Tag Archive for: Pacific Islands

The Pacific needs to upgrade regional intelligence cooperation

Strengthening regional partnerships can help Pacific intelligence capabilities overcome rising challenges. The Pacific should establish a centralised intelligence hub alongside or through the expansion of the existing Pacific Fusion Centre to deliver greater intelligence capabilities to the region.

Resource constraints present some of the most significant difficulties for intelligence efforts in the Pacific as they face growing maritime domains threats and transnational crime such as drug and arms trafficking. Many Pacific island security forces and governments face financial constraints that hinder their ability to invest in modern intelligence systems. As a result, their capacity to collect, interpret and respond to vital information is significantly limited. But a regional hub would help alleviate the financial load and make it easier for international partners to support the region’s needs.

The Pacific Fusion Centre is one example of a regional information-sharing initiative that could be expanded to address these challenges. Analysts from across the region are seconded to the centre and collaborate in producing strategic assessments for the region against priorities outlined by regional leaders at the Pacific Island Forum in 2018. However, the centre relies heavily on open-source data, which may not be sufficient for analysis of complex threats such as transnational crime networks, cyberattacks and maritime domain threats. These threats often require access to classified or more sensitive intelligence sources to develop effective responses. Strengthening the integration of diverse data types available at the centre could enhance its ability to tackle such complex issues.

Training initiatives for Pacific intelligence groups involving advanced technologies or international partnerships also often come with substantial costs. Pacific countries struggle to allocate sufficient funds for comprehensive training programs. Moreover, training models developed for other regions may not always be suitable for the Pacific’s specific cultural and operational settings, which can limit their relevance and effect. Partners such as Australia should focus on developing and delivering region-specific intelligence training that uses regional knowledge and expertise in its examples.

The Pacific also has an issue with staff retention in intelligence roles. Enhancing staff retention demands strategies that address the region’s specific needs. Competitive compensation packages that acknowledge the importance of intelligence work can help retain talent. The Pacific intelligence community can sustain employee engagement and motivation by establishing clear opportunities for career progression, as well as offering training and professional development programs. Designing programs and practices that align with the cultural and operational context of the Pacific would also enhance employee connection and commitment. Offering long-term incentives, such as bonuses or educational support, can also encourage employees to stay. Another option is more exchange or secondment opportunities within member nations of the Pacific Islands Forum.  The fusion centre allows for secondments from the region to the centre. But, for many, such one-and-done initiatives aren’t enough to sustain long-term interest and development.

Intelligence sharing is also an obstacle in the Pacific as nations are often wary of disclosing sensitive data and prioritise the protection of their national sovereignty. This reluctance to share information restricts cooperation and hampers the creation of thorough analyses of potential threats. Also, the decentralised structure of governance in many Pacific countries hampers the dissemination and influence of intelligence evaluations, which diminishes their utility in shaping effective policies. Many Pacific island countries also lack access to secure communication systems, making it difficult to share sensitive intelligence without risking breaches. Limited funding and a lack of infrastructure prevent the establishment of robust information sharing networks, leaving gaps in regional security.

This is why the region needs to push for the expansion of the Pacific Fusion Centre to serve as a hub for greater sharing and coordination of intelligence across Pacific nations or establish, in partnership with the existing centre, a new hub dedicated to some of the more sensitive intelligence work. Intelligence hubs are needed to provide secure communication systems and advanced tools for data collection, to conduct data analysis and to use surveillance systems to improve intelligence capabilities. As a hub, it needs to foster greater collaboration with international allies, such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States, to leverage expertise and resources to offer training programs tailored to the unique cultural and operational contexts of the Pacific. Without greater support for regional intelligence collaboration, the Pacific will remain behind in countering some of the region’s largest security issues.

This article is part of ASPI’s Pacific Perspectives series, dedicated to championing the assessments and opinions of Pacific island security experts. All opinions presented, including any errors or omissions, are the sole responsibility of the author.

Chinese pressure is a part of Solomon Islands’ politics. Other Pacific countries should take note

The Chinese embassy in Solomon Islands has reportedly pressured newly appointed Minister of Rural Development Daniel Waneoroa to quit an international group that challenges China’s authoritarian regime. This incident highlights Beijing’s increased tendency to pressure foreign elites, despite rhetoric around non-interference in domestic affairs. Pacific leaders and their foreign partners should be watching.

Waneoroa said he made the decision to resign from the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) last week ‘in the interest of fostering stability and aligning with a collective national vision’. That national vision is likely one that strongly adheres to the ‘One-China principle’ in exchange for financial benefits from Beijing.

Waneoroa’s decision should not reflect poorly on him as a politician or a leader. He was brave enough to be part of a group that many others wouldn’t join, despite potential personal beliefs; he is now choosing to be part of the governing coalition for domestic stability and economic opportunities.

Instead, this affair should highlight the depth of Chinese influence in Pacific politics and an increasing trend of self-censorship by countries when it comes to China.

