Tag Archive for: Papua

Journey to the east? The rebalancing of Indonesia’s force structure

In early January, Indonesian finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati inaugurated the new Tawiri Ambon naval base near Ambon Bay with direct access to the Banda Sea.

The base will support the navy’s major warships and be the home port of the new Third Armada’s naval combat task force.

The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) launched the Third Armada last year along with the Third Infantry Division of the army’s Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) in South Sulawesi, the Third Marine Force in West Papua, and the air force’s Third Operational Command in Papua.

The TNI also plans to establish tri-service ‘integrated TNI units’ across Indonesia’s key strategic outer islands. The first of these units was launched in Natuna late last year, with others in Biak, Merauke, Morotai and Saumlaki—all in eastern Indonesia—soon to follow.

These new commands are part of the TNI’s organisational and force restructuring towards eastern Indonesia. As the map below shows, the army, navy and air force have been upgrading and creating new territorial and combat units across eastern Indonesia in recent years.

While the map covers only the more recent high-profile upgrades or additions, all three armed services have been gradually expanding their structures since the mid-2000s.

By my count, the army has upgraded and created  60 new territorial and combat units since 2002, including territorial and KOSTRAD units and infantry battalions in Kalimantan, Papua and Sulawesi. Since 2003, the TNI has formed new and upgraded existing infantry battalions into 42 raider battalions, almost half of which are located in eastern Indonesia.

The navy and air force have each upgraded and created around three dozen new units and bases since 2004, including upgrading existing bases or facilities as well as creating new units to accommodate recent arms procurements. Again, most of these activities have taken place in eastern Indonesia.

The TNI plans to establish and upgrade dozens more units and bases over at least another decade. By one estimate, the TNI’s overall organisational restructuring could involve the redeployment of 25,000 to 30,000 personnel.

The organisational expansion and rebalance to the east are a function of overlapping security concerns as well as  internal pressures.

First, some defence policymakers see eastern Indonesia—from the tri-border area with Malaysia and the Philippines to the eastern corner of Papua—as the nexus of transnational security threats, border disputes and internal security challenges, including socio-religious conflicts to secessionist threats.

Kalimantan and the Moluccas were the centre of violent religious and ethnic conflicts between late 1990s and mid-2000s. The Ambalat dispute with Malaysia, one of the most intense territorial disputes in the post–New Order era, is off the coast of Kalimantan. Many of the key strategic outer islands are also in eastern Indonesia.

Central Sulawesi was a site of intense religious–ethnic conflicts until the late 2000s. Since then, terrorism has become a prominent problem in the area. Militants and organised crime groups also engage in piracy, kidnapping and smuggling of weapons and drugs in the tri-border area. Papua is also the only area in Indonesia that continues to be plagued by separatist threats.

Second, the eastern rebalance is also part of the TNI’s effort to better control and manage Indonesia’s third ‘archipelagic sea lanes’ (known as ALKI III) that facilitate navigation from the Timor Sea and Arafura Sea to the Pacific Ocean through the seas of Sawu, Banda, Seram and Maluku.

How foreign naval and air forces pass through this north–south axis has been a perennial strategic concern for Indonesia’s defence policymakers. Boosting the naval and air force presence in key points along the sea lanes in eastern Indonesia is an effort to address those concerns.

Third, the need to ameliorate promotional logjams—when there are too many officers but too few positions—has accelerated the organisational expansion plans to eastern Indonesia in recent years.

The extraordinarily high rate of promotions—around 30 general-rank and 330 mid-rank officers (lieutenant colonels and colonels) annually between 2011 and 2017—has jumpstarted the expansion plans. Until recently, budgetary concerns, civil–military politics and arms procurement priorities have prevented the military from fulfilling the 2004 TNI law’s mandate to reorient the military’s posture towards the border area, including in eastern Indonesia.

President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo announced recently that the TNI will create 60 new high-ranking positions for TNI officers in the coming years. Most will be located in the new and upgraded commands and units in eastern Indonesia.

Finally, for the army leadership at least, the expansion plans partly reflect the competitive relationship between the police and the military at the local level.

Following the separation of the police from the military in 1999, the two security institutions have struggled to coexist given the overlap in authority in local jurisdictions.

According to the National Violence Monitoring System, there were 817 incidents of military–police clashes between 1997 and 2015. Around half occurred in Sulawesi, Papua, West Papua, the Moluccas and East Nusa Tenggara.

For the TNI leadership, these security concerns, organisational pressures and interagency dynamics all shape the eastern organisational rebalance of the force structure. We can debate whether these concerns are valid—or whether the rebalance is the best way to address them. For now, most of the TNI’s forces remains in western Indonesia covering the major straits and the bulk of the population and economic infrastructure.

