

Ninth, the minister should reassure himself that effective plans are in place to deal with mass casualty bombing attacks, active shooter contingencies, siege/hostage recovery situations, and car-ramming attacks. With the Minister for Defence, he should satisfy himself that the call-out arrangements under Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act are in order, and that the ADF’s Tactical Assault Groups can be quickly deployed.

He should also instruct the co-ordinator to ensure that the guidance for the protection of crowded places, schools and places of worship is current, and has been promulgated effectively to the Jewish community, and to the owners and controllers of relevant physical places. Similarly, access to dangerous chemicals and explosives should be reviewed and tightened as required, and preparations made for the lawful deployment of counter-drone capabilities at certain locations, to defend against drone-mounted attacks.

Finally, the minister should direct Home Affairs to expedite the cancellation on character grounds of the visas of any non-citizens who espouse extremist anti-Semitic viewpoints. A new ministerial direction to decision-makers should be promulgated to ensure that consistently decisive decisions are being taken in this regard.

These measures have a single theme. We know, from the findings of commissions of inquiry, terrorist attacks are more likely to occur where there has been a failure of central co-ordination and direction, a fragmentation of effort, and a breakdown in information flows.

What is suggested here could be set in motion this afternoon. Doing so would not reflect any criticism of officials, and certainly not of the operational teams who are doing their job. However, they do not bear the onerous burden of being responsible for “the whole scene”. That charge falls to the government, which also needs to do its job.

As antisemitism strains Australian social cohesion, the government must step forward

Australia’s national resilience and social cohesion are under strain, with the most visible cracks seen in the alarming rise of antisemitism. Governments, most particularly the federal government, whose responsibility it is to lead national debates, desperately need to engage more forthrightly with the Australian public.

The discovery in Dural of a caravan containing explosives and, reportedly, an antisemitic message and the addresses of a synagogue and other Jewish buildings, is the latest shock that will heighten anxiety in Australia’s Jewish community and further inflame public tension.

We can give police some benefit of the doubt that they had operational reasons for secrecy about the caravan, but these decisions must be balanced against the need to confront the underlying problems of extremism and hatred, and to reassure Australians that we have national leaders who are facing up to them. If our politicians had been leading the conversations that we need, there would be greater goodwill for understanding operational decisions, rather than the fraying patience that we are seeing.

Instead of confronting extremism, radicalisation and the growing influence of ideological violence, policymakers have retreated into reticence, offering platitudes that fail to give the public confidence or deter those who seek to cause harm. This absence of leadership is a communications failure and a strategic miscalculation that threatens social cohesion and national security.

The federal government’s reluctance to educate and inform the public about terrorism and extremism is fuelling uncertainty and fear. Security agencies such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police play a vital role in countering threats, but their mandate is to act once the danger has escalated to the level of criminality and national security risk.

The broader responsibility—explaining the ideological drivers of extremism, reinforcing shared values, and setting clear boundaries of acceptable conduct—belongs to the government. Yet, time and again, the government has abdicated this duty, preferring to let ASIO’s annual threat assessment stand as the only authoritative voice on extremism in Australia. That is not enough. National security is not just about neutralising threats but about preventing them from taking root in the first place.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hardly lifted anyone’s morale when speaking defensively about the discovery of the caravan during two radio interviews on Thursday morning. On ABC radio, he failed to mention antisemitism at all. He refused to say when he’d learnt about it, describing that as ‘operational details’, and refused to say whether the national cabinet had discussed the investigation. Most of his commentary was about what the police had said and done. The closest he gave to an expression of the government’s view was by saying: ‘We remain concerned about this escalation.’

It wasn’t until a press conference later in the day that Albanese said, unprompted, that there was ‘zero tolerance in Australia for hatred and for antisemitism’ and that he wanted ‘any perpetrators to be hunted down and locked up’.

One of the core failures underpinning this crisis is a misinterpretation of tolerance. Australia prides itself on being an open and inclusive society, but inclusivity does not mean tolerating the intolerable. Support for terrorist leaders and groups is not free speech, nor is it a legitimate expression of diversity—it is a direct threat to social stability. When governments fail to call this out unequivocally, they enable a dangerous dynamic by which extremists feel emboldened, and the broader population grows resentful and anxious. An anxious public is not a resilient one.

