Tag Archive for: Northern Territory

Energy security needs pipelines, not promises

Few issues are as urgent and as poorly understood as Australia’s energy policy. While we build up renewable energy to replace an ageing and increasingly uneconomic coal fleet, we are more dependent on gas to support the grid. Yet we are at risk of more severe and more frequent gas shortfalls as soon as 2028, and we lack the commitment to investing in a viable long-term solution.

Australia needs to build a national pipeline network to ensure domestic production and supply.

Energy isn’t just another commodity. It’s the invisible infrastructure behind every product we make, every commodity we mine, every service we deliver and every aspiration we hold for continued stability, security and resilience. Energy underpins our current standard of living and future prosperity.

According to analysis by the Grattan Institute, we are at risk of increasing gas shortfalls: 130 days of shortfall in 2025, then 201 in 2026, 266 in 2027, and up to 322 in 2028. All this despite being one of the world’s largest gas producers.

This paradox is driven by extensive exports, domestic price caps and an over-reliance on global maritime supply chains for critical energy imports. As recently discussed in The Strategist, building import terminals for liquified natural gas at locations such as Port Kembla and Geelong is a reactive approach that overlooks the need for long-term resilience. Considering the government’s Future Gas Strategy extends to 2050, Australia needs to invest in sovereign, sustainable and long-term solutions.

Countries with strategic intent don’t just chase export earnings; they build resilience. They use domestic gas supply and national pipeline infrastructure to underwrite economic sovereignty and develop complementary domestic industries. In the United States, for example, shale gas development has transformed global markets while also revitalising domestic manufacturing. It has created jobs and secured affordable energy for households. Closer to home, countries across Asia are investing in energy corridors that ensure both competitiveness and security.

Meanwhile, Australia is doing what it too often does: relying on luck, timing and long-held assumptions that the market will sort it out. It won’t. The convergence of economics, geopolitics and domestic industrial policies too significantly distorts the market for a purely laissez-faire approach.

Australia needs a more strategic approach to energy infrastructure. The consequences of our current reactiveness are real. Industry is slowing. Energy costs are rising. Investment is stalling. As the government signals commitment to gas, it should equally commit to building the backbone of long-term energy security: a national integrated pipeline network connecting Australia’s gas basins to consumers.

Pipelines are important economic enablers. While pipelines currently connect the states and territories, excluding Western Australia, capacity limits hinder the network significantly. It needs upgrading and expanding. Unlike other infrastructure assets, Australia seems content to treat gas as someone else’s problem and is slow to step-in.

The government is often left with problems too difficult for the market to solve on its own; if we don’t incentivise private capital to build pipelines now, the cost will fall on taxpayers later. Opportunity costs of a failure to act lie in lost jobs, declining industry and weakened geopolitical leverage.

The Beetaloo Basin, a vast untapped resource in the Northern Territory, offers a critical opportunity. It is likely to be the lowest cost and lowest emissions source of gas capable of fulfilling Australia’s domestic needs. APA Group is in the first stage of investment in the basin, connecting it to the NT’s gas market. This is a crucial step for energy security in the NT, where approximately 80 percent of power generation relies on natural gas.

Maximising the project’s value requires connecting it to the east-coast market. Domestic gas produced in the north and transported to southern demand centres should deliver significantly lower cost and lower emissions than imported liquified gas, particularly due to the government’s existing price controls.

This isn’t just about resources; it’s about national capability. We can’t have a modern defence industry, a competitive manufacturing base, or even affordable food processing without affordable, reliable energy. Doing nothing is not a neutral position, it’s a choice that leaves us weaker.

To make this vision a reality, the government must provide certain guarantees to attract private capital. Investors need confidence that if they build pipelines, the gas will flow. This means establishing clear, long-term supplier agreements and maintaining stable policy settings to reduce risk and encourage investment.

In late 2024, the Senate Select Committee on Energy Planning and Regulation rightly recommended that the Department of Climate Change, Energy, Environment and Water update the 2019 Strategic Energy Plan. This new plan must be strategic in a real sense: it must recognise Australia’s energy security challenges and the inability to outsource energy production. It must commit to domestic solutions.

National resilience relies on stable energy supply, now and in the future, and it needs pipelines to complement new supply. A national pipeline network aimed at supporting domestic industry and Australian households isn’t just common sense. It’s nation-building.

Localising northern supply chains will strengthen national resilience

Coming off the back of a successful NT Defence Week, one thing is clearer than ever: the Northern Territory is not just a remote outpost—it is an asset central to our national security, economic resilience and future-focused industry growth.

Today, supply chain disruptions are a daily reality, not just a possibility. As we face growing threats—from international conflicts and climate change, to pandemics and trade tensions—the need for robust, sovereign and localised supply chains has never been more urgent. For northern Australia, this is both a challenge and enormous opportunity.

