Tag Archive for: Pacific

The Pacific needs to upgrade regional intelligence cooperation

Strengthening regional partnerships can help Pacific intelligence capabilities overcome rising challenges. The Pacific should establish a centralised intelligence hub alongside or through the expansion of the existing Pacific Fusion Centre to deliver greater intelligence capabilities to the region.

Resource constraints present some of the most significant difficulties for intelligence efforts in the Pacific as they face growing maritime domains threats and transnational crime such as drug and arms trafficking. Many Pacific island security forces and governments face financial constraints that hinder their ability to invest in modern intelligence systems. As a result, their capacity to collect, interpret and respond to vital information is significantly limited. But a regional hub would help alleviate the financial load and make it easier for international partners to support the region’s needs.

The Pacific Fusion Centre is one example of a regional information-sharing initiative that could be expanded to address these challenges. Analysts from across the region are seconded to the centre and collaborate in producing strategic assessments for the region against priorities outlined by regional leaders at the Pacific Island Forum in 2018. However, the centre relies heavily on open-source data, which may not be sufficient for analysis of complex threats such as transnational crime networks, cyberattacks and maritime domain threats. These threats often require access to classified or more sensitive intelligence sources to develop effective responses. Strengthening the integration of diverse data types available at the centre could enhance its ability to tackle such complex issues.

Training initiatives for Pacific intelligence groups involving advanced technologies or international partnerships also often come with substantial costs. Pacific countries struggle to allocate sufficient funds for comprehensive training programs. Moreover, training models developed for other regions may not always be suitable for the Pacific’s specific cultural and operational settings, which can limit their relevance and effect. Partners such as Australia should focus on developing and delivering region-specific intelligence training that uses regional knowledge and expertise in its examples.

The Pacific also has an issue with staff retention in intelligence roles. Enhancing staff retention demands strategies that address the region’s specific needs. Competitive compensation packages that acknowledge the importance of intelligence work can help retain talent. The Pacific intelligence community can sustain employee engagement and motivation by establishing clear opportunities for career progression, as well as offering training and professional development programs. Designing programs and practices that align with the cultural and operational context of the Pacific would also enhance employee connection and commitment. Offering long-term incentives, such as bonuses or educational support, can also encourage employees to stay. Another option is more exchange or secondment opportunities within member nations of the Pacific Islands Forum.  The fusion centre allows for secondments from the region to the centre. But, for many, such one-and-done initiatives aren’t enough to sustain long-term interest and development.

Intelligence sharing is also an obstacle in the Pacific as nations are often wary of disclosing sensitive data and prioritise the protection of their national sovereignty. This reluctance to share information restricts cooperation and hampers the creation of thorough analyses of potential threats. Also, the decentralised structure of governance in many Pacific countries hampers the dissemination and influence of intelligence evaluations, which diminishes their utility in shaping effective policies. Many Pacific island countries also lack access to secure communication systems, making it difficult to share sensitive intelligence without risking breaches. Limited funding and a lack of infrastructure prevent the establishment of robust information sharing networks, leaving gaps in regional security.

This is why the region needs to push for the expansion of the Pacific Fusion Centre to serve as a hub for greater sharing and coordination of intelligence across Pacific nations or establish, in partnership with the existing centre, a new hub dedicated to some of the more sensitive intelligence work. Intelligence hubs are needed to provide secure communication systems and advanced tools for data collection, to conduct data analysis and to use surveillance systems to improve intelligence capabilities. As a hub, it needs to foster greater collaboration with international allies, such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States, to leverage expertise and resources to offer training programs tailored to the unique cultural and operational contexts of the Pacific. Without greater support for regional intelligence collaboration, the Pacific will remain behind in countering some of the region’s largest security issues.

This article is part of ASPI’s Pacific Perspectives series, dedicated to championing the assessments and opinions of Pacific island security experts. All opinions presented, including any errors or omissions, are the sole responsibility of the author.

Pacific island countries need support to address information manipulation

Pacific island countries are being drawn into broader foreign information manipulation and interference efforts by countries such as Russia and China, which want to shape the global narrative in their favour. These operations often aim to create the illusion of widespread international support for authoritarian leaders and their policies. As the United States withdraws its support for efforts countering false information, Australia needs to step up in helping the region build information resilience.

In early May, Solomon Islands’ Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Police, National Security and Correctional Services Karen Galokale publicly denied ever making ‘damning statements’ attributed to her in a pro-Russian online article. The piece, published five months earlier by Moldovan freelance journalist Alex Ivanov, claimed Galokale called Solomon Islands Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele and his coalition ‘weak’. She insists the quotes were untrue.

Verifying Galokale’s claim is difficult. Ivanov has not responded to attempts to contact him. Although his X profile—where he shares links to most of his articles published on Medium—seems like it could be legitimate, there is little public information about his identity or motives and he is not present in any other media. It’s still unclear, but Ivanov is most likely a fabricated individual part of a Russian propaganda campaign.

