Tag Archive for: Russia

Nathalie Tocci on the birth of a new Europe, and what it means for Australian security

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen this week initiated a conversation about a security partnership with Australia. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese responded with a ‘maybe, sort of’.

To talk about this development and much more, we have Nathalie Tocci, director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, former adviser to two EU presidents and one of the world’s top experts on European foreign and strategic policy. Nathalie gives her thoughts on the link between European and Indo-Pacific security, the China-Russia relationship, the centrality of Ukraine to European security, and the best and worst possibilities for US support to Ukraine under Donald Trump.

Nathalie also outlines her (very useful) theory about ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ norms as foundations for international cooperation, and expands on a wonderful line she wrote recently in the Guardian about what it would take for Europe to pull itself together security-wise.

Sir Lawrence Freedman on the delusions that plague war planners

Wars are easy to start, hard to end and are often launched with political goals that are loftier than the planning and capabilities that are committed. In today’s episode, Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London, talks about the “short war fallacy” and why strategists keep planning for quick victories when long and costly conflicts are demonstrably the norm.

Lawrence discusses Putin’s misjudged invasion of Ukraine, the way forward—and significant obstacles—for Kyiv, Moscow and Washington, other long conflicts around the globe including those in Africa and what Xi Jinping might be thinking about Taiwan.

He explains how mass remains a key factor in warfare, and the ways in which new technology and old realities converge to create layers in modern warfighting. He caps off with some thoughts on nuclear strategy and the recent flareup between India and Pakistan.

You can read Lawrence’s recent Foreign Affairs Article, “The Age of Forever Wars: Why Minister Strategy No Longer Delivers Victory”.

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And read his substack here.

Vladimir Putin is taking the peace, with Peter Tesch

During a two hour phone call this week with US President Donald Trump, Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin did what everyone expected—he raised impossible demands, promised next to nothing, and generally made a mockery of Trump’s patience. 

Australia’s former Ambassador to Russia and Germany Peter Tesch speaks with David Wroe about the dynamic between Trump and Putin, Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s perilous place in the middle, Ukraine’s courageous fight for global democracy, the future of European security, the shape of a new world in which major powers carve out spheres of influence, and Australia’s defence investment with the budget and election looming. Peter and David also discuss gaps in their reading habits.

The Economist’s Shashank Joshi on Trump, Ukraine and Europe’s rearmament

Donald Trump has upended US foreign policy—in particular his nation’s role in supporting Ukraine’s self-defence against Russia’s unprovoked invasion, and its traditionally close relationship with its NATO allies in Europe. As a consequence, Europe is scrambling to lift its defence investment and capability with a sense of urgency not seen in the post-War years.

The Economist’s Defence Editor Shashank Joshi gives us his expert take on the latest developments, what they mean and where the world is headed from here. Shashank helps us to understand what Trump is trying to do, how Europe sees the threat from Russia in a possible future in which Putin’s aggression is rewarded rather than penalised, and the increasingly positive signs of strong European leadership to take up the role defending a liberal international order. Finally he gives his view on what it all means for Australia and the Indo-Pacific.

A new world order? Ukraine’s Ambassador on Russia, the United States and Europe

In this special episode of Stop the World, ASPI’s David Wroe speaks with Ukraine’s Ambassador to Australia, Vasyl Myroshnychenko, on the morning after US and Russian representatives met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

The Ambassador responds to the blizzard of recent developments affecting the prospect of a peace agreement to end Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against its democratic neighbour as we approach the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion. He talks about signs of a turning point in the world order, Ukraine’s hopes of joining NATO, recent remarks from the Trump administration, a security guarantee for the Ukrainian people, and the grim future the world faces if aggression is allowed to go unchecked.

Guests:

David Wroe

Vasyl Myroshnychenko

Strategic shifts with Thijs van der Plas, Anita Nergaard and Scott M. Oudkirk

In the latest episode of Stop the World, ASPI’s Executive Director Justin Bassi is joined by Netherlands Ambassador to NATO Thijs van der Plas, Norway’s Ambassador to NATO Anita Nergaard and the US Chargé d’affaires to NATO Scott M. Oudkirk. 

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO has undergone a strategic shift with increased collective defence spending and the expansion of the alliance to include Finland and Sweden. This conversation explores NATO’s recent evolution and how Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine contributed to it. 

Justin, Thijs, Anita and Scott also discuss the current state of the war in Ukraine and whether the conflict is headed towards a stalemate, or if there is a credible path towards a Ukrainian victory. They also talk about China’s role in enabling the Russian war effort, the introduction of North Korean troops into the conflict and how to deter Russia’s increasing hybrid warfare. 

Finally, they explore NATO’s relationship with the Indo-Pacific, including its ties with the Indo-Pacific Four countries – Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand – and they discuss the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. 

Guests:
Thijs van der Plas
Anita Nergaard
Scott M. Oudkirk

Not just another conversation on Russia, with Mark Galeotti

This week on the pod, David Wroe interviews Russia expert Mark Galeotti. Mark is a renowned author of many books, including ‘We Need to Talk About Putin’ and ‘Downfall: Prigozhin, Putin, and the new fight for the future of Russia’, and host of the podcast ‘In Moscow’s Shadows’.

David asks Mark for an update on Russia’s war on Ukraine, whether time is on Ukraine or Russia’s side, the impacts of the war on Russia domestically and Putin’s hold on power. They also discuss the increase of Russia’s sabotage activities across Europe and the potential impacts of the US elections on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Mark is a true Russia expert and he’s full of insights that you’re unlikely to have heard elsewhere.

Guests:

⁠David Wroe⁠

⁠Mark Galeotti

Russia, North Korea and nuclear threats with Bee Yun Jo and Peter Tesch

This week on Stop the World, we bring you the second episode in our special series recorded from the sidelines of the ASPI Defence Conference ‘JoiningFORCES’.

In this episode, the conversation is all about North Korea, Russia, China and nuclear threats. Alex Bristow speaks to former Australian diplomat and defence official, Peter Tesch, and Dr Bee Yun Jo, Associate Research Fellow at the Center for Security and Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. They consider the increased alignment and cooperation between Russia and China, and between Russia and North Korea as seen through Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Pyongyang. They also discuss Russia’s war in Ukraine, the risks of further escalation by Moscow, and how the West should respond.