Yet the federal government continues to invest billions into defence and infrastructure projects that bypass local capabilities. Southern suppliers, multinational contracts, and offshore interests dominate the procurement pipelines, while NT businesses, including Indigenous-led enterprises, are left fighting for scraps.

The NT’s proximity to Australia’s northern neighbours, its access to critical infrastructure, and its vast natural resources position it well to support the growth of Australia’s sovereign manufacturing capability. To capitalise on this, we must shift our focus from just doing business to building long-term capability through investment, innovation and people.

Local procurement is key. Too often, large-scale projects and defence contracts rely heavily on southern suppliers, missing the chance to engage the talent, industry knowledge and entrepreneurial spirit that exists right here in the NT. When we invest in local businesses—from advanced manufacturers and logistics providers to Indigenous-owned contractors and regional suppliers—we’re not just supporting the economy; we’re reinforcing a resilient, adaptable supply chain that can meet Australia’s evolving needs.

The NT is already leading the way. Defence NT is pushing for greater inclusion. The Industry Capability Network NT is turning capability into contracts. The NT branch of the Australian Industry and Defence Network is amplifying small and medium enterprises, while the Chamber of Commerce and Australian Industry Group are connecting the dots between policy and practice.

But they need backup, not just applause.

The future of Australia’s sovereign capability cannot be achieved without inclusive, ethical, and place-based supply chains that empower local enterprise and honour our regional strengths. But infrastructure is only half the story.

The other half is our people, and particularly our young people. The territory has a rising generation of curious, capable minds who should be given every opportunity to step into careers in science and technology. From defence innovation and engineering to cyber security and space tech, the demand for territory-grown talent is real—but so is the supply gap.

We need to invest early in our schools, training providers and hands-on programs that show young Territorians what’s possible. We must centre Indigenous youth in these efforts, recognising the importance of cultural knowledge, land stewardship, and the unique perspectives they bring to innovation and sustainability.

We also need visible leadership and role models who reflect the diversity of the NT, demonstrating that success in defence, technology and manufacturing is not only possible, but powerful.

A radical reset is necessary, and possible. But changes must be made.

The government should mandate local content quotas in all federally funded projects, especially those in defence, infrastructure and energy. This should be a requirement, not a recommendation: if it’s built here, it should be sourced here.

As well as this, decision-making must be decentralised. We need to move procurement officers, investment leads and project managers into the north, so they can see what local businesses can deliver instead of relying on spreadsheets from city offices thousands of kilometres away.

Too often, the same names keep winning contracts because of outdated systems and risk-averse thinking. We must dismantle this trusted supplier monopoly and improve  transparency and equity. This will require an overhaul of how supplier capability is assessed, ensuring it factors in cultural knowledge, community benefit and regional resilience—not just bottom-line cost.

Finally, we must invest in NT-owned manufacturing. If we’re serious about sovereignty, we need to fund regional manufacturing hubs. Let’s build the infrastructure for Australia’s future here in the north, with equity at its core.

The NT is not on the edge of the map, it’s on the frontline of opportunity. It we get this right, we won’t just build a stronger supply chain; we’ll build a stronger nation.

It’s a wrap: NT Defence Week 2025

Australia’s future security will be decided as much in Darwin as in Canberra. NT Defence Week 2025 made that reality unmistakably clear, showcasing the Northern Territory not as a remote outpost, but as the operational heart of Australia’s Indo-Pacific defence posture. To translate this momentum into lasting capability, government and industry must act with intent: investing in sovereign infrastructure, locking in supply chains and treating the north as the strategic asset it truly is.

Last week, more than 400 national and international government and industry representatives gathered in Larrakia Country to attend the Northern Australia Defence Summit and multiple supporting events hosted by DefenceNT, the Department of Defence, and industry leaders. The gathering collectively recognised the NT’s strategic importance and vitality in the regional security framework.

DefenceNT has set a clear and strategically aligned agenda to strengthen the NT’s role as a frontline enabler of Australia’s Indo-Pacific defence posture. Central to this is developing robust logistics and pre-positioning capabilities, which are vital for ensuring the Australian Defence Force and its partners can respond rapidly and decisively across a contested and dynamic region. The focus on army littoral manoeuvre basing reflects a pragmatic understanding of the operational demands of maritime and archipelagic warfare.

Attracting defence industry supply chains and accelerating investment in the northern bases pipeline are not only strategic necessities but present economic opportunities as well. Deepening integration with the United States through force posture initiatives, alongside expanding partnerships with Japan and other trusted regional partners, reinforces the territory’s position as a cornerstone of regional deterrence and collective security.

