Tag Archive for: Space 2.0

The time is right for Australia to re-establish its reputation as a global space power

We’re on the precipice of Space 2.0, a new space age defined not just by bold explorations, of which there will continue to be plenty, but by the movement of more and more of our day-to-day activities from the earth’s surface to space. Australians can take pride in their contribution to the first space age in the second half of the 20th century, but effort is needed if we are to optimise our position in this new era.

To be effective, Australia’s participation in global space development requires national coordination and cohesion. It requires a unified approach to exploit the geographic, geopolitical, technological and entrepreneurial advantages that can make Australia a leader in the space domain. That potential fell dormant in about the late 1960s, but from around 2015, a series of Australian government decisions started to change that.

Space 2.0 is primarily commercially driven; key innovations and drivers of progress lie outside government (in an inversion of the previous space age). This presents Australia with an opportunity to re-establish its reputation as a space power—one that comes with significant economic, industrial, environmental, foreign policy and national security benefits.

A clear political and strategic commitment to elevate the establishment of a sovereign space launch capability to a first-order national priority would send a powerful signal. Pieces of the complex strategic framework needed to support a successful commercial launch industry exist at various levels of maturity across our vast federated system. A comprehensive sovereign launch strategy could drive coherence and fuse government priorities in space policy, foreign affairs, national security, modern manufacturing, regional development and tourism (including, in the future, space tourism).

As an organising principle for pursuing interdependent and vital national interests, space launch is a striking proposition. The time to act is now.

Some see the movement towards commercialisation of space as a development analogous in import to the emergence of the semi-conductor industry in the 1970s. Just as persistent and predictable declines in the cost of computing drove digitisation into an ever-increasing number of economic sectors, rapidly declining costs of constructing and launching satellites will drive ever more commercial activities into space.

An essential pre-requisite to participate in the growth promised by the space economy is secure access to launch services. Recent large investments in US launch vehicle companies indicate market confidence in rapid expansion of demand for access to space over the next decade. Four US companies raised US$2 billion over a six-month period to March, and each has announced intentions to make 300+ launches per year by 2025. Right now, Australia has a window to attract international investment to build a secure, flexible, responsive and high-cadence launch capability to serve the growing global market. Building capability to serve this global demand now will be far more effective than attempting to displace other suppliers in future, once costs are sunk.

The question raised by these investments is, where will all of these spacecraft launch from? In 2020, a total of 112 launches were made to orbit. More than half of those came from China, Russia and Iran. Launch facilities in the US and elsewhere are at or near capacity, and bringing new space ports on line has proved challenging. Putting mega-constellations of satellites into orbit will require greater launch capacity, including for surgical precision in the replacement of malfunctioning or offline units.

Space ports represent a significant bottleneck for development of the global space economy. Opening this bottleneck offers an enormous opportunity for Australia. Geography and geopolitics give Australia several competitive advantages.

Australia is an economically and socially stable democracy as well as one of the United States’ most-trusted allies. Australia has proven it can be trusted to protect sensitive technologies, but to secure US investment and customers we need to formalise this through a bilateral technology safeguard agreement. A decision to negotiate such an agreement would spotlight Australia’s advantages precisely when international markets are awash with capital looking for space industry investments.

Australia’s vast geography offers many sites for traditional, vertical (rocket) launches to a variety of orbits, including equatorial as well as polar or sun-synchronous orbits, from within a single regulatory framework and system of infrastructure. Various sites can also support horizontal launches, offering access to a high degree of inclination safely and effectively. Australia’s planned launch sites contend with less commercial air and marine traffic than sites elsewhere in the world, as well as weather conditions that are more favourable, permitting greater launch responsiveness and frequency.

As powerful actors work to develop modular satellite designs and highly portable launch systems, Australia’s geography and growing manufacturing capability offer an option-rich southern hemisphere node within a resilient global space architecture.

Australia offers all of these attributes at scale for the global space economy as well as for sovereign launch. Exploiting these advantages, including through regulations that are internationally aligned and commercially attractive, while also ensuring environmental, cultural and physical safety, would create an unparalleled environment for secure, flexible, high-cadence launch. This isn’t just a government concern. Australia’s launch site operators have the greatest interest in safety, because their reputations and commercial viability are on the line if things go wrong.

There’s a clear role for federal government leadership. A national strategy and coordinated policy settings are vital to attract international launch clients—particularly from the US. Prioritising the developing of a sovereign space launch capability would promote Australia’s natural advantages and the strengths of its existing (but small-scale) space industry. Developing an investment and customer pipeline is vital to underpin commercial viability and realise economic and strategic benefits. This is an area in which Austrade is experienced and able and has existing international government and commercial relationships.

Federal-level mechanisms can most effectively bring together the necessary authorities, expertise, industry leaders, potential investors and customers to inform a sovereign launch strategy. Australia’s private space port owners (Equatorial Launch Australia and Southern Launch) and leading Australian rocket companies (Gilmour Space and Black Sky Aerospace) have long sustained their vision and investment into Australia’s space launch potential; they bring vital perspective and expertise and they need support. State and territory governments are essential contributors to, and will be beneficiaries of, a whole-of-nation approach.

Success requires a single point of entry for foreign governments, international investors and customers. Australian space port and commercial launch development is a national interest and a national endeavour; it just needs a unified national strategy.

Manufacturing initiative risks squandering prime opportunity for Australia’s space industry

The government announced its modern manufacturing initiative (MMI) on 1 October as the centrepiece of its strategy to help Australian manufacturers ‘scale up, improve competitiveness and build more resilient supply chains’. The MMI will support six national manufacturing priorities: resources; food and beverages; medical products; recycling and clean energy; defence; and space.