While the rising cost of living is at the forefront of most Australians’ minds, physical and social security must remain the government’s highest priority. People need to feel safe, and that safety is reinforced not just by policing, but by clear, decisive leadership.

The government’s approach—avoiding public discussion for fear of inflaming tensions—belongs to a bygone era. Excessive reticence was a flawed strategy even before social media, but now, in an age in which digital communications dominate every aspect of our lives, it is a liability.

Government hesitancy leaves a vacuum that is filled by those who want society to break. Without direct and frequent public engagement, we give ground to those who distort facts, push dangerous ideologies and promote violence.

ASIO head Mike Burgess was left swinging in the breeze last September after he told the ABC that the organisation assessed entrants to Australia for any national security risk, which might not cover someone who had only expressed ‘rhetorical support’ for Hamas. Amid the political controversy that followed, the government should have swung in quickly and stressed that the wider visa check would, of course, include rhetorical support for Hamas but that this wasn’t ASIO’s job. That failed to happen, leading to days of public anger and confusion.

Equally dangerous is the government’s willingness to indulge in false equivalencies. Responding to attacks on Jewish Australians by condemning ‘all forms of hate’ or vaguely mentioning ‘antisemitism and Islamophobia’ is both politically weak and strategically harmful. Each act of violence or intimidation should be condemned for what it is—without hedging, without lumping disparate issues together, and without fear of offending those who sympathise with extremists.

This failure of clarity extends to the review of Australia’s terrorism laws, where there is discussion about removing the requirement for an ideological motive. Instead of diluting definitions, the government should lead the discussion on what ideology is, why it matters, and how it fuels extremism.

The government’s refusal to deal with reality is at the heart of this crisis. There is no neutral ground when it comes to national security. Attempting to placate all sides by responding too slowly and downplaying threats only emboldens those who seek to justify intimidation and violence.

Everyone accepts that history and geopolitics are complex—not least in the Middle East—but there is no justification for bringing foreign conflicts onto Australian streets. Like it or not, the federal government’s faltering responses have facilitated a false equivalence between Israel and Islamist terrorist groups, emboldening extremists who now see Australia as a battleground for their ideological struggles.

Australians can see the world is unstable and don’t appreciate being dismissed or misled. The government’s failure to engage honestly is backfiring. Public trust erodes when people feel their concerns are ignored, and social cohesion weakens without leadership. To maintain our national resilience, the government must step up, speak clearly and reassert the values that make Australia a safe and united society. Silence is not a strategy—it’s a surrender.

Silence from Canberra on threat to national security

They say silence breeds contempt but the reticence of the Australian government about national security threats is more akin to the quote attributed to Dietrich Bonhoeffer when resisting Nazi Germany: that ‘silence in the face of evil is itself evil’.

The government is not responsible for individual violent incidents across our cities, but it is responsible for informing, reassuring and protecting the public. Yet the current malaise of leadership is feeding anxiety and infecting the social cohesion that has stood Australia apart from much of the world despite decades of global terrorism and conflict.

Australia remained united in the face of terrorist plots from al-Qaeda, attacks by ISIS, wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan, the malicious rise of China, and Russia’s war in Europe. But we are cracking; rising anti-Semitism and national fear shows domestic division is even more insidious than international incidents.

The government’s systemic abdication of responsibility, cloaked in silence and evasive justifications, is not a one-off relating to the caravan plot against Australia’s Jewish community but a troubling trend, exemplified by the tactic of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and ministers only commenting if asked by media and, even then, answering with non-statements.

Australians are not naive. We understand the need for operational secrecy in matters of national security and that classified intelligence should not be divulged lightly. But ‘operational details’ cannot be a catch-all excuse to deflect legitimate scrutiny or hide truth.

Uncertainty breeds fear so governments must be on the front foot. Almost within the hour of Japan bombing Pearl Harbor, US president Franklin Roosevelt was instructing his press secretary to immediately inform the media. While not comparable events, the principle is key: keep the public informed and confident that its government is in control even in the most challenging times—even more important in the digital age.

