Tag Archive for: Northern Australia

Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world

For more than a decade, which has included the 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2022 federal elections, ASPI has helped to generate ideas and foster debate about Australian strategic policymaking through Agenda for change, a wide-ranging collection of analyses and recommendations to assist the next Australian Government in its deliberations and planning.  

Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world continues in its tradition by providing focused and anticipatory policy advice for the 48th Parliament of Australia. The agenda strives to highlight, and present solutions to, the most pressing questions that our next government must consider in order to advance and protect Australia’s national interests in a more disordered and challenging world. 

This edition reflects five interrelated aspects of Australia’s position in 2025, focused on the need to:

  • defend Australia
  • navigate our place in a new world (dis)order
  • reform our security architecture and policies
  • secure our critical infrastructure
  • protect and use our natural resources. 

In 2025, that means equipping the next government for the reality of the contest in which our country is engaged. Since the previous edition of Agenda for change in 2022 we’ve seen:

  • Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and public confirmation of the China–Russia ‘no limits’ partnership
  • change in Australia’s policy towards China, with a focus on ‘stabilisation’, accompanied by reduced economic coercion against Australia but a ratcheting up of military intimidation, including an unprecedented PLA Navy circumnavigation of Australia
  • heightened aggression by China against the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Taiwan
  • a lowering of the national terrorism threat level to ‘possible’ in 2022, before it was raised back to ‘probable’ not quite two years later 
  • the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the resulting war in Gaza and an increase in politically motivated violence in Australia
  • the rise of artificial intelligence, including the landmark release of ChatGPT in late 2022 and then DeepSeek in 2025
  • the return of Donald Trump to the White House, bringing tension among allies and question marks over the future of the US-led international order.

Each chapter in Agenda for change includes a limited number of prioritised policy recommendations, which are intended to be discrete, do-able and impactful. Although, when dealing with some of the more existential challenges facing Australia, the recommendations are necessarily and similarly expansive.

In addressing that extraordinary range of developments, ASPI has drawn on a wide range of expertise for the 2025 edition of Agenda for change. The views expressed are the personal views of the authors and don’t represent a formal position of ASPI on any issue, other than a shared focus on Australia’s national interests. 

Darwin Dialogue 2024: Triumph from teamwork

In an increasingly fracturing international system, set to undergo only further strain in the near future, critical minerals are a point of significant international contention. Critical minerals underlie competition across critical civil and defence sectors and promise economic opportunity throughout their supply chain. They are vital to the clean-energy transition with minerals needed for electric vehicle batteries, solar panels, and even wind turbines. Resolving the significant vulnerabilities across critical mineral supply chains is a significant economic and national security challenge.

This report—based on an exclusive, invitation-only discussion at the Darwin Dialogue 2024, a 1.5 Track discussion between the Australian, United States, Japanese and Republic of Korean Governments-makes 11 recommendations for government and industry to develop both the domestic and international critical minerals sector.

This report also assesses the developments in Australia’s critical mineral policy since the inaugural Darwin Dialogue in April 2023, including the flagship Future Made in Australia policy; policy options to unlock new sources of domestic and international capital for the Australian critical minerals sector, and, how to better promote high ESG compliance in the international critical minerals market.

Australia’s natural endowments of critical minerals promise significant economic opportunity. But seizing this opportunity is dependent on teamwork. The Australian Government must work effectively with domestic state and territory governments, as well as close minilateral partners, to resolve the threats facing the critical minerals sector and develop secure and resilient supply chains for ourselves and the international community.

Building whole-of-nation statecraft: How Australia can better leverage subnational diplomacy in the US alliance

Australia and the US are both federations of states in which power is shared constitutionally between the national and subnational levels of government. However, traditionally, one domain that hasn’t been considered a shared power, but rather the constitutionally enshrined responsibility of the national governments, has been international affairs (in the US Constitution through Article I, Section 10 and other clauses and in the Australian Constitution through section 51 (xxix), known as the external affairs power). For this reason, foreign-policy and national-security decision-makers in Washington DC and Canberra have rightly seen themselves as the prime actors in the policymaking that develops and strengthens the US–Australia alliance and all global relationships, with limited power held by subnational governments.

However, in our globalised and digital world, constitutional power no longer means that subnational governments have only narrow roles and influence on the international stage. While national governments will continue having primary responsibility for setting foreign policy, subnational governments have offices overseas, sign agreements with foreign governments, and regularly send diplomatic delegations abroad. Recent events, including the Covid-19 pandemic, have highlighted subnational governments’ decisive role in shaping, supporting, adapting to and implementing national and international policy. The pandemic, including post-pandemic trade promotion, demonstrated that the relationships between layers of governments in both federations are essential to national security, resilience, economic prosperity and social cohesion.