Note: This episode was recorded on the sidelines of the conference, so please forgive the less than perfect audio quality.

Guests:

⁠Alex Bristow⁠

⁠Peter Tesch⁠

⁠Bee Yun Jo

EU security and strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific

This week on Stop the World, ASPI Senior Analyst Alex Bristow speaks to Niclas Kvarnström, Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European ExternalAction Service, to discuss the European Union’s engagement in and relationship with the Indo-Pacific.

With war in Europe and conflict in the Middle East, they discuss how much capacity the European Union (EU) has to focus on the Indo-Pacific, how Russia’s war on Ukraine has forced a rethink of the EU’s future security, as well as its relationship with China.

And in the episode’s second segment, Alex is joined by William Leben, Expert Associate at the Australian National University’s National Security College, to unpack his recent ASPI report ‘Escalation risks in the Indo-Pacific: a review for practitioners’. They discuss the main threats to strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific, how a potential crisis in the region might develop, and whether or not AUKUS will contribute to a balance of power in the region.

Mentioned in this episode:

⁠https://www.aspi.org.au/report/escalation-risks-indo-pacific-review-practitioners#:~:text=The%20outbreak%20of%20war%20in,potential%20miscalculations%20heighten%20the%20risk⁠.

Guests:

⁠Alex Bristow⁠

Niclas Kvarnström

⁠William Leben

Tag Archive for: Russia

Indonesia has good reasons to reject Russian aircraft basing

Indonesia has plenty of reason to reject basing of Russian aircraft at its air force base on Biak, an island north of New Guinea at 1,400 km from Darwin.

From Russia’s point of view, keeping aircraft at the Manuhua Air Force Base would add to its prestige and might also be helpful to its ‘no-limits’ partner, China.

Whether it has asked for such access is disputed. Defence publisher Janes, citing Indonesian government sources and documents that it had reviewed, reported on 14 April that Russia had asked to base several aircraft on Manuhua; this would be a step up from aircraft merely transiting through the airfield. A day later the Indonesia Defence Ministry said the report was ‘incorrect’. But the Australian, a newspaper, said in an unsourced 28 April report that the Australian government had known in February of Russian requests to use Indonesian airfields for long-range military aircraft.

No one has suggested Indonesia has accepted such a proposal. Acceptance would indeed amount to a huge change in foreign policy and would roil the strategic situation in the region. It is not clear that Indonesian leaders would want to engage in such drastic initiatives.

Moreover, Indonesia has always presented itself as non-aligned, and it is proud of this self-image. As the Foreign Ministry said on 17 April, ‘Indonesia has never granted permission to any country to build or possess a military base in Indonesia.’

Though one can quibble over the true extent of Indonesia’s non-alignment, at the very least, the superficial trademarks of non-alignment are important to the country. Accepting the Russian proposal to use an Indonesian air base would severely dent the country’s non-aligned stature.

Acceptance would upset Indonesia’s international relationships, including the one with Australia, with which it has have become increasingly close. Indonesia knows that Russian aircraft basing on its territory would not please Canberra. Indeed, Australia would consider basing Russian combat aircraft so close to Australian territory a seriously unfriendly act.

Other powers, including India, the United States and Japan, would also be displeased. These are all powers with which Indonesia enjoys good relations and hopes to deepen ties. Even India, which has good relations with Russia, would be concerned about the potential for such a move to enhance China’s power in a vital region, especially so close to the sensitive Malacca straits.

Russian aircraft flying from Biak could conceivably provide valuable wartime reconnaissance and targeting data for China. If Russia were not a declared participant in the war, China’s opponents, such as the US and Australia, could do little to stop this activity. Even in peacetime, the potential to offer such wartime benefits would increase Russia’s clout in Beijing.

A request to base aircraft on Biak, which Moscow’s ambassador to Jakarta has not denied, would be part of a pattern of Russian expansion. Russia has sought to extend its global reach. President Vladimir Putin wants to reassert the country’s traditional great power role, despite its much-weakened condition and its being bogged down in its war against Ukraine.

Russia has been increasing its activities in Africa and the Middle East, areas of traditional Russian influence during the Cold War. Though Russia suffered a setback in Syria last year, its ties with Iran have deepened, with Tehran becoming an important source for drones and ballistic missiles.

Regardless of the practical benefit that Russia gets from this, it clearly enjoys the prestige of global influence.

Though Russia does not have any direct interests at stake in Southeast Asia, Putin likely views a Russian presence in the region as necessary. Russia’s traditional friend in the region has been Vietnam. The Soviets had an important military base in Cam Ranh Bay, reportedly the largest outside their own territory. But the lean years after the Cold War saw Russia withdraw its Indo-Pacific presence.

Nevertheless, Vietnam continues to be an important partner, but it is also concerned about China and is increasingly friendly to the US and its partners. A US aircraft carrier visited Vietnam in 2023 and the country has reportedly agreed to buy F-16 fighters from the US. Vietnam and the region are worried about China’s aggressiveness.

No Russia in Papua: Indonesia’s quiet diplomacy speaks loudly

Indonesia’s low-key rejection of reported Russian interest in military basing in Papua says more than it appears to. While Jakarta’s response was measured, it was deliberate—a calculated expression of Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine of non-alignment, domestic political caution and regional diplomatic restraint.

Australia may view the lack of outrage or strong rhetorical pushback from Jakarta as a sign of ambiguity or even strategic hedging. But this would be a misjudgement of how Indonesia navigates great power competition. The country’s preference for understated diplomacy is not a weakness; it is a product of deeply rooted principles and historical experience.

In early April, media reports emerged suggesting that Russia had requested to base long-range aircraft in Biak, a small island in Papua. The Indonesian defence ministry quickly issued a brief statement rejecting the report. No grandstanding, no televised press conferences and certainly no escalatory rhetoric.