Albanese’s refusal to address questions about the explosives-laden caravan, due to ‘ongoing investigations’, added to confusion, anxiety and speculation. A stonewalled public is not a secure one. Similarly, his reluctance to clarify whether he discussed China’s sonar pulse attack on Australian navy personnel in a meeting with Xi Jinping just days after the incident in November 2023, citing the confidentiality of diplomatic talks, simply resulted in doubt and more questions.

While discretion in diplomacy is essential, selective silence is inconsistent given the broad topics of leaders’ meetings, if not the exact words, are usually published, and suggested he just didn’t want to admit he had inexcusably failed to raise the matter.

Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s handling of the case of Yang Hengjun, the Australian arbitrarily detained in China, is equally disconcerting—failing to even acknowledge on 19 January Yang’s sixth year of detention, and previously insisting on being ‘constrained for privacy reasons’, despite Yang’s own desire for public advocacy. Hiding behind the veil of privacy appears less about protecting Yang’s interests and more about protecting the government’s.

This week marks one year since Beijing sentenced Yang to death so a comprehensive condemnation and demand for release is required. Similarly, Wong omitted to mention China in her readout of January’s discussions with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in contrast to Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya’s honesty that China was a central part of his meeting with Rubio.

Meanwhile, when asked about the United States and European countries reviewing the security risk of Chinese-made smart cars, Energy Minister Chris Bowen said no such review would happen here as the priority was consumer choice. On that basis, we’d welcome Russian gas or perhaps Iranian nuclear know-how, not to mention that prioritising price now will mean consumers in the future will have few choices but Chinese-made smart cars.

The pattern of evading, ignoring or downplaying security threats is itself a security threat. It erodes public trust—and cynicism can quickly turn to conspiracy. It creates an information vacuum to be filled by conspiracy theories and speculation, leading not just to an uninformed but a misinformed public. And it has the potential to weaken Australia’s strategic position by reducing the confidence of our allies and increasing that of our rivals.

We’ve seen it before. The flood of illegal boats from 2008 and refusal to acknowledge pull factors created not only a backlash against illegal immigration but reduced confidence in legal immigration and emboldened criminal organisations. It was only by being upfront about the illegal immigration problem that confidence was restored in Australia’s strength as a migration nation.

Importantly, division is distinct from difference. Different opinions, including on world leaders or policies, are to be promoted as the basis of freedom of speech. But support for terrorist groups and acts of intimidation and violence are not free speech.

Only a transparent government can be accountable to the people it serves. A silent government shows no confidence in itself or the people.

In 1962 president John F. Kennedy said: ‘We are not afraid to entrust the American people with unpleasant facts … For a nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people.’

Our longstanding national resilience means the cracks can’t be papered over but can be resealed quickly by a government willing to lead, including with some good old-fashioned naked truth.

Romance and radicalisation: an overlooked concern for young Australian women

Radicalisation of vulnerable women in romantic relationships is a poorly recognised threat in Australian domestic security. This issue isn’t just a passing concern; it’s a persistent one that can devastate lives and communities.

With extremist groups targeting vulnerable women, we need to understand how love can become a dangerous trap. We must develop measures that help women become less exposed to these tactics.

Adolescence and early adulthood are tough periods, during which many people search for acceptance. As many young women navigate development stages, they grapple with complex questions of identity and self-worth. Young women often seek validation from relationships that seem to offer love and belonging, making them prime targets for extremists posing as knights in shining armour.

These extremists know how to exploit vulnerabilities. Research shows that women who crave external reassurance are more likely to adopt extremist beliefs, just for a little affection. Those who may be more avoidant and struggle to make connections may be more vulnerable to the false camaraderie of extremist groups. If recruiters can identify these vulnerabilities, they can use them as tools of radicalisation.

Social media makes these struggles harder, distorting self-image and intensifying feelings of exclusion. It is also part of the radicalisation process. Platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and TikTok are breeding grounds for extremist views. Recruiters use the anonymity and reach of these platforms to engage with young women under the guise of romantic interest. Once drawn in, the women can find themselves ensnared in extremist ideologies through emotional manipulation and promises of love and belonging.

