Tag Archive for: People’s Liberation Army

The return of the interceptor

Every year, the International Institute for Strategic Studies publishes a thorough assessment of the capabilities and defence economics of militaries around the globe. The 2020 edition of The military balance covers 171 countries and provides a disconcerting deep dive into Chinese military technology.

The IISS’s sober analysis of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s stealthy new fifth-generation J/H-XX jet adds substance to what had been only educated guesswork in a number of forums. So, what does the development of this sophisticated aircraft mean for Australian operations risks in the 2020s?

The IISS notes that the J/H-XX is a fighter bomber, an old term for multirole combat aircraft, but what stands out is that it’s capable of carrying long-range air-to-air missiles. It suggests the platform is connected to the PL-15 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, or BVRAAM, and potentially an even longer range ramjet-powered hypersonic PL-21 missile. Sources suggest the PL-15 is already in service with a range of 200 kilometres, while the longer range PL-21 is still in development and may have a range up to 400 kilometres.

The function of these weapons, whether launched from a J/H-XX or the J-20 already in service, is to attack vital platforms such as airborne early warning and control aircraft and air-to-air refuellers. For example, in attacking a carrier battlegroup as part of an anti-access/area-denial operation, a key goal would be to destroy E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft. That would force the carrier taskforce to use ship-based radar in active mode, allowing long-range anti-ship missiles, both ballistic and cruise, to target it more easily.

Australia lacks a long-range strike capability and is dependent on either forward-based tankers and aircraft operating in uncontested airspace or forward support hosted by a nation closer to the action. Neither of those options is assured in a future conflict with an adversary such as China. If the PLAAF were to shoot down the RAAF’s E-7A Wedgetails and KC-30 tankers at the start of a conflict, our strike and air combat capability would be rendered ineffective.

The J/H-XX should be a concern to RAAF planners. A 2018 report in The Diplomat discussed both the H-20, a new strategic bomber in development for the PLA Air Force, and the ‘regional fighter bomber’—the J/H-XX. It noted that the first information on the J/H-XX emerged in 2013 in the form of a model of a new combat aircraft . It was presumed to have supersonic performance with a combat radius of up to 2,000 kilometres and to be able to carry BVRAAMs within side weapons bays. It appeared to be designed to be stealthy, with a design reminiscent of the US YF-23 Black Widow fighter. The article suggested that:

Such an aircraft would leverage a combination of stealth, speed, [and] onboard electronic warfare capabilities, to penetrate well monitored and defended airspace to target high value targets … Potential targets may include anything from carrier strike groups … to well defended airbases and radar sites … The aircraft’s large internal payload capacity and side BVRAAM bays may also hint at a secondary long range, high persistence interceptor role.

The article speculated that the J/H-XX’s secondary role as a long-range, high-persistence interceptor involve equipping it with PL-15s or even PL-21s. It concluded that the J/H-XX either wasn’t being pursued or wasn’t at an advanced stage of development.

Yet the 2019 China military power report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency suggested that the J/H-XX was in development, and now the 2020 IISS report supports this. The DIA report noted that:

The PLAAF is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets … which probably will reach initial operational capability no sooner than 2025. These new bombers will have additional capabilities, with full-spectrum upgrades compared with current operational bomber fleets, and will employ many fifth-generation fighter technologies in their design.

The report noted in a table that the ‘tactical bomber’, classified as a ‘fighter bomber’, would carry advanced electronic scanned array radar, long-range air-to-air missiles and precision-guided munitions.

This suggests China recognises the value of long-range airpower not only for strike but also for offensive counter-air operations. It’s a return to the interceptor concept that disappeared in the 1980s, when the RAF’s Tornado F-3 ADV served as the last true interceptor aircraft in Western air forces. The Soviets persisted with interceptors with the MiG-25 Foxbat and Russia sustains its MiG-31 Foxhound fleet even now. So it’s interesting that China is developing an aircraft that can be a multirole platform that would bring back long-range air defence—an interceptor by any other name—for both offensive and defensive application.

If the J/H-XX becomes operational later this decade, it will give the PLAAF the ability to undertake offensive counter-air operations directly against Australia’s air approaches north of Darwin. Operating from Chinese military bases on disputed territories in the South China Sea, PLAAF J/H-XXs equipped with PL-21 BVRAAMs could hold at risk RAAF aircraft over the Molucca and Banda seas. RAAF tankers operating out of Tindal would be at immediate risk, as would the Wedgetails.  Sustaining a combat air patrol to defend those vital combat enablers would become a logistical nightmare, so the safer option would be to simply not fly them. That would leave our F-35 fighters, F/A-18F Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers operationally constrained.

To defeat the prospective threat posed by PLAAF strategic airpower, including the potential challenge posed by the J/H-XX operating in a long-range offensive interceptor role, we’d need longer range airpower ourselves. Sadly, that’s what’s missing in Western air forces—a mid-range capability between tactical fighters and strategic bombers. But not, it would seem, in the PLAAF.

PLA tries its hand at transparency

U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, not shown, meets with Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan in Beijing, April 8, 2014. DOD photo by Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo

The People’s Liberation Army’s military modernisation programs are often criticised for their lack of transparency, with commentators citing an increased risk of regional insecurity as capabilities expand in the shadows. But in China’s perspective, transparency doesn’t automatically drive strategic stability. Transparency can display strength if you have it, or expose weakness if you don’t. For rising powers like China, displaying cards that show a weakish—albeit strengthening—hand could invite adverse responses from strong states. A stronger player may want to undermine the PLA and hinder its effectiveness, if it judged its own future security was threatened.

So transparency represents a dilemma for China’s security planners: they want—perhaps begrudgingly—to show enough of their growing capabilities to limit suspicion and hardening attitudes against them, but not so much that they would risk revealing their vulnerabilities. Read more

Spying beyond the façade

Chinese opera mask

The almost-eternal profession of covert intelligence collection and analysis (a.k.a. spying) has been much in the news of late, with the US National Security Agency and Australia’s own Signals Directorate sharing headlines across the region and indeed the globe. But it’s not just Australia and the United States that have had their covert activities brought to public attention. China’s covert operatives (in this case HUMINT rather than SIGINT) have also been the subject of some unsought attention through the publication of a recent detailed study (PDF) of the General Political Department (GPD) of the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by the Project 2049 Institute in Virginia.

Authors Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao used primarily open-source material to detail the history and current activities of the political wing of the PRC military. ‘Political warfare’ has been an intrinsic part of Chinese military strategy under both the Guomindang and the Communist Party of China. It was long domestically oriented, but of late, with the growing global engagement of China, the activities of the GPD’s Liaison Department (LD) have become increasingly international. Stokes and Hsiao see political warfare as ‘active measures to promote the rise of China within a new international order and defend against perceived threats to state security,’ with these functions augmenting traditional state diplomacy and formal military-to-military relations.

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