This kind of restraint has long been part of Indonesia’s playbook, and it extends beyond public statements. When Australia’s defence minister contacted Indonesia’s defence minister to seek clarification, Indonesia conveyed its position clearly and directly: the report was false and Jakarta had no intention of allowing such basing. The message was firm and delivered through quiet but unambiguous diplomatic channels. Though some foreign observers may find it unsatisfying, this approach allows Indonesia to preserve room for manoeuvre.

Indonesia’s ‘independent and active’ doctrine is more than a slogan. Indonesia’s recent decision to join BRICS—a group where Russia plays a prominent role—may indicate a gesture of alignment, but it is better understood as part of Jakarta’s broader interest in multipolar forums. Such engagement supports Indonesia’s non-aligned policy, allowing it to engage multiple powers while avoiding entanglement in blocs.

Nevertheless, when combined with other issues, such as the Biak basing reports, it is understandable that these developments may concern Canberra. This non-aligned stance has helped Indonesia weather Cold War pressures, regional conflicts and, more recently, the strategic tug-of-war between the United States and China.

This concern reflects longstanding patterns in the Australia-Indonesia relationship. The relationship has long been shaped by shared strategic interests, from maritime security and disaster response to regional stability, even as it has experienced periods of tension and recalibration.

Jakarta responded to the Biak report with a firm but calm statement, showing its typical diplomatic style. At the same time, it was careful to ensure that partners such as Australia would not misunderstand its silence as uncertainty. These geographic realities heighten Canberra’s sensitivities, but they do not change Jakarta’s steady posture. Long-range Russian aircraft stationed in Indonesia, if ever realised, would understandably trigger strategic concern in Canberra.

Jakarta’s restraint is not an invitation to doubt its alignment or question its reliability. It is a signal of how it intends to manage rising geopolitical pressure: by staying calm, avoiding theatre and asserting control over its own narrative. That narrative is grounded in sovereignty and, yes, in a form of regional leadership that values stability over spectacle.

Indonesia also understands that loud declarations can backfire, especially when domestic dynamics are at play. In fact, civil society observers and policy analysts have openly reminded the Prabowo administration to remain sober and uphold Indonesia’s long-standing non-alignment, cautioning against any defence postures that could invite strategic misperception.

The government is sensitive to how Papua features in both international and domestic political debates. Amplifying the Biak story could have generated unnecessary heat and risked politicising a defence matter that Jakarta was keen to close quickly.

For Australia, the key is not to misread silence as passivity or fence-sitting. Indonesia’s approach may not always align with Canberra’s expectations of strategic signalling, but that does not make it opaque. Instead, it calls for a deeper understanding of how Indonesia communicates intent: often subtly, often on its own terms.

The Australia-Indonesia relationship is stronger when both sides recognise each other’s strategic cultures. Australia prefers clarity and predictability in foreign policy, while Indonesia sometimes keeps its position flexible to reduce external pressure. These differences are not flaws; they are features to be managed with mutual respect.

Misreading Indonesia’s restraint risks reinforcing a false binary: the idea that if a partner isn’t loudly with us, they must be against us. The idea that Australia needs to ‘do business with partners who have friends we don’t like’ oversimplifies the complexity of regional partnerships. Such phrasing may be analytically useful, but it risks normalising transactional attitudes in relationships that require nuance, reciprocity and long-term investment.

Indonesia’s foreign policy is rarely that binary. It is calibrated, complex and designed for flexibility. Recognising this approach for what it is—not a lack of commitment, but a deliberate form of regional statecraft—can help Australia navigate its strategic partnership with Indonesia more constructively.

Joint naval exercises with Russia undermine Indonesia’s commitment to international law

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has repeatedly asserted the country’s commitment to a non-aligned foreign policy. But can Indonesia still credibly claim neutrality while tacitly engaging with Russia?

Holding an unprecedented bilateral naval drills with Moscow in Indonesian waters while Russia wages a full-scale war against Ukraine is a strategic misstep. The move risks undermining Indonesia’s own stated commitment to upholding international law. It also creates a perception of inconsistency in its foreign policy and weakens its moral standing on the global stage.

In November 2024, Indonesia and Russia held their first-ever bilateral naval exercise, Orruda Joint Training, in the Java Sea near Surabaya. While Russia had previously participated in regional maritime drills with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2021, this was the first time Jakarta engaged in naval exercises solely with Moscow. The move was deemed controversial, as it took place amid widespread condemnation of Russia for its serious breaches of international law.

Shortly after the drills with Russia, Indonesia also conducted its largest-ever combined military exercise with Australia, Keris Woomera. Taking place from 13 to 16 November under the Indonesia-Australia Defence Cooperation Agreement, the exercise involved around 2000 personnel from both nations’ navies, armies and air forces. Similarly, from 25 August to 6 September 2024, Indonesia hosted its annual Super Garuda Shield exercise with the United States in East Java. Twenty-three nations participated in the drills, with 11 countries actively involved in the exercises.

By conducting drills with both Russian and Western militaries, Indonesia emphasised its non-aligned stance. Analysts state that Jakarta was sending a signal to the world, particularly the Indo-Pacific region, that Indonesia will not take sides and intends to continue building relations with all major powers and regional players.

This position is often cited as part of Jakarta’s ‘free and active’ foreign policy, which reflects its desire to befriend all nations, regardless their political orientation. As Prabowo has stated on multiple occasions, ‘A thousand friends are too few, and one enemy is too many’.

Yet Indonesia’s decision to proceed with naval drills alongside Russia amid that country’s ongoing war in Ukraine is questionable.

Many legal experts have stated that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine violates the UN Charter and constitutes one of the gravest breaches of international law: the crime of aggression.

On 27 February 2022, Indonesia joined 140 other countries in a UN General Assembly resolution that condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, reaffirming its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence unity, and territorial integrity. The resolution further ‘[deplored] in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter’. This signals Indonesia’s apparent stance against Russian aggression—a signal that contradicts its justifications for the joint military exercises.

On 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, the Commissioner for Children’s Rights. This was followed by warrants on 5 March 2024 against Lieutenant General Sergei Kobylash and Admiral Viktor Sokolov for war crimes and crimes against humanity. On 24 June 2024, further warrants were issued for Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov on similar charges.