The article itself had very little to do with the Pacific. Its primary goal appeared to be to reinforce global support for Russian President Vladimir Putin and challenge Western narratives. Galokale was reportedly quoted as saying, ‘During tough times, a government must be strong and it is clear that President Putin is not afraid to make difficult decisions …  to defend Russia from external interference.’ Galokale denies ever making this statement.

Countries such as Russia and China invest significant resources in shaping domestic and international perceptions through information manipulation and narrative control. They previously coordinated on spreading disinformation targeting Solomon Islands. Whether Ivanov is part of a deliberate Russian information operation, or an independent person aligned with pro-Russian narratives propagating anti-Western views (including republishing articles by Russian government-owned outlet RT, formerly Russia Today), the effect is the same: Russia achieves its strategic goals.

One common component of these narrative control efforts is to use purported ‘endorsements’ of Russia or China’s leaders and policies by respected world figures. This attempts to demonstrate their global legitimacy domestically and to foreign partners who seek positive affirmation about their engagements. The credibility of such quotes is often unchecked, and their cumulative impact is to reinforce authoritarian narratives while sowing confusion and division elsewhere. In this case, causing political tension in Solomon Islands was a secondary effect.

The article wasn’t aimed at Solomon Islands, which probably contributed to the five-month delay between publication and the article becoming an issue locally on social media. Few people in Solomon Islands, if any, had probably seen it before last week. And Ivanov’s opinions in general don’t appear to have a huge audience, with some X posts reaching fewer than 100 people. Still, it shows that one unchecked article, even without a large following or platform, can impact another country’s government or public service.

On this occasion, the Solomon Islands government and media should both be congratulated on the maturity of their response. Media organisations held back from reporting on the social media accusations and helped prevent the spread of potentially false information, and Galokale and the Ministry were swift in attempting to set the record straight.

But it’s not always so simple. Previously, false information about political leaders has spread much further before being addressed, leading to calls for the resignation of leaders who have been falsely accused, as happened in Tonga.

We should expect more of this to occur in the Pacific, as it does globally. Whether this article or author is legitimate or not, it’s becoming quite easy to access technology that can quickly create fake accounts and articles at next to no cost. The online information environment is so full of noise that is difficult for the audience to discern the truth. Cuts to funding for activities to counter disinformation will only make it harder to detect and prevent.

For this reason, Australia must enhance its support for the region in this space. Initiatives such as the Pacific media assistance scheme can do a good job teaching media professionals to check sources and avoid false information. However, addressing the full scale of foreign information manipulation online requires a more strategic response. Foreign information manipulation and interference is a serious threat to the region. Individuals in government, security forces and civil society need to understand the methodology used, psychological tactics and strategic purpose of these activities. For that, you need the assistance of national security experts and strategic thinkers. It’s a gap Australia must address before a competing narrative fills the void.

Chinese pressure is a part of Solomon Islands’ politics. Other Pacific countries should take note

The Chinese embassy in Solomon Islands has reportedly pressured newly appointed Minister of Rural Development Daniel Waneoroa to quit an international group that challenges China’s authoritarian regime. This incident highlights Beijing’s increased tendency to pressure foreign elites, despite rhetoric around non-interference in domestic affairs. Pacific leaders and their foreign partners should be watching.

Waneoroa said he made the decision to resign from the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) last week ‘in the interest of fostering stability and aligning with a collective national vision’. That national vision is likely one that strongly adheres to the ‘One-China principle’ in exchange for financial benefits from Beijing.

Waneoroa’s decision should not reflect poorly on him as a politician or a leader. He was brave enough to be part of a group that many others wouldn’t join, despite potential personal beliefs; he is now choosing to be part of the governing coalition for domestic stability and economic opportunities.

Instead, this affair should highlight the depth of Chinese influence in Pacific politics and an increasing trend of self-censorship by countries when it comes to China.

IPAC aims to unite global lawmakers to promote democracy and address the threats China’s rise poses to human rights and the rules-based system. Individuals from more than 40 countries are part of the alliance, including more than 20 Australian parliamentarians from both major parties after the 2022 election. After Waneoroa’s resignation, opposition member Peter Kenilorea Jr is the only representative from Solomon Islands listed on IPAC’s website.

IPAC’s partners are mostly Taiwanese and US institutions, so membership is a highly sensitive issue for Beijing, which views it and similar pro-democracy groupings as tools of US foreign policy. Kenilorea Jr reportedly said that Waneoroa ‘had been pressured by the Chinese embassy here in Solomon Islands to quit IPAC for some time now.’ But Waneoroa’s actual decision point was his appointment as a minister in the governing coalition.

In April, several ministers resigned from Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele’s Government for National Unity and Transformation (GNUT) coalition and joined the opposition in a looming motion of no confidence. Manele worked quickly to stave off the motion—which was ultimately withdrawn—by coaxing Waneoroa and others into the GNUT with offers of better positions. It was a savvy move seen many times before in Pacific politics. The remaining point of contention was Waneoroa’s IPAC ties.