The decision to identify space as a priority area is a welcome signal that the government recognises the importance of Australia playing an increasingly significant role in the global space sector—which was worth US$366 billion in 2019 and could grow to US$1.1 trillion by the 2040s. But it’s fair to say that the MMI could have done more to really boost the nation’s space activity.

The program’s budget of $1.3 billion will be allocated across the six priority sectors over four years. So the annual financial pie is small, and dividing it among so many areas could quickly dilute the impact of each investment. If the money is apportioned evenly across the six priorities, the space industry would get around $52 million a year from government. The MMI is a start, but its effect might be less than hoped. A misfire rather than a blast-off?

Certainly, recent years have demonstrated that Australia is no longer content to sit on the sidelines and be a passive recipient of space capability. Australia is becoming an active provider of space services, not only for its own purposes, but also as a part of the growing global market. Now is the time to match words with resources, including serious funding. The MMI just may not be sufficient.

Australia’s role in supporting US space exploration, with both robots and humans, goes back decades. Ground facilities and the personnel to run them have been Australia’s forte. With the establishment of the Australian Space Agency and the growth of a commercial space sector aligned with the ‘Space 2.0’ paradigm, new opportunities will emerge and the MMI should feed into them very effectively.

We’re now building satellites, establishing up to three space launch sites and building orbital-class launch vehicles. The MMI can supercharge this process, facilitating faster development and a more expansive space sector for the future. But the funding has to be sustained and sufficient to make a visible impact, and it needs to be carefully targeted.

Developing the ground segment of our space sector needs to be given just as much priority as building and launching spacecraft. The development by CSIRO and Geoscience Australia of a satellite-based augmentation system, or SBAS, will enhance our use of global navigation satellite systems like GPS. This will open up new applications for enhanced precision in positioning, navigation and timing services in agriculture, weather prediction, urban planning, ‘smart cities’, driverless cars and the internet of things.

More accurate positioning services—to less than a metre in some regions—will allow new approaches for ‘fourth industrial revolution’ manufacturing. SBAS also opens up greater use of robotics and new approaches to logistics for the Australian Defence Force in the coming decade. The MMI should be targeted to allow SBAS to enable secondary and tertiary expansion of new services and technologies.

Expanding the Australian space capability through digital design and development and through additive manufacturing on a large scale means Australian small satellites and smart ‘cubesats’ can be produced locally at scale and speed, and take full advantage of a rapid innovation cycle and low cost. Rather than wait years for a single satellite costing hundreds of millions of dollars, Australia is well placed to allow the commercial space sector to exploit ‘e-satellite’ concepts, borrowed from similar US Air Force efforts to develop future air combat capability. Such a process would enable spiral development of new capabilities and experimentation in both virtual and real space for a rapid innovation cycle. MMI funding would directly benefit this part of the space economy.

However, it’s pointless if satellites are being locally developed only to sit in a ‘clean room’ at some other country’s launch pad for months or even years, waiting for a ride into orbit. The rapid innovation cycle established at the start of the acquisition process would be wasted, Australia would become less competitive in the global space sector and opportunities would be lost. We need to focus on developing a sovereign launch capability.

With part of the MMI funding going to the defence priority area, there’s potential for confluent approaches that would allow both defence and space to more effectively benefit from the initiative, and reduce the risk that the money won’t be sufficient to deliver useful outcomes in either area.

Defence’s approach to space capability has to be forward-looking—and should seek to compress what are unnecessarily long and wasteful acquisition processes. Space 2.0 promotes the benefits of fast acquisition and the use of digital design and development in the commercial space community to unlock development of space capability.

With the strategic uncertainty facing Australia, time isn’t on our side. The timelines for new projects need to be accelerated, so that the ADF has a full spectrum of space capabilities for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, satellite communications, and space domain awareness sooner, and in a manner that is consistent with the defence strategic update’s recognition that space is an increasingly contested domain.

The government’s MMI represents an opportunity for a paradigm shift away from the ‘slow, large and few’ to the ‘fast, small and many’ approach that Australia’s commercial space sector is well placed to provide—but only if the money is used effectively. A broad approach of simply throwing funding at a few key areas isn’t going to work when the amount is so limited.

If the basis of Space 2.0 is agile, smart and rapid transformation, then the government’s funding of the space sector has to emulate that approach. It may ultimately be up to the private sector to shape Australia’s future in space, dragging government behind it.

Towards Space 3.0

The space age has gone through two paradigm shifts since the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957. Until the early 1990s, ‘Space 1.0’ was the province of government-run, taxpayer-funded space programs. Civil space agencies such as NASA, Russia’s Roscosmos and the European Space Agency, along with military and major aerospace prime contractors, were the main players. Then a paradigm shift to ‘Space 2.0’ got underway when the commercial space sector entered the global market and began to  achieve dominance.

At ASPI’s recent ‘in conversation’ event, Australian Space Agency director Megan Clark made it clear that the agency has embraced Space 2.0 to promote the growth of Australia’s commercial space industry. It is the commercial sector that’s leading innovation and transforming the global space industry.

The global space sector is currently worth around US$350 billion, and may grow to US$ 1.1 trillion by the 2040s, or potentially even as high as US$2.7 trillion. At the moment, the ‘downstream’ sector has the biggest share of the global space market. The ‘upstream’, or space, segment will pick up, driven by the deployment of large mega-constellations in low-earth orbit (LEO) to provide new types of space services, such as broadband in the sky, and as an enabler for the ‘internet of things’.

That in turn will stimulate the growth of the space launch industry, particularly as reusable rocket technology, pioneered by companies like Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin, dramatically lowers the cost of launching to orbit. We are seeing a gradual shift towards a space-based infrastructure that will underpin globalisation and a global information-based economy in the 2020s and beyond.

