Tag Archive for: Soryu Class

SEA 1000: why should we have to choose Option J?

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The current strategic/political argument to buy Japanese submarines doesn’t stand up against a $50+ billion life cycle submarine project for acquisition, sustainment and upgrades which will run until at least until 2060.

Alan Behm’s recent assessment of strategic partnerships makes valuable reading on this subject.

There is no off-the-shelf design that meets Australia’s capability requirements. The engineering and Australian production challenges to be overcome by Japan to scale-up the current Soryu to a suitably evolved platform, are critically important for the CEP to assess.

Recent commentary advocating moving Australia’s naval shipbuilding into the digital age highlights the huge effort already made by German contender tkMS to understand and bring into use a methodology and tools (also now used by three US naval shipyards) to resolve scaling issues ahead of commencing actual construction.

There’s no doubt that the MHI and KHI shipyards in Kobe can build superb submarines which perform reliably and to specification, but they only have a planned 20 year life, not the 30 years Australia wants. And there’s another rub, neither MHI nor KHI have built or sustained a submarine outside Japan, whereas the Germans and French are widely experienced in overseas builds and ongoing support. Perhaps during his visit the MHI CEO should have explained to Australia’s media why Japan declined to bid to construct its own submarines in India for the Indian Navy?

Usable space on board a submarine is determined by surface displacement. The Soryu’s surface displacement is 2,950 tonnes compared with 3,100 tonnes for Australia’s existing Collins Class. Fully submerged displacements are about one third larger, with this increase largely accounted for by fuel tanks and ballast water surrounding the main pressure hull. A fully submerged Soryu is propelling around 1,300+ tonnes of fuel and sea water, for a range which is currently about two-thirds that of Collins. An evolved Soryu will have to be increased significantly in size to accommodate even more fuel and ballast water.

Not only is range an important consideration, but as advised by Peter Briggs so too is the period a submarine can remain deep, or in transit below snorkel depth. Both French and German designs will include the option of proven air-independent propulsion, while Japan is moving away from its Kawasaki Stirling AIP engines for Soryu’s  seven and eight, to seek range at depth by incorporating some lithium ion batteries (LIBs). All three contenders will incorporate significant battery technology improvements, including the use of LIBs because they have a much higher charge density in a smaller form factor than traditional lead acid accumulators.

Increased LIB charge rates and a power hungry US-supplied AN/BYG-1 combat system, never before fitted to Soryu, will dictate a total re-design of its power generation and distribution system. As well 6MW size permanent magnet synchronous electric motors must be developed, larger than any such existing submarine main engine—a risk to be managed for all contenders.

Modern European submarine construction uses a single pressure hull, while the Soryu class uses a combination of double pressure hulls for the forward and aft compartments, but with a different steel alloy from single pressure hulls for the intermediate four compartments. Does this create differential expansion/cracking and corrosion problems at the dissimilar metal junction and is this the reason why Soryu has a 20 year life, not the 30 required by Australia?

While double pressure hulls increase a submarine’s reserve of buoyancy, they also increase cost and complexity of manufacture, probably give a shorter planned sea life, and increase the wetted area of the submarine requiring more energy to propel the vessel underwater.

A 4,200 tonnes Soryu has a crewing capacity around the same as Israeli Navy’s 2,400 tonnes Dolphin 2 Class submarines. The physical layout inside the current Soryu won’t meet ergonomic standards for future RAN submariners, affecting their alertness, health and welfare during a long range/endurance mission. Arguably the current Japanese internal design is inefficient and a poor starting point for an evolved Soryu detailed design.

One of the most telling differences is experience in overseas builds and sustainment. The Germans committed to that from day one and have a wide range of Australian partners and international experience. The French also engaged widely during 2015 and are again in 2016 seeking out further potential Australian sub-contractors. As yet there’s limited evidence of real Japanese effort, despite fine words.

Both French and German contenders have built submarines for their own country’s navies as well as for other navies in their own countries. The Japanese have not, even though in October 2015 Masaki Ishikawa, from Japan’s Ministry of Defence, said the Japanese consortium is ‘very confident that we can build boats from Day One in Australia’. This really is a bridge too far and too important for Australia to risk its key 50 year strategic defence project to the hands of a trusted, yet inexperienced, ally.

Let’s hope our politicians leave Defence’s CEP alone, and allow it to reach the right conclusion mid-year after a balanced consideration of all factors.

How strategic is our strategic partnership with Japan?

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‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less’. It would appear that there’s no dearth of Humpty Dumpties among those who draft the breathless joint communiqués that mark senior ministerial meetings. So, in December 2015: ‘The Prime Ministers reaffirmed the special strategic partnership between Japan and Australia, based on common values and strategic interests including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, open markets and free trade’.