Once the dust had settled, Waneoroa had little choice but to align himself fully with GNUT’s position. Ministers are highly replaceable in the Solomon Islands system and the coalition is large enough to survive losing one uncooperative member. So, Waneoroa made the decision to cut ties with IPAC, allowing him to keep his government position and deliver more for his own constituents in North Malaita. Even without direct pressure from the Chinese embassy, there are logical reasons for Waneoroa’s decision that prioritise domestic politics and stability over his broader international affiliations. Again, Waneoroa shouldn’t be blamed for his decision when the problem of political pressure is built into the system.

With so much dependence on and desire for Chinese funding and support, countries such as Solomon Islands are in a tough position, and government members have little choice but to toe the line. We can expect Waneoroa to now align with the GNUT and Manele’s stance on all China issues going forward. Publicly opposing that position would only generate internal tensions and potentially additional harassment and pressure from China.

Other Pacific leaders have spoken about attempts by Chinese officials to harass, bribe and undermine them, including former president of the Federated States of Micronesia David Panuelo, who said Chinese officials had directly threatened his personal safety. Self-censorship on issues likely to trigger Beijing is a rational choice for local politicians who are trying to represent their constituents’ best interests. But cumulatively, such decisions narrow the space for domestic political debate.

The attraction of China’s partnership has been financial support with no strings attached. But leaders need to start thinking about what the real cost is in terms of free speech and affiliation. It may seem easy and harmless to make a statement in support of the ‘One-China principle’, but how far can China push those statements? Clearly it leads to a change in behaviour in politicians, whether the pressure comes directly from China or from peers. Pacific media outlets also face pressure from Chinese embassies, which has led to greater self-censorship and less transparent reporting on Chinese activities in their countries.

For Solomon Islands, all eyes will be on any efforts to disrupt Taiwan’s participation in the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in early September. It’s unlikely Taiwan will be shut out completely, but we may well see the next stage of Chinese pressure on the political elite, upsetting the region’s core institution.

One year on: no agreement for New Caledonia despite serious negotiations

It’s been a year since massive riots shook New Caledonia, but progress towards a long-term agreement on the territory’s status has been slow. Last week, intense closed-door talks failed to reach concensus. The discussions centred on two proposals: one by Paris for ‘sovereignty with France’ and the other by loyalists for ‘federalism within the French Republic’.

In late April, French Minister for Overseas Territories Manuel Valls arrived in New Caledonia—his third visit since February—to bring together local political parties for an intense round of negotiations. Valls even promised to remain in the territory until they reached an agreement.

These negotiations followed riots that broke out on 13 May last year. The violence reflected underlying tensions but was ignited by French President Emmanuel Macron’s decision to amend the constitution to expand the electoral roll. This would extend voting rights to residents of at least 10 years—a move seen by indigenous Kanaks as an attempt to further dilute their voting power.

This followed three failed referendums on independence, although the third result was disputed as the Kanak population boycotted amid a Covid-19 outbreak.

In response to the 2024 riots, the French government declared a state of emergency. It deployed excessive military force, later prompting the United Nations to release a statement of condemnation.

Paris first suspended the electoral reforms in June before abandoning the proposed changes in October. By then, 13 people had been killed, including 11 indigenous Kanaks and two French officers.

The Pacific Islands Forum was keen to play its role as a neutral regional actor. After some delays, the prime ministers of Fiji, Tonga and Cook Islands led a three-day observational mission in October to gather information and provide assessment to the forum. They are expected to present their findings at the leaders’ summit in early September this year.

During the observational mission, Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka and Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown suggested the deployment of forces from the newly established Pacific Policing Initiative.

French authorities weren’t convinced. France’s Ambassador to the Pacific Veronique Roger-Lacan stated that regional policing had not been discussed, clarifying that ‘security is the exclusive competence of the French State’. But a regional force could be a neutral alternative to France’s policing efforts, given the criticism of latter’s heavy-handed crackdown.

Paris tried to increase its engagement with the territory after the riots, but spent the second half of 2024 preoccupied by a prolonged domestic political crisis, weakening its response.

During a mid-October visit to New Caledonia, France’s newly appointed minister of the overseas, François-Noel Buffet, could only promise up to €500 million in loans and funds for the reconstruction of all schools and 70 percent of public buildings. However, the total damage was estimated at more than €2 billion.

The French government eventually fell to a motion of no confidence in December.

Valls has taken the issue seriously and, under his guidance, negotiations have progressed well. In April, a draft document was leaked that appeared to acknowledge further delegation of ‘soveriegn competencies’ to authorities in Noumea. Valls denied the document was an official proposal from France, claiming the paper was a result of earlier talks in February and March.

The Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front, the dominant pro-independence group, initially accepted the proposal as the basis of negotiations, but also stated that they would not be rushed to an agreement. The language around delegation of sovereign powers concerned loyalists that France was abandoning the territory. As a result, loyalists walked out of a multilateral negotiation in early May, before key figures entered into a conclave for intense discussion on 5 May.