ISIS recruiters use striking short videos and photos on platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp. They entice women with promises of love, marriage and meaningful lives as ‘jihadi brides’.

Similarly, the Nordic Resistance Movement, a neo-Nazi group, specifically targets women by promoting traditional gender roles and highlighting their importance in the movement. They romanticise motherhood and family values, suggesting that joining the group is a way to protect a pure society. Their propaganda features eye-catching posts, testimonials from women in the group, and discussions that celebrate women as key players in their ideology.

Both groups exploit emotional vulnerabilities, making their messages especially appealing to those looking for acceptance and community.

The European Union has made some progress in protecting young women from radicalisation. A report published by the European Commission detailed extremists’ use of social media to recruit young women and presented recommendations for addressing the threat.

In Australia, most existing youth outreach programs don’t address the particular vulnerabilities faced by young women at risk of radicalisation. Initiatives such as the Australian government’s Youth Engagement Strategy promote social inclusion but often overlook the specific emotional and relational challenges that can make girls susceptible to extremist influences.

With these challenges in mind, we need to develop initiatives tailored to the vulnerabilities of young women. These programs should include workshops that build emotional resilience and self-esteem, helping participants recognise unhealthy relationship dynamics and signs of manipulation. Mentoring schemes that connect young women with positive role models can provide guidance and foster a sense of belonging, steering them away from harmful ideologies.

Targeted educational programs should also be established. Initiatives in schools, for example, can integrate education on emotional intelligence and healthy relationship into teaching. By teaching respect, consent and the importance of supportive friendships, schools can help create an environment where young women feel empowered and valued. This directly addresses the vulnerabilities that extremist recruiters seek to exploit.

Domestic violence awareness campaigns are another opportunity for education. They should not only highlight signs of abusive relationships but also stress the importance of strong, supportive friendships. Young women must be empowered to recognise manipulative behaviours and understand the need to seek help when necessary. Critical media literacy programs can further equip them to evaluate online content, enabling them to spot extremist propaganda and resist its allure.

Collaboration between community organisations, mental health professionals and law enforcement will also be crucial for developing these comprehensive approaches to tackling radicalisation. Providing opportunities for discussion and support allows young women to process their experiences and concerns constructively, reinforcing resilience.

The radicalisation of young women through romantic relationships is overdue for attention. Strengthening self-esteem, fostering resilience and promoting healthy relationships will address the issues that often lead women to extremism in the first place. This preventative approach will fortify our society against the insidious pull of radicalisation and save lives.

Addressing this issue isn’t just about security; it’s about ensuring that every young woman feels empowered to pursue her dreams and find her voice without falling prey to harmful ideologies. The stakes are high and the potential for positive change is immense.

Like the US, Australia remains badly unprepared for drone threats

Prominent security failures have demonstrated that even nations regarded as the most well-equipped to handle domestic threats are wildly unprepared to deal with drones as tools of surveillance and direct attack.

In countries such as Australia and the United States, drones are not being detected, and, even if they are, authorities and defence forces are not equipped for economically and safely destroying them.

There’s no greater example of failure to handle drones than the 13 July assassination attempt on former US president Donald Trump. Intending killer Thomas Matthew Crooks used a drone to survey the area before pulling the trigger. Poor cellular connectivity has been blamed for the Secret Service’s inability to detect that drone and prevent its reconnaissance mission.

Similarly, Chinese national Fengyun Shi plead guilty in July to espionage charges for flying drones around US shipyards and submarines in the past months.

Drones—both small consumer-grade devices and larger units—continue to target sensitive locations globally despite efforts to regulate their use. While Australia is far from geopolitical conflicts and hostile environments, these examples reflect just how easily a nefarious actor can carry out surveillance.

And, as the war in Ukraine has shown, it’s not a long stretch for someone to escalate surveillance into a direct attack by attaching a plastic charge or similar substance to a cheap drone, particularly where highly valuable and confidential assets are concerned.

