Tag Archive for: Qatar

The Qatari–Turkish joint venture in Afghanistan

The Afghanistan fiasco has already touched off regional rivalries. The small but oil-rich State of Qatar and allied Republic of Turkey were the first off the rank, joining forces to assist the Taliban and their Pakistani backers to consolidate power and attract international recognition. What’s in it for these two distant actors?

The camaraderie between Qatar and Turkey has been crystallising largely since the pro-democracy popular uprisings, or Arab Spring, more than a decade ago. The two states have increasingly shared common regional geopolitical and strategic interests. Both Doha and Ankara supported the Arab Spring uprisings and the initial electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its resurgence elsewhere in the Arab world, especially in the Gulf kingdoms, led by Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia and two of its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, plus Egypt, accused Qatar of aiding terrorism and failing to toe their line against the Islamic Republic of Iran as a major regional threat. They expelled Qatar from the GCC and imposed a blockade to bring it to its knees, which heightened Doha’s fear of the old Saudi claim over Qatar.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose desire to be a central player in the Middle East and the Muslim world has caused Saudi Arabia and its allies to be wary, backed Qatar to overcome the difficulties and fear arising from the blockade. He beefed up Turkey’s military base in Qatar and provided it with whatever assistance it required, including facilitating its transactions with Europe and beyond. While pleased with the weakening of the GCC, Iran also rushed fresh vegetables and fruit to Qatar to meet its immediate needs.

As such, Ankara, and to an extent Tehran, aided Doha at its critical moment of need, enabling it to weather the blockade and to finally prompt its instigators, along with pressure from US President Joe Biden’s new administration, to lift the blockade in early 2021. Even so, the UAE has still not fully restored diplomatic relations with Qatar, which lends credibility to another commonly held view that Dubai has shunned the rise of Doha as a competing regional financial and economic hub.

Qatar is quite small, with an indigenous population of little more than 200,000, aided by two million foreign workers. But Doha has made good use of its oil wealth and close lucrative and strategic ties with Turkey as well as the United States, which has its biggest Middle Eastern base in Qatar, to play an important role at the regional and international levels in pursuit of an independent foreign policy. As part of this, it has not only established the Al Jazeera Media Network that expounds wide-ranging critical perspectives, including some that have irritated the conservative Arab states, but also hosted a Taliban political office since 2013.

Doha’s mediation between the US, the Taliban and other Afghan parties and its spending power proved instrumental in enticing the Taliban to conclude the peace agreement of February 2020 with the US. The deal was terribly flawed as it didn’t provide for a universal ceasefire and political settlement. But it met the US’s earnest desire for a total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan within 14 months, which Biden extended by another four.

With the return of the Taliban and humiliation of the US and, for that matter, the world’s supposedly most powerful military alliance, NATO, Qatar has now seemingly thrown its weight behind the Taliban to make their governance operational and credible, though under the patronage of Pakistan’s powerful military spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence.

After flying the Taliban’s deputy leader and main negotiator in Doha to Kandahar in late August, Qatar has now sent a technical team to help manage Kabul airport’s operations for both domestic and international flights. It has also indicated a willingness to make a substantial financial contribution to the Taliban’s coffers and activate the dying Afghan economy. Today, the second most important and active embassy in Kabul, after Pakistan’s, is Qatar’s. In its efforts, Qatar is joined by Turkey in assisting with the activation of Kabul’s airport and voicing a readiness to play a role in legitimising the Taliban regime.

The Qatari and Turkish approach is unlikely to go down well with the GCC members, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The UAE has provided asylum to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, who fled in total disgrace from Kabul on the eve of the Taliban’s takeover of the city. Interestingly, Ghani had the option to go to Doha, but Abu Dhabi rolled out the red carpet for him, which can be viewed as part of the two sides’ rivalry. Riyadh would be wary of developments not only because of its continued concerns about Doha’s and Ankara’s behaviour, but also because of the manner in which they could gazump traditional close Saudi ties with Pakistan, which of late have come under some strain.

Afghanistan has historically sparked outside power competitions and slapped interventionists in the face. Its potential in this respect remains very much alive in the current transition back to the Taliban. Whichever regional and global actors get involved in Afghanistan need to be conscious of this reality.