But if the expansion plans are fully realised, Indonesia is likely to be more confident in managing its regional environment. The Jokowi administration and TNI Commander Air Marshall Hadi Tjahjanto appear determined to lay as much as the foundation for the rebalance as possible.

Editors’ note: Minor amendments have been made to the end of this post since it was originally published.

Massacre a sign of increased trouble in Papua

The Indonesian government’s long and difficult task of developing Papua just got a lot harder after Free Papua Movement (OPM) rebels slaughtered at least 16 construction workers who were building a 4,320-kilometre highway that will bring migrants into the once-remote Central Highlands in greater numbers than ever before.

It is thought to be the bloodiest single incident in Papua since the controversial UN-administered 1969 Act of Free Choice made the former Dutch-controlled territory a formal part of Indonesia, sparking an independence struggle that continues today.

The OPM’s armed wing, the West Papua National Liberation Army, claimed responsibility for the massacre, which suggests that the decades-long conflict may have entered a dangerous new stage despite the rebels having very few modern firearms.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo made it clear that the attack wouldn’t discourage the government from finishing the long-delayed Trans-Papua Highway by the end of next year. ‘This only makes us more determined to continue our great duty to develop Papua’, he said.

With the highway and Jakarta’s new mass rapid transit system as centrepieces, Widodo has presided over arguably the biggest infrastructure construction boom in the nation’s history, using it to press his claims for a second term when Indonesians go to the polls next April.

The OPM wants to stop the road, which cuts a meandering path through challenging terrain from the coastal city of Sorong in the western Bird’s Head region across the Central Highlands to Merauke on the southeast coast bordering Papua New Guinea.

In March last year, separatist gunmen upped the ante by ambushing and killing four construction workers on a section of the highway in the rugged district of Puncak Jaya, 120 kilometres northwest of Wamena, the quasi-highland capital in the Balian Valley.

While the highway will sharply reduce the costs of fuel and other basic needs in Papua’s interior, local leaders worry about the social impact, saying the tribes aren’t prepared for the influx of migrants, who now outnumber native Papuans by as much as 60:40 across the once-roadless region.

The combined population of Papua and West Papua provinces is estimated at 3.6 million, 1.7 million of whom are listed as indigenous. Many of them are highland tribespeople living in the 10 districts that straddle the road as it winds along the region’s mountainous spine.

Still fresh in many minds is the violence which erupted in 2015 in Tolikara, north of Wamena, after local church leaders forbade Muslims from celebrating the end of the Ramadan fasting month. Although only one person died, it was a taste of what a toxic mix of community tensions and poor governance can do.

That discord hasn’t been helped by better-educated migrants getting most of the senior positions in the creation of new administrative regions, a process known as pemakaran which is more common in Papua than anywhere else in Indonesia.

Since 2000, the number of kabupaten, or districts, alone has grown from nine to 29 in Papua province and from three to 13 in West Papua, all aimed at satisfying local political demands and getting access to funding rather than improving the quality of administration.

The 1 December massacre in the central mountain district of Nguda follows a series of pin-prick attacks dating back to local government elections last June and has led to fears of the military and the police overreacting, as they have done in the past.

Ironically, the death toll is the worst since a deranged Indonesian special forces lieutenant, armed with an assault rifle, killed 11 soldiers and five civilians in an airport hangar in Timika, the largest town on Papua’s south coast in 1996. He died in prison years later.

Employed by a state-owned construction company, the workers were building a bridge in Nduga, a long-time OPM hotspot lying northeast of Freeport, Indonesia’s heavily guarded Grasberg mining operation which has been a favoured rebel target in the past.

The killings were reportedly triggered by one of the workers filming a pro-independence flag-raising ceremony, an activity banned by the government that has often led to mass arrests and a violent security crackdown.

The OPM claims the video-cameraman was in fact a government intelligence agent, one of a network of paid informers across Papua. There are conflicting reports about what exactly transpired in the lead-up to the massacre, with even the initial casualty estimates varying between 24 and 31.

According to one unverified social media account, the gun-toting rebels rounded up the workers at their construction camp, tied their hands and then marched them to the Karunggame River, where they were shot or hacked to death.

In a separate incident on 3 December, one soldier died when the same assailants struck a nearby territorial battalion security post, forcing the small unit there to withdraw until the arrival of helicopter-borne reinforcements from Wamena.

Nduga and neighbouring Puncak Jaya were both the scene of election-related violence, including two separate incidents when rebel snipers opened fire on passenger aircraft readying for take-off at Kenyam, the Nduga district capital. Two pilots were wounded.

Changing demographics and efforts to improve the welfare of native Papuans have always been controversial, given the legacy of former president Suharto’s now-defunct transmigration program, under which 750,000 migrants settled mostly in western Papua.

Since then, unassisted migrants from Java, Sulawesi and neighbouring islands have followed in growing numbers, settling in West Papua’s coastal towns, the Papua province capital of Jayapura, and around the boom town of Timika, which also serves as Freeport’s logistics base.  