Subnational governments have vital roles to play in helping to maximise national capability, increase trust in democratic institutions, mitigate security threats and build broader and deeper relationships abroad. At the subnational level in Washington and Canberra, people-to-people, cultural and economic links create the deep connective tissue that maintains relationships, including those vital to the US-Australia alliance, no matter the politics of the day. But that subnational interaction must be consistent with national defence and foreign policy.

Australia’s federal system should help facilitate international engagement and incentivise positive engagement while ensuring that the necessary legislative and policy levers exist to require the subnational layer to conduct essential due diligence that prioritises the national interest. In this report, the authors make a series of policy recommendations that will support the development of such a framework.

Developing Australia’s critical minerals and rare earths: Implementing the outcomes from the 2023 Darwin Dialogue

Critical minerals and rare earths are the building blocks for emerging and future technologies, inseparable from the supply chains of manufacturing, clean energy production, medical technology, semiconductors, and the defence and aerospace industries. Despite their criticality, their supply chains are exposed to numerous vulnerabilities – threatening the production and development of vital technologies.

This report—based on closed-door, invitation-only discussions at ASPI’s new Darwin Dialogue, a track 1.5 meeting between Australia, Japan and the US—makes 24 recommendations for government and the private sector to support the development of viable, competitive alternative markets that offer products through supply chains secure from domestic policy disruptions and economic coercion.

These recommendations are derived from analysis of the challenges embedded in critical minerals supply chains, including the inability for global production to meet projected demand, and dependency upon China and politically unstable nations as at times near singular sources of production.

Australia’s natural endowments of critical minerals and rare earths provide a unique opportunity to achieve intersecting economic, environmental, and strategic objectives. But, as detailed in this report, effective coordination between Australia’s state, territory and federal governments, mining and industry, and international partners will be pivotal to developing this opportunity. Further still, achieving our critical minerals objectives will require a bold new policy approach from all stakeholders.

Australia’s north and space

This report examines opportunities for the development of sovereign space capability in the Northern Territory, Queensland, and Western Australia. Given that those northern jurisdictions are closer to the equator, there’s a natural focus in the report on the potential opportunities offered by sovereign space launch, particularly in the Northern Territory and Queensland. However, I also consider the potential for other aspects of space besides launch, including space domain awareness, the establishment of satellite ground stations, and space industry. I explore the potential for the co-location of space industry—domestic and international—within or close to launch sites, which would result in the development of ‘space hubs’ in strategic locations in Australia.

Benefits are gained by situating space-launch sites as close to the equator as possible, and two sites—Nhulunbuy near Gove in the Northern Territory and Abbot Point near Bowen in Queensland—are now under development. The closer a launch site is to the equator, the greater the benefit in terms of reduced cost per kilogram of payload to orbit, due to velocity gained by a rocket from the Earth’s rotation.

The report then explores the transformation of Australia’s space sector that’s occurred within the past decade, from one solely dependent on foreign-provided satellite services and locally developed ground-segment capabilities, including for space domain awareness, to the growth of sovereign space industry and the establishment of the Australian Space Agency in 2018. I note that, since the establishment of the agency, Australia’s commercial space sector has expanded rapidly, but now faces headwinds, with the recent cancellation of the National Space Mission for Earth Observation being a serious blow to Australia’s space industry. The Australian space industry sector must now fight to sustain funding. In this report, I argue that the best way to achieve success is to emphasise sovereign launch as a focus for Australian space activities and to reinforce the potential opportunities offered by the north, including for defence and national-security requirements in space.

AUKUS and critical minerals: Hedging Beijing’s pervasive, clever and coordinated statecraft

AUKUS has a heavy focus on R&D of military capabilities. A number of departments, including defence, foreign affairs and prime ministerial equivalents are engaged. The science and technology to deliver those capabilities must resolve issues of insecure supply chains. Currently, supply chains for processed critical minerals and their resulting materials aren’t specifically included.

Yet all AUKUS capabilities, and the rules-based order that they uphold, depend heavily on critical minerals. China eclipses not only AUKUS for processing those minerals into usable forms, but the rest of the world combined. Without critical minerals, states are open to economic coercion in various technological industries, and defence manufacturing is particularly exposed to unnecessary supply-chain challenges.