Apart from the ‘special strategic partnership’ with Japan, Australia now boasts strategic partnerships with, inter alia, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and Singapore—not to mention the historical strategic partnerships with New Zealand, the UK and the US.

But what does ‘strategic partnership’ mean, or is it simply a question of debasing the coinage of language? Is Australia really considering going to Japan’s defence should it be threatened or attacked? Is Japan really considering the deployment of its military forces should Australia be threatened or attacked? Is the ‘strategic partnership’ a reflex of ANZUS, with Australia implicitly obligated to support the US in defending Japan? If it doesn’t address any or all of those questions, just what does ‘strategic partnership’ intend? And what does it mean to have a ‘strategic partnership’ with both China and Japan, as they bicker over the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea and exchange vituperation over Japanese atrocities in China and Manchuria 80 years ago?

As a newly minted diplomat, I was deployed in support of the first Australia Japan Ministerial Committee (as it was then called) meeting in October 1972. The five Japanese ministers and eight Australian counterparts, led by the Foreign Minister Nigel Bowen, sat across the table in the CSIRO Board Room in Canberra, just a couple of hundred metres from the composite remains of the Japanese midget submarines sunk in Sydney Harbour on 31 May 1942. Marked more by frosty formality than friendship, the consultations focused on broadening the trade and investment relationship. Not a word was said about defence, and, of course, no one mentioned the war! It appeared, nonetheless, that the fall of Singapore, the Burma railway, the Bangka Island executions, the massacre of the Gull Force POWs and the Sandakan March weighed on the minds of the Australian ministers.

So, over 40 years on, what has changed? The answer, of course, is two-fold: China, and our own insecurity and lack of confidence.

Just to be clear: I have no objection to closer defence ties with Japan. Indeed, I was one of the instigators of a closer defence relationship almost two decades ago. It makes even more sense today as Japan begins to play a more prominent role in humanitarian relief activities in the Pacific and UN peacekeeping operations globally. But when do closer defence relations become a ‘strategic partnership’?

Sound defence relationships are important. Discussion of matters of mutual interest and avenues for practical cooperation do much to dispel suspicion and build confidence, confidence based on transparency. Such relationships, however, fall a long way short of partnerships based on shared interests, shared values, and an acceptance of the risk and pain that would result from confrontation with a common adversary in a common cause.

China has embarked on the pursuit of regional policies that are assertive to the point of aggression. Naval confrontations in proximate waters and land reclamation in disputed seas impose direct challenges on its neighbours. They aren’t, however, challenges to Australia. Apart from a continuing interest in a rules-based approach to the resolution of regional disputes, we have no strategic interests at stake. They certainly aren’t matters over which any Australian government should contemplate the use of armed force.

We are nonetheless perplexed by China, and constantly find ourselves caught in the headlights of other nations’ problems. Too often our strategic prospects are portrayed in terms of a series of Hobson’s choices—between Washington and Beijing, Tokyo and Beijing, Washington and Moscow, New Delhi and Beijing. Our inability to resolve those confected antinomies is a direct consequence of our sense of isolation, our lack of confidence as a regional strategic player, our lack of comfort at being different, our unwillingness to invest seriously in our regional and global diplomacy, and our need to have ‘friends’, particularly great and powerful ones—in short, a sense of national insecurity that displays itself in a fawning need to be liked.

As the great Indonesia-born Malaysia-educated Australian Wang Gungwu pointed out almost a quarter of a century ago, Australia’s role in Asia is a function of our western liberal values (to which many Asians aspire), not the prospect of our somehow becoming Asian. Former Prime Minister Abbott’s  awkward identification of Japan as Australia’s ‘closest friend in Asia’ mistakes utility for similarity, sentimentality for substance. The fact that Australia is different and culturally aligned with the nations of Europe and North America is what affords us both strategic relevance and room for strategic manoeuvre.

Which brings us back to the power of language. Vague phrases and jargon are no substitute for meaning. If strategic partnerships are built upon common values, then what are the common values Australia shares with Japan? As an increasingly secular nation with an increasingly diluted Christian tradition, what do we truly share in common with a nation whose social structures are based on a markedly ethnocentric neo-Confucianism, and whose cultural practices are deeply informed by Shinto and Buddhism? These are what gives Japan its character and shape its values. They certainly don’t shape Australian values.

If ‘common values and strategic interests’ do form part of the suite of arguments supporting the eventual acquisition of the Soryu-class submarine, then one must hope that the rest of the arguments are more robust than that.

The Japanese SEA 1000 bid and Australian industry participation

The clock is ticking for the Japanese.

The Japanese have never exported Defence products so it isn’t surprising that, in their own words, they are ‘behind the power curve’ with respect to the SEA 1000 Competitive Evaluation Process (CEP).

That was apparent when a Japanese delegation of navy, government and industry personnel arrived in Adelaide last week to engage with Australian industry as part of their CEP activity. In principle they should be congratulated for their efforts to keep their heads above the water while swimming in the deep end.