Since April, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and Australian police have investigated eight such cases for connections to terrorism, with intelligence officials worrying that social media is amplifying political volatility, particularly among youth. Intelligence officials describe the current sentiment as ‘lawful, awful and unhelpful’ and believe there is a heightened risk of lone-wolf attacks in crowded places. Intelligence agencies have reportedly said such attacks will be ‘low cost, locally financed and use readily acquired weapons with relatively simple tactics’. Should an attack happen, the devastation will far outweigh the price of the weapons used.

In the north of Australia, while the federal government is pushing ahead with upgrades to bases and airfields as part of its 2024 National Defence Strategy, these installation are generally even more exposed to the threats posed by drones by the simple arithmetic that they are protected by fewer individuals because of their remoteness. With fewer personnel, there is less capacity for traditional methods of drone spotting, let alone the most effective ones, to the point that personnel are reliant on visual tools alone. The problem will only become more widespread for Australia as we build and host more sensitive installations. Should the new facilities for submarines obtained through the AUKUS agreement fail to detect and thwart drones going near them, the outcome could be catastrophic.

It wasn’t much more than 12 months ago that sources inside the Australian Defence Force advised that they couldn’t confidently determine whether, when or how many drones were flying too close to assets or within restricted areas. Since my conversations at that time, little has changed.

Unfortunately, in most cases, old-hat methods of sensing and preventing drone intrusions come down to manual spotting and hard-kill capabilities. And they’re entirely impractical.

The first issue is that most drones go unseen. The inability to automate detection, particularly for more expensive drones that operate out of eyesight and earshot, welcomes surveillance and espionage. Detection, particularly once laced with artificial intelligence built to see and hear drones at long distances, is far more capable than a human alone. It allows alerts to be issued well before a threat becomes visible or audible to a lone human, triggering a rapid response long before a threat can cause damage.

The second problem is the mindset that we can simply shoot down anything that may pose a threat, whether that’s with live rounds or lasers. Economics and logistical constraints suggest relying on bullets or kinetic counter-drone weapons to stop drones is neither affordable nor effective, as it will take tens of thousands of dollars to take down a drone worth a few hundred dollars. The costs skyrocket when considering the risk of collateral damage from those weapons as well. Firing rotary cannons near our future nuclear submarine bases is not an option.

But even in the case a drone is stopped through traditional means, taking it down often results in a dead end. Drones are popular among nefarious actors because they are disposable. That doesn’t do much for Australia’s ability to determine who’s behind an incursion, where they are located, the information they have collected, and whether there is a broader risk at play on which to act. It’s this type of intelligence that could have alerted the US Secret Service to Crooks preparing his position, or to ensuring that an infantry unit knows a drone is nearby on the battlefield.

As legislation pushes forward, from the Defence Strategic Review to the infrastructure requirements, there is no time to sit idle while drones become a weapon of choice for surveillance and direct attacks. We can’t put all our focus on traditional means for protecting the nation and its interests; remit must expand to avoid a deer-in-the-headlights moment in the face of an inevitable drone attack.

The transnational element of right-wing extremism in Australia

Right-wing violent extremist ideas burst to the forefront of public attention in flashes of violence. Shootings and vehicular attacks perpetrated by individuals motivated by hateful views stun the public. They have also sharpened government attention to and galvanised action on addressing such violence. For example, the Christchurch Mosque attack in 2019 prompted the New Zealand government to launch an inquiry as well as the international community’s Christchurch Call, ‘a commitment by governments and tech companies to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online’.

The growing threat of right-wing extremism (RWE) comes alongside unsettling trends towards illiberalism and attacks on democratic institutions. The 6 January 2021 Capitol riot in Washington DC is a prime example of political violence erupting, fuelled by, among other factors, a wide array of RWE ideas. The ferocity and impact of the violence highlighted RWE as a major domestic security threat in the US, prompting President Joe Biden’s administration to develop a national strategy for countering domestic terrorism in 2021.

As I explain in a new ASPI report, released today, these disturbing trends call for renewed vigilance in confronting RWE—which the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation has classified as ‘ideologically motivated violent extremism’, or IMVE—in Australia’s security agencies’ policy and law enforcement responses. As governments respond to IMVE, it is important to nuance how they conceptualise the challenges posed by RWE and, therefore, scope their solutions.