NT Defence Week 2025 demonstrated the NT’s strategic value, highlighting the depth of local capability and the untapped potential of northern industry. Direct engagement with defence stakeholders reinforced that resilient, locally anchored supply chains are crucial to sustaining future ADF operations. The rollout of new defence platforms has created a surge in demand for maintenance and sustainment services, opening the door to long-term regional economic and strategic benefits. Panel discussions addressed key enablers, including infrastructure development, regional collaboration and the ability to support a persistent operational presence. Across the week, one message was clear: certainty in project pipelines beyond current forward estimates is essential to unlocking industry investment and aligning northern development with the goals of the Integrated Investment Program, which guides investment to support the National Defence Strategy.

Defence capability in the NT is inseparable from infrastructure supporting energy, transport, water, digital connectivity, and sovereign industrial capacity. The NT is uniquely suited to support sustained multi-domain operations, from the Beetaloo Basin and renewable energy networks, to liquid fuel supply chains and strategic logistics hubs such as Darwin Port and Middle Arm. Water security initiatives and digital technologies such as undersea cables further enhance the territory’s operational resilience, while its strength in critical minerals, agribusiness, and space technology makes it dual-purpose powerhouse for national defence and economic security.

However, the scale of investment required to fully realise this potential exceeds what Defence alone can deliver under the current Integrated Investment Program. This creates an opening for private sector to lead the development of dual-use infrastructure, particularly in liquid fuel production, logistics connectivity, sovereign manufacturing, and sustainment hubs. Unlocking this opportunity demands greater certainty from Defence on project timelines and funding beyond existing forward estimates.

As NT Chief Minister Lia Finocchiaro stated during the event, the NT is not a remote outpost; it is Australia’s frontline in the Indo-Pacific. That view was reinforced by retired US Marine Corps Lieutenant General John Wissler, who described the territory as an essential launch point for integrated, long-range operations across all five domains.

NT Defence Week 2025 made unequivocally clear that the territory is indispensable to Australia’s long-term defence strategy. Turning that recognition into action demands sustained partnerships, targeted investment, and a shared commitment to building the north as a strategic asset—not just for today, but for decades to come.

Without logistics, northern defence is going nowhere

Australia must develop a national logistics plan to support combat operations in its primary theatre.

Defence’s primary strategic guidance, the National Defence Strategy, has chapters on people, innovation, acquisition and partnerships. It does not talk about logistics, assuming perhaps that this will just happen. Defence appears to simply take for granted the availability and adequacy of existing civilian infrastructure, with no strategic planning to ensure it actually has satisfactory and reliable access to roads, rail and ports. This is a logistical vulnerability that must be addressed.

Australia has underinvested in logistical infrastructure for decades. This will be a liability in the event of a conflict, especially one where Australia acts as both a participant and as a host for allied and partner nations. The poor state of transport infrastructure in Australia already costs the nation through delays to freight or long diversions. In the worst-case scenario, this lack of investment may disrupt force generation and risk the sustainment of deployed formations.

This underinvestment is best exemplified in northern Australia, and perhaps most obviously in Townsville. This city is home to the 3rd Brigade, a formation designated as an armoured amphibious brigade. Armoured formations impose a particularly heavy logistical burden. Armoured formations deployed via amphibious vessels create further logistical complexity. Defence’s direction to establish this capability in Townsville was unaccompanied by any supporting logistic plan. It appears that, again, the assumption is that logistics will just happen.

The Australian Defence Force must consider both sustainment and force projection for its logistic needs. Sustainment for the armoured units of the 3rd Brigade means having the necessary classes of supply and resources to maximise availability of serviceable platforms. With a large fleet of complex vehicles that are regularly pushed to their limits, a local sustainment hub is the only logical way to ensure that.

Any support contract for the army’s armoured fighting vehicles must include a local sustainment plan that ensures repairs and maintenance are done near to operating units. While it may be expensive in the short term, failure to adhere to this logistical necessity will impose a far greater long-term financial burden and, worse, reduce the availability of vehicles and readiness of operators.

Townsville’s location is highly advantageous for the 3rd Brigade, but without the coherence of a national strategy, it remains vulnerable to unnecessary risks. For example, consider the interior lines of communication that would support logistics in a crisis. Movement of 3rd Brigade personnel and equipment from Townsville would rely on the roads and rail systems that carry freight from the industrial precincts in the south.

Ironically, the amphibious brigade’s supply chain is regularly interrupted by excess water: wet-season floods disrupt the highways and rail lines that carry goods to Townsville. This isolates the brigade and prevents logistical resupply. Upgrading the Bruce Highway, or building an alternative route, is a matter of national security. Such initiatives would also improve civil productivity and safety.

