Tag Archive for: rules-based order

Will Australia defend the ‘rules-based order’ in Asia?

China has become the most formidable challenge to Asia’s regional order, and to Australia’s stake in that order, since the days of Japanese imperialism. It’s not just its growing economic and military power but increasingly Beijing is experimenting with order building and it’s plainly trying to exert political influence beyond its borders.

The heated and polarised debate in Australia about the consequences of China’s ‘sharp power’ is a notable consequence of this. And it has brought into focus the crucial issue of the future of the ‘rules-based order’ in the region, an image invoked by the Turnbull government in numerous speeches and policy statements.

Famously, the 2016 Defence White Paper used the term 56 times, defined a ‘stable global rules-based order’ as one of Australia’s three ‘core strategic interests’ and plainly stated that the country’s armed forces should be prepared to fight alongside allies and partners to defend this order. In comments following a recent speech at La Trobe University, Julie Bishop said that the country had to be prepared to fight to defend the order, the alternative being ‘catastrophic’.

But will Australia really defend the rules-based order in Asia? As we argue in the latest issue of Asian Survey, it’s too easy to dismiss the concept as an ‘increasingly meaningless expression’. Rather, the organisational weight of the ‘rules-based’ formulation shouldn’t be underestimated. Its emergence is a direct response to an international order in growing disarray and a reduced willingness and capacity of key countries to enforce those rules. After all, secondary powers such as Australia are price-takers in the international strategic balance.

Navigating great-power rivalry and the broader challenges of international politics are much more difficult when questions of raw power are determinative. A world in which ‘might makes right’ is considerably less appealing for Canberra than a world in which power is moderated by liberal ideas and rules, supported by a militarily powerful America. Simply put, Canberra has neither an interest in the emergence of a US–Sino ‘power-sharing arrangement’, nor in a China-centric regional order.

The government’s strong emphasis on the rules-based order is an effort to signal Australia’s willingness to join a broad ‘coalition against revisionism’ by major powers such as China. If the liberal international order in its current configuration ceases to exist, Australia is likely to opt for the ‘second best’ option. Led by America, this coalition would include democratic and non-democratic countries, and would be based on common interests (rather than common values) such as the prevention of Chinese hegemony in East Asia.

While more flexible and uncertain than the previous system—in that the US is likely to feel less restraint when its key interests are at stake—this coalition would still benefit Australia since the US would retain its rule-making authority because of its ongoing military and economic strength.

That’s why the Turnbull government has opted to remain close to our US ally, regardless of irritations about the Trump administration. Strategically, the 2016 Defence White Paper already paved the way for ever-closer cooperation and integration with the US military.

The decision to focus on a rules-based order and not on a liberal order in the white paper and in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper also opens the door to cooperation with non-democratic Asia–Pacific countries to defend the status quo. The Turnbull government deserves credit for assuming a key role in leading the strategic debate in the Indo-Pacific region about the challenges to the rules-based order and the need to defend it.

But there are risks in framing Australia’s strategic policy in this way. First, it’s not entirely clear if the United States under President Donald Trump is willing to underwrite this order to the same degree as past administrations. Without America’s commitment, Australia’s strong support for this order lacks its most important ingredient. Still, Washington’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ concept is reassuring, as is Trump’s apparent willingness to push back against China on unfair trade and investment practices and his possible re-engagement with the TPP.

Second, there’s a risk that Canberra will fail to underwrite its ambitious declaratory support for the rules-based order with concrete action. The default position in the Australian debate remains that Australia shouldn’t support a stronger response against China (or initiate such a move on its own) in defence of this order if it risks escalation with Beijing.

In a contested Asia this position isn’t really tenable, yet the question remains: is Australia prepared to pursue policies alongside its US ally and others that reflect a new mix of competition and cooperation, with the balance tilting towards the former?

The jury is still out on the extent to which Australia will actually defend the rules-based order in Asia. On the one hand, more than most countries in the region, Australia has made clear its interest in protecting an order in which the interests of lesser powers are respected by the great powers, particularly China.

The strong emphasis at the level of defence planning documents also underscores Canberra’s preparedness to incur significant strategic costs, to work even more closely with its US ally, but also to expand and support strategic partners in the region. But the litmus test is yet to come.