IPAC aims to unite global lawmakers to promote democracy and address the threats China’s rise poses to human rights and the rules-based system. Individuals from more than 40 countries are part of the alliance, including more than 20 Australian parliamentarians from both major parties after the 2022 election. After Waneoroa’s resignation, opposition member Peter Kenilorea Jr is the only representative from Solomon Islands listed on IPAC’s website.

IPAC’s partners are mostly Taiwanese and US institutions, so membership is a highly sensitive issue for Beijing, which views it and similar pro-democracy groupings as tools of US foreign policy. Kenilorea Jr reportedly said that Waneoroa ‘had been pressured by the Chinese embassy here in Solomon Islands to quit IPAC for some time now.’ But Waneoroa’s actual decision point was his appointment as a minister in the governing coalition.

In April, several ministers resigned from Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele’s Government for National Unity and Transformation (GNUT) coalition and joined the opposition in a looming motion of no confidence. Manele worked quickly to stave off the motion—which was ultimately withdrawn—by coaxing Waneoroa and others into the GNUT with offers of better positions. It was a savvy move seen many times before in Pacific politics. The remaining point of contention was Waneoroa’s IPAC ties.

Once the dust had settled, Waneoroa had little choice but to align himself fully with GNUT’s position. Ministers are highly replaceable in the Solomon Islands system and the coalition is large enough to survive losing one uncooperative member. So, Waneoroa made the decision to cut ties with IPAC, allowing him to keep his government position and deliver more for his own constituents in North Malaita. Even without direct pressure from the Chinese embassy, there are logical reasons for Waneoroa’s decision that prioritise domestic politics and stability over his broader international affiliations. Again, Waneoroa shouldn’t be blamed for his decision when the problem of political pressure is built into the system.

With so much dependence on and desire for Chinese funding and support, countries such as Solomon Islands are in a tough position, and government members have little choice but to toe the line. We can expect Waneoroa to now align with the GNUT and Manele’s stance on all China issues going forward. Publicly opposing that position would only generate internal tensions and potentially additional harassment and pressure from China.

Other Pacific leaders have spoken about attempts by Chinese officials to harass, bribe and undermine them, including former president of the Federated States of Micronesia David Panuelo, who said Chinese officials had directly threatened his personal safety. Self-censorship on issues likely to trigger Beijing is a rational choice for local politicians who are trying to represent their constituents’ best interests. But cumulatively, such decisions narrow the space for domestic political debate.

The attraction of China’s partnership has been financial support with no strings attached. But leaders need to start thinking about what the real cost is in terms of free speech and affiliation. It may seem easy and harmless to make a statement in support of the ‘One-China principle’, but how far can China push those statements? Clearly it leads to a change in behaviour in politicians, whether the pressure comes directly from China or from peers. Pacific media outlets also face pressure from Chinese embassies, which has led to greater self-censorship and less transparent reporting on Chinese activities in their countries.

For Solomon Islands, all eyes will be on any efforts to disrupt Taiwan’s participation in the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in early September. It’s unlikely Taiwan will be shut out completely, but we may well see the next stage of Chinese pressure on the political elite, upsetting the region’s core institution.

One year on: no agreement for New Caledonia despite serious negotiations

It’s been a year since massive riots shook New Caledonia, but progress towards a long-term agreement on the territory’s status has been slow. Last week, intense closed-door talks failed to reach concensus. The discussions centred on two proposals: one by Paris for ‘sovereignty with France’ and the other by loyalists for ‘federalism within the French Republic’.

In late April, French Minister for Overseas Territories Manuel Valls arrived in New Caledonia—his third visit since February—to bring together local political parties for an intense round of negotiations. Valls even promised to remain in the territory until they reached an agreement.

These negotiations followed riots that broke out on 13 May last year. The violence reflected underlying tensions but was ignited by French President Emmanuel Macron’s decision to amend the constitution to expand the electoral roll. This would extend voting rights to residents of at least 10 years—a move seen by indigenous Kanaks as an attempt to further dilute their voting power.

This followed three failed referendums on independence, although the third result was disputed as the Kanak population boycotted amid a Covid-19 outbreak.

In response to the 2024 riots, the French government declared a state of emergency. It deployed excessive military force, later prompting the United Nations to release a statement of condemnation.

Paris first suspended the electoral reforms in June before abandoning the proposed changes in October. By then, 13 people had been killed, including 11 indigenous Kanaks and two French officers.

The Pacific Islands Forum was keen to play its role as a neutral regional actor. After some delays, the prime ministers of Fiji, Tonga and Cook Islands led a three-day observational mission in October to gather information and provide assessment to the forum. They are expected to present their findings at the leaders’ summit in early September this year.

During the observational mission, Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka and Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown suggested the deployment of forces from the newly established Pacific Policing Initiative.

French authorities weren’t convinced. France’s Ambassador to the Pacific Veronique Roger-Lacan stated that regional policing had not been discussed, clarifying that ‘security is the exclusive competence of the French State’. But a regional force could be a neutral alternative to France’s policing efforts, given the criticism of latter’s heavy-handed crackdown.