So what’s next?

In the same way that commercial Space 2.0 has challenged the traditional dominance of government-run space activities, a new paradigm shift towards ‘Space 3.0’ is on the horizon. While Space 2.0 is defined by the rapid growth of the commercial sector, Space 3.0 will see the emergence of an in-space economy. Bezos promotes the idea of millions of humans living and working in space, while Musk talks about settling Mars to make humanity a multi-planet species. But getting there isn’t just about providing shiny new reusable rockets—a business case has to be present.

Space 3.0 implies a shift of industry and economic activity into orbit, and beyond to the moon. For example, rather than hauling everything up earth’s steep gravity well on rockets, it’s ultimately cheaper to manufacture in space, and to sustain human activity through in situ resource utilisation (known in the space business as ‘ISRU’), while at the same time generating new types of industry and new paths to profit.

We’re seeing the first stirrings of Space 3.0 now.  At last month’s International Astronautical Congress (IAC) in Washington, one company—Made in Space, based in California—demonstrated its work on developing advanced 3D printers for use in orbit to build objects in space—anything from electronic components for space applications to small satellites to even large structures that would support ambitious goals such as space-based solar power.

In-space manufacturing is just one example of a looming step-change in how we access and use space. It clearly implies a requirement for ISRU to use the raw materials to drive on-orbit manufacturing, which in turn will provide a more solid rationale for mining space resources on the moon and in near-earth asteroids. Made in Space has signed a US$73 million contract with NASA to build and fly a spacecraft, Archinaut One. The aim of the project is to construct two 10-meter solar arrays in orbit, in part to prove the technology, so that more ambitious goals can be pursued.

The intersection between in-space manufacturing and the exploitation of ISRU to sustain the next phase in human space activity has the potential to generate all sorts of new secondary industries and services by the late 2020s and early 2030s.

For example, commercial space platforms in LEO undertaking space manufacturing will need logistics support. There’s a clear expanding market for in-space repair and refuel of satellites and other platforms using robotic systems. That becomes easier if the means is produced at the source, rather than on earth. If we’re mining the moon for usable resources to drive in-space 3D printers, space logistics between the earth and the moon will be needed to sustain that infrastructure. At IAC, Bezos displayed a full-size mock-up of his company’s ‘Blue Moon’ commercial lunar lander.

Although much of this infrastructure will normally be unmanned, a human-tended requirement to manage and support them is clearly necessary. The establishment of a permanent human presence on the lunar surface as part of NASA’s Artemis program, with commercial companies such as SpaceX there as well, will drive the extension of commercial crew transportation not only from earth to LEO, but also from LEO across the earth–moon system.

There’s even a commercial opportunity to deal with accumulating space debris in orbit, which is likely to extend out to the moon as human activity expands outwards. At IAC, both Japan’s Astroscale and Switzerland’s ClearSpace identified a market for clearing hazardous space debris for commercial gain.

For Australia, this journey promises exciting times. Space 2.0 has transformed the global space sector for the better, and Space 3.0, which is likely to take shape later in the next decade, will open up even more ambitious horizons. That means Australia needs to be forward-looking and ambitious in how it thinks about space. We need to take a lead on driving policy and regulatory reform to manage the next decades of space activity, while managing risks of astropolitical competition between major powers and among commercial space actors that could generate a risk of conflict.

The vision of humanity as a space-faring species starts with the transition from Space 2.0 to Space 3.0. The new Australian Space Agency, along with the growth of our commercial space sector, provides a golden opportunity for us to position ourselves to play a key role in opening up the high frontier for the next great leap for humankind.

From moon walk to space wars

Fifty years after astronauts first walked on the moon, space wars have gone from Hollywood fantasy to looming threat. Not content with possessing enough nuclear weapons to wipe out all life on earth many times over, major powers are rapidly militarising space. Given the world’s increasing reliance on space-based assets, the risks are enormous.

As with the Cold War–era space race between the United States and the Soviet Union, the new global space race has an important symbolic dimension. And, given the lunar landing’s role in establishing US dominance in space, the moon is a natural starting point for many of the countries now jostling for position there.

In January, China became the first country to land an unmanned robotic spacecraft on the far side of the moon. India—which in 2014 became the first Asian country to reach Mars, three years after China’s own failed attempt to leave earth’s orbit—is scheduled to launch an unmanned mission to the moon’s uncharted south pole on 22 July, a week after the first planned launch was called off at the last minute due to a helium fuel leak. Japan, and even smaller countries like South Korea and Israel, are also pursuing lunar missions.

But the US will not surrender its position easily. US President Donald Trump’s administration has vowed to ‘return American astronauts to the Moon within the next five years’. As Vice President Mike Pence put it, ‘just as the United States was the first nation to reach the Moon in the 20th century’, it will be the first ‘to return astronauts to the Moon in the 21st century’.

This escalating space race is not just about bragging rights; countries are also making rapid progress on developing their military space capabilities. Some, like systems that can shoot down incoming ballistic missiles, are defensive. But others, such as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons technologies that can target space assets, are offensive.

The ability to take advantage of such systems, while denying them to adversaries, is becoming central to military strategies. That is why Trump directed the US Department of Defense to establish a space force, an independent military branch that will undertake space-related missions and operations.

The US hopes that such a force can protect its ‘margin of dominance’ in space. Before Patrick M. Shanahan resigned as acting defence secretary last month, he said that that margin is ‘quickly shrinking’, as newer powers become adept at militarising commercial space technologies, including those first developed as part of civilian prestige projects. The most notable such powers are Russia and China.