Unfortunately for them, the visit may have backfired.

At their presentation to local industry, they clearly stated their intention to respond to the foreign, hybrid and local build options required by the Government and that they stand ready to engage Australian industry to the maximum extent possible throughout all stages of the submarine project.

Australians and Australian companies would be involved in all stages: first, the design stage (assisting with respect to boat design effort and sub-supplier selection), second, the build phase (assisting with respect to project management, material acquisition, welding and fit-out), and third, ongoing submarine upkeep.

They said all the right words to an audience of keen product and service providers, but then curiously advised that industry engagement would only occur post-CEP. There’s risk in this approach for them; it could prejudice their chances of ‘winning’ the CEP.

The French and Germans, both seasoned players, have already provided industry briefs to small groups all around the country. They’ve followed up those briefs with one-on-one discussions so that they can identify relevant service and product suppliers and examine their capacities and capabilities, discuss and explore potential opportunities, make proper assessments as to what can be achieved with respect to local industry capability and detail both the cost impact (negative or positive) and risks that future engagement may entail. This isn’t being done solely from a project and engineering perspective, but also from a corporate due-diligence perspective. Neither DCNS nor TKMS executives will be able to sign off on CEP submissions unless they are satisfied that the due-diligence has been done.

The Japanese will have done none of this and won’t be in a position to even understand what’s possible with respect to Australian industry involvement, nor appreciate the cost and risk. One would expect that Defence, as part of the proper consideration they must give each contender’s submissions, won’t be able to, in good conscience, accept key elements of the Japanese proposal.

Also problematic with respect to the Japanese bid, and something that will almost certainly be under consideration by Defence, is what’s referred to in CEP public discussion as ‘the Japanese techno-culture risk’. This is the risk associated with differences in laws, workplace relations and practices, technical regulations and standards, among others, between Japan and Australia. It’s already apparent with respect to language that the nuances of conversations are being lost through the translators that have been accompanying the many non-English speaking Japanese delegates.

The same issues haven’t manifested in discussion with the French and German parties, with both DCNS and TKMS having previously built ships in Australia, and indeed in a number of international jurisdictions.

It’s worth noting that, even though the French and Germans have Australian defence experience, they have both employed a number of former Australian Navy and Defence personnel to participate in their sell. The Japanese have not.

Nonetheless, the Japanese are quick learners and have rapidly responded to suggestions and concerns levied at them in this unfamiliar game.

Whilst the media have reported that the Babcock, BAE, and SAAB have approached Japan to co-operate, it’s probably too early for the Japanese to enter into any such arrangement. They do however need to recruit some Australians onto their team who can advise on and take some level of prominence with respect to local industry. They also need a permanent presence in-country and desperately need to form up a small and intimate team to embark on a national tour with the aim of ultimately interacting one-on-one with those Australian entities seeking opportunities in the SEA 1000 space.

The clock is ticking for the Japanese.

Why Australia should build its own submarines (1)

SubmarineThe case for building the next generation of RAN submarines in Australia begins with the stand-out attributes that make submarines so important for us: they must be able to operate in areas a long way from home, without air or sea control, to watch, listen, evaluate and act when necessary. Australia’s future submarine will be a unique platform, giving early warning of an adversary’s intentions and providing an excellent antisubmarine and anti-surface ship capability.

As discussed in an earlier post, these capabilities are based on the submarine’s key attribute—stealth—which enables access to sensitive or critical areas denied to other vehicles and surveillance systems.

In simple terms, a submarine has to have sufficient buoyancy to support its payload when it’s underwater (that is, to be neutrally buoyant). If you add more fuel (or any other payload), you have to either take out an equivalent weight or increase the vessel’s volume. Simply lengthening an existing design by adding hull sections to increase volume works only so far. As the ratio of the vessel’s length to its diameter grows, it becomes noisier, less agile and less efficient. Read more

Submarines: the value of Option B

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Brendan Nelson will be remembered as the defence minister who pushed through the Super Hornet purchase as a hedge against further delays in the long-troubled F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. While Air Force held tight to the increasingly forlorn hope that the F-35 would be delivered on schedule—resisting any suggestion of a 4th-generation interim fighter lest it become the final capability—Nelson moved decisively to mitigate the risk of a capability gap. In doing so, he saved the RAAF from itself.

Fast-forward eight years, and another capability gap looms. This time it’s Australia’s submarine capability. It’s now widely known that the Abbott government is working hard to secure a submarine deal with Japan. A great many concerns have been raised about so-called Option J, from the suitability of the Soryu-class boats to the difficulty of dealing with a first-time exporter. Perhaps most vocally, Australia’s shipbuilders are crying foul that the longstanding promise of a local build has been broken. Read more