Paris tried to increase its engagement with the territory after the riots, but spent the second half of 2024 preoccupied by a prolonged domestic political crisis, weakening its response.

During a mid-October visit to New Caledonia, France’s newly appointed minister of the overseas, François-Noel Buffet, could only promise up to €500 million in loans and funds for the reconstruction of all schools and 70 percent of public buildings. However, the total damage was estimated at more than €2 billion.

The French government eventually fell to a motion of no confidence in December.

Valls has taken the issue seriously and, under his guidance, negotiations have progressed well. In April, a draft document was leaked that appeared to acknowledge further delegation of ‘soveriegn competencies’ to authorities in Noumea. Valls denied the document was an official proposal from France, claiming the paper was a result of earlier talks in February and March.

The Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front, the dominant pro-independence group, initially accepted the proposal as the basis of negotiations, but also stated that they would not be rushed to an agreement. The language around delegation of sovereign powers concerned loyalists that France was abandoning the territory. As a result, loyalists walked out of a multilateral negotiation in early May, before key figures entered into a conclave for intense discussion on 5 May.

That closed-door discussion covered the two proposals. There was some convergence around reinforcing New Caledonia’s competence in international relations and even security, including the training of military personnel, albeit in a shared manner. But this failed to translate into a full agreement. While France seems willing to seriously discuss future institutional arrangements—short of independence—even that appears too far for loyalists.

However, changes to the electoral roll remain a sticking point.

Provincial elections, initially planned for last year, are now expected in December. New Caledonians may end up going to the polls without an agreement, risking further tensions by potentially undermining electoral legitimacy.

While negotiations are for Paris and Noumea alone, stability is in the region’s interest. As New Caledonia’s competencies in international relations and security are discussed, there is room for more engagement with regional partners.

Australia must build its understanding of New Caledonia to support any emerging concensus, or ensure it is better prepared should further violence erupt. A passive Australia is a bad look to its Pacific family.

The path forward will almost certainly be slow and frustrating but progress is welcome.

Deep sea mining is the new front in Pacific competition

We should have been thinking about the seabed, not so much the cables.

When a Chinese research vessel was spotted near Australia’s southern coast in late March, opposition leader Peter Dutton warned the ship was likely ‘mapping undersea cables’, and others expressed similar concerns. But in the subsea domain, exploitation of the seabed itself is fast becoming the frontier where influence will be exercised, rules contested and regional alliances tested.

Two recent developments highlight the rising strategic importance of the seabed, far beyond the narrow frame of cable security.

In February, the Cook Islands government signed a deal with China, granting licenses for seabed surveys. Weeks later, Vancouver-based The Metals Company (TMC) began lobbying the United States to bypass the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and issue permits for commercial seabed mining directly.

These developments reflect the rise of renewed great-power resource rivalry and the race for critical minerals, which underpin digital infrastructure and green energy.

Such unilateral and bilateral actions threaten international interests. Australia must engage with the Pacific to develop a comprehensive regional set of norms.

According to the International Cable Protection Committee, the long-term threat to undersea cables is seabed mining. Dredging operations, sediment disruption and mechanical collisions from mining operations can physically damage cables in ways that are often irreversible. The concern, then, is not so much that China is mapping cable routes—as most routes are already publicly available—but that it is using exploratory research missions to potentially lay the groundwork for future seabed extraction.

The ISA, established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), has yet to issue mining licenses but has granted dozens of exploratory permits. As its principal funder, China has steadily built influence over seabed governance, acquiring multiple exploration contracts through both international channels and regional partnerships. The Cook Islands agreement is only the latest step in a long-running strategy to secure access to critical seabed resources.

The US, by contrast, has refused to ratify UNCLOS or recognise the ISA’s authority. Increasingly frustrated with the ISA’s slow pace and growing support for a global moratorium, firms such as TMC are attempting to bypass multilateral oversight altogether. They’re citing a 1980 US domestic law—the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act—to justify Washington’s unilateral authorisation. The Trump administration appears receptive.

Reports suggest the administration of US President Donald Trump is now weighing an executive order that would authorise deep-sea extraction in international waters, outside the framework of UNCLOS. If it moves ahead, we will see a powerful state discarding multilateral frameworks in favour of domestic authorisation.

Such a precedent would enable China, Russia and others to justify departures from seabed governance norms. The outcome would be a patchwork of self-authorised claims, eroding oversight and reduced protections for some smaller Pacific states advocating for a moratorium on seabed mining.

States such as Papua New Guinea, which is still reeling from the collapse of the Nautilus Minerals project, will face pressure to agree high-stakes partnerships with powerful mining interests. Meanwhile, some, such as the Cook Islands, denounce climate inaction at international forums as they embrace deep-sea mining—and its destructive environmental effects—at home. Two Australian states have banned offshore mining. But Australia didn’t join more than 30 countries calling for a moratorium on seabed mining and Canberra’s record on climate action remains a point of friction with the Pacific island countries.