Should China continue to push the boundaries of the acceptable, a failure to match declaratory policy and actions could prevent Canberra from effectively defending this order and could also reduce Australia’s value as an alliance partner to the United States. Australia thus cannot afford to be a bystander amidst Asia’s shifting order.

Australian strategy has a TINA problem

Image courtesy of Flickr user ArTeTrA

In 1983 Bob Hawke and his new Treasurer Paul Keating came to office promising to resist radical changes to Australia’s economic system. Hawke’s election pitch had recognised the economy was in bad shape, but he wanted to solve its problems by doing the same things Labor always liked doing: emphasising cooperation and boosting public investment in infrastructure and industry.

We all know what happened next. Confronted with a much worse set of numbers and trends than had been expected, the government turned rapidly to embrace economic liberalisation, radically reforming Australia’s economic system.

Why raise this now? Well, like 1983’s economic trends, 2016 brings with it a series of strategic trends which are increasingly negative. Like 1983 our politicians have initially approached this by doubling down on the ideas they’ve long favoured.

The key difference, however, is that should a new government come to office in July and decide on the need for change—even incremental change—there are no clear alternative conceptions of Australian strategic policy, at least in the public domain, waiting to be embraced.

Malcolm Fraser’s book Dangerous Allies only turns to the question of how to secure Australia outside the US alliance in its final pages. And it largely waves away the question with an acknowledgement that higher spending will be necessary as we eke out a new reality with the US at an arm’s length. Contrary to the public image of his work, Hugh White’s main contribution to the strategic debate is actually about the choices that should be made by the US. To his credit, Ross Babbage has written perhaps the most detailed ‘Game Plan’, but it largely swims with the tide in seeking ever stronger cooperation with the US.

And beyond that? Plenty of fine papers, reports, speeches, blog posts and articles highlight specific issues and argue for specific changes to issues or process. Some even sketch out some new organising principles for defence. But there’s nothing that could be adopted tomorrow as a coherent policy alternative, or even has enough bones for policy officials to quickly flesh out.

Where Hawke and Keating were able to draw on 30 years of new economic thinking by academics and intellectuals and the policy experience of the governments of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and others, there are few substantive alternatives floating around Australia’s strategic community.

Of course, that analogy isn’t exact. It’s much easier for governments to substantially change economic policy than to make even moderate adjustments to how they interact with the governments around them. Still, to borrow from Thatcher, it increasingly feels like a TINA situation: There Is No Alternative.

Whether by drift or jump, moving ever closer to the US seems the only option for which coherent, clear policies and guidance is available. This isn’t a problem of ideas, as such. Many on the right advocate for closer links with democratic powers like Japan in order to help reassure the US that it’s worth staying in Asia. Many on the left want better ties with Southeast Asia in case the US isn’t willing to continue engaging. And while the Greens have lots of criticisms of the current system, it’s not clear they would like the actual price tag their preference for neutrality would require.

While people like Andrew Shearer have admirably advocated for particular changes, there still isn’t much in the public domain for a government to adopt wholesale. It may be that radical change isn’t needed. And we don’t need to indulge in demands for ‘grand strategies’ that somehow weave every aspect of our peacetime nation into a unified whole. But without detailed work on the options, challenges and opportunities, the scope for strategic flexibility, already fleetingly small, will shrink even further.

Perhaps it’s still far too early to hope for a proliferation of proposals. The regional order is still shifting and assuming we already know enough to form a coherent strategy may be a mistake. Maybe spending more time figuring out in a granular fashion what is occurring is a better use of analyst’s time than bold speculation on tectonic shifts.

So this is a qualified criticism of my field and the state of the debate. I certainly haven’t written anything like the kind of contribution I’m calling for, so I’m just as willing to find excuses. Yet, as supporters of economic liberalisation are finding today, the absence of coherent, thoughtful alternatives doesn’t lead to unquestioned dominance but to confused and populist responses that prefer to rip up the system today than undertake slow and steady change over the years.

To avoid such a future, Australia’s strategic alternatives need a lot more fleshing out. With luck these efforts will never be implemented. The US alliance will suffice and alternatives will gather dust. But even in that rosy scenario we’ll still be a lot better able to evaluate today’s small changes or respond to a shock tomorrow with such resources at hand.