This is where Australia comes in. Australia has the essential minerals, which are more readily exploitable because they’re located in less densely populated or ecologically sensitive areas. Australia also has the right expertise, including universities offering the appropriate advanced geoscience degrees, as well as advanced infrastructure, world-class resources technology and deep industry connections with Asia and Africa, which are also vital global sources of critical minerals.

This paper outlines why Australia offers an unrivalled rallying point to drive secure critical-mineral supply among a wide field of vested nations, using AUKUS but not limited to AUKUS partners, how WA has globally superior reserves and substantial expertise, and why northern Australia more generally has a key role to play. The paper also explains why policy action here must be prioritised by the Australian Government.

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 6

The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 6, is a series of articles published in The Strategist over the last six months, building on previous volumes by identifying critical intersections of national security, nation-building and Australia’s north.

This issue, like previous volumes, includes a wide range of articles sourced from a diverse pool of expert contributors writing on topics as varied as maritime law enforcement, equatorial space launch, renewable energy infrastructure, rare earths and critical minerals, agriculture, Industry 4.0, advanced manufacturing, fuel and water security, and defence force posturing. It also features a foreword by the Honourable Madeleine King MP, Minister for Northern Australia.

Minister King writes, “Northern Australia promises boundless opportunity and potential. It is the doorway to our region and key to our future prosperity.”

The 24 articles propose concrete, real-world actions for policy-makers to facilitate the development, prosperity and security of Australia’s north. The authors share a sense that those things that make the north unique – its vast space, low population density, specific geography, and harsh investment environment – are characteristics that can be leveraged, not disadvantages.

This is a link to the previous volume 5.

‘Deep roots’: Agriculture, national security and nation-building in northern Australia

This report offers a multidisciplinary analysis of the various components that make up and influence the vast and complex agriculture industry network in northern Australia. It examines the economic and historical underpinnings of the agriculture industry we know today; the administration, direction and implementation of agricultural policy and funding across levels of government; the many and varied demographic and cultural characteristics of the northern Australian population; and the evolution of place-based physical and digital infrastructure.

The role of infrastructure and infrastructure funding in northern Australia plays a key role in the report’s narrative, which outlines the implications for national security, economic prosperity, service delivery, social cohesion and policy implementation if prevailing arrangements aren’t reformed to a sufficient standard that addresses contemporary challenges.

The report also examines biosecurity vulnerabilities, mitigation strategies for those vulnerabilities and their strategic and national security implications, and the long-term positioning of the north of Australia as critical for future growth, prosperity and security. The focus on opportunities presented by the north’s unique nature throughout the report culminates in a set of recommendations for policymakers to take a unified and big-picture approach across a daunting array of issues and disciplines.

This report suggests:

  1. a unified message among all relevant stakeholder groups with awareness of the strategic role of the northern agriculture sector
  2. greater investment in agricultural research to grow and protect agricultural industries (prosperity is key to security)
  3. greater engagement of Indigenous populations, with genuine appreciation for the role of Indigenous people and their connection and knowledge of land and  water as the key to unlocking potential.
  4. a cohesive nation-building plan.

Breaking down the barriers to Industry 4.0 in the north

Innovation in northern Australia is thriving. It’s not clear why there’s a culture of innovation in the north, and perhaps that represents a focus for social research. However, there’s no doubt that innovators in northern Australia are seizing the opportunity to pursue solutions that generate economic benefits, contribute to national resilience, and respond to defence needs.

This special report highlights how innovators in the north are at the leading edge of the fourth industrial revolution and draws attention to the challenges they face.

Industry 4.0 represents opportunities to transform, but it’s not just about developing and adopting smart technology. And it’s not about evolutionary or transformative change; it’s a different way of thinking that will allow us to leap into a different future. To reap the transformative benefits from Industry 4.0 we need to adopt leading-edge technology in the best way to deliver better outcomes from the perspective of a wider range of interests.

But there are barriers. Australia has regulatory and standards frameworks and mechanisms that have evolved from traditional Industry 2.0 process thinking and Industry 3.0 manufacturing. There are inherent conflicts within and between sectors that safeguard the status quo of outdated and broken supply chains and wasteful manufacturing paradigms.