Yet, even when roads are open, the brigade is somewhat isolated. The other combat formation in Australia’s north, the 1st Brigade in Darwin, occupies what is arguably the other national mounting point for land force projection. It would make sense to have a line of communication that safely and securely allows force movements between these two points without exposure to air and maritime threats.

Australia’s lack of a coherent national strategy, however, means that this internal line is inherently fragile. The Flinders Highway, which connects Mount Isa to Townsville, cannot be reliably used to transport armoured vehicles between our two force projection hubs. This road is also cut by flooding during the wet season and is subject to oversize and overmass restrictions on key bridges.

It is uncertain if the 3rd Brigade could guarantee local berth access to embark when ordered to deploy. Again, the lack of a national strategy that integrates logistics with Defence’s needs has led to a situation where the Port of Townsville, only kilometres from the 3rd Brigade’s base, does not have purpose-built facilities to support embarkation or disembarkation of the brigade’s armoured fighting vehicles.

Army’s new watercraft cannot use Ross Island Barracks and Defence have not committed to the planned expansion at the Port of Townsville, an expansion that would include facilities for landing craft to berth and embark or disembark tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles. Without this facility, and with access to commercial berths not assured, the army may be forced to transport vehicles via road to another suitable port—at huge cost.

Australia must integrate transport infrastructure with defence strategy. It is difficult to fathom the army’s acceptance of risk to the movement of heavy combat vehicles via the most direct route, constant disruption to supply lines via flood-prone roads, and inability to guarantee access and use of fit-for-purpose berths in the closest port.

Middle Arm project: the infrastructure enabler for Northern Territory development

Darwin’s proposed Middle Arm Sustainable Development Precinct is set to be the heart of a new integrated infrastructure network in the Northern Territory, larger and better than what currently exists in northern Australia.

However, the project’s success depends on coordinated financial support between the Northern Territory and federal governments. More attention needs to be paid to the current model of federal funding, which risks limiting the project’s development and reducing its benefits.

Developing northern Australia’s economic opportunities presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the rest of the country. The Northern Territory’s geostrategic position and its vast natural resources, including its renewable energy potential, world-class gas reserves and mineral deposits, help maintain Australia’s role as a key player in global energy and mineral supply chains.

The precinct, still in its early stages of planning, will be spread over 15 square kilometres of newly developed land and include common user infrastructure such as roads, renewable power networks, water supply, telecommunications, infrastructure corridors, a module offloading facility and a shipping channel.

The Northern Territory government is also developing a large pipeline of enabling infrastructure projects, each with some level of interdependency on the precinct. These include enabling infrastructure and new industries such as:

—A proposed ship lift facility in Darwin Harbour;

—Carbon capture, utilisation and storage facilities built around the existing INPEX (Ichthys onshore LNG) and Santos (Darwin LNG) gas facilities;

—Large-scale solar and hydrogen projects, such as the proposed solar farm associated with SunCable’s Australia-Asia PowerLink project;

—Water infrastructure projects such as the Adelaide River Off-stream Water Storage project and the return to service of the Manton Dam; and

—A marine industry park.

Although the Middle Arm project is a joint effort between the federal and Northern Territory and governments, federal support for it has changed over time.

In 2021, the Liberal government allocated $2 billion for the precinct. This would be granted to the Northern Territory government to fund the $1.5 billion common user marine infrastructure, $200 million road upgrades and a $300 million carbon capture and storage manifold.

The revenue generated from these assets would set the territory on a path of self-generated revenue, which would then fund critical infrastructure across the region including police, health and education facilities.

However, when the current Labor federal government took over in 2022, it switched the funding profile to an equity style arrangement of $1.5 billion for common user marine infrastructure, leaving the road upgrades and carbon capture and storage manifold unfunded.

The key difference between these two commitments is not the amount of funding, but the way in which the funding is given.

Under the previous Liberal-National federal government, the territory government did not have to pay back the money, which was intended as a grant. But with the current model of equity investment, the territory is expected to make a positive return on investment and pay back the funds with interest.

This means the territory will need to draw down on its self-generated revenue, which in turn will make it more difficult and costly to comprehensively develop the precinct and increase the risks for the territory. While the loan clearly demonstrates strong federal support for the project, it will reduce the benefits to northern Australia in the short term.

Another key element of the Middle Arm project is provision of strategic infrastructure corridors for transmission of feedstock and export products including gas, water and high voltage power. Energy availability and cost determines the capacity and economics of advanced industry. By combining energy generation, storage and energy-intensive industry in a single precinct, the project aims to unlock the territory’s capacity to progress further down the commodity supply chain.

Northern Australia’s lack of infrastructure and energy grid issues—despite producing most of Australia’s LNG—are consistent stymying factors for economic growth. The precinct’s concentration of supply and customers will reduce the inherent challenges of distance and localises infrastructure needs, allowing it to host manufacturing projects that are unfeasible across the rest of the territory.