That closed-door discussion covered the two proposals. There was some convergence around reinforcing New Caledonia’s competence in international relations and even security, including the training of military personnel, albeit in a shared manner. But this failed to translate into a full agreement. While France seems willing to seriously discuss future institutional arrangements—short of independence—even that appears too far for loyalists.

However, changes to the electoral roll remain a sticking point.

Provincial elections, initially planned for last year, are now expected in December. New Caledonians may end up going to the polls without an agreement, risking further tensions by potentially undermining electoral legitimacy.

While negotiations are for Paris and Noumea alone, stability is in the region’s interest. As New Caledonia’s competencies in international relations and security are discussed, there is room for more engagement with regional partners.

Australia must build its understanding of New Caledonia to support any emerging concensus, or ensure it is better prepared should further violence erupt. A passive Australia is a bad look to its Pacific family.

The path forward will almost certainly be slow and frustrating but progress is welcome.

The threat spectrum

Planet A

China has secured a five-year agreement with Cook Islands to explore seabed minerals. The deal, signed alongside broader economic cooperation agreements, consolidates China’s growing presence in Pacific island countries. It follows recent Chinese naval exercises off Australia’s east coast, heightening concerns about Beijing’s engagement in both economic and military domains close to Australian waters.

US mining company TMC USA has indicated it will move forward with Pacific seabed mining plans, in line with an executive order signed by US President Donald Trump on 24 April. In response, global anxiety over the environmental and security consequences of seabed exploitation has intensified, with more than 30 nations calling for a moratorium on commercial seabed mining. Despite this, Australia has yet to take a clear stance, even as Pacific island countries and environmental advocates such as Greenpeace Australia Pacific press for stronger safeguards.

Democracy watch

Six Australian universities have shut down Confucius Institutes—Chinese government-affiliated educational centres—on their campuses. This follows the federal government’s 2023 decision to block the establishment of any new such institutes. This move comes amid increasing government scrutiny, as critics argue that the institutes compromise academic freedom and allow foreign influence to shape university curricula. While some universities cited the Covid-19 pandemic as a primary factor in their decision, broader concerns about national security and foreign interference also played a significant role.

Considering these closures, academics are urging New Zealand universities to reconsider their partnerships with Confucius Institutes, highlighting the potential risks to democratic values and the autonomy of academic institutions.

Research has found that, despite international efforts to shut down Confucius Institutes, Beijing has been able to maintain influence over educational institutions by rebranding many of the closed centres or forming new agreements that replicate the original model.

Info ops

Foreign interference allegations emerged days before Australia’s federal election, prompting calls for investigations by national security agencies. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Electoral Commission are reviewing claims that the Hubei Association of Victoria, a Chinese-Australian community group, had been organising volunteers to campaign for independent member Monique Ryan and Housing Minister Clare O’Neil.

The group has known links to the United Front Work Department, the Chinese Communist Party network coordinating domestic and foreign influence operations. This has sparked concerns that the association’s alleged involvement is part of a broader ‘three warfares’ campaign seeking to advance Chinese influence abroad through information, psychological and legal warfare.

The association’s president has denied any links to the Chinese government, claiming members were acting voluntarily. The Coalition warned of attempts by foreign-linked entities to influence the election outcome, suggesting a broader campaign threatening to destabilise Australian democracy.

Follow the money

On 24 April, the Additive Manufacturing Cooperative Research Centre secured $58 million in Commonwealth funding. The AMCRC is a collaboration between Defence, universities and industry partners such as Boeing Aerostructure and shipbuilding firm Austal. Its aim is to translate Australia’s research expertise in additive manufacturing—ranked 5th in the world—into workforce capability for small and medium enterprises.

Additive manufacturing, which includes 3D printing, is already used across the defence and aerospace sectors. The Department of Industry, Science and Resources has identified the sector as ‘a critical technology in the national interest’, as has ASPI’s own Critical Tech Tracker.

Terror byte

A year after the Bondi stabbings, counterterrorism police say many Australians remain ill-equipped to respond to acts of mass terror, and that public awareness on the topic remains shockingly low. Colin Green, a member of NSW Police’s Terrorism Protection Unit, said that the ‘escape, hide, tell’ slogan should be as familiar as fire safety protocols, yet few know how to react when violence erupts in public spaces. Authorities fear that this lack of preparedness among the Australian public could extend to larger-scale military aggression.

A British carrier group is coming to the Pacific—with doubts looming over it

Operation Highmast got underway in late April, as the British aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales and supporting warships embarked on an eight-month deployment, also known as Carrier Strike Group 25, to the Pacific and Australia.

Highmast is the biggest test to date for the Royal Navy’s return to the carrier business, a plan 30 years in the making. At least in theory, this renewed British power-projection capacity offers to support the United States in the Pacific—if not by deploying there in a crisis and joining in the fighting, then maybe by relieving the US of duties in the Middle East.