China, which established an independent space force in 2016, is aiming for global leadership in space. And both China and Russia have demonstrated offensive space capabilities in the form of ‘experimental’ satellites that can potentially aid military operations. According to a US Air Force report, the purpose of these countries’ orbiting offensive capabilities is to hold US space assets hostage in the event of conflict.

This highlights the tremendous vulnerability of these assets, and not just those belonging to the US. The existing space infrastructure comprises at least 1,880 satellites owned or operated by 45 countries. These assets support a wide range of activities, including telecommunications, navigation, financial-transaction authentication, connectivity, remote sensing and weather forecasting. From a security perspective, they facilitate intelligence, surveillance, early warning, arms-control verification and missile guidance, for example.

There is one more key player in this intensifying space race: India. In March, the country used a ballistic-missile interceptor to destroy one of its own satellites orbiting at nearly 30,000 kilometres per hour, making it the fourth power—after the US, Russia, and China—to shoot down an object in space. The test employed some of the same technologies the US used to shoot down an intercontinental ballistic missile in a test conducted just a couple of days before.

Unlike China’s 2007 demonstration of its ASAT capabilities—which left more than 3,000 pieces of debris in orbit—the Indian test faced no international criticism, largely because it was intended to blunt China’s edge in space-war capabilities. In fact, the head of US Strategic Command, General John E. Hyten, defended India’s test: Indians are ‘concerned about threats to their nation from space’, he said, and thus ‘feel they have to have a capability to defend themselves in space’.

This sounds a lot like the justification used to build today’s enormous nuclear arsenals, and we know where that logic leads. As with nuclear deterrence, countries continue to upgrade their offensive space capabilities, until ‘mutually assured destruction’ becomes their best hope of protecting themselves and their assets.

Before that happens, international norms and laws must be strengthened. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans space-based weapons of mass destruction, but not other types of weapons or ASAT tests. A new treaty is needed to outlaw all use of force in space, with clearly delineated—and reliably enforced—consequences for violations. Likewise, norms for responsible behaviour in space must be established, in order to deter ASAT weapons testing or other actions that endanger space assets.

It’s easy to get caught up in the escalating strategic competition and conflict on earth. Safeguarding, say, freedom of maritime navigation in places like the Persian Gulf and the South China Sea (where China continues to shift the territorial status quo unilaterally) is vitally important. But guaranteeing the freedom to navigate the stars has become no less essential to global peace and security.

Australia’s space future: where to next on the final frontier?

With the establishment of the Australian Space Agency on 1 July this year and the growth of Australia’s space industry, the future has arrived for many Australian space advocates. A critical mass of participants, initiatives and developments are riding a wave of government enthusiasm and private-sector support. It’s a good time to be involved in space in this country.

It’s also a good time to look forward, and consider where we might head over the next decade in space.

The starting point has to be with the Australian Space Agency, which released its charter setting out its purpose, values, roles, responsibilities, approach to governance, and reporting arrangements at the end of October. The agency’s purpose is to ‘transform and grow a globally respected Australian space industry that lifts the broader economy, inspires and improves the lives of Australians—underpinned by strong international and national engagement’.

That’s a very positive mission statement because it will improve Australia’s ability to compete in a rapidly expanding global space sector. Reports suggest that the global space economy, currently worth around US$350 billion, could increase to between US$1 trillion and US$2.7 trillion in the 2040s. Most of that growth will come from the private sector, including companies focusing on commercial space travel and industries that can use new satellites to support innovative terrestrial services.

Australia needs to be bold and fully embrace the space market by developing our space industry sector. We need to move on from the purely ground-based space efforts of the past. Our future in space over the next decade must include developing and building our own satellites and launching them on Australian launch vehicles from Australian launch sites. That will pave the way for terrestrial space activities that benefit our economy and our society and strengthen our national security.

The Australian Space Agency also needs to be ambitious in leading international civil space engagement, both with its international counterparts and with the global commercial sector. When it’s not talking to NASA, ESA or JAXA, the agency should be talking to SpaceX, Blue Origin and Stratolaunch. As a new space actor, Australia can play a growing role in international collaboration on scientific research, space science, and commercial activities.

As the agency’s charter indicates, Australia must meet its international obligations in space, including strengthening legal mechanisms and arms control. We already contribute a great deal to strengthening norms against the weaponisation of space by promoting legal instruments and dialogues that limit the development of such a capability.

Annie Handmer recently wrote a thought-provoking article in The Strategist about the need for strategic space diplomacy. One of her central arguments is that discussion about space as a warfighting domain reinforces the policy acceptance of that outcome. She suggests refocusing the dialogue towards international acceptance of legal norms of non-weaponisation.

I agree with her that closer scientific collaboration with international partners might strengthen established norms against space weaponisation.

The challenge, though, is that this particular horse has already bolted, as Chinese and Russian development of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) demonstrate. The weapons are real and have already been deployed. China’s army has a Strategic Support Force that leads the formulation of thinking on space war. The US is responding to this challenge by considering ways to boost its security in space. The proposed US Space Force is just one component of that response.

So Australia needs to manage its space activities in an environment that is already contested, congested and competitive. The defence and national security aspects of space can’t be ignored, and that means we have to think about space deterrence.

The best path for Australia to achieve space deterrence is to strengthen resilience in space by augmenting existing space capability and finding ways to reconstitute lost capability. Augmentation can be done by deploying large numbers of small satellites rather than relying on small numbers of more vulnerable, complex and costly large satellites. We can contribute to reconstitution by rapidly deploying small satellites to fill gaps if an adversary does use ASATs. Both approaches make it more difficult for an adversary to launch a decisive attack on vital US and allied satellites prior to, or at the outset of, a conflict. Making it so that such an attack is less likely to be effective will reinforce credible space deterrence by denial.