A strong Northern Territory means a strong Australia. Despite the territory’s relatively small population and voice on the national stage, it is crucial for the country that it grows economically and develops into a more prosperous, strategically vital region.

The precinct is set to be a holistic, integrated network that combines big projects with infrastructure enablers, creating more favourable economies of scale. This type of systems thinking is vital for development in the north, but support from the nation remains crucial, and close attention must be paid to the terms of that support.

Northern Australia’s economic revival can support defence readiness

Two blueprints that could redefine the Northern Territory’s economic future were launched last week. The first was a government-led economic strategy and the other an industry-driven economic roadmap.

Both highlight that supporting the Northern Territory is not just an economic necessity; it is a national security imperative. By aligning defence priorities and economic development, Australia can ensure the Northern Territory is a resilient and self-sufficient pillar of our national defence strategy.

The Northern Territory Government’s Economic Strategy 2025 sets out a determined investment plan to drive economic growth using the Territory’s natural resources, strategic location and emerging industries. It prioritises renewable energy, critical minerals, transport and digital connectivity, tourism, and workforce capacity building. These areas are intended to enhance trade links with Asian markets and achieve annual growth in gross state product that exceeds national GDP growth.

Simultaneously, the Darwin Major Business Group’s What the Territory Needs 2025 roadmap presents an industry-led approach to the Territory’s economic revitalisation focusing on defence, agriculture and critical minerals. By upgrading Darwin Port and expanding renewable energy projects, it seeks to establish the Territory as a trade and energy hub while aligning with national security priorities to attract federal funding and international partnerships.

Both strategies recognise the Territory’s role in Australia’s defence posture and the fact that the Territory’s economic strength underpins national security. Revitalisation of the Territory could reduce reliance on imports, sustain defence operations and reinforce Australia’s ability to project power in the Indo-Pacific.

But progress to transform Northern Australia into a hardened defence hub is slow and limited to enabling infrastructure contained within the defence estate. For example, Defence has earmarked billions over the coming decade to strengthen northern bases. Beyond this, secure energy, stable digital connectivity, reliable water supply and resilient transport networks are required to sustain military operations and accommodate extreme demand surges during joint training exercises.

Defence investment in the Northern Territory cannot operate in isolation. Without a strong economy to sustain it, Defence will struggle to reach its full posting potential. The Territory needs affordable housing, healthcare, education and job opportunities for defence families and industry. Otherwise, recruitment and retention will suffer, places such as Darwin and Katherine will continue to be considered ‘hardship’ postings, and the Territory will be unable to build the workforce needed to support a growing Defence presence.

Both economic strategies recognise that private sector investment must be mobilised alongside government funding. The industry-led strategy can ensure a faster, more agile approach to infrastructure development by using private capital, streamlining regulations and incentivising business. Encouraging the private sector to co-invest in dual-use infrastructure—ports, airstrips and logistics hubs—will create lasting economic benefits while supporting defence capabilities.

Unlocking the Territory’s vast critical mineral reserves and energy resources must also be framed in a national security context. The Beetaloo Basin’s gas potential and the Territory’s deposits of rare earth elements can contribute to energy security and domestic manufacturing growth and self-resilience. The Adelaide River Off-stream Water Storage project ensures reliable potable water supplies for defence bases, training areas and disaster response operations. This shows how infrastructure investment can serve both economic and military needs.

The Northern Territory has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to become Australia’s northern powerhouse for defence and critical minerals. But success will require sustained bipartisan support and collaboration between government, industry and Defence. The window for action is narrowing. As regional tensions rise and global competition for supply chain sovereignty intensifies, Australia must seize the opportunity to strengthen its northern frontier.

Darwin is well-placed for an uncrewed systems hub

Australia often relies on overseas facilities for uncrewed systems’ maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), exposing the country to operational delays, escalating costs and potential security risks. To address this vulnerability, it should establish an MRO facility for uncrewed systems in Darwin.

Uncrewed systems, including drones, uncrewed aerial vehicles and uncrewed underwater vehicles, are transforming Australia’s defence, security and commercial sectors. They have a range of applications in defence operations, border security, environmental monitoring and industrial applications such as extraction of natural resources, including natural gas.

Darwin’s strategic location, existing infrastructure and proximity to major defence and commercial partners mean it is the ideal hub for maintaining these vital assets.

The city’s strategic significance, long recognised by Australia’s defence planners, makes it the natural location for a dedicated MRO facility. As the gateway to the Indo-Pacific, Darwin’s proximity to regional and global markets, particularly Asia, provides an unparalleled advantage for servicing domestic and international clients.