These divergences don’t necessarily imply hypocrisy but reveal how national interest drives behaviour in domain-specific ways above and below the waterline, making any shared strategy difficult—but not impossible.

Canberra’s staying on the fence, neither shaping the rules of regional seabed governance nor preparing to operate within them, implies its cable security anxiety is dangerously selective. It views risk only through the lens of espionage or sabotage, not structural transformation. In today’s Pacific, the most destabilising force isn’t a lone Chinese vessel. It’s the steady erosion of rules, the spread of commercial extractivism and the rise of actors willing to shape seabed exploitation on their own terms.

UNCLOS requires states to exercise ‘due regard’ when operating in areas of overlapping activity, particularly between subsea cables and prospective seabed mining operations. But with no binding rules to govern how due regard is implemented or cable-mining specific dispute resolution mechanisms, the system defaults to avoidance and ambiguity.

Australia could take the initiative here by convening a regional dialogue to codify operational norms—early notification, transparent consultation and environmental risk mitigation—transforming due regard into a functional Pacific-specific code of conduct.

The seabed is now the frontline of the unfolding strategic competition in the Pacific. If Australia fails to act, it won’t just fail to shape the regional security order needed to secure its undersea security interests; it will be collateral to its collapse.

A successful COP31 needs Pacific countries at the table

Australia’s bid to co-host the 31st international climate negotiations (COP31) with Pacific island countries in late 2026 is directly in our national interest. But success will require consultation with the Pacific.

For that reason, no final decision should yet be made on which Australian city hosts COP31—particularly because this week’s announced preference to host it in Adelaide appears to have taken the Pacific climate community by surprise. Adelaide isn’t on the Pacific.

By making this announcement, Australia sent the wrong message to its potential Pacific co-hosts, and if collaboration goes ahead, there will be many more choices and investments to make.

To be clear, Australia should maintain its bid for COP31. Australia’s leaders need to grasp that hosting COP31 is a strategic win for Australia, but how it does so matters. It is an opportunity to build and strengthen relationships with the Pacific community at a crucial time in the region, given key partners such as US are withdrawing and competitors such as China are advancing.

Going forward, Australia should define COP31’s success in terms of strengthening its relationships with Pacific island countries. Failure, not just for COP31 but for Australia’s interests in the region, will come from decisions that work against those relationships

Viewing COP31 from a domestic policy perspective is a mistake, yet that is how Australia’s leaders appear to be approaching it. It is instead a much wider strategic investment aimed to firm up Australia’s Pacific partnerships on climate and security.

Australia’s narrow approach includes framing the rationale of hosting COP31 around the cost of the event. It’s right for federal and state governments to be prudent about practical aspects when it comes to choosing a host location for such a large event, but thinking of it solely in those terms ignores the important strategic benefit of hosting in the first place. Preparing for an event of this scale comes at a cost, but in purely narrow local economic terms, hosting COP26 in Glasgow netted more than $1 billion in benefits for Britain.

It may well be that the South Australian government was more interested in hosting than the Queensland or New South Wales governments—both of which make more sense logistically for Pacific participation. South Australia has advanced renewable energy deployment at a great scale. Hosting COP31 would allow it to showcase its efforts and domestic industry. But with co-hosting being a strategic priority, these decisions should be made in consultation with Pacific governments.

Again, potential economic benefits should not be the main driver of decisions around hosting COP31. Our aim should be to jointly advance Australian and Pacific interests in the region.

Australia and its Pacific partners should prioritise the development and advancement of a COP31 agenda defined by key regional concerns. On climate, we are all digging ourselves further into a hole. Australia should work with Pacific partners to reframe climate discussions around addressing those fundamental risks.

Rapid reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are crucial for the survival of many low-lying islands and regions, including in Australia. Equally, we are behind on adapting to and preparing for climate effects, limiting our ability to mitigate. Global climate finance is seeing even more regression: the gap between what countries need and what will be delivered is widening, just as global investments in development and resilience are dropping.

COP31 is an opportunity for Australia to shift regional views of its approach to climate and security. It’s a chance to demonstrate to Pacific leaders that Australia legitimately wants change and is willing to make sure the Pacific voice is heard. To do this well, it needs the support of Pacific countries who have proven time and time again that their voices are worth hearing.

It is still a long road to hosting COP31. Turkey’s competing bid remains active, and the next decision on Australia’s bid will take place this coming June. But if Australia does not secure Pacific support ahead of that vote, it won’t just be harder to land the bid; it will also be less worthwhile, and the damage to our Pacific relations will hurt our regional interests.

The Pacific Response Group is making pleasing progress but needs more buy-in

The Pacific Response Group (PRG), a new disaster coordination organisation, has operated through its first high-risk weather season. But as representatives from each Pacific military leave Brisbane to return to their home countries for the winter, there is still plenty of work to do.

The PRG should focus on two key priorities. Firstly, it should engage all members of the Pacific Islands Forum to highlight how the PRG can benefit them as it grows and expands. Secondly, it should consult with regional partners and organisations on the development of operating frameworks to facilitate the group’s deployment.