Indonesia’s non-alignment provides the flexibility to engage in military training with any nation. However, conducting exercises with a state that is in flagrant violation of international law is highly imprudent, especially while the conflict is ongoing.

Moreover, if Jakarta intends to justify its position under the banner of non-alignment, it must revisit the principles set forth at the 1955 Bandung Conference, which served as the bedrock for the formal founding of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Chief among these principles is mutual respect for sovereignty and non-aggression. Engaging in military training with an aggressor directly contradicts the very essence of non-alignment.

Europe can still prevent a Russian victory

When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he knew that he was upending Europe’s security order. But this was more of a tactical gambit than a calculated strategy and he could not have predicted what would follow. Though Donald Trump’s return to the White House has caught Europe flat-footed, it can still keep Putin from walking away a winner.

For now, Putin seems to hold all the cards. The transatlantic relationship is fracturing, as Trump’s isolationist administration criticises its European allies and casts doubt on his commitment to NATO. Worse, Trump appears to be aligning the United States with Russia in the Ukraine war. While he has threatened to impose new sanctions and tariffs on Russia until a ceasefire and peace deal are reached, he has blamed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the fighting and suspended military aid and intelligence support for Ukraine (now apparently set to resume).

But Europe still has a chance to turn things around. Already, it is abandoning its post-Cold War ‘end of history’ mindset, according to which international law reigned supreme, European militaries were for keeping peace, not fighting wars, and the US could be counted on to safeguard Europe’s security.

Finland and Sweden were perhaps the first to realise that history is back, and their accession to NATO—in 2023 and 2024, respectively—provided a major boost to the Alliance’s northern flank. Now the European Union also appears to be coming to terms with its new security situation, having just announced an $840 billion rearmament plan. Even Germany, for which the return of history is particularly fraught, is preparing to rearm: incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his likely coalition partners have agreed to create a €500 billion infrastructure fund and loosen fiscal rules to allow for greater investment in defence.

The significance of this move should not be underestimated. Since the end of World War II, Germany has eschewed hard power in favour of the soft kind, serving as an engine of European integration and a bulwark of the rules-based world order. Beginning in the 1960s, this included the pursuit of constructive engagement—a foreign-policy approach known as Ostpolitik—with the Soviet Union and then Russia. This explains former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s embrace of Russian energy supplies, despite the objections of other EU members and the US.

Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine drove a stake through the heart of Ostpolitik. Within days, Merkel’s successor, Olaf Scholz, announced an ‘epochal change’ (Zeitenwende) in Germany’s defence and foreign policy. But it is Merz who is set to oversee a true break from Germany’s postwar past—a change that will require the country to confront the most daunting, destructive ghosts of its history.

For starters, there is the fiscal revolution. Germany’s frugality has been a source of considerable tension in the EU, particularly during the eurozone debt crisis of the early 2010s. But Germans—not least Merkel—recalled all too well how hyperinflation had paved the way for the rise of Adolf Hitler, and in 2009 Merkel’s first government introduced a constitutional restriction on structural budget deficits to 0.35 percent of GDP annually, also known as the debt brake. Against this backdrop, Merz’s planned overhaul of borrowing rules—including the modification and possible elimination of the debt brake—represents a radical change in Germany’s priorities.

More broadly, Merz appears prepared to embrace European leadership. Despite being the EU’s largest economy, Germany has long been reluctant to assume a genuine leadership role in Europe, particularly in the security domain. The combination of Russian revanchism and US isolationism, however, has made this stance untenable. As Europe’s most populous country, situated in the continent’s ‘geostrategic centre’, Merz says, Germany must ‘take greater responsibility for leadership’ on defence.

Any effort to keep Europe secure starts with Ukraine. As it stands, Trump wants to have his cake and eat it: ‘negotiate’ a peace deal—which will almost certainly involve capitulation to Russia and an economic shakedown of Ukraine—then walk away and let Europe enforce it. But what good is a peace broker who offers no guarantees?

To avoid a repeat of the Munich Agreement of 1938—when France and Britain forced Czechoslovakia to cede territory to Hitler, setting the stage for WWII—Europe must step up quickly to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield and, thus, at the negotiating table. Fortunately, substituting lost US financial aid will not be as difficult as Trump would have us believe: to date, Europe has provided far more support for Ukraine’s war effort in dollar terms than the US has. Fulfilling the weapons gap would, however, be far more challenging and probably impossible in the all-important short term.

Once a peace agreement is reached, Europe will have to act as its guarantor—and that means delivering effective deterrence against Russian aggression. A credible nuclear umbrella is essential. That is why Merz has suggested replacing US nuclear warheads in Europe with French and British alternatives. There is even talk of Germany becoming a nuclear power itself.

When NATO intervened in the Kosovo War in 1999, Germany’s then-chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, ruled that sending ground troops to fight in a country that had once been occupied by Hitler’s Wehrmacht was ‘unthinkable’. Today, as Merz seems to recognise, the unthinkable has become necessary. Only if Germany—and Europe as a whole—puts aside its moral and political inhibitions can it continue to perform its most important role: as a global force for peace and a defender of democratic principles.

How Russia will reassess its ties with North Korea after Ukraine

An agreement to end the war in Ukraine could transform Russia’s relations with North Korea. Moscow is unlikely to reduce its cooperation with Pyongyang to pre-2022 levels, but it may become more selective about areas of cooperation.

Regardless of how favourable a settlement it can achieve in Ukraine, Russia will want to challenge the US-led security architecture in Asia. Cooperation with North Korea can be a tool for this.

Russia has already made clear that it wants to be more involved in Asia: during meetings with Chinese, North Korean and Vietnamese leaders last year, it called for new security mechanisms in the region.

Military cooperation is a core of the deepened partnership between Russia and North Korea, with Moscow helping Pyongyang to modernise its military capabilities. Reportedly, Russia has sent air-defence systems, provided technologies for intercontinental ballistic missiles and agreed to supply North Korea with fighter aircraft.

Still, Moscow may be wary of sharing too much, as North Korea could become a competitor on the arms market by making cheaper copies of Russian weapons. So the pace of transfers from Russia to North Korea may decline.