In both cases, investing in a sovereign space industry makes sense. If we build and launch the satellites needed to augment and reconstitute our capability, we won’t need to wait on a US provider, or accept dependency on the US to provide essential space support. Australia can grow its space industry to ensure sovereign space support for the ADF, burden-share in orbit with the US, and work with regional partners under multilateral space consortiums that make it politically untenable for an adversary to use ASATs.

Rather than contribute to space weaponisation and reinforce the idea of the high frontier as a warfighting domain, deterrence through more resilient space capabilities makes it more likely that our opponents will, in self-interest, sit down and talk about arms control. Restrictions on weapons in space could be introduced by strengthening the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which is showing its age.

Space deterrence must be seen as a logical partner to the type of strategic space diplomacy Handmer advocates. Through political, legal, defence and economic means, the goal must be to make space war so unattractive to all sides that it becomes low-hanging fruit for successful arms control. The reality is that space is already a warfighting domain—but that doesn’t mean we have to accept that war in space is inevitable.

Australia should aspire to be a leader in strategic space diplomacy

President Donald Trump’s announcement earlier this year that the US planned to establish a space force prompted discussion about the overt militarisation of the rhetoric surrounding the international use of space.

While some have argued that the proposed space force is nothing more than a rebranding exercise, others contend that it’s a positive, necessary step. And there are those who see it as opening a new field of conflict and making war more likely or as a threat to the very tenets of international space law.

Whatever one’s view, it’s clear that something has changed in the last decade. Space 2.0 is characterised by increasing space accessibility and a growing commercial space industry, against a backdrop of shifting power balances in the Asia–Pacific region. How should Australia respond to these challenges?

Space law is a complicated mixture of international treaties, resolutions and customs, among other elements. The nexus between treaty and custom is a nebulous zone; interpretation is required within different and potentially conflicting political and geopolitical contexts. The UN Outer Space Treaty is a dynamic instrument that is continually shaped by the network of institutions and individuals who enact the norms of international law.

Space law intersects with domestic policy and trade through international and national organisations and individuals. These parties are both the recipients and the sustainers of international customs, and their behaviour affects the system of international law.

That’s why the militarised discourse about space that continues to dominate social and traditional media threatens the international framework and principles that support the peaceful, cooperative use of space. It is normalising a conception of space as a warfighting domain.

It’s not in Australia’s interests for this shift in the characterisation of space to continue. Our space industry is small, and our defence capabilities in space remain underdeveloped compared to those of other nations.

Now that we have a dedicated space agency, we have an opportunity to influence international behaviour through strategic space diplomacy by overtly espousing a non-militaristic approach. The key question is whether the Australian Space Agency’s strategic focus should be on science or on commerce.

Current conceptions of the space agency suggest a definite tilt to the latter. The Department of Industry’s review of Australia’s space capabilities sets out a strategy for tripling Australia’s domestic space industry to $10–12 billion by 2030. A key focus of the Australian Space Agency is to foster international links to facilitate economic opportunities for Australia’s domestic space industry. Undoubtedly, an increased focus on and investment in the growing space sector will provide opportunities for Australian businesses and for our economy.

However, international cooperation through commercial activities in space cannot be as effective in preserving the tenets of international space law as science.

The term ‘science diplomacy’ has been around since 2009. It works because ideas about international law, like ideas about science, are socially constructed; the ‘cartoon image’ of science serves a vital normative purpose. While not necessarily accepted by scholars of science and technology studies as being ‘correct’, Merton’s norms  (communalism, universalism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism), first published in 1942, are nonetheless a reasonable description of the way that science is often viewed by society. In Antarctica, another internationally governed area, science is the vehicle through which models of cooperative and peaceful cross-border interaction are reinforced so that they actively support the continuation of legal frameworks.

But if scientific norms align neatly with the aims of international treaties, commercial activity does not. Whereas ‘good science’ is disinterested, ‘good commerce’ is necessarily interested: businesses owe it to their investors, legally, to act in their financial interests and seek to profit. It is secretive and competitive, and does nothing to reinforce the sort of international customs that have kept space largely peaceful over the past 50 years.

If we wanted to ensure that space stayed ‘congested, contested and competitive’, we would focus squarely on growing the space economy.

Rather than looking inwards at our domestic industry, our space agency should be leading the world in space diplomacy, using international scientific cooperation to shape the discussion and reinforce the principles of peaceful cooperation. Our good relations with many of the big operators in space and our geographic proximity to rising powers in Asia make us well placed to counteract militaristic discourse. Our relatively small bureaucracies also mean we can be agile when it comes to foreign policy decisions. We can change our approach in response to new information quickly and efficiently.

Science may not be the answer to all global conflict, but the strategic diplomacy that surrounds it—involving the creation of international organisations and cross-border collaboration, made strategic by being integrated with a comprehensive vision of Australia’s long-term national security goals—can go a long way towards preventing escalation of conflicts into space.

This is not to say that we can’t have a thriving space industry, too, but let’s not spend our diplomatic capital on signing business deals and touting start-ups. Peace in space is too important for Australia and for the world. Our national space strategy must prioritise a peaceful future ahead of profit.

Balancing the risks and rewards of space

This is the 15th in our series ‘Australia in Space’ leading up to ASPI’s Building Australia’s Strategy for Space conference.

Recent years have seen an explosion of optimism around our ability to reach and exploit space, with a multitude of benefits apparent across all aspects of human endeavour. However the paradigm of ‘Space 2.0’ offers both risks and rewards, and shouldn’t be viewed as an unalloyed good.

The rapid and uncontrolled exploitation of new opportunities without consideration of potential consequences has the potential to aggravate the already congested and competitive character of the space environment, with risks to both Australia’s national interests and the long-term survival of the global commons of outer space.