In October, members of the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting endorsed the establishment of the PRG. The novel multinational military initiative aims to deepen cooperation to improve Pacific military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Aiming to be of immediate use to the region, the first step in establishing the PRG was to co-locate an advisory capability in Brisbane available for rapid deployment (originally referred to as the Pacific Special Advisory Team in official announcements).

The PRG is composed of 19 people from across its six member countries—Australia, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. It deployed to its first disaster just before Christmas, when a planning team of six arrived in Vanuatu to offer advice and support after the devastating earthquake in Port Vila. Since Port Vila’s recovery could be handled by civilian heavy machinery and by urban search and rescue, the PRG planning team quickly determined that a greater military response was not required.

It probably wasn’t what the PRG was expecting for its first call-out: to deploy to a country that lacked a military and deal with a disaster that didn’t require military support. But it was an important and successful exercise in responding fast and exiting in a timely and appropriate manner. There is valuable experience to be gained in practising deployment and communication in the early days of a disaster response.

As we exit the high-risk weather season, October to March, PRG members will return to their home countries, and their deployment response time will rise from 48 to 72 hours. While cyclones are far less likely, the low-risk weather season does not actually bring a much lower disaster risk for most countries. The PRG will stay active and seek to get involved where possible in Pacific national disaster planning exercises, including regional exercises such as Longreach and the French-led Croix du Sud.

But the PRG is still trying to develop its image and brand. Not all national disaster management offices are fully aware of the group, its mission, its capabilities and its plans. Greater engagement is needed across the region, not only from PRG personnel but from officials in-country who regularly engage with government and non-government disaster management organisations.

As the current host of the PRG and the country with the largest regional footprint, Australia should take the lead in promoting the group through diplomatic channels and encourage other partners to do so where possible. The PRG should also develop its online presence to provide the public with more information about the group and its aims and activities.

The PRG should also prioritise establishing appropriate legal mechanisms for the group to enter Pacific countries when requested. Because of the multinational nature of the PRG, it does not neatly fall under any bilateral agreements, such as status of force agreements, that Australia and other military countries may have in the region that enable their forces to enter efficiently upon request.

In March, Pacific security leaders convened at the annual Joint Heads of Pacific Security meeting in Port Moresby, where PRG operations were discussed as part of a regional operations deployment framework. The framework would ‘close a gap in existing regional security architecture by providing a common mechanism to support Pacific-led responses to Pacific security challenges’, according to the meeting’s joint communique.

This would be an efficient way to support PRG operations in the region, in addition to other initiatives such as the Pacific Police Support Group (a multinational deployable police capability). But a complicated regional framework would require endorsement by Pacific leaders and could take years to negotiate and finalise.

In the meantime, the PRG should still consider how it will grow to better meet the needs of the region in coming years. Our October report, Stepping up military support to humanitarian assistance in the Pacific, provides further targeted recommendations for Australia and other PRG members to consider as the group continues to take shape.

Humanitarian assistance in the Pacific should be led by Pacific countries

In the Pacific, the rush among partner countries to be seen as the first to assist after disasters has become heated as part of ongoing geopolitical contest. As partners compete for strategic influence in the region, humanitarian interests should not be sidelined.

Instead, partners to Pacific island countries can advance both humanitarian and political interests by prioritising humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) initiatives that are Pacific-led, resilience-based and—ideally—Pacific-owned.

Not only is HADR important for meeting humanitarian needs; it helps partner countries gain visibility and strengthen relationships. When Cyclone Yasa hit Fiji in 2020, Richard Marles, acting Labor leader at the time, emphasised the importance of Australian readiness to support Fiji. He suggested that Australia should ‘remain the natural partner of choice for the countries of the Pacific and central to that is our standing ready to provide whatever assistance is required.’ Australia has since demonstrated this readiness, for example by deploying its first relief flight within 24 hours of the 7.2-magnitude earthquake that struck Vanuatu in December 2024.

HADR operations also provide opportunities for signalling capability. China did so when it displayed its range of military capabilities, deploying  army vessels and planes in response to disasters in Tonga and Vanuatu. Furthermore, HADR exercises such as Bhakti Kanyini, a multinational exercise conducted in Darwin in 2024, can improve interoperability among partners and support collective responses.

However, we have observed that these cooperative dynamics are now increasingly marked by contestation among partners. For example, French officials noted that France and the European Union were initially omitted from reporting on HADR efforts in Tonga in 2022, with reports largely crediting only Australia and New Zealand. Competition between external actors can also lead to miscommunication and impede the delivery of assistance, as Australia and China found during the 2020 response to Cyclone Harold in Vanuatu.

New HADR initiatives also raise old questions about how militaries, often among the first on the scene to offer support, can effectively interact and coordinate with other military and civilian-military partners.