Through the lens of real experiences and success stories, this special report shines a light on the opportunities and challenges, and highlights what’s needed to better harness those opportunities. In particular, we need to:
•    Drive national capability through a philosophical positioning that’s supported by practical examples of innovation.
•    Acknowledge that economic theory underpinned by a need to have large-scale manufacturing and production lines for viability is thinking not aligned with the opportunity that Industry 4.0 presents.
•    Align government thinking and practice with the growing environmental, social and governance mindset of business and the growing expectations of investors, consumers and the community.
Northern innovators have a commitment to Australia, its future and the kind of world that they want to create for future generations. Thus, they conceptualise, create and deliver by leveraging Industry 4.0 thinking and technology.

Technology doesn’t drive change, but how they use it does. This is sovereign capability in action.

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 5

The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report is a series of articles published in The Strategist over the last six months, building on previous volumes by identifying critical intersections of national security, nation-building and Australia’s north.

This issue, like previous volumes, includes a wide range of articles sourced from a diverse pool of expert contributors writing on topics as varied as biosecurity, infrastructure, critical communications, cyber-resilience, maritime infrastructure, foreign investment, space, and Indigenous knowledge-sharing. It also features a foreword by ASPI’s new Executive Director, Justin Bassi.

The 19 articles propose concrete, real-world actions for policy-makers to facilitate the development, prosperity and security of Australia’s north. The authors share a sense that those things that make the north unique – its vast space, low population density, specific geography, and harsh investment environment – are characteristics that can be leveraged, not disadvantages.

Tag Archive for: Northern Australia

It’s a wrap: NT Defence Week 2025

Australia’s future security will be decided as much in Darwin as in Canberra. NT Defence Week 2025 made that reality unmistakably clear, showcasing the Northern Territory not as a remote outpost, but as the operational heart of Australia’s Indo-Pacific defence posture. To translate this momentum into lasting capability, government and industry must act with intent: investing in sovereign infrastructure, locking in supply chains and treating the north as the strategic asset it truly is.

Last week, more than 400 national and international government and industry representatives gathered in Larrakia Country to attend the Northern Australia Defence Summit and multiple supporting events hosted by DefenceNT, the Department of Defence, and industry leaders. The gathering collectively recognised the NT’s strategic importance and vitality in the regional security framework.

DefenceNT has set a clear and strategically aligned agenda to strengthen the NT’s role as a frontline enabler of Australia’s Indo-Pacific defence posture. Central to this is developing robust logistics and pre-positioning capabilities, which are vital for ensuring the Australian Defence Force and its partners can respond rapidly and decisively across a contested and dynamic region. The focus on army littoral manoeuvre basing reflects a pragmatic understanding of the operational demands of maritime and archipelagic warfare.

Attracting defence industry supply chains and accelerating investment in the northern bases pipeline are not only strategic necessities but present economic opportunities as well. Deepening integration with the United States through force posture initiatives, alongside expanding partnerships with Japan and other trusted regional partners, reinforces the territory’s position as a cornerstone of regional deterrence and collective security.

NT Defence Week 2025 demonstrated the NT’s strategic value, highlighting the depth of local capability and the untapped potential of northern industry. Direct engagement with defence stakeholders reinforced that resilient, locally anchored supply chains are crucial to sustaining future ADF operations. The rollout of new defence platforms has created a surge in demand for maintenance and sustainment services, opening the door to long-term regional economic and strategic benefits. Panel discussions addressed key enablers, including infrastructure development, regional collaboration and the ability to support a persistent operational presence. Across the week, one message was clear: certainty in project pipelines beyond current forward estimates is essential to unlocking industry investment and aligning northern development with the goals of the Integrated Investment Program, which guides investment to support the National Defence Strategy.

Defence capability in the NT is inseparable from infrastructure supporting energy, transport, water, digital connectivity, and sovereign industrial capacity. The NT is uniquely suited to support sustained multi-domain operations, from the Beetaloo Basin and renewable energy networks, to liquid fuel supply chains and strategic logistics hubs such as Darwin Port and Middle Arm. Water security initiatives and digital technologies such as undersea cables further enhance the territory’s operational resilience, while its strength in critical minerals, agribusiness, and space technology makes it dual-purpose powerhouse for national defence and economic security.

However, the scale of investment required to fully realise this potential exceeds what Defence alone can deliver under the current Integrated Investment Program. This creates an opening for private sector to lead the development of dual-use infrastructure, particularly in liquid fuel production, logistics connectivity, sovereign manufacturing, and sustainment hubs. Unlocking this opportunity demands greater certainty from Defence on project timelines and funding beyond existing forward estimates.