Firstly, the sheer number of potential satellites planned will tax existing collision deconfliction and traffic management structures. On current forecasts, the number of active satellites will increase in the next decade, from approximately 1,800 to a number approaching 10,000. Within this range, a number of ‘mega-constellations’ are proposed, each containing thousands of satellites. Much of the explosion in numbers is forecast to occur within a fairly constrained orbital regime, within 1,000 kilometres of the surface of the earth.

Such developments may quickly overtake the current means of space surveillance, which is based around the independent verification of orbits by agencies like the US Space Surveillance Network, and in the future the US Department of Commerce. Increasingly, the best source of orbital information will be the operators themselves, which will require new ways of exchanging and verifying such data. Once exchanged, agreed norms of orbit maintenance and deconfliction measures will need to be established between operators. Additionally, the real-time monitoring and adjustment of constellations within a congested environment will drive a level of system autonomy currently unseen in current operations.

Added to this, the increasing miniaturisation of spacecraft—exemplified by the growth of ‘cubesats’—will challenge the ability of existing surveillance systems to track and identify objects in orbit. The distribution of missions across multiple satellites has meant a steady reduction in object size, while modular construction techniques will make more satellites appear alike to external ground- and space-based observers.

Miniaturisation and modularisation offer twin challenges—first the ability to detect and track objects, and second to characterise these objects and associate them with an owner-operator. For example, the bulk of the manifest for the record-setting launch of 104 satellites on an Indian PSLV rocket in February 2017 comprised essentially identical cubesats, which caused identification challenges when they separated from the booster.

These challenges drive a requirement for active identification methods, similar to the radio transponders used by aircraft. However, unless they’re motivated by an understanding of the benefits of ‘best practice’ space operations, owner-operators seeking to prioritise payload space on their spacecraft might treat such measures as being of secondary importance.

Finally, the shrinking costs of entry into space operations enable a range of new players with little or no experience to push the boundaries of missions, orbits and spacecraft design. This newfound access requires the space community to answer not only the question of ‘Can we do it?’, but also ‘Is it a good idea?’

Missions such as the crowd-funded ‘Kicksat’—which planned to dispense ‘chipsats’ the size of credit cards (while short-lived, these were essentially untrackable by existing surveillance sensors)—raise the issue of the bounds of reasonable operations in space. In a similar vein, the recent launch of US satellites (on an Indian launcher) that had been denied FCC approval to operate highlights at best gaps in current regulation, and indicates at worst a ‘Wild West’ mentality among some of those hungry to exploit new opportunities.

In combination, these challenges have the potential to place at risk the safe operation of other spacecraft, and by extension entire orbital regimes. As demonstrated by the accidental collision between an Iridium spacecraft and a decommissioned Russian surveillance satellite, damage to the space environment has the potential to remain a factor for many years to come. With a significant increase in the number of space objects, the risks of cascading consequences from one mistake (the so-called ‘Kessler Syndrome’) are also enhanced.

This isn’t to say that we should discourage space activities. Australia should take advantage of the opportunities presented by space, and where possible reduce the barriers to entry. But such measures should be tempered by sufficient regulation and norms of behaviour to minimise environmental risks, and to maintain the long-term viability of space operations. Thus, the management of space within Australia will need to not only consider the industrial aspects of space, but the safe operation of orbital missions.

The exploitation of new opportunities in space has the potential to significantly benefit many aspects of Australian society. However, like all the other global commons accessed by humanity, there are always risks to accompany the potential rewards. As space becomes more congested and competitive, it behoves us to manage our responsibilities properly to ensure that space remains a source of prosperity into the future.

Space 2.0—why it matters for Australia’s defence

This is the sixth in our series ‘Australia in Space’ leading up to ASPI’s Building Australia’s Strategy for Space conference in June.

Some key events are looming in the nascent Australian space sector. Following the announcement in October 2017 regarding the Australian Space Agency, government is set to provide details about this new organisation, including its charter and likely funding, not to mention where it will be based.

The government is also studying findings of the 2017 Review of Australian Space Industry Capability, and will likely provide new policies and funding to stimulate this growing sector of the economy.

With these important developments in mind, if Australia is to seek a more meaningful role in space, then it’s important to get the right business model. In a recent ASPI Strategy paper, I strongly promoted the concept of ‘Space 2.0’ as the best path forward for Australia.

Space 2.0 has transformed the global space sector. Its growing emphasis on the ‘small, cheap and many’ in terms of satellite design challenges the traditional approach of relying on a smaller number of large, expensive and increasingly vulnerable satellites that must operate in an increasingly challenging and crowded space domain.

Space 2.0 emphasises much more cost effective and responsive space launch capabilities, best epitomised by Elon Musk’s SpaceX that now regularly launches reusable rockets. It’s about innovation by new companies in opening up new uses of space, such as the ‘internet of things’, the establishment of mega-constellations of small satellites to support a global ‘broadband in the sky’ (making NBN obsolete in a few years), or new uses of commercial Earth observation to support rapidly developing economies.

Space 2.0 suggests a path for Australia that’s both affordable and can be developed locally. It also undermines the traditional justification for total dependency on foreign providers of space capability.

The business paradigm of Space 2.0 is akin to the business model of Silicon Valley and smartphone development. In the same way that mobile devices have rapidly evolved on a three-year cycle, Space 2.0 rides the wave of Moore’s Law, allowing smaller satellites to continuously exploit new technology to do more, at less cost, and benefit from the rapid refresh of technology and innovation. This phenomenon is occurring now, and it means the next decade will see the global satellite and space launch industry going through a rapid transformation.