RWE and the broader category ASIO classifies it within, IMVE, encompass different but related and overlapping ideologies, often linked by hatred, fear, anger and hostility towards an ‘other’ or perceived outgroup. RWE is an umbrella term; its ideologies can be grouped along several axes. Key categories include xenophobic and racially driven violence, gender-driven violence and anti-authority violence.

RWE does not only threaten physical violence. RWE touches on consequential issues at the forefront of public discussion, especially disinformation and misinformation, angry divisions within societies, and democratic resilience. This overlap exists because some RWE beliefs are rooted in conspiracy theories, rebukes of common truths and facts, and distrust in public institutions, and they can be virally self-reinforcing. RWE also often taps into hate and denigrates others’ membership in society.

RWE beliefs can involve rejections of the basic human dignity of fellow citizens, which makes the path to violence against those ‘others’ easier—as we see repeatedly in the context of war, war crimes and genocide. As such, the fabric and character of democracy—especially that of the multicultural and multiethnic democracies that are the focus of my report—are put under stress by the rise of RWE.

The report looks at four case studies, qualitative interviews and expert literature to highlight important transnational dimensions of RWE, as well as expand the way governments understand the RWE threat and craft policy responses to it.

The result shows a clear need for governments to use a broader lens when seeking to understand and respond to RWE. While governments may conventionally see terrorism in ‘domestic’ versus ‘international’ terms, RWE attackers and their sources and legacies of inspiration are not bound by national borders. Efforts to address RWE should take into account these transnational dimensions while examining the challenge at hand and developing and implementing solutions.

The report’s recommendations point to early steps Australia can take to improve international collaboration and coordination on countering RWE. For example, politicians can shape the information space by steadfastly rejecting RWE ideas. Governments can converge on norms and expectations. Together, they can more effectively engage the private sector, align policy and address the gaps across geographical jurisdictions and online platforms.

Augmented efforts should also avoid focusing narrowly on the physical violence RWE threatens. The hate that powers many RWE ideas, for example, contributes to environments that are more conducive to violent extremism and thus exacerbate the RWE threat. Efforts to address RWE can be complementary to addressing mis- and disinformation and in bolstering democratic resilience. RWE’s harms aren’t just violence and criminality. Rather, RWE destabilises democracy itself.

Our approaches and solutions must recognise this threat to democracy and include efforts to bolster resilience in democratic institutions and processes. Public trust and confidence in these institutions and processes constitute a critical element of this resilience to mis- and disinformation broadly and the violent extremism it enables. My report shows that it’s not only important for governments to take RWE seriously; it matters how they do so.

Democracies must be accountable and must respect fundamental rights and freedoms. In particular, addressing RWE means striking difficult balances between appropriate restrictions and preservations of freedoms––and doing so repeatedly. Therefore, it’s important that governments consult and communicate when making those decisions.

Governments must also be open to revision—and to explaining those revisions to the public. This is because the threat is unlikely to stay constant, so we must re-examine our analysis and responses too. It’s also because governments can get things wrong. The deliberate choice to regularly reflect on the nature of the threat, how policy meets those challenges and the shortcomings of policy helps to refine and update policy responses. Communicating this information to the public helps governments maintain legitimacy and accountability.

Not only is the current political moment conducive to reinvigorated action to counter RWE, but these efforts may be a necessary part of our recovery from the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic has seen an ugly, combustible mix of right-wing narratives, information manipulation, conspiracy theories and hateful harassment of Asian people in Australia, Canada and the US. A healthy, robust recovery will certainly centre on public health. But it will also benefit from attention to information environments, public political discourse and democratic resilience.

Governments need to meet the moment. Taking up the RWE challenge should not be a narrow exercise in tackling the physical violence that RWE threatens. Rather, it requires governments to seriously address the more insidious harms of RWE that ultimately culminate in physical violence. This must be done through the larger core mission for governments: representing and enabling inclusive and resilient democracies.

This important topic is a key part of the discussion accompanying the upcoming release of ASPI’s 2022 counterterrorism yearbook.