As NT Chief Minister Lia Finocchiaro stated during the event, the NT is not a remote outpost; it is Australia’s frontline in the Indo-Pacific. That view was reinforced by retired US Marine Corps Lieutenant General John Wissler, who described the territory as an essential launch point for integrated, long-range operations across all five domains.

NT Defence Week 2025 made unequivocally clear that the territory is indispensable to Australia’s long-term defence strategy. Turning that recognition into action demands sustained partnerships, targeted investment, and a shared commitment to building the north as a strategic asset—not just for today, but for decades to come.

Without logistics, northern defence is going nowhere

Australia must develop a national logistics plan to support combat operations in its primary theatre.

Defence’s primary strategic guidance, the National Defence Strategy, has chapters on people, innovation, acquisition and partnerships. It does not talk about logistics, assuming perhaps that this will just happen. Defence appears to simply take for granted the availability and adequacy of existing civilian infrastructure, with no strategic planning to ensure it actually has satisfactory and reliable access to roads, rail and ports. This is a logistical vulnerability that must be addressed.

Australia has underinvested in logistical infrastructure for decades. This will be a liability in the event of a conflict, especially one where Australia acts as both a participant and as a host for allied and partner nations. The poor state of transport infrastructure in Australia already costs the nation through delays to freight or long diversions. In the worst-case scenario, this lack of investment may disrupt force generation and risk the sustainment of deployed formations.

This underinvestment is best exemplified in northern Australia, and perhaps most obviously in Townsville. This city is home to the 3rd Brigade, a formation designated as an armoured amphibious brigade. Armoured formations impose a particularly heavy logistical burden. Armoured formations deployed via amphibious vessels create further logistical complexity. Defence’s direction to establish this capability in Townsville was unaccompanied by any supporting logistic plan. It appears that, again, the assumption is that logistics will just happen.

The Australian Defence Force must consider both sustainment and force projection for its logistic needs. Sustainment for the armoured units of the 3rd Brigade means having the necessary classes of supply and resources to maximise availability of serviceable platforms. With a large fleet of complex vehicles that are regularly pushed to their limits, a local sustainment hub is the only logical way to ensure that.

Any support contract for the army’s armoured fighting vehicles must include a local sustainment plan that ensures repairs and maintenance are done near to operating units. While it may be expensive in the short term, failure to adhere to this logistical necessity will impose a far greater long-term financial burden and, worse, reduce the availability of vehicles and readiness of operators.

Townsville’s location is highly advantageous for the 3rd Brigade, but without the coherence of a national strategy, it remains vulnerable to unnecessary risks. For example, consider the interior lines of communication that would support logistics in a crisis. Movement of 3rd Brigade personnel and equipment from Townsville would rely on the roads and rail systems that carry freight from the industrial precincts in the south.

Ironically, the amphibious brigade’s supply chain is regularly interrupted by excess water: wet-season floods disrupt the highways and rail lines that carry goods to Townsville. This isolates the brigade and prevents logistical resupply. Upgrading the Bruce Highway, or building an alternative route, is a matter of national security. Such initiatives would also improve civil productivity and safety.

Yet, even when roads are open, the brigade is somewhat isolated. The other combat formation in Australia’s north, the 1st Brigade in Darwin, occupies what is arguably the other national mounting point for land force projection. It would make sense to have a line of communication that safely and securely allows force movements between these two points without exposure to air and maritime threats.

Australia’s lack of a coherent national strategy, however, means that this internal line is inherently fragile. The Flinders Highway, which connects Mount Isa to Townsville, cannot be reliably used to transport armoured vehicles between our two force projection hubs. This road is also cut by flooding during the wet season and is subject to oversize and overmass restrictions on key bridges.

It is uncertain if the 3rd Brigade could guarantee local berth access to embark when ordered to deploy. Again, the lack of a national strategy that integrates logistics with Defence’s needs has led to a situation where the Port of Townsville, only kilometres from the 3rd Brigade’s base, does not have purpose-built facilities to support embarkation or disembarkation of the brigade’s armoured fighting vehicles.

Army’s new watercraft cannot use Ross Island Barracks and Defence have not committed to the planned expansion at the Port of Townsville, an expansion that would include facilities for landing craft to berth and embark or disembark tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles. Without this facility, and with access to commercial berths not assured, the army may be forced to transport vehicles via road to another suitable port—at huge cost.

Australia must integrate transport infrastructure with defence strategy. It is difficult to fathom the army’s acceptance of risk to the movement of heavy combat vehicles via the most direct route, constant disruption to supply lines via flood-prone roads, and inability to guarantee access and use of fit-for-purpose berths in the closest port.