Qatar’s reconciliation with its Gulf partners doesn’t mean all is well

The diplomatic and economic blockade of Qatar led by fellow Arab state Saudi Arabia is over after more than three and a half of years of acrimonious exchanges. It has occurred at Riyadh’s initiative, with backing from President Donald Trump’s outgoing administration in the United States. What has caused this change of position, and will the lifting of the blockade and resumption of ties result in enduring mutual trust?

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its three allied blockaders—the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt—severed ties with the tiny, oil-rich Emirate of Qatar for failing to pursue a regional policy in accord with its membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council. They accused Qatar of supporting terrorism in the region. Their target was primarily such Islamist groups as the Muslim Brotherhood, whose elected government in Egypt had been toppled in 2013 by the military, and which had been scorned by Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies.

They also shunned Qatar over its support for the Palestinian Islamic movement of Hamas, which has been in control of the Gaza Strip since 2007; its good working relations with Iran; and its close ties with Turkey. The Saudis and their allies regard Iran as a serious threat for sectarian, ideological and geopolitical reasons and view Turkey as ambitious in claiming leadership of the Sunni Muslim world, which the Saudi monarchy has historically claimed to be within its province.

The blockers also had misgivings about Qatar’s Al Jazeera TV news network, which exposed governmental, human rights and socioeconomic inadequacies in the Arab world, and Qatar’s potential to rival Dubai economically. These concerns were embedded in a list of 13 demands presented to Qatar in 2017.

Qatar adamantly rejected all of the allegations and refused to budge on its status as a sovereign and independent state or change its regional posture. Its stance was immediately backed by Iran, which couldn’t have been more pleased to see the breakup of the GCC (a defensive organisation made up of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar), and by Turkey. Whereas Iran ferried supplies of urgent vegetables and fruit and provided a corridor for Qatar Airways flights, Turkey not only boosted its economic and trade ties, but also beefed up its small military base against any possible Saudi-led invasion of Qatar. Doha also expanded trade with core European countries, whose goods were transported to Qatar through the Omani port of Salalah.

The Qatari government delved into its more than US$40 billion national reserve to meet the costs and move towards self-sufficiency as much as possible. Since most of Qatar’s food supplies had come through Saudi Arabia, the blockade initially created a severe shortage of milk and dairy products. A Qatar businessman immediately purchased 4,000 cows from Germany, the US and Australia to address this shortage.

Initially, the impulsive Trump sided with Saudi Arabia and its allies as the bigger fish in the region. But his then secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, advocated mediation. Trump was made aware that Qatar hosted America’s largest military base in the region—a vital feeding source of American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In recognition of Trump’s appetite for boosting America’s arms sales, Qatar signed a deal to buy 36 F-15 fighter jets from the US at the cost of US$12 billion. Recognising the importance of Qatar as a useful ally and the need to avoid inadvertently pushing it further towards Iran and Turkey, Trump rapidly found it beneficial to opt for a more even-handed approach.

Qatar ultimately emerged from the crisis in a stronger position regionally and internationally. Although the mediatory efforts of the emir of Kuwait, whose country and Oman never joined the blockade, and those of Washington cannot be overlooked, it was largely Doha’s resilience that eventually persuaded Riyadh and its partners that they were fighting a losing battle (as is the case in Yemen).

Last week, the Qatari emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, attended the GCC summit at the invitation of Saudi Arabia’s ageing king, Salman bin Abdulaziz, who concurrently lifted the blockade. Al Thani’s conciliatory response comes from a position of strength. Meanwhile, the development shows once again the vulnerability of King Salman’s powerful son and one of the main architects of the blockade, Mohammad bin Salman, to making serious misjudgements.

While the process of reconciliation has begun, the issues that motivated Saudi Arabia and its partners to punish Qatar have not been addressed. Doha has given no undertaking that it will sever its ties with Iran, downgrade its relations with Turkey, or clamp down on Al Jazeera and require it to be more charitable in its coverage of the problems facing Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab world. Nor has it decided to halt its humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians, especially in Gaza, or to renounce its reputation as an advocate of liberalist changes in the Arab world, even if Qatar itself remains a politically tight state.