Arms trade between Moscow and Pyongyang has weakened the nonproliferation regime and undermined international sanctions. This collective resistance highlights a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms: Russia simply ignores the threat of punishment, as the US ability to coerce North Korea and Russia to adhere to sanctions is limited. North Korea is notorious for its sophisticated schemes to evade sanctions and can easily work around new restrictions. Furthermore, North Korea can cooperate with Russian entities to diversify its own illegal supply chains.

North Korea has exported military equipment to Russia during the war, but Russia’s demand for it will diminish when the fighting stops. A step-up in supplies of civilian goods from North Korea is unlikely to replace this trade, because of the limitations of its economy.

North Korea can offer few goods that would be competitive in the Russian market. Its primary exports—natural resources—are abundant in Russia. Moreover, North Korea is not a useful conduit for Russia to import Western goods, because it has limited trade with Europe, unlike China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. As sanctions are partially lifted, Moscow will prioritise restoring economic ties with the West to boost its economy.

Russia will also want South Korea to lift sanctions and normalise economic relations with it. South Korea is one of Russia’s major trading partners, and the two economies have complementary structures. To approach Seoul, Moscow will need to scale down its military and technology cooperation with Pyongyang.

Still, Russia will want to keep a friendly North Korea as a backup option in case the West and its friends decide to reinstate sanctions.

When the fighting ends, the future of North Korean troops in Russia will become a controversial issue. While a peace deal would reduce the need for them militarily, they will probably be used as labourers in Russian-occupied territories.

Since the start of the war, Russia’s labour market has shrunk due to high enlistment numbers and a decline in foreign workers. In 2022, Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin proposed to invite around 50,000 North Korean workers to supplement the Russian workforce. In 2024, the number of North Korean workers sent to Russia skyrocketed.  If Russia continues to struggle with labour shortages, it may persist with this policy.

Moscow and Pyongyang can also continue cooperation in non-sanctioned areas, such as tourism. Their diplomats have discussed ways to simplify travel regulations to encourage Russian tourists to visit North Korean resorts. Still, North Korea remains a niche destination for Russians. In 2024, only 1500 of them visited North Korea, compared with 200,000 who travelled to South Korea, despite a lack of direct flights.

Academic collaboration is another avenue for cooperation. North Korean agreements with Russian universities include access to advanced technologies and training for specialists. North Korean delegations have visited Russia’s Moscow State University, Novosibirsk State University, Far Eastern Federal University and others, where they focused on joint projects in chemistry, medicine and information technology. As well as sending more students to Russia, North Korea will have opportunities to send illegal workers posing as students.

Peace in Ukraine depends on European commitment

Peace is an attractive, yet elusive, concept. It can mean different things to different people at different times. Ukraine is a case in point. The quest for peace could yield either of two fundamentally different outcomes: a Vichy-style capitulation, perhaps with an interim ceasefire that buys Russia more time to rearm and prepare its next attack, or a robust defence of a frozen frontline, as one finds on the Korean Peninsula today.

The Kremlin’s vision for peace in Ukraine is clear. Russian forces would directly occupy swathes of illegally seized Ukrainian territory, and a compliant, helpless Ukrainian government (lacking any meaningful military capacity) would take orders from Moscow. Something quite similar happened in France during World War II, when the part of the country not under direct German occupation was run by General Philippe Petain’s collaborationist government and took orders from Berlin.

Thus, for most of WWII—roughly between 1940 and 1944—the situation on the ground in France was ‘peaceful’. The Vichy regime under Petain regularly boasted that it had protected France, while blaming the Resistance—French guerrillas—and periodic Allied bombing raids for any disturbances to the ‘peace’. This option has been on offer for Ukraine since the first hours of Russia’s large-scale invasion. Yet having witnessed the executions, rapes and other atrocities committed by Russian forces against civilians in Bucha and elsewhere, the Ukrainians have understandably refused to capitulate.

The alternative is the type of peace that kept Germany peaceful for decades after WWII and kept the Korean Peninsula peaceful since the 1953 armistice. In each case, the peace was secured by accepting de facto borders, which were fortified with massive defensive military buildups, boots on the ground and credible security guarantees. While West Germany enjoyed NATO membership after 1955, South Korea relied on a bilateral alliance with the United States. Even today, the US keeps around 28,000 active-duty troops in South Korea and 50,000 in Germany.

Such backstops made the former wartime frontline almost impregnable, allowing each rump state to consolidate, develop and remain at peace. The equivalent of a West German or South Korean model for Ukraine today would require a freezing of the frontline and either NATO accession or a deployment of tens of thousands of Western troops to Ukrainian territory.

The French government has pushed for this kind of solution since February 2024, and it now features prominently in discussions among European leaders. With the new US administration demanding that Europe do more to ensure its own peace and security, at least a half-dozen European governments are said to be seriously considering it.

Of course, if Europeans dislike the first model (a Vichy-style peace) but prove unable to deliver a sufficient security guarantee, that will create the conditions for a third possible scenario: a bogus peace leading to another war. A temporary ceasefire—like the one that prevailed under the Minsk agreements after 2014—would allow Russia to regroup, rearm and attack again sooner rather than later. Not only might this cycle be repeated more than once; it also could implicate countries beyond Ukraine—such as the Baltics or Poland.

Thus, if Ukraine does not get enough support in the coming months and years, Europe will find itself confronting a dangerous new strategic reality, one that would challenge NATO solidarity and leave EU territory perpetually vulnerable. With enough prodding and hybrid warfare, Russia could test the limits of NATO’s mutual defence guarantee and either expose it as a dead letter or precipitate a direct military confrontation between nuclear powers. Such would be the consequences of a bogus peace.

The immediate task for Europe, then, is not only to navigate US President Donald Trump’s unilateral pursuit of a settlement with Russia that could offer Ukraine on a platter to Russia, but also to ensure that any deal does not increase the likelihood of an even wider war in the near future.