Northern Australia: fortress, gateway and resource powerhouse

In the week of Australia’s 3 May election, ASPI will release Agenda for Change 2025: preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world, a report promoting public debate and understanding on issues of strategic importance to Australia. This is an article from the report. The full report can be read here.

Australia’s north holds immense strategic significance for Australia’s security, economic prosperity and regional influence. Amid the global impact of conflict in Europe and rising tensions in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, northern Australia—with its military bases and critical minerals—should be a key factor in any Australian national-security or economic-security strategy. Yet northern Australia policy continues to be bedevilled by the region’s unique economic, social, climatic and geographic challenges.

Northern Australia is broadly defined as the region north of latitude 26° South and accounts for nearly half of Australia’s landmass. It plays a pivotal role in national security and defence strategy. The region hosts key defence assets, including air bases, naval facilities, and surveillance installations essential for monitoring and responding to security threats. As the importance of the Indo-Pacific grows, so too does the geostrategic and economic importance of northern Australia.

The great potential of northern Australia extends well beyond being host to a network of hardened bases and training grounds, or a ‘lily pad’ from which Australia can project force or defend our maritime approaches. Its proximity to key maritime trade routes and regional partners positions it as a crucial node for engagement with allies and strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific. The region is rich in natural resources, particularly in energy and minerals, significantly contributing to Australia’s economic security. The development of those resources not only strengthens national resilience but also enhances Australia’s position as a reliable supplier in global markets.

If Australia is to leverage the maximum benefits from its north, then it must resolve a development challenge that’s existed since Federation. How does Australia support the development of the kind of infrastructure and scalable sovereign industry base that enhances economic prosperity, promoting security and growth?

A defence lens

The 2024 National Defence Strategy envisions defence facilities across northern Australia as a networked posture aligned with the 2023 Defence Strategic Review’s focus on deterrence and power projection. Northern Territory bases ensure forward presence, enable air–maritime surveillance, and facilitate allied training. Western Australia’s northern bases support air and space operations, while Queensland bases enable rapid amphibious deployment and foster allied interoperability.

Darwin stands as a steadfast symbol of Australia’s deep alliance with the US, hosting a permanent rotational presence of US Marines alongside joint military exercises and infrastructure support, underscoring a shared commitment to regional security. Its strategic location provides the US with a crucial refuelling point and launch pad for operations across the Indo-Pacific, reinforcing interoperability and ensuring a forward-deployed presence in the region. The Port of Darwin and nearby facilities serve as critical refuelling and logistical hubs, extending the US’s operational reach. Darwin not only strengthens military coordination between the two nations but also acts as a launch pad for rapid response, reinforcing the alliance amid an increasingly contested geopolitical landscape.

But much of northern Australia’s defence infrastructure is ageing and facing maintenance challenges exacerbated by supply-chain delays, remote logistics and workforce shortages. Although significant investment is earmarked for northern air bases, progress has been slow due to supply-chain issues and contractor shortages.

The Defence organisation has been reluctant to proactively engage with the region’s economic realities. In northern Australia, Defence must work even closer with industry if it’s to successfully secure the industry capacity it needs at the time it’s needed. Moreover, it needs to increasingly engage in broader regional development measures.

An infrastructure lens

Northern Australia’s deep-sea ports are vital for economic resilience, national security and Indo-Pacific engagement, but historical planning has underestimated demand, hampering maritime readiness and forcing ships south for logistical support.

The Port of Darwin, adjacent to the Larrakeyah Defence Precinct, is a key hub for defence, mining and energy, supporting Australian and allied naval ships. Yet its limited moorings restrict RAN operations, and security concerns have been raised over its foreign control. The Northern Territory Government’s development of Middle Arm Peninsula as an industrial hub, and its investment in the yet to be built Darwin Ship Lift facility, could well see the port play a critical role supporting AUKUS.

But there’s a challenge here, too.

Much has been written about the 99-year lease of the Port of Darwin to a foreign-owned company: Landbridge. Most commentary ignores the fact that the lease means a Chinese-owned company has a significant voice in how the port will, or won’t, be developed over the next 89 years, which might or might not align with our national interests.

That means key decisions about infrastructure upgrades, operational priorities and access could be shaped by commercial or strategic interests that don’t necessarily align with Australia’s national-security objectives. For example, Landbridge could prioritise commercial shipping over defence-related expansions, delay or obstruct projects that enhance military readiness, or limit access to certain parts of the port and thereby potentially constrain the port’s ability to support RAN or AUKUS-related activities in the long term.