This places Darwin at the crossroads of Australia’s defence and commercial interests in the region, with clear benefits for its role as a logistics and maintenance hub for uncrewed systems. Furthermore, the city’s established infrastructure, including air and sea ports, rail connections and utilities, already supports large-scale defence operations and the growing defence footprint in the region, making it primed for expansion into a world-class MRO hub for uncrewed systems.

Australian uncrewed systems are largely serviced overseas, leaving them vulnerable to extended downtimes, longer repair times and increased risk in transportation. This reliance on foreign facilities compromises Australia’s operational readiness. It hampers the efficiency of industries, such as resource extraction, that rely heavily on uncrewed technology for monitoring, inspections and surveillance.

As the Australian Defence Force and commercial sectors increasingly deploy uncrewed systems, it is essential to ensure they can be maintained and repaired promptly to avoid delays in operations, whether they involve national security, disaster response or remote infrastructure management.

As uncrewed systems are central to the future of defence operations, creating an MRO facility in Darwin would strengthen Australia’s position as a key partner in the region, with the ability to service not only its own uncrewed systems but also those of allied nations. This strategic advantage would provide a competitive edge in defence readiness and international collaborations.

Moreover, Darwin’s potential MRO facility could support other government agencies, such as the Australian Federal Police, Home Affairs and the Australian Border Force. They all use uncrewed systems for surveillance, border protection and law enforcement.

The ability to rapidly repair and maintain these systems would improve agencies’ responsiveness and availability of capabilities, ensuring that they are always equipped to respond to emerging threats. Darwin could thus play a greater role in Australia’s broader security architecture, providing reliable, homegrown support to key domestic and international partners.

From a commercial perspective, establishing an MRO facility in Darwin would be commercially viable and a boon for local businesses.

With the growing demand for uncrewed systems in industries such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), telecommunications and mining, establishing a local MRO facility would significantly reduce the reliance on overseas service providers. This would cut transport costs and ensure faster turnaround of repairs, improving the operational efficiency of these industries.

It would also create a thriving commercial ecosystem around uncrewed systems in the Northern Territory. Local businesses would be able to engage with the growing global market for uncrewed systems, contributing to job creation and the region’s economic growth.

For this MRO facility to be commercially successful, it should be designed as a multi-use facility, capable of supporting not only defence and government sectors but also commercial enterprises. This approach would ensure financial sustainability through a diversified revenue stream.

Partnerships with commercial operators in the LNG, mining, and telecommunications sectors could provide steady demand for services.

Moreover, collaborations with international partners—such as the United States, Japan and other Indo-Pacific nations—could provide further opportunities for industry growth, turning Darwin into a regional centre for uncrewed system innovation and service.

Such collaborations could include joint research and development projects, knowledge sharing and training programs, further enhancing the facility’s global relevance.

Establishing an MRO facility in Darwin would have significant strategic, economic and operational benefits. It would enhance Australia’s defence readiness, reduce its reliance on overseas maintenance services and foster closer collaboration with key regional partners. A local MRO facility would strengthen Australia’s ability to respond to threats, contribute to the security of the Indo-Pacific region and support industries that rely on uncrewed systems.

By capitalising on Darwin’s strategic location, existing infrastructure and growing importance in regional security, Australia can establish a world-class facility that meets its future needs and reinforces its role as a key player in the Indo-Pacific.

Lessons from Cyclone Tracy: preparing for a future of cascading disasters

On Christmas morning in 1974, Cyclone Tracy unleashed catastrophic destruction on Darwin, forever altering the city and Australia’s approach to disaster resilience. As the intensity of climate-driven catastrophes grows, the main lesson of Cyclone Tracy is clear: we must do more to prepare, and we must do it now.

With wind speeds surpassing 217 km/h, the Category 4 cyclone killed 66 people and injured hundreds. It obliterated more than 70 percent of Darwin’s buildings, displacing most of its population. Fifty years on, the lessons from Cyclone Tracy remain as urgent and relevant as ever, as Australia confronts a new era of escalating climate change and increasingly frequent extreme weather events.

ASPI’s new report commemorating Cyclone Tracy’s anniversary highlights the need for proactive, comprehensive disaster resilience in the face of rising climate risks. The aftermath of Tracy revealed deep vulnerabilities in Australia’s preparedness, from inadequate building codes to insufficient community awareness. This reshaped our approach to disaster management, laying the foundations for national disaster-response frameworks that continue to guide Australia.

The immediate aftermath of Cyclone Tracy brought Australia together in a way that was unprecedented in peacetime. The Australian Defence Force led a coordinated relief effort, showcasing the power of military, government and civilian agencies working in unison. The cyclone also prompted establishment of the Darwin Reconstruction Authority, a centralised body that drove the city’s rebuilding efforts and set a benchmark for future disaster recovery initiatives. These responses proved that a structured, collaborative approach to recovery can lead to resilience.