Many Europeans think that if Russia could not conquer Ukraine in 2022, Russia would not dare challenge NATO and the European Union. That is dangerously wishful thinking. Occupying most of Ukraine would not only allow Russia to expand its territory, but also allow it to unite Europe’s biggest and second-biggest armies, under Kremlin command. Occupied territories bring in new people, defence production capacities, and resources—from rare-earth minerals to gas and nuclear power plants. Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity—which has been impressive in multiple areas, from sea drones to the sheer capacity to produce equipment en masse—would be a welcome bonus for Russia as well, and it could be used against Europe. French President Emmanuel Macron already publicly warned that the combined armed forces of Russia and Ukraine would be unstoppable.

The bottom line is that avoiding a Ukrainian capitulation or a fake peace will require a European commitment to, at the very least, freezing the current frontline. Otherwise, vulnerable EU and NATO members could be the next targets. European public opinion must wake up to the reality that the only alternative is something that no one wants: a perpetual threat of war for much of Central and Northern Europe, with all the security and economic uncertainty that comes with it.

Trump’s turbulence shifts Australia’s focus to Europe

The SS United States is the largest American ocean liner to be entirely built at home.  To this day, it holds the speed record for crossing the Atlantic Ocean, which it set on its 1952 maiden voyage thanks to its military-grade propulsion.

Informed by a wartime need to move soldiers and materiel to Europe, the luxury liner had been designed to be readily convertible to a troopship that could swiftly deliver a 14,000-strong US Army division anywhere in the world. 

Despite decades of rust and decay, the beauty and power of the now 75-year-old vessel was evident when I had a private tour of United States in Philadelphia some years ago. Once emblematic of US primacy and trans-Atlantic ties, the ship is soon to be an artificial reef off Florida. Its fate and destination—in the re-named ‘Gulf of America’—is a depressingly apt metaphor for what America is becoming. 

The domestic whirlwind sweeping the US is echoed in its foreign policy, with serious implications for Australia’s strategic interests.  President Trump not only has renamed a map feature, he also is opening a gulf between the US and its long-time partners and allies—and Moscow and Beijing are strategic beneficiaries. 

While Australia rightly will remain committed to the Alliance which has underpinned our national security for decades, we must recognise that other countries that share our principled strategic goals will become more important to our national and regional security. 

Regional partnerships remain critical, but European nations—with their own experience of an autocratic neighbour—can help buffer our region against Trumpian caprice and resist growing pressure from a would-be hegemon, China. 

In his first term, Trump’s goading and confrontational bluster was fuelled by his unquenchable thirst for publicity. This time, it is more visceral, informed by conviction (in more than one sense of the word), and underpinned by determined malice and vindictiveness. 

This has been especially evident in his disdain for Ukrainian sovereignty, his dismissive attitude and threats towards NATO and Europe, and his solicitous courting of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. 

Barely a month in office, Trump has shifted the strategic balance more decisively in Russia’s favour than the Kremlin had been able to since Putin started his full-fledged, illegal and unjustifiable war of choice against Ukraine in February 2022. Trump deludes himself about the real aggressor, denigrating Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy while trying to monetise Ukraine’s existential war and extort an arms-for-minerals deal in a shakedown that would make Don Corleone blush. 

It is shameful that one democracy should be willing thus to abandon another to the predations of an autocracy. 

We are yet to see any strategic quid pro quo for Trump’s unilateral turn towards the Kremlin. His innately mercurial approach and pathological need to ‘win’ yet may disappoint Moscow, but Europe will scramble in the short term to compensate for any abrupt diminution in US commitment to trans-Atlantic security. Decisive leadership and vision will be vital, but the recent German election results underscore that this is not a given. 

In Who Will Defend Europe? Keir Giles, one of Britain’s leading Russia analysts, examines the self-imposed constraints that prevented the EU and NATO from adjusting fast enough to the end of the post-post-Cold War era and the return of strategic competition. At the core was Europe’s lack of military-industrial readiness and political resolve to confront a revanchist Russia. Those shortcomings must now be reddressed with long-overdue urgency. 

Giles usefully illuminates the wider malaise afflicting other nations grappling with the new world disorder and revisionist risk-takers who see strategic gain in near-term opportunism and confrontation. His arguments underscore an important consideration for Australia in coping with the turbulence and disruption emanating from Washington. 

Australia will need to maintain its natural focus on our Indo-Pacific region, but we will benefit at the same time from deeper collaboration with European counterparts in building national resilience here and elsewhere. By pooling our respective experience of autocratic efforts to subvert domestic cohesion and undermine trust in our democratic institutions, we will be better able jointly to contend with what’s become known as the Axis of Upheaval.

We can learn from the forthright approach of NATO’s newest members, Sweden and Finland.  Both use the concept of ‘total defence’, in which aspects of national strength, including social resilience and economic power, contribute to the defence of the nation, and from the honesty with which their governments articulate the challenges their societies face. 

Though varied in size and heft, Norway and the Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) have deeply relevant and valuable experience as frontline states that share not just a continent but a common border with an imperially-minded power whose strategic goals are misaligned with those of democracies that trust in, and rely on, the international rule of law for their security and prosperity rather than the application of military force. 

Poland is also a valuable exemplar.  Like Estonia and Sweden, it has been pushing back against disinformation for years.  It recently put one of its most seasoned diplomats in charge of countering subversion and is also hosting a multinational Communications Group to better co-ordinate efforts at debunking misleading Russian narratives. 

As the SS United States began its final voyage, Susan Gibbs, the grand-daughter of the ship’s designer observed: ‘The ship will forever symbolize our nation’s strength, innovation, and resilience.’  While we must hope that these qualities will endure in the Alliance, we would be prudent to cultivate them more assiduously in our relations with Europe. 

North Korea is the big beneficiary in its military partnership with Russia

North Korea is getting more out of its engagement in Russia’s war than Russia is getting from North Korea.

The forces that Pyongyang has sent to fight Ukraine are poorly equipped and are not performing well. Yet, the military-technological help that Russia is sending to North Korea in return is highly valuable.

Moscow’s assistance to Pyongyang is somewhat destabilising for East Asia, since any increase in North Korean military strength heightens the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea should respond by helping Ukraine.