In northern Queensland, the ports of Cairns and Townsville anchor RAN operations in the north. The Port of Weipa, located on the Gulf of Carpentaria, while primarily a mineral export hub, provides a naturally deep anchorage, and its proximity to our northern approaches make it a potential logistics asset for defence in a crisis, supplemented by its relatively proximity to RAAF Base Scherger (although access will need to be hardened to mitigate wet-season flooding). But, as Rio Tinto continues to wind down its operations, the future of this port is in question, especially if dredging operations cease.

In northern Western Australia, civilian-focused ports such as Hedland, Dampier, Broome and Walcott have limited military use, but the proposed Gascoyne Gateway near Exmouth, with its multi-user design and proximity to defence assets such as the Harold E Holt naval communication facility and RAAF Learmonth could provide naval support for Australian and allied forces.

To ensure that multi-user port facilities continue to be available across northern Australia, Defence will need to engage more proactively with the private sector and with state and territory governments.

Northern Australia’s road, rail and logistics networks are critical to national defence preparedness and resilience and economic prosperity. The networks serve as a national lifeline for Australia’s northern communities as well as Defence, but they’re extremely vulnerable to climate change, extreme weather events, and distance and capacity limitations.

The Great Northern, Stuart and Bruce highways connect key hubs such as Darwin and Townsville to ports and defence bases, yet single-lane stretches, seasonal flooding and ageing infrastructure delay deliveries, isolate communities and create opportunities for adversarial disruption. Too often, remote communities are cut off for extended periods, when roads and bridges are closed, exposing the fragility of national supply chains and increasing pressure on the ADF to provide disaster assistance. Heavy military use, such as during Exercise Pitch Black and Talisman Sabre, creates congestion, accelerates wear and disrupts civilian supply.

The Darwin–Tarcoola rail line links the Port of Darwin to southern markets but lacks intermodal terminals and sidings, restricting freight transfers from road to rail. The absence of rail connections to key bases such as Tindal slows resupply, undermining sustained operations during crises. Expanding terminals and sidings would ease road congestion, reduce transportation costs and strengthen logistics resilience, which is critical for Australia’s northern defence posture. Targeted investment in flood proofing roads, sealing rural routes, expanding rail infrastructure and developing a coordinated hub-and-spoke freight network aligned with government and military needs is essential to strengthen logistics resilience and balance military and civilian priorities in northern Australia. The combined needs of national resilience and preparedness, defence and economic prosperity make such investment far more attractive.

Northern Australia is a critical hub for Australia’s defence operations, hosting major joint exercises and permanent military rotations. Each year, around 2,500 US Marines deploy to the Northern Territory for six to eight months as part of the Marine Rotational Force—Darwin (MRF-D). Every two years, Exercise Talisman Sabre sees the arrival of about 30,000 personnel from 13 nations, while Exercise Pitch Black brings together about 4,400 personnel and more than 140 aircraft from 20 countries. Regional partners, including Indonesia, Japan, Singapore and France, also conduct training in the Northern Territory and Queensland. Those activities place significant strain on water, energy and sewerage infrastructure not designed to accommodate such immense surges.

Despite the increasing operational tempo, Defence investment beyond the wire hasn’t kept pace with demand. In Darwin, a power grid reliant on gas and solar struggles with surge loads, increasing the risk of brownouts and forcing greater reliance on diesel generators—an expensive and unsustainable stopgap. RAAF Base Tindal, which is dependent on microgrids, is vulnerable to power disruptions if fuel supplies are interrupted, affecting both military operations and civilian communities. Without targeted investment, future operational surges will amplify those risks, undermining military readiness.

Water infrastructure is equally strained. Dry-season exercises in Darwin push water reserves to critical levels, while Katherine’s limited treatment capacity can’t support sudden demand increases, risking shortages and pressure drops. During past surges, Defence has been forced to rely on bottled water or tanker imports—a costly and temporary solution. Without infrastructure upgrades, future exercises could face severe logistical constraints.

Sewerage capacity is another growing concern. Darwin’s system was designed for a population of 150,000 but is already at its limit. The establishment of the MRF-D military camp has increased demand, which increases by another 20% during peak training, leading to system overloads, backups and untreated discharge. Those problems are exacerbated during the wet season, when infrastructure is already under pressure. As Defence activity expands, failure to invest in sewerage capacity will heighten environmental and public-health risks.