Yet the British carrier force faces obstacles. The only kind of fighter that the carriers can operate is the F-35B, which can make short take-offs unassisted by a catapult and can land vertically, not needing arrestor wires. Britain doesn’t have enough F-35Bs, and there’s a serious risk that the price of buying them will rise steeply.

Meanwhile, the ships rely on helicopters for carrying air-surveillance radars aloft, whereas some kind of aeroplane, with greater altitude and endurance, would be far better for the task.

Unlike a Pacific deployment of sister ship HMS Queen Elizabeth four years ago, Highmast includes only British F-35Bs; 18 are aboard Prince of Wales. Last time, 10 of the 18 F-35Bs were guests from the US Marine Corps.

The latest carrier group is in uncharted waters. Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer’s Labour government is still new after 12 years of Tory rule, and a strategic defence review is under way. Ukraine and Donald Trump have combined to form the second up-ending of strategic assumptions since Britain’s first strategic defence review committed to building the carriers in 1998, and British defence equipment plans (as usual) require more money than is available.

The RN is irreversibly committed to carriers and what carriers do, which—as admirals Yamamoto and Halsey showed in the Pacific eight decades ago—is to project power at great distances.

But what do you do when an enemy rises from its tomb in the middle of your neighbouring land mass? At least some British defence planners must be thinking that aircraft carriers aren’t needed for facing Russia.

The two carriers are an achievement, far from poor relations of the American nuclear ships. British naval architects recognised that the life-cycle cost of a carrier was dominated by people, as did the US Navy in the early days of development of its new Ford class, but the RN did something about the issue, with highly automated turbine-electric engine rooms and robotic weapon handling.

The snag is that an aircraft carrier carries aircraft. Its offensive and defensive weapon is its air wing, and at present the RN air wing has a gaping hole.

There is no substitute for airborne early warning for any warship fleet. Unprepared in the Falklands in 1982, the RN bodged a solution by fitting Sea King anti-submarine helicopters with an off-the-shelf radar. The concept worked better and lasted longer than expected, but the RN seems to have pushed it too far in its latest iteration, Crowsnest, which uses a 2000s-era radar on the Merlin helicopter. Just declared operational, Crowsnest already has an end-2029 out-of-service date. So let’s not count it as a satisfactory solution.

The RN is planning to use uncrewed aeroplanes  to provide airborne early warning. One option under study is to carry a radar pod on a variant of the General Atomics MQ-9 family; the version would have a modified wing giving high lift and better low-speed control so it could take off and land on the British ships, which lack catapults and landing arrestor gear. The MQ-9s could take-off just by rolling forward into the wind, and they’d land slowly enough to stop with their brakes.

A smaller, related uncrewed aircraft, General Atomics’ Mojave, was tested on Prince of Wales in 2023—but there is a lot of expensive work left to do.

Although Prince of Wales sailed with only 18 F-35Bs aboard, six more may fly out to the ship later in the exercise. Getting those 24 together is a stretch for Britain, which has a usable F-35B fleet of 33 out of 37 units delivered (one lost and three assigned to tests in the US) and 11 on order.

Something may have been learned from the deployment of the Queen Elizabeth in 2021, where fatigue was cited as a factor in the loss of an F-35B that crashed. In operation Highmast, the ratio of air group personnel to aircraft is higher.

Britain’s F-35s lacks two missile types that have been intended for them, the intended MBDA Meteor ramjet-powered air-to-air missile and Spear 3 air-to-surface weapon. The F-35 should carry eight Spears internally, with a standoff range of more than 100 km. The weapon itself is running behind schedule, making its first guided test flight in November, and there is no set date for integration of either Spear or Meteor on the F-35. And there won’t be one before the Joint Strike Fighter program office can set a revised schedule for the F-35’s troubled Block 4 upgrade effort. The previous plan was discarded in early 2024. A contributing factor is a shortage of instrumented test assets, not helped by the loss last May of one of the test force’s newest F-35Bs.

But there is a looming cloud on the horizon of the F-35B, the only modern fighter than Britain’s aircraft carriers can now use. A new US Marine Aviation Plan published in January disclosed that the US Navy plans to change intended orders for 73 F-35Bs to F-35Cs, designed for catapult-launch and arrested recovery on aircraft carriers. This would leave only 60 more F-35Bs to be delivered to the US after FY2025 and put upward pressure on the F-35B unit cost. It’s already $175 million in the current budget. And the British Ministry of Defence has determined that it needs another 26 Bs, a total buy of 74, to support carrier squadrons.

Lockheed Martin has been pitching a radical proposal to Britain: convert the carriers to catapult-and-arrest configuration in the early 2030s and buy F-35Cs plus a gap-filler land-based fleet of either F-35As or fighters of an advanced land-based F-35 variant. Whether or not it gains traction in Britain, this idea doesn’t indicate confidence in the future of the F-35B.

Then, in written pre-confirmation testimony, new US Navy Secretary John Phelan was asked directly how many Marine F-35Bs would not get Block 4 upgrades, and responded noncommittally that ‘clear requirements for a potential Block 4 upgrade’ were still being defined.