The growing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia is substantial. Among other reasons for this military-cum-strategic partnership, North Korea eyes several strategic and tactical goals. These include the modernisation of its military capabilities, access to Russian military technologies, combat experience, help in launching spy satellites into space, bolstering its air-defence networks and possible diplomatic cover at the United Nations from international sanctions.

The troops provided by North Korea lack battlefield expertise despite some reportedly being part of North Korea’s special forces. They’re also unfamiliar with the terrain of Russia and Ukraine. Two South Korean lawmakers, Lee Sung-kwon and Park Sun-won have said that North Korean troops deployed in Russia suffer from a ‘poor understanding of modern warfare tactics’. Recently, Ukrainian defence forces wiped out an entire battalion of North Korean troops in Makhnovka, a village in Kursk.

The artillery ammunition, rockets and missiles imported from North Korea have proliferated across Russian defences in large volumes, outdoing EU production lines. Their poor quality translates to low accuracy. While such low-tech weaponry might frustrate Russian soldiers, without it the Russian war machine would slacken.

Consider, however, what North Korea is getting in return. First, Russia sends oil from Vostochny, a port east of Vladivostok, to the North Korean city of Chongjin. But its aid to Pyongyang beyond oil is more important because North Korea is technologically starved.

Russia has already responded to North Korea’s help by sending it air defence systems. According to South Korean intelligence reports, North Korea’s air defences have been outdated and need great improvement to combat South Korean and US air power.

Although North Korean soldiers in the Russia-Ukraine war have not been highly effective, they are learning. Moreover, the war has introduced them to drone warfare. Pyongyang can look forward to this experience improving the combat power of its forces in its own theatre of potential conflict, the peninsula.

The big concern is that Russia may help improve North Korea’s nuclear forces, which in some respects remain somewhat limited. For example, Pyongyang would probably want help in improving its ballistic missile technology, particularly for intercontinental strikes. It must also want nuclear weapons—or better nuclear weapons—for submarines.

Jenny Town of the Stimson Centre, argues that if Russia’s dependence on North Korea expands, the deeper cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang is likely to intensify, and may facilitate the development of nuclear technologies in North Korea.

Earlier this year, the deputy US representative to the UN, Dorothy Camille Shea, warned the Security Council that North Korea might be gaining an upper hand in its military relationship with Moscow, which could strengthen it and make it more capable of destabilising its neighbours.

Scholar Robert Carlin argues that North Korea previously built and tested advanced weapons systems as leverage in negotiations with South Korea and the United States. However, North Korea may now be less interested such negotiations.

Although South Korea’s correct response should be to help Ukraine more, it is still debating whether to send lethal weapons. They could include the Cheonmu multiple rocket launcher, K9 self-propelled howitzer and 155 mm shells.

The South Korean public does not support arms transfers to Ukraine. Indeed, all non-lethal aid from Seoul is routed through the US, since direct supply could create unnecessary friction with Moscow.

In response to the growing relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang, Seoul is at least increasing cooperation with democratic partners.  For example, upon NATO’s request, the South Korean government sent a delegation to Brussels to discuss possibilities for intelligence sharing. And in 2022, South Korea opened its diplomatic mission to NATO.

To deal with Russia, first understand what Putin wants

President Donald Trump has said he wants to end the fighting in Ukraine quickly. But it’s far from clear whether this is achievable, not least because the war in Ukraine has become a proxy for Putin’s wider confrontation with the West.

Trump’s campaign pledge that he would end the fighting within 24 hours has already been modified, with the new president and his advisers more recently discussing a period of three to six months. Trump has signalled plans for an early meeting with Vladimir Putin, while the United States’s special adviser to Ukraine is expected to visit Kyiv soon.

Putin will likely welcome a meeting with his US counterpart, not least because it will put him where he always wanted to be: talking directly to Washington, one great power to another, disposing of world affairs. This appeals to the Russian president’s concern for his, and Russia’s, appropriate standing in global affairs.

Moreover, Putin will likely fancy that he can play the incoming president, much as reports claim he did at their Helsinki summit in 2018. He will also consider himself to be in a strong position to drive a hard bargain on Ukraine.

He thinks he’s winning and that time is on his side. To some extent, he has a point.

Russia has the upper hand in what has become a brutal war of attrition. Russian forces have been making slow, costly yet inexorable progress, pushing the outmanned and outgunned Ukrainian defenders onto the backfoot. Meanwhile, relentless missile and drone attacks have taken a high toll on Ukrainian energy and civilian infrastructure.

Western countries are facing domestic political and economic pressures and distractions. Putin calculates that this, coupled with uncertainty over Trump’s approach to the US’s European allies, will lead the West to tire of supporting Kyiv and to welcome a deal.

To date, Putin has shown no real interest in a negotiated settlement—except on his own terms. These terms would effectively amount to capitulation by Kyiv and are by no means in the West’s interests.

Putin has not resiled from his core objective to bring Ukraine to heel, install a more pliable government in Kyiv, and draw Ukraine back firmly within Russia’s sphere of influence.

He won’t therefore be satisfied with just a ceasefire. Rather, he’ll want recognition of Russia’s annexed territories and a pledge of permanent Ukrainian neutrality and disarmament.

This relates to Putin’s wider objectives. As the war has continued, he has increasingly described Ukraine as a proxy for what he portrays as a wider existential conflict between Russia and the West. Resisting purported Western hostility towards Russia is now crucial in legitimising Putin’s continued rule.

Putin also wants to revise the post-Cold War security settlement in Europe and restore Russia’s global standing and influence. This was the essence of treaties that Moscow proposed in December 2021 on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine.

How the Trump administration deals with Moscow will be crucial not only for Ukraine’s future, but also for wider European and global security.

A quick, partial deal now would eventually come back to bite the US and its European allies.

If Trump wants a quick deal, he will press Ukraine to accept a ceasefire along the current lines of fighting. Kyiv may indeed have to accept a loss of territory as part of a settlement. But unless this is accompanied by robust Western (above all, US) security guarantees, such an agreement is unlikely to last, giving Russia the opportunity to rebuild its forces. Once it senses that Western attention has shifted elsewhere, Moscow will be emboldened to resume its subjugation of Ukraine.