Our story map of HADR architecture shows how traditional alliances that support HADR, including the FRANZ (France, Australia, New Zealand) arrangement and the Quad, have been joined by newer initiatives such as the Australia-led Pacific Response Group and the Pacific Humanitarian Warehousing Program, which is supported by Partners in the Blue Pacific and France.

But these initiatives are led by partners, not Pacific island countries. An earlier justification for this was that only Fiji, Tonga and PNG have militaries. However, these militaries are now noticeably far more involved in regional disaster responses, and their national disaster management offices are taking the lead.

Partners can advance humanitarian interests in the region by minimising contestation and competition around HADR. They should share knowledge and expectations, strengthening preparedness and supporting predictability. These partners should develop a Pacific islands-centric handbook on disaster management that captures disaster risk profiles, national frameworks and actors for disaster management, as well as arrangements for requesting assistance and civil-military coordination approaches in different countries.

The United Nations has set out basic guidelines in this area, but the document does not detail country-specific policies, frameworks or responsibilities of national actors. And while the UN has, in recent years, created a set of recommended practices based on lessons learned, it is unclear how these have been adopted at the national level in Pacific countries, each of which has unique structures, protocols and systems. A regional handbook would be a useful way to establish local approaches to effective civil-military interaction and coordination of disaster relief.

This initiative should be developed through the Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction Ministers Meeting, which could help ensure that the outcomes reflect Pacific priorities, preferences and needs. It should work within the existing regional security architecture while avoiding duplication, a key issue under the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security.

By capturing current processes and arrangements, a handbook would also be a useful resource in the development of regional standard operating procedures and coordination mechanism for HADR, key actions proposed within the Boe Declaration Action Plan.

The Pacific is one of the world’s most disaster-prone regions, and climate change is only increasing the destructive power of weather events such as tropical cyclones. Partners of Pacific island countries need to prepare accordingly. They must support Pacific-led preparedness initiatives so that they can build shared knowledge and mutual understanding, strengthen partnerships and meet future humanitarian needs.

The permanent Australia-China contest in the South Pacific

Foreign Minister Penny Wong in 2024 said that ‘we’re in a state of permanent contest in the Pacific—that’s the reality.’

China’s arrogance hurts it in the South Pacific. Mark that as a strong Australian card in this permanent contest.

The Chinese navy’s no-notice live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea have become another talking point in Australia’s effort to deny Beijing a Pacific island naval base.

Canberra can offer the South Pacific this argument: ‘Do you want to host Chinese warships so they can play deadly cowboy games in your waters?’

As Australia prepares for a national election in May, China’s Pacific ambitions are again making headlines. During the 2022 election campaign, Wong lashed the Coalition government after Solomon Islands signed a security agreement with China, calling it ‘the worst Australian foreign policy blunder in the Pacific since the end of World War II’. Around that time, China sent a surveillance ship down Australia’s west coast.

Australia must become used to China’s blue water navy noodling around our shores, and not just during elections.

As with its navy, China’s Pacific ambitions have expanded. In the past 10 to 15 years, Beijing has shifted from pursuing one core aim in the islands—the diplomatic contest with Taiwan. Now it seeks, even demands, great power entitlements. My rough timeline for the shift says the great power assertiveness has been to the fore for the past 10 to 15 years.

In 1975, Fiji became the first Pacific islands state to give diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. For the next 40 years, China’s overriding purpose was to beat Taiwan in the cheque-book battle for diplomatic recognition. By 2005, China was ahead: seven island states recognised the PRC while six recognised Taiwan. Today, only three island states have diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

With the flag battle mostly won, China has settled into the permanent contest. That’s why Wong has made more visits to the islands than any previous Australian foreign minister. Taking up the diplomatic duel, Wong headed to Fiji in her first week as minister, saying:  ‘Strategic contest will challenge us in new ways. We understand that the security of any one Pacific family member rests on security for all.’

As China probes, Australia steadily responds, building on what we already have.  As Sean Dorney, one of Australia’s great Pacific correspondents, said: ‘Thank God for China! Now Australia has to pay attention.’

Dorney’s point is simply that China reminds Australia of what we should be doing anyway. When Australia speaks of being the region’s partner of choice–economically, politically and strategically—it defines a lesser role for China.

Australia’s response draws on the calm approach used to stare down coercion and sanctions during the five-year icy age from 2017 to 2022, and three years of slow rebalance.

In this grand competition, Australia has the huge multilateral advantage of being in the region. Canberra strives to win the bilateral contests. More than Beijing, Canberra is explicit in stating its defence aims, signing agreements with Nauru and Tuvalu giving Australia veto rights over security partnerships with other countries. The response to claims of paternalism or colonialism is that Australia holds up island states by holding them close.

The next step is negotiation of a defence treaty with Papua New Guinea, building on the 2023 Australia-PNG security agreement.  China has changed the level of the security pledge Australia offers PNG.

Because of PNG’s shared border with Indonesia, Canberra had always been cautious about a full defence treaty with Port Moresby. The moral hazard fear was that PNG might take risks Australia would have to cover, and Australia was wary of going to war with Indonesia because of PNG’s actions.