The F-35B exists only because of the US Marine Corps’ outsize political influence. Neither is it a secret that there are few F-35B fans in big-carrier US naval aviation: the version is expensive and doesn’t contribute a lot of capability to a US task group. ‘Marine aviation has always the annoying little brother,’ a US Navy aviator told me some years ago, ‘but now they’re getting expensive.

Diminishing support for the F-35B and the high cost of alternatives are not happy news for Britain’s carrier force.

Deep sea mining is the new front in Pacific competition

We should have been thinking about the seabed, not so much the cables.

When a Chinese research vessel was spotted near Australia’s southern coast in late March, opposition leader Peter Dutton warned the ship was likely ‘mapping undersea cables’, and others expressed similar concerns. But in the subsea domain, exploitation of the seabed itself is fast becoming the frontier where influence will be exercised, rules contested and regional alliances tested.

Two recent developments highlight the rising strategic importance of the seabed, far beyond the narrow frame of cable security.

In February, the Cook Islands government signed a deal with China, granting licenses for seabed surveys. Weeks later, Vancouver-based The Metals Company (TMC) began lobbying the United States to bypass the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and issue permits for commercial seabed mining directly.

These developments reflect the rise of renewed great-power resource rivalry and the race for critical minerals, which underpin digital infrastructure and green energy.

Such unilateral and bilateral actions threaten international interests. Australia must engage with the Pacific to develop a comprehensive regional set of norms.

According to the International Cable Protection Committee, the long-term threat to undersea cables is seabed mining. Dredging operations, sediment disruption and mechanical collisions from mining operations can physically damage cables in ways that are often irreversible. The concern, then, is not so much that China is mapping cable routes—as most routes are already publicly available—but that it is using exploratory research missions to potentially lay the groundwork for future seabed extraction.

The ISA, established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), has yet to issue mining licenses but has granted dozens of exploratory permits. As its principal funder, China has steadily built influence over seabed governance, acquiring multiple exploration contracts through both international channels and regional partnerships. The Cook Islands agreement is only the latest step in a long-running strategy to secure access to critical seabed resources.

The US, by contrast, has refused to ratify UNCLOS or recognise the ISA’s authority. Increasingly frustrated with the ISA’s slow pace and growing support for a global moratorium, firms such as TMC are attempting to bypass multilateral oversight altogether. They’re citing a 1980 US domestic law—the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act—to justify Washington’s unilateral authorisation. The Trump administration appears receptive.

Reports suggest the administration of US President Donald Trump is now weighing an executive order that would authorise deep-sea extraction in international waters, outside the framework of UNCLOS. If it moves ahead, we will see a powerful state discarding multilateral frameworks in favour of domestic authorisation.

Such a precedent would enable China, Russia and others to justify departures from seabed governance norms. The outcome would be a patchwork of self-authorised claims, eroding oversight and reduced protections for some smaller Pacific states advocating for a moratorium on seabed mining.

States such as Papua New Guinea, which is still reeling from the collapse of the Nautilus Minerals project, will face pressure to agree high-stakes partnerships with powerful mining interests. Meanwhile, some, such as the Cook Islands, denounce climate inaction at international forums as they embrace deep-sea mining—and its destructive environmental effects—at home. Two Australian states have banned offshore mining. But Australia didn’t join more than 30 countries calling for a moratorium on seabed mining and Canberra’s record on climate action remains a point of friction with the Pacific island countries.

These divergences don’t necessarily imply hypocrisy but reveal how national interest drives behaviour in domain-specific ways above and below the waterline, making any shared strategy difficult—but not impossible.

Canberra’s staying on the fence, neither shaping the rules of regional seabed governance nor preparing to operate within them, implies its cable security anxiety is dangerously selective. It views risk only through the lens of espionage or sabotage, not structural transformation. In today’s Pacific, the most destabilising force isn’t a lone Chinese vessel. It’s the steady erosion of rules, the spread of commercial extractivism and the rise of actors willing to shape seabed exploitation on their own terms.

UNCLOS requires states to exercise ‘due regard’ when operating in areas of overlapping activity, particularly between subsea cables and prospective seabed mining operations. But with no binding rules to govern how due regard is implemented or cable-mining specific dispute resolution mechanisms, the system defaults to avoidance and ambiguity.

Australia could take the initiative here by convening a regional dialogue to codify operational norms—early notification, transparent consultation and environmental risk mitigation—transforming due regard into a functional Pacific-specific code of conduct.

The seabed is now the frontline of the unfolding strategic competition in the Pacific. If Australia fails to act, it won’t just fail to shape the regional security order needed to secure its undersea security interests; it will be collateral to its collapse.

A successful COP31 needs Pacific countries at the table

Australia’s bid to co-host the 31st international climate negotiations (COP31) with Pacific island countries in late 2026 is directly in our national interest. But success will require consultation with the Pacific.

For that reason, no final decision should yet be made on which Australian city hosts COP31—particularly because this week’s announced preference to host it in Adelaide appears to have taken the Pacific climate community by surprise. Adelaide isn’t on the Pacific.