The smarter approach for Washington would instead be to try and even up the scales by intensifying pressure on Putin to nudge him into negotiations while strengthening Ukraine’s hand ahead of any talks.

For example, Putin is keen to secure a relaxation of Western economic and technology sanctions so the Russian economy can recover and Moscow can reduce its stark dependence on China. Western states should give no such relief. Sanctions should instead be stepped up to increase pressure on the already-weakened Russian economy.

Washington should also pledge to increase military and economic support for Kyiv, signalling to Putin that he’s unlikely to achieve his aims in eastern Ukraine.

These measures would push Moscow to agree to talks to end the fighting and would strengthen Kyiv’s hand (and that of its Western backers) ahead of any such negotiations.

Early signals from the new administration are encouraging. Trump has urged Putin to agree to end the fighting in Ukraine, threatening otherwise to increase pressure substantially on Moscow, including through expanded sanctions.

Even so, securing a long-term, durable settlement in Ukraine involves more than this. It will also require Washington and its European allies to face up squarely to Moscow’s more confrontational and expansive ambitions.

The question is whether the new US administration will do this.

The 16th Madeleine Award: truths and totems in tumultuous times

Amid tumultuous times, it’s the annual moment to lift the curtain, up the lights and open the envelopes for the 16th Madeleine Award for symbol, stunt, prop, gesture or jest.

The Madeleine is a silly-season special, served at year’s start with a soupcon of seriousness, seeking sense in sayings, signs and symbols.

The award is inspired by the late Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the United Nations (1993 to 1997) and US secretary of state (1997 to 2001), who sent diplomatic messages via her lapel brooches. Now displayed at America’s diplomacy museum, those lapel pins expressed ‘hopes, determination, impatience, warnings or warm feelings’.

For Albright, it wasn’t ‘read my lips’ but ‘read my pins’. Her favourite mistake was taunting Vladimir Putin over Russia’s military brutality by wearing three monkey brooches, representing Putin’s stance of ‘See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil’. Putin went ape. Sometimes the message is just too sharp, Albright reflected, judging ‘I’d gone too far’.

With no monkeying about, we turn to the minor Madeleines. The first is the OOPS! Award for blooper and blunder. This slip-up star is almost always won by a politician. The prize’s nickname is ‘The Boris’, in honour of Boris Johnson who provides the OOPS! axiom: ‘There are no disasters, only opportunities. And, indeed, opportunities for fresh disasters.’

The Boris winner is South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol, for imposing martial law. Yoon’s power grab—the first use of martial law in 44 years—was a gamble that crashed in six hours. The president declared emergency rule at 10:30 pm on 3 December, only to lift it at 4:30 am on 4 December after the members of the National Assembly rushed to vote to overturn the decree. By 14 December, the assembly had impeached the president, and he faces the possibility of a separate charge of treason. For conjuring up a disaster that destroyed his leadership, Yoon becomes a worthy member of the Order of the OOPS!

Next is the ‘Diana prize’, marking ‘the utility and force of photographs’. The trophy is named for Diana, princess of Wales, a noblewoman who understood that you’re nix without pix: ‘As Diana used to say, the picture is what counts,’ former British prime minister Tony Blair wrote.

The Diana goes to the photo of Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese being welcomed to Papua New Guinea with headdress and garb. The picture by the ABC’s Melissa Clarke is a winner, not least, because it overturns the don’t-look-silly-rule of the political minder class: never let your boss wear a strange hat or unusual costume. Context beats the minder rule. Albanese was on his way to walk the Kokoda Track with PNG’s prime minister. The image shows a cheerful leader paying homage to PNG as well as to the military legend of Kokoda.

While giving the Diana to Albo in PNG headdress, the judges point to one of the greatest ever news pix, the July photograph of a bloodied Donald Trump with his raised fist and an American flag in the background, after he’d been wounded in an assassination attempt. The photo by Associated Press photojournalist Evan Vucci is in the same class as that of the US Marines raising the American flag on Iwo Jima in World War II. Journalists use the word ‘iconic’ too often, but Vucci’s image reaches that rare grade. The only defences for not gonging Vucci’s magnificent work is that the Diana tends toward light, not shade, and Trump was last year’s Diana winner, for his scowling police mugshot after being indicted on racketeering charges.

Now to the George Orwell prize for double think. In Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston Smith labours in the Ministry of Truth, rewriting the past so history meets the shifting needs of the Party. In that spirit, the Orwell goes to Russia for creating a modern Ministry in RuWiki, to counter Wikipedia. In the RuWiki rendering of Vladimir Putin’s truth, Russian atrocities in Ukraine are merely ‘Western disinformation’.

As Foreign Policy commented: ‘RuWiki is an isolated digital ecosystem that has created an alternate reality. In this version, Holodomor, the man-made famine under Stalin’s rule that killed up to 8 million Ukrainians by some estimates, never happened.’ RuWiki lives the slogans Orwell describes carved into the concrete facade of the Ministry of Truth: ‘War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength.’

We stay in Russia for the Madeleine Award itself. Finding hope in Putin’s Russia is the mark of an award that arcs towards optimism, channelling a great Albright line: ‘I am an optimist who worries a lot.’

In that spirit, the 16th Madeleine goes to an inspiring Russian politician, Alexei Navalny, killed in jail by the regime on 16 February 2024, at the age of 47. A fine obituary judgement of the opposition leader is that Navalny didn’t just defy Putin, he showed up his depravity, exposing the fear and greed at the heart of Russia’s regime.

Putin’s first attempt to murder Navalny was in 2020, when the lawyer was poisoned by nerve agent. Navalny survived and recovered in Germany. Then, he bravely returned to Russia, knowing exactly what he would face—a rigged trial and exile to the modern gulags. At the close of his trial, Navalny blasted the court with a favourite movie line: ‘Tell me, where does power lie? I believe that power lies in the truth.’

Alexei Navalny was a proud Russian nationalist who used his own life to symbolise what Russia should be. More than gesture, this was sacrifice expressed as greatness.