The reconstruction of Darwin not only transformed the city into a modern urban centre; it caused a shift in how Australia views the intersection of disaster response and urban planning. The introduction of stricter building codes, designed to withstand Category 5 cyclones, became a cornerstone of our disaster preparedness. The recovery also highlighted the importance of local leadership, community involvement and a whole-of-nation response to disasters.

While we’ve made progress since Cyclone Tracy, the growing threat of climate change means that disaster resilience today requires an even more multifaceted approach. Our report explores the need to look beyond building codes and infrastructure and include advancements in predictive technologies such as satellite monitoring and early warning systems. Equally important is empowering local communities, particularly those in vulnerable regions like northern Australia, to take proactive measures and adapt to changing conditions. We cannot afford to be reactive. We must be anticipatory in our approach to future disasters.

In this context, Cyclone Tracy offers not only a historical lesson but a clear call to action. The resilience of Darwin in the face of overwhelming destruction was impressive, but future threats demand that we take a more proactive, strategic approach. Australia’s National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework is a step in the right direction, but it must evolve to meet the demands of an increasingly volatile climate. The growing frequency of cascading disasters—whether bushfires, floods, or cyclones—requires even greater collaboration and resource-sharing between government, industry and the private sector.

The 50th anniversary of Cyclone Tracy must not only be a moment of reflection but a reminder that disaster resilience is a dynamic, ongoing process. Northern Australia is particularly vulnerable to cyclones, heatwaves and flooding, and it cannot afford complacency.

As climate risks continue to escalate, we need to invest in smarter, more resilient infrastructure, better systems of disaster response, and more informed, empowered communities. Traditional knowledge, particularly from Indigenous communities in northern Australia, must also be integrated into disaster planning, offering invaluable lessons on sustainable living and resource management.

The legacy of Cyclone Tracy is clear: resilience is not just about recovery, but about preparation. As Australia faces the challenges of climate change, we must build on the lessons of the past to ensure a safer, more resilient future. This anniversary is an opportunity to strengthen our commitment to disaster preparedness, ensuring that Australia remains a global leader in disaster resilience and recovery.

By taking Cyclone Tracy’s lessons and adapting them to today’s climate risks, Australia can create a more resilient future for all its communities, ensuring that no one faces disaster alone.

Darwin is key for undersea data links. We must promote their resilience there

Australia needs further investment into Darwin’s digital infrastructure to leverage the city’s proximity to Asia and support the resilience of international data flow through subsea cables.

Actions should include establishing an office to coordinate industry and government agencies, and it should build a substantial capability in Darwin to repair cables.

The importance of acting is underscored by Google’s November statement that it would lay a data cable from Darwin to Singapore via Christmas Island and by ongoing joint efforts by Australia, the United States and Japan to increase connectivity in the Pacific.

As subsea links, such as the existing Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable, become Australia’s digital lifelines, their security and resilience become paramount. Disruption to them would have profound consequences for both Australia’s economy and national security.

Darwin’s role in the Indo-Pacific digital ecosystem is growing ever faster, making the city increasingly central to global data flows. Vulnerabilities come with dependence on such infrastructure. Incapacitation of these cables—whether through physical damage or cyber threats—would severely affect Australia’s economy, security, and geopolitical standing.

The government’s current approach to managing subsea cable security lacks the coordination needed to address the growing challenges in this space. With multiple agencies involved, from the Department of Infrastructure to the Australian Communications and Media Authority, Australia needs a more unified and proactive approach to safeguarding these assets.

Given the national security stakes, Australia must establish a dedicated domestic subsea cable coordination unit to oversee construction, maintenance and security. This unit should serve as a clearinghouse, working closely with key government stakeholders, telecommunications regulators and private sector players—including major tech firms, such as Google and Meta. By integrating their expertise, the unit could ensure that subsea cables were shielded from physical and cyber threats, coordinating national security efforts and fostering a unified response to emerging risks.

As Darwin continues to evolve as a data hub, Australia’s capacity to swiftly repair damage to its subsea cables is becoming increasingly critical. To maintain resilience, the government must establish a local repair hub. This includes building up domestic repair capabilities, which could be achieved through partnerships with international cable operators or by developing local expertise within the Northern Territory. A dedicated repair ship, staffed with a rapid-response team based in Darwin, would be invaluable, ensuring that cable damage was addressed quickly to minimise disruption. This approach would further strengthen Australia’s position as a reliable player in the global digital infrastructure arena.

To support this growing digital infrastructure, Darwin’s physical and digital capabilities must also be scaled up. This requires robust terrestrial backhaul connections and investment by large cloud-service providers in world-class AI data centres.  We also need a regulatory framework that supports the increasing volume of data while addressing potential physical and cyber threats.