By making this announcement, Australia sent the wrong message to its potential Pacific co-hosts, and if collaboration goes ahead, there will be many more choices and investments to make.

To be clear, Australia should maintain its bid for COP31. Australia’s leaders need to grasp that hosting COP31 is a strategic win for Australia, but how it does so matters. It is an opportunity to build and strengthen relationships with the Pacific community at a crucial time in the region, given key partners such as US are withdrawing and competitors such as China are advancing.

Going forward, Australia should define COP31’s success in terms of strengthening its relationships with Pacific island countries. Failure, not just for COP31 but for Australia’s interests in the region, will come from decisions that work against those relationships

Viewing COP31 from a domestic policy perspective is a mistake, yet that is how Australia’s leaders appear to be approaching it. It is instead a much wider strategic investment aimed to firm up Australia’s Pacific partnerships on climate and security.

Australia’s narrow approach includes framing the rationale of hosting COP31 around the cost of the event. It’s right for federal and state governments to be prudent about practical aspects when it comes to choosing a host location for such a large event, but thinking of it solely in those terms ignores the important strategic benefit of hosting in the first place. Preparing for an event of this scale comes at a cost, but in purely narrow local economic terms, hosting COP26 in Glasgow netted more than $1 billion in benefits for Britain.

It may well be that the South Australian government was more interested in hosting than the Queensland or New South Wales governments—both of which make more sense logistically for Pacific participation. South Australia has advanced renewable energy deployment at a great scale. Hosting COP31 would allow it to showcase its efforts and domestic industry. But with co-hosting being a strategic priority, these decisions should be made in consultation with Pacific governments.

Again, potential economic benefits should not be the main driver of decisions around hosting COP31. Our aim should be to jointly advance Australian and Pacific interests in the region.

Australia and its Pacific partners should prioritise the development and advancement of a COP31 agenda defined by key regional concerns. On climate, we are all digging ourselves further into a hole. Australia should work with Pacific partners to reframe climate discussions around addressing those fundamental risks.

Rapid reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are crucial for the survival of many low-lying islands and regions, including in Australia. Equally, we are behind on adapting to and preparing for climate effects, limiting our ability to mitigate. Global climate finance is seeing even more regression: the gap between what countries need and what will be delivered is widening, just as global investments in development and resilience are dropping.

COP31 is an opportunity for Australia to shift regional views of its approach to climate and security. It’s a chance to demonstrate to Pacific leaders that Australia legitimately wants change and is willing to make sure the Pacific voice is heard. To do this well, it needs the support of Pacific countries who have proven time and time again that their voices are worth hearing.

It is still a long road to hosting COP31. Turkey’s competing bid remains active, and the next decision on Australia’s bid will take place this coming June. But if Australia does not secure Pacific support ahead of that vote, it won’t just be harder to land the bid; it will also be less worthwhile, and the damage to our Pacific relations will hurt our regional interests.

To counter anti-democratic propaganda, step up funding for ABC International

A global contest of ideas is underway, and democracy as an ideal is at stake. Democracies must respond by lifting support for public service media with an international footprint.

With the recent decision by the United States to freeze funding for the US Agency for Global Media, crippling media bodies including Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, the ABC’s international media activities across the Indo-Pacific are needed more than ever.

The ABC’s international media channels and the bespoke content we create, distribute and share with our media partners showcase an Australian society that is diverse, free and equal, with an independent media that holds power to account.

We show a positive alternative to the authoritarian systems that illiberal states promote through their own international media activities, and we reach out to people across our region with an Australian voice.

The US has also frozen foreign aid (which affects media houses and journalists across the globe) and, according to former secretary of state Hillary Clinton, is making cuts to its diplomatic service, with planned closures of representative offices.

The timing of this broad-based US withdrawal of soft power is of particular concern. Autocratic states are subjecting populations across the globe to an information assault. Russia, China and others are vigorously propagating the narrative that they are part of a battling Global South, fighting against a degenerate Western agenda that champions women’s rights and minority interests to the fundamental detriment of people everywhere.

Democracy, the narrative goes, does not lift people out of poverty, and human rights are merely a Western notion. In the absence of a strong US information presence around the world, that view has more opportunity to take hold.

Today authoritarian states take soft power as seriously as hard power and work together to sell, share or otherwise promote their content across social media, in multiple languages and across regions. China invests about US$7 billion to $10 billion per year in its media outlets, including Xinhua News Agency, China Global Television Network, China Radio International and the China Daily web portal. While funding is generally opaque, Russia’s international media operations are estimated to receive $9 billion a year.

With the US pulling back, Australia’s security in our region is challenged. We cannot afford to sit back and wait for a change in the US position; we need to project our soft power with all available tools.

In December 1939, when Australian prime minister Robert Menzies saw the threat posed by the regional propaganda of the Axis powers, he announced the formation of Radio Australia specifically because, he said, ‘the time has come to speak for ourselves’.