Three and a half years of bickering and recriminations have generated a sufficient trust deficit to pose an enduring challenge for the GCC partners.

The Qatari diplomatic crisis: All right, we’ll call it a draw

It’s been nearly two years since the simmering feud between Qatar and its Gulf neighbours, led by Saudi Arabia, erupted into a blockade intended to isolate Qatar until it capitulated once and for all.

In retaliation for Qatar’s alleged support for terrorism, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt led a diplomatic, economic and travel embargo that included withdrawal of diplomatic staff, return of citizens from Qatar, and a land, sea and air blockade.

Shortly after these actions, Al Jazeera (a Qatari news outlet and a frequent source of irritation to Saudi Arabia and its friends) published the apparent list of 13 demands issued by the Saudi-led coalition. Qatar was given a mere 10 days to comply with all demands. Unsurprisingly, Qatar vigorously denied the allegations of terrorism funding, rejected the demands, and settled in for a siege.

On paper at least, it initially looked like Qatar was in serious trouble. In the blink of an eye it was cut off from 60% of its imports, and many of its key trade routes. Yet somehow, more than 20 months later, it’s Qatar that appears triumphant, or at least very much unbowed by what should have been intolerable pressure. So how has Qatar seemingly managed to shrug off what was supposed to be a death sentence?

To start with, Qatar has been relentless and thorough in its international engagement. Since the first announcements of the blockade, it has been on the front foot diplomatically, expanding its international relationships, pleading its case to the International Court of Justice, and relaying its message of being the victim of a gross injustice through its various influential news outlets.

Economically, it has worked even harder to broadcast the message that it is open for business. It has expanded its investments as far as Southeast Asia, increased exports by as much as 19%, and expanded previously state-owned projects to the private sector, encouraging foreign investment. Remarkably, since June 2017 Qatar’s economy has actually grown: GDP increased by 2.4% in 2018, and a projected 3.1% in 2019.

Qatar has decided to spend some of this largesse on bolstering its security, purchasing billions of dollars of weapons systems, announcing the construction of a new naval base, and planning to double its naval forces by 2025. The US is also expanding its Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, already its largest in the region.

While Qatar continues its aggressive international campaign, Saudi Arabia has faltered. It lost considerable credibility on the heels of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey, and its rapprochement with Israel, however subtle, is looked on askance by Gulf hardliners. Riyadh’s ongoing conflict in Yemen is deeply unpopular internationally, and the effects have been felt with countries such as Germany, Canada and Belgium halting arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Australia continues to face pressure to follow suit).

The Saudis have also been unable to rely on consistent US support, with President Donald Trump moving from his initial response apparently endorsing Saudi Arabia’s actions, to his characterisation less than a year later of the emir of Qatar as a ‘great friend’.

Despite all the heated rhetoric and the lack of formal negotiations, there are signs of a slight thaw. Qatari gas continues to flow to the UAE, where it supplies around 30% of the country’s energy needs, and will continue to do so until at least 2032. Ports at Abu Dhabi and Dubai have both apparently eased restrictions on third-party shippers moving cargo to and from Qatar (although Qatari-flagged vessels are still banned). Preparation for the all-important hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar continues unabated, a sure sign that it is not just Qatar that is confident in its future.

Qatar’s success is founded on one vital asset: its enormous gas reserves that have made it a leading gas exporter and, by some estimates, the richest country per capita. Such enormous wealth has provided a more than adequate buffer against the blockade. But in November 2018, the mantle of top gas exporter was passed to Australia. Qatar is unlikely to catch up again for several years, even with a substantial export increase planned.

Meanwhile, Qatar has shrugged itself free of the chains of OPEC, declaring an interest in expanding not only its gas but also its relatively small oil exports. If Qatar’s exports of gas and oil are threatened in any way, this could call its continued survival into question, and it will no doubt respond aggressively to any such threat.

In a complicated tangle of foreign investment, regional conflict, Saudi pressure, Asian demand, and the loss of OPEC as one of the last neutral grounds for discussion, Qatar will need to continue its deft balancing act, and Australia should be watching closely.