The Northern Territory offers geological stability and an advantageous position for connections to Singapore, itself an important node in the global submarine cable network. These advantages make it an ideal place for increasing Australia’s overall telecommunications and subsea cable resilience by diversifying submarine cable landings from clogged areas like Sydney and existing areas like Perth.

As the volume of data flowing through the region rises, so too must the capacity to handle it securely and efficiently. Strong, resilient infrastructure will not only bolster Australia’s own security but position the country as a reliable alternative to higher-risk regions. It will also attract investment and foster deeper international partnerships, particularly with allies such as the United States and Japan, who are already deeply engaged in securing subsea cable infrastructure.

Australia must also step up its role in the global dialogue surrounding subsea cable security. Given the interconnectedness of these cables and their importance to international trade and security, it cannot afford to act in isolation. Active participation in global initiatives is essential. For example, in September, Australia endorsed the New York Statement on Undersea Cables, which calls for international cooperation to safeguard the links.

By engaging in these discussions, Australia can share insights on emerging threats, establish best practices for protection and help shape global responses to subsea cable disruptions. This leadership would further cement Australia’s position as a key partner in global digital infrastructure security.

The time for action is now. Australia’s government must move decisively to secure the subsea cable infrastructure of the Northern Territory, ensuring long-term resilience and reliability.

With its strategic location in the Indo-Pacific, Darwin is poised to be a cornerstone of global digital connectivity, not only serving as a gateway for Australia but also reinforcing regional security and economic stability. By securing subsea cable infrastructure, Australia will pave the way for a secure, resilient and interconnected future, reinforcing both its national interests and its partnerships with key allies.

Training in Australia is a big chance for Japan. Let’s make it permanent

Valuable training in the Northern Territory for Japan’s key amphibious force from next year should be only a step towards more extensive use of Australian exercise areas by the Japanese armed forces.

Canberra should now offer Tokyo a permanent arrangement for Japanese armed forces to train in the Northern Territory, similar to the initiative for Singaporean troops training in Queensland.

The plan for the Japanese brigade to begin training in the Northern Territory was announced on 17 November during a meeting in Darwin of the three countries’ defence chiefs. Japan’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB), a marine unit of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), will join the training and exercises held by the US Marine Rotational Force–Darwin (MRF-D) and the Australian Defence Force from 2025.

The ARDB incorporates Japan’s former Western Army Infantry Regiment, the dedicated amphibious warfare unit of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. It conducts a full range of amphibious operations and limited training with the US Marine Corps to enhance the skills and doctrine for retaking Japanese territory seized by a foreign power.

To support the ARDB, Japan has bought amphibious assault vehicles. It has also modernised ships for operating F-35B Lightning fighters and MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, both types also used by the USMC.

Peace in Japan since World War II and the country’s pacifist constitution have ensured that its armed forces haven’t fought a war for almost 80 years. Training opportunities of the highest quality are therefore even more important to them than they are for the militaries of other countries.

The Northern Territory provides the space and the multi-domain training that the JSDF needs to better prepare its soldiers and equipment for the battlefield. It is arguably the best place on this side of the world for the sort of unrestrained, combined-arms training the JSDF is seeking.

Japan’s training spaces are limited, because of the country’s high population density. Alternatives in the US don’t have the unique characteristics of the Northern Territory, which provides for multi-domain training across air, land, sea, space and cyberspace.

JSDF presence in the Northern Territory would also be useful in accelerating unilateral, bilateral and multilateral testing and evaluation for dual-use technologies. By adding Japanese systems to those that are already tested an evaluated in the Northern Territory, we can develop a larger and more robust private support industry.

It is good news that the first Japanese Joint Staff liaison officer will be placed in Australia’s Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) in November. Also welcome is the commitment to send an ADF liaison officer to JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) once it is established in 2025.

Australia should continue the momentum of those announcements and focus on initiatives that build the people-to-people linkages.

Canberra should also offer Tokyo a permanent Japan-Australia Training Initiative located in the Northern Territory along similar lines to the long-standing Australia-Singapore Military Training Initiative (ASMTI) based in central and northern Queensland.

Under the ASMTI, Singapore has invested in the development and enhancement of two training areas in Queensland, owned and managed by Canberra. These will support future needs of the ADF and facilitate an increased presence of Singapore Armed Forces personnel. When the ASMTI reaches maturity, up to 14,000 Singaporean troops will train in Queensland for up to 18 weeks a year, split into two nine-week periods.

In deepening the engagement with Japanese forces, there will be political hurdles and challenges posed by public perception, but now is the time to think boldly and act quickly. Japan’s participation in US and Australian training in the Northern Territory has great potential to lead to a more extensive collaboration that’s beneficial to all parties.