ABC International, of which Radio Australia is now a part, works through partnerships, creating programming for, with and about the peoples of the Indo-Pacific region. Its output covers many genres including news and current affairs, arts, sport, science and culture. This commitment to regional perspectives and voices is well recognised by our neighbours and seen as a sign of Australian sincerity and friendship. The ABC’s increasing reach across the Indo-Pacific is both strengthened by and lends strength to Australia’s diplomatic presence and foreign policy initiatives.

Through media capacity building projects funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and with funding under the Indo-Pacific Broadcasting Strategy, our ABC International Development team partners with media houses, press councils, media associations, journalists and content makers in countries across the Pacific, in East Timor and in Indonesia. These collaborations help our neighbours strengthen their own media, bolster their civil societies and thereby counter the influence of malign external actors.

There is much more that could be done, both to expand existing programs and to step up Australia’s media engagement with vulnerable and growing economies, and large populations in our region including Indonesia, Vietnam and India.

Funding for ABC International broadcast and digital activities, excluding DFAT grants for media capacity building activities but including additional funding from the government as part of the Indo-Pacific Broadcasting Strategy, currently sits at around $20 million per year.

This is a modest investment when compared to the funds being deployed by China, Russia and others in promoting autocracy and their world views. Further spending by the government in our media outreach to the region would be well justified, especially when compared with hard power investment, and it can be swiftly scaled up.

We are defending and promoting free speech, reliable information, independent media and citizenship. For Australia, it means ensuring that our neighbours understand us and value our friendship. And ultimately it enhances the security of our nation.

The Pacific Response Group is making pleasing progress but needs more buy-in

The Pacific Response Group (PRG), a new disaster coordination organisation, has operated through its first high-risk weather season. But as representatives from each Pacific military leave Brisbane to return to their home countries for the winter, there is still plenty of work to do.

The PRG should focus on two key priorities. Firstly, it should engage all members of the Pacific Islands Forum to highlight how the PRG can benefit them as it grows and expands. Secondly, it should consult with regional partners and organisations on the development of operating frameworks to facilitate the group’s deployment.

In October, members of the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting endorsed the establishment of the PRG. The novel multinational military initiative aims to deepen cooperation to improve Pacific military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Aiming to be of immediate use to the region, the first step in establishing the PRG was to co-locate an advisory capability in Brisbane available for rapid deployment (originally referred to as the Pacific Special Advisory Team in official announcements).

The PRG is composed of 19 people from across its six member countries—Australia, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. It deployed to its first disaster just before Christmas, when a planning team of six arrived in Vanuatu to offer advice and support after the devastating earthquake in Port Vila. Since Port Vila’s recovery could be handled by civilian heavy machinery and by urban search and rescue, the PRG planning team quickly determined that a greater military response was not required.

It probably wasn’t what the PRG was expecting for its first call-out: to deploy to a country that lacked a military and deal with a disaster that didn’t require military support. But it was an important and successful exercise in responding fast and exiting in a timely and appropriate manner. There is valuable experience to be gained in practising deployment and communication in the early days of a disaster response.

As we exit the high-risk weather season, October to March, PRG members will return to their home countries, and their deployment response time will rise from 48 to 72 hours. While cyclones are far less likely, the low-risk weather season does not actually bring a much lower disaster risk for most countries. The PRG will stay active and seek to get involved where possible in Pacific national disaster planning exercises, including regional exercises such as Longreach and the French-led Croix du Sud.

But the PRG is still trying to develop its image and brand. Not all national disaster management offices are fully aware of the group, its mission, its capabilities and its plans. Greater engagement is needed across the region, not only from PRG personnel but from officials in-country who regularly engage with government and non-government disaster management organisations.

As the current host of the PRG and the country with the largest regional footprint, Australia should take the lead in promoting the group through diplomatic channels and encourage other partners to do so where possible. The PRG should also develop its online presence to provide the public with more information about the group and its aims and activities.

The PRG should also prioritise establishing appropriate legal mechanisms for the group to enter Pacific countries when requested. Because of the multinational nature of the PRG, it does not neatly fall under any bilateral agreements, such as status of force agreements, that Australia and other military countries may have in the region that enable their forces to enter efficiently upon request.

In March, Pacific security leaders convened at the annual Joint Heads of Pacific Security meeting in Port Moresby, where PRG operations were discussed as part of a regional operations deployment framework. The framework would ‘close a gap in existing regional security architecture by providing a common mechanism to support Pacific-led responses to Pacific security challenges’, according to the meeting’s joint communique.

This would be an efficient way to support PRG operations in the region, in addition to other initiatives such as the Pacific Police Support Group (a multinational deployable police capability). But a complicated regional framework would require endorsement by Pacific leaders and could take years to negotiate and finalise.

In the meantime, the PRG should still consider how it will grow to better meet the needs of the region in coming years. Our October report, Stepping up military support to humanitarian assistance in the Pacific, provides further targeted recommendations for Australia and other PRG members to consider as the group continues to take shape.