Paul Dibb tells the story of accompanying Australia’s then defence minister, Kim Beazley, to a Jakarta meeting with Benny Moerdani in the 1980s. Indonesia’s defence chief asked if Australia would fight for PNG, to which Beazley replied: ‘We’d fight to the last man, but we wouldn’t tell them that.’ Such are the contortions when moral hazard meets strategic imperative. China has wiped away that old caution.

When PNG Prime Minister James Marape addressed the Australian parliament last year, he spoke of Australia’s history as a ‘big brother’. This year marks the 50th anniversary of PNG’s independence from Australia, and Marape joined Wong in Canberra on 24 February to welcome Somare-Whitlam scholars, named after the prime ministers of Australia and PNG in 1975.

In her speech, Wong went first to the people dimension: ‘Neighbours, friends, equal partners. One of the nicest things in my job is that the prime minister of Papua New Guinea calls me “sister”.’

In this permanent contest, Australia has unique assets. China makes ambitious offers to South Pacific states. Australia’s great counter-offer is to South Pacific people, as Labor and Coalition governments embrace Australia’s role in the Pacific family.

If New Zealand wants to restate terms with Cook Islands, it should step up support

New Zealand wants to renegotiate its free association agreements with Cook Islands to secure increased transparency in its foreign partnerships. To do so, New Zealand will need to step up its own support and can learn a thing or two from Australia.

Following the announcement of an agreement between the island nation and China this week, New Zealand’s foreign affairs minister, Winston Peters, on Wednesday said his country and Cook Islands needed to ‘reset’ the relationship and ‘re-state the mutual responsibilities and obligations’. He stressed that consultation and transparency was most important.

His stance seems to raise the possibility that New Zealand will seek a power of veto over Cook Islands’ agreements with other countries.

But New Zealand must be careful not to overstep when Pacific sovereignty is at stake: every Pacific island nation is entitled to engage with foreign partners, including China. But Wellington also has a right to ensure that its support to Cook Islands is not jeopardised by engagement with other foreign partners.

This week the Cook Islands government released an action plan for its comprehensive strategic partnership with China. New Zealand is uncomfortable with the Cook Islands government’s lack of consultation with Wellington before the agreement. The deal’s inclusion of cooperation around sea-bed mining, diplomatic missions, maritime cooperation and humanitarian aid must be putting New Zealand even more on edge.

The plan identifies priority areas including economic resilience, environment, cultural exchange, social well-being and regional and multilateral cooperation. It reiterates Cook Island’s commitment to its One-China policy.

Seabed mining, noted as a ‘national priority for the Cook Islands’, remains a key motivator for Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown. The section on maritime cooperation also contains opportunities for cooperation on hydrography, geospatial and foreshore protection, maritime support and attendant infrastructure. This support could provide excuses for increased visits and engagement by Chinese security forces. Disaster management cooperation also strays into New Zealand’s defined role but will likely be limited by distance and emergency response times.

China already engages with Cook Islands at several regional-level forums on fisheries and foreign affairs. But the two countries now commit to bilateral ‘discussions’ before any regional meetings hosted by Cook Islands that China is to attend. China has also been supporting Cook Islands infrastructure development for years, building a court house, police headquarters, sports stadium, school and water supply network. However, not all support has earned favour, with some projects requiring substantial repairs after China’s substandard work.

The action plan notably lacks the security strings that much of the world was worried about. Although Brown promised no security deals, Wellington may still fear the slow-growing Chinese presence and influence that may accompany activities in the plan.

Brown now faces domestic upset. There was a popular protest of over 400 people in the capital (more than one in 40 people in the nation). Opposition party members have filed a motion of no confidence. They are frustrated that the deal is jeopardising the partnership with New Zealand.

In free association with New Zealand, Cook Islands is self-governing, but New Zealand assists in defence, disaster relief and foreign affairs. The 2001 Joint Centenary Declaration is a non-binding agreement to consult with New Zealand on national security issues, but Pacific security has changed dramatically in the past 20 years.

This is where New Zealand can learn from Australia’s new approach.

Over the past two years Australia has redefined competition in the region. Agreements with Nauru, Tuvalu and Papua New Guinea have given Canberra some degree of power to prevent other foreign countries from entering the same security or infrastructure space.

But it hasn’t come cheap.

In Nauru, Australia will provide $100 million in budget support over five years and ensure physical banking services in the country. Under the Nauru-Australia treaty, both countries must agree to any foreign engagement in Nauru’s security, banking and telecommunications sectors and consult on any engagement in critical infrastructure.

Similarly, in Tuvalu, the Falepili Union treaty states, ‘Tuvalu will mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other State or entity on security and defence-related matters’. In exchange, Australia is helping address Tuvalu’s climate threats and offering a special visa pathway.

Australia and PNG have just announced plans to restart negotiations on a treaty-level agreement. This follows Australia’s investment in a future PNG National Rugby League team.

In these agreements, Australia has highlighted the lasting value it will provide and has made it clear that foreign competition in the same space will prevent Australian support from reaching its potential.