Australia’s space agency must be savvy enough to identify, understand and surf that wave, rather than be left behind by choosing an increasingly outmoded Space 1.0 business model that is risk averse, slow to innovate and heavily regulated. Rather than be a ‘NASA down under’, the new space agency must instead let the private sector lead and fully support the rapid growth of Space 2.0 start-ups.

These can provide new services ‘downstream’ (the ground segment) to the end user, be it government, commercial companies or the private individual. They can also offer Australia the chance to begin developing its own sovereign space segment (‘upstream’), including satellites and ultimately, a sovereign space launch capability.

Getting the right approach is also vital for Australia’s defence and national security. Space is contested, congested and competitive, and a traditional Space 1.0 approach is increasingly incapable of responding to these challenges.

Space is contested because peer adversaries such as China and Russia are developing a suite of counter-space capabilities, including co-orbital and direct ascent anti-satellite weapons, as well as ‘soft kill’ counter-space capabilities based around electronic warfare, cyberattack and, potentially, directed-energy weapons.

Investment in or reliance upon the traditional approach of a smaller number of large, expensive satellites makes it easier for an adversary to threaten vital space capabilities quickly, and that could result in a sudden and catastrophic loss of space support. Conversely, the use of disaggregated space capabilities using large numbers of smaller, cheaper satellites that can be quickly reconstituted makes it harder for an adversary to threaten a decisive counter-space attack, and reinforces deterrence and dissuasion against such a threat.

Space is congested because of a growing amount of space debris that increasingly threatens to choke vital orbits and places vital satellites at risk. There’s an urgent effort to find ways to clear space debris, and Australia plays a significant role in monitoring such debris using ground-based space situational awareness.

As Space 2.0 is all about rapid innovation, finding a timely solution to space debris would suggest tapping the thinking of commercial space actors to find new ways to solve this problem.

Space is competitive because Space 2.0, while opening up space to Australia, also allows the proliferation of militarily relevant space technologies to a broader range of state and non-state actors in a manner that boosts their prospective military capability. In doing so, our military–technological edge is eroded and the traditional market dominance of space powers is being challenged. To mitigate risk, Australia needs to effectively compete in the global space sector. We can’t do that by embracing outdated thinking.

With this challenging environment in mind, the space agency needs to develop effective space policy that isn’t just focused on space science, or on supporting civilian space industry, but also manages the nexus between defence and civilian space activities. Defence must be well inside the tent, rather than kept at a distance.

Firstly, the agency should consider the nature of Space 2.0 and how the ADF can exploit it, and also explore how our adversaries might use it against us. Secondly, the space agency has to be bold, and not simply re-establish a traditional emphasis on the ground segment in key defence missions. It’s time to do more than more of the same.

With this in mind, a key early policy debate in the new agency should be about how Australia can best contribute to deterring and dissuading counter-space threats. Australia’s current activities in space surveillance should be the starting point for this debate, which will encompass how Australia contributes to developing disaggregated space systems, and how it can best support reconstitution of space support to key partners.

The Australian Space Agency: rhetoric and reality

This is the fifth in our series ‘Australia in Space’ leading up to ASPI’s Building Australia’s Strategy for Space conference in June.

In September 2017, the Minister for Education and Science, Senator Simon Birmingham, announced that the Australian government would establish a space agency in 2018. The announcement was made to the global space community at the opening ceremony of the 68th International Astronautical Congress (IAC2017) in Adelaide.

Australia had a space agency from 1987 to 1996. Called the Australian Space Office (ASO), it was established by the Keating Labor government. Shortly after the Howard Coalition government came to office in 1996, the ASO was axed. The ASO and associated programs failed for numerous reasons, not the least of which was the ambivalence shown by Defence towards the office and its responsibilities.

The question now is whether the new agency will fare any better. There are three causes for optimism:

  • There’s bipartisan support for the new agency.
  • There’s much broader community awareness of the dependence that we all have on secure and assured access to services and data provided by satellites.
  • Defence is engaged and supportive.

A reasonable expectation is that the agency will be funded and staffed to perform a series of essential tasks. It may also be funded and staffed to perform some discretionary tasks as well. The essential tasks relate to governance and regulation, nationally and internationally. They include:

  • administering the Space Activities Act
  • providing a degree of coherence and explicit coordination to the Australian government’s own investments in space capabilities
  • representing Australia’s space interests at international forums devoted to space matters, including the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

Four discretionary tasks that the agency might perform are:

  • support for domestic space industry development in both upstream (space) and downstream (ground-based) elements
  • support for space science and engineering research
  • promotion of STEM education programs, using space topics as a learning vector
  • development of public outreach programs that promote a better understanding of the outer space environment and of Australia’s interests and activities among the broader public.

The extent to which the new agency does involve itself with these matters will be a test of the real priority accorded to space matters, beyond the rhetoric and commitments made at IAC2017 by the government.

The agency is essential to the development of a domestic industry, but on its own will not be sufficient. Industry, including large companies, will need to step up and invest, and that won’t happen unless companies can see a path to profit within a reasonable period of time.

In recent years several small companies seeking to engage in upstream space activities have been founded in Australia. They’re taking advantage of technological changes, including the miniaturisation and commoditisation of electronics, sophisticated software, and new materials and manufacturing techniques to develop niche products and services. The commercial success of these companies will be determined by the extent to which they are successful internationally. The Australian market may nurture their development but isn’t large enough to ensure long-term and sustained success.

Furthermore, space companies seeking to develop technologies in Australia may well find their access to export markets limited by Australia’s export regulations, which are restrictive where space technologies are concerned. Export facilitation may become one of the most important roles of the space agency in support of the Australian space sector if the sector is to flourish.