Widodo has visited Papua six times since taking office in 2014, more than any other president, and was pictured earlier in the year touring part of the Trans-Papua road on a motorcycle. But he has so far failed to follow through on his commitment to a sustained peace dialogue.

With former military commander General Moeldoko taking over as the president’s chief of staff last January, even efforts at a limited dialogue focused on health, education and the environment have gone nowhere.

There has always been a high level of mistrust felt among defence and home affairs officials, who believe that any talks with indigenous Papuan leaders will inevitably lead to demands for independence. If any pretext was needed, the massacre will only harden that stance.

ASPI suggests

Srebrenica

This week’s best reads, podcasts and videos starting in 3, 2 …

Where did the idea for the Japanese submarine option (aka ‘Option J’) come from? Rex Patrick draws up a speculative history of the origins of Option J, tracking it back to influential figures in the Australian Embassy in DC as far back as 2000, under Prime Minister John Howard. Keep reading here.

Tomorrow will mark twenty years since the Srebrenica massacre, which took place during the Bosnian War. The casualties—over 7,000 Islamic men and boys as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign—contribute to what is considered the worst atrocity in Europe since WWII. As this horrific anniversary approaches, The Economist explores how that tragedy contributed to relative peace in Europe, and how it should serve as a cautionary tale to prevent genocide through early intervention.

How can the Arab world’s most promising and ambitious new democracy also be one of its greatest producers of violent jihadists? That’s the premise of Hugh Eakin’s new piece on Tunisia in The New York Review of Books.

Diplomat photojournalist Rohan Radheya was given the unique chance to visit factions of Organisasi Papua Merdeka’s (OPM) military wing in the tropical jungles of West Papua and capture their military drills on camera. The black and white images alternate between defiance and despair, with some capturing the moment when members sing the independence song ‘Hai Tanahku Papua’—an act of treason under Indonesian law that attracts a prison sentence of 15 to 20 years.

How does the Indonesian media see Australia? Over on AIIA, Marlene Millot looks at Australian portrayal in Indonesian media from the furore surrounding April’s executions to the current negotiations on asylum seekers. What’s the solution to both countries’ narrow perceptions of each other? Check it out here.

The New York Times reports that the number of refugees who have fled fighting in Syria has just reached 4 million people—roughly the population size of Sydney. Independent digital media project Syria Deeply has constructed this interactive map using UNHCR data to show how refugees and casualties are dispersed through the region. Explore the rest of the site for updates and a timeline.

Exciting times for the US Navy on the horizon; engineers at L-3 Maritime Systems are taking the next step towards developing integrated Hybrid Electric Drive (HED) Electric Propulsion Systems for the USN Arleigh-Burke-class destroyers. This new system is designed to help solve the USN’s high fuel consumption issues by using the vessel’s electrical power for propulsion at low speeds. The order should be finished by July 2016—watch this space.

And lastly, a challenger appears! A Japanese robot firm has accepted the challenge from a US firm in a fight-to-the-death duel (think Pacific Rim: Fight Club edition) between their giant human-piloted robots in a year’s time. Watch the Americans throw down the gauntlet on YouTube here.

Podcasts

Could India become a global hub for submarine maintenance and repairs? The Russians think so. In fact, there have been significant developments in the Indian Ocean region, with greater US–India maritime cooperation, active regionalism and the entrance of China. Hosted by Natalie Sambhi, listen to the latest CIMSEC Sea Control podcast with Scott Cheney-Peters and Nilanthi Samaranayake on these issues and more (30mins).

University of Melbourne’s Dave McRae is back with another Talking Indonesia podcast on foreign policy under President Jokowi featuring University of Indonesia’s international relations hard-hitter Dr Evi Fitriani (27mins).

Video

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) recently held their annual conference themed ‘Charting America’s Course’. During the first session, Erin Simpson of Caerus Associates (below) grapples with the implications social issues like population trends and developments in technology. Also, watch Audrey Kurth Cronin, Michael Leiter, Michèle Flournoy and Karen De Young debate a better strategy for fighting ISIS.

Events

Canberra: the Australia–China Relations Institute (ACRI) is proud to announce the launch of ‘New Zealand’s China Policy: building a comprehensive strategic partnership’, the first comprehensive account of the relationship between New Zealand and China in trade, investment and foreign policy. Find out about Wellington’s China strategy at the ANU next Tuesday 14 July at 12pm. RSVP here.

Also in the nation’s capital, join Dr Knut Dormann of the International Committee of the Red Cross for a discussion on the relevance of international humanitarian law in the context of terrorism, and how IHL applies to the activities of non-state armed groups, such as ISIS. It’s on the ANU, Tuesday 21 July at 6pm. More info here.