If New Zealand doesn’t want Cook Islands engaging with China in certain sectors, including those outside traditional security, it will need to show commitment to developing those areas and delivering what Cook Islands needs. It can start by investing more in maritime security and infrastructure and addressing climate threats.

Stepping up in Cook Islands won’t solve all of New Zealand’s issues in the Pacific, with tensions still high in Kiribati and other leaders looking on cautiously. But they can at least start with taking care of their realm.

The Pacific needs greater cyber resilience as malicious actors break into networks

Samoa and Papua New Guinea’s recent experiences with cyber intrusions are the latest reminders of the urgent need for enhanced cybersecurity resilience in the Pacific. What’s needed is capacity building and coordinated response initiatives.

On 11 February Samoa’s Computer Emergency Response Team (SamCERT) issued an advisory warning about APT40, a Chinese state-backed hacking group operating in the region. Days later, reports emerged that Papua New Guinea had suffered an unattributed cyberattack on its tax office, the Internal Revenue Commission, in late January.

SamCERT’s advisory marks the first time a Pacific island country has formally attributed a cyberattack to a China-linked group. While the advisory does not directly name China, it identifies APT40 as the perpetrator behind the cyber intrusion and provides a link to the Australian Signal Directorate’s website that details APT40’s connection with the Ministry of State Security, China’s foreign intelligence agency.

The advisory also warns that the hacking group conducts ‘operations directed at sensitive networks administered by Pacific Island nations’. While this reflects a growing awareness of foreign cyber influence in the Pacific, it also shows the caution that smaller nations exercise when publicly attributing cyber threats to state actors.

APT40, classified as an advanced persistent threat, conducts cyber operations by infiltrating networks and maintaining access. By loitering, it can monitor activity, collect data and carry out more sophisticated attacks targeting high-value accounts, including those of government officials.

This group and this method of operation are not new. Australia, the United States and New Zealand have all previously attributed cyberattacks to APT40. In the Pacific, Palau is the only country that has openly accused China of targeting its digital infrastructure, but didn’t issue technical attribution. Samoa’s willingness to publicly acknowledge this threat is a step towards greater cyber transparency in the Pacific and encourages more open discussions among regional leaders and cybersecurity experts.

Beyond the immediate implications of cyber espionage, these incidents highlight the broader hybrid threats Pacific nations face. Malicious actors often exploit weaknesses in cyber hygiene, including in server exploitation, phishing campaigns and web compromises, to gain initial access to networks. The intersection of cyber operations, economic dependencies and diplomatic sensitivities creates a complex security environment for the Pacific. While raising awareness of cyber threats is crucial, strategic communication must be handled in a way that fosters regional cooperation and builds cyber resilience without unnecessarily escalating geopolitical tensions.

Australia has worked with Pacific nations to enhance their incident response capabilities, provide technical assistance and facilitate information sharing. It has supported initiatives such as the Pacific Cyber Security Operational Network and the Cyber Rapid Assistance to Pacific Incidents and Disasters team. Samoa’s ability to issue a public advisory is, in part, a testament to such capacity-building efforts.

In contrast, Papua New Guinea communicated poorly following a cyberattack on its Internal Revenue Commission that paralysed tax administration functions and potentially exposed sensitive financial data. The commission first characterised the 29 January attack as a ‘system outage’, reflecting deeper structural challenges in the region’s cyber resilience framework, such as infrastructure gaps and bureaucratic red tape.

While it’s ideal for organisations to be transparent about being victims of a cyberattack, this requires a level of cyber maturity. Doing so effectively would require a level of technical capability and strategic communications preparedness to manage public awareness and response that many of these institutions in the Pacific have not yet built.

Governments in the Pacific recognise the importance of cybersecurity. PNG launched its National Cyber Security Strategy in 2024 joining several other countries who have published or are drafting their own. But many still face limitations in resources, technical expertise and infrastructure.

Pacific nations and international partners need to prioritise strengthening national computer emergency response teams and fostering regional cooperation. Enhancing incident detection and response capability, as well as promoting intelligence sharing across borders will help mitigate future cyber threats.

Arguably, Australia’s strategic investments in the region’s digital infrastructure, including high-capacity subsea cables, are important to digital transformation in the region. But transformation is outpacing cybersecurity preparedness, creating a widening gap that exposes critical institutions to cyber threats. Support must be matched with comprehensive and sustained cybersecurity capacity-building programs that raise Pacific nations’ agency—not just token efforts.

Although Australia has committed to building cyber capacity across the region, its support should extend beyond government networks to include businesses, critical infrastructure operators and civil society. Long-term resilience will come from increasing public awareness, developing a skilled cybersecurity workforce and integrating cyber resilience into national security strategies.

At least, Australia needs to gather like-minded partners, such as Japan, France and India, to coordinate investment in Pacific cybersecurity, ensuring that the region is equipped with the necessary tools and expertise to counter the growing sophistication of cyber adversaries.