Australia’s space engagement since the 1940s has been shaped by the country’s geography (location, size and population distribution), and tied to national security interests. Initially, Australia established Woomera to support the ambitions of the United Kingdom to develop long-range missiles. Since the 1970s Australia has hosted ground stations that support missile early-warning and intelligence gathering satellites vital to the security interests of the United States. More recently, Australia has installed ground-based sensors at North West Cape that contribute to the space debris monitoring system of the United States.

Defence and national security interests, at the heart of which is Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States, will be the dominant policy driver for Australian space activity for the immediate future. The bulk of the Commonwealth’s space investments are in Defence, notably a $3–4 billion investment in space-based remote sensing announced in the 2016 Integrated Investment Program.

The Australian Defence establishment is seeking to understand outer space both as a domain from which to influence maritime, land, air and cyber warfare, and as a warfighting domain in its own right. To acquire knowledge and understanding, even before contemplating space operations, Defence is making modest investments in cubesats. A civilian program is a helpful adjunct to these activities.

Australia’s geography will continue to be attractive and important as a location for ground stations from numerous nations, including the United States. Although Australian relations with China and Russia are presently strained, both may seek to install ground infrastructure in Australia in support of their space activities in future.

Ukrainian groups are known to be interested in an Australian launch site, and Brexit may also lead, in time, to closer cooperation with the United Kingdom on space projects. These possibilities may present opportunities for Australia to exercise middle-power influence in the space domain in its own interests and those, more broadly, of the global rules-based order.

Space technologies and capabilities are profoundly ‘dual use’. The new agency, by promoting civil and commercial opportunities, will establish a basis for defence-related space capabilities for the foreseeable future. There’s a risk that the potential of so-called ‘Space 2.0 technologies’ will be overstated by some who would put them at the core of an emergent Australian space sector. New jobs and innovation in the Australian market are more likely to occur downstream in the data processing and application domains than in the upstream satellite segment, which is where Space 2.0 technologies are concentrated. As a consequence, the new agency may face a significant challenge in managing expectations.

The most immediate challenge, however, will be to find a cadre of women and men who have the standing, connections, skills and knowledge to turn the rhetoric of the Minister’s announcement at IAC2017 into reality.

Space 2.0: building Australia’s strategy for space

This is the fourth in our series ‘Australia in Space’ leading up to ASPI’s Building Australia’s Strategy for Space conference in June.

Australia, and the world, is experiencing one of the most exciting revolutions of our time. The information age is evolving and we’re deep in the fourth industrial revolution, rapidly moving towards a society dominated by the internet of things (IoT) and artificial intelligence. This will be the most powerful revolution yet.

As we pivot towards a world where everything—from fridges to forests—will be connected to the internet, the dial will be shifted and our lives significantly affected. We’ll experience noticeable changes in the way we live, work and interact with each other. That will apply not only to individuals, but to businesses too.

The fourth digital revolution will no longer see individuals and businesses operating alongside devices. Instead they’ll be seamlessly and subtly integrated into our everyday lives. It’s here and it’s happening, but there’s a serious problem that we must address.

The world lacks the infrastructure to cope with the billions of devices that are set to dominate our lives. We need to build a better internet, one that fuses digital technologies. The first iteration of the digital age connected people. We now need an internet that connects not only people, but also things.

This is where the next wave in space industry comes in, one commonly referred to as Space 2.0. The first wave was very much dominated by government and authorities. The second will see the commercialisation of space, will be dominated by businesses and private companies, and will realise space’s potential to provide low-cost global connectivity.

This new era requires collaboration and partnership. No business, no matter how ambitious or determined, can do it alone.

In most cases, ‘commercialisation’ is linked to competition. But with space, collaboration and partnership is the only way forward. We mustn’t compete, but partner. Global connectivity is too big a job for any one business to handle alone. Engaging with corporate partners, educational institutes and industry leaders from day one is key for any organisation, commercial or otherwise, looking to be successful in the space industry.

A thriving space economy is starting to develop in Australia, and it’s about to accelerate. The federal budget this year will be the first ever that has a dedicated space budget, and that alone is a huge development. The money will go towards the Australian space agency, which in turn will attract overseas investment and talent, fuelling the local economy. Space 2.0 holds the potential to directly affect each and every Australian.

Space 2.0 isn’t just about commercialisation. It’s about future jobs, future skills and a new era of STEM education that will train the new employees that will staff space services. The Fleet Space Technologies mission control centre in Adelaide has already attracted some of the brightest minds in Australia, and the world. Having that talent on our own soil will sustain a healthy ecosystem of STEM expertise in Australia.

The past two years have seen a rapid advancement in the sophistication of Australia’s space operations. It’s therefore too easy to focus on the local effects that the Australian space agency and our commercial space industry have.

But we mustn’t forget the global potential. When we look globally, the effect is impossible to quantify. At Fleet Space Technologies, we’re trialling a precision agriculture project in Tasmania that could see farmers using nanosatellites to monitor irrigation levels via sensors on the ground.

Australia is a big country and the effect of precision farming in this country alone could be huge. But when you scale that effect globally, the opportunities to transform global industries—maritime, emergency services, agriculture, transport, logistics and environment—are extraordinary.

As we’ve seen with recent debates around technological advancements that were born in the digital age, their potential impact was only realised in hindsight. For some, the real awakening came almost a decade after the initial development of these new technologies.

I’d argue that when it comes to the next industrial revolution, businesses won’t have the privilege of hindsight if we don’t work rapidly to keep up with the growing presence of devices in our daily lives.

Without the infrastructure in place, businesses working with data will fail to keep up, and educational institutes will lack the expertise to train workers for current and future jobs. This isn’t a risk we can afford to take. For Australia to become a leader in IoT, we must have a space infrastructure to allow us to thrive.

Now is the time to put in place the societal and physical infrastructure to build the world of the future, one that is currently being driven by an exciting venture into space.