Town planning models don’t account for the episodic surges in demand that military operations create. Assuming that unmodified civilian infrastructure can absorb such spikes without consequences is a flawed strategy. A long-term, integrated approach is needed to ensure that Defence facilities remain operationally viable and don’t strain local communities. Without decisive action, infrastructure shortfalls will continue to pose a critical vulnerability to national resilience and preparedness, economic prosperity and defence readiness.

Australia’s fuel security is deteriorating: approximately 90% of liquid fuel is imported, and stockholdings are consistently below the International Energy Agency’s 90-day minimum requirement. The 2022 global fuel shock, driven by Russia’s war on Ukraine, exposed Australia’s vulnerabilities as global supply chains tightened, and key suppliers prioritised domestic stockpiles.

Northern Australia’s geography, sparse population and limited infrastructure exacerbate fuel shortages, particularly during military surge periods. Large-scale joint exercises place exceptional demand on aviation, diesel and maritime fuel supplies, exceeding peacetime norms. Bases in the north lack adequate fuel reserves, constraining air and maritime reach. While recent US Force Posture Initiatives upgrades have helped, capacity remains insufficient during high-intensity operations. Without further investment, fuel shortfalls will continue to undermine Australia’s ability to project force and sustain operations.

Australia’s two remaining refineries rely on imported crude and government support to meet new fuel standards, improving quality but not capacity. Diesel remains the nation’s most critical fuel, powering transport, emergency services and backup electricity for remote areas. However, Australia’s reliance on China for 90% of imports of urea (a key component of the AdBlue used in diesel vehicles to reduce emissions) creates a major vulnerability. The collapse of Australia’s last urea producer in 2022 has left transport and defence supply chains exposed to future shortages, threatening operational continuity.

Investing in domestic biodiesel production presents a strategic opportunity. Establishing decentralised biodiesel plants in Darwin and Townsville or Cairns would pre-position fuel in critical locations, mitigating logistical bottlenecks and seasonal disruptions. Sovereign production would enhance ADF readiness, cut costs and strengthen supply-chain resilience, while contributing to strengthening economic prosperity and positioning Australia as a leader in renewable energy.

A people lens

Northern Australia’s workforce, particularly in construction and manufacturing, is critical to the success of the NDS and Integrated Investment Program, both now and well into the future. The primary issues are associated with labour shortages, high costs and industry reluctance to engage in defence contracts due to complex processes and lower profitability compared to other sectors. Those issues are exacerbated by a transient workforce and a generational skills gap, especially in remote areas. In the short term, lowering entry barriers for less sensitive projects can improve participation, while a long-term strategy should focus on Defence–industry collaboration to commit to a program of works (over 5–10 years) to enable industry to invest in regional communities. Working with state and territory governments to support workforce growth and to build regional social infrastructure to encourage the workforce (also of benefit to the ADF) to remain in regional and remote locations will be essential for sustainable development and securing the labour force needed for strategic defence objectives.

Recommendations

Northern Australia is at a pivotal moment, balancing immense strategic potential with significant vulnerabilities. As a key defence hub, economic driver and gateway to the Indo-Pacific, its role in national security and regional influence is undeniable. However, ageing infrastructure, logistical constraints and exposure to both climate and geopolitical risks threaten its effectiveness. The government’s focus on a ‘strategy of denial’ and investments in defence and critical infrastructure are steps in the right direction, but progress must accelerate to close persistent gaps in readiness, interoperability and resilience. Without urgent action, northern Australia will remain underprepared to meet the demands of an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the next government should take the following steps:

—Fast-track infrastructure upgrades to eliminate logistical bottlenecks and enhance rapid mobilisation. Defence bases and transport networks require targeted investment to ensure they can meet surge demands, particularly in Darwin. Integrating civilian and military infrastructure planning will enhance resilience, while flood proofing and climate-adaptive designs will safeguard reliability. Deep-sea ports must be secured and expanded. Strengthening Weipa and returning the lease of the Port of Darwin to sovereign management will enhance deterrence and ensure operational readiness.

—Acknowledge fuel security as a critical vulnerability. Reliance on imported fuel exposes Australia to supply-chain disruptions, so establish decentralised biodiesel production in northern Australia. The use of local agricultural and waste resources would enhance self-sufficiency, improve ADF readiness and sustain surge demand during military exercises or crises. That would also align with national net-zero targets while reducing logistical risks.

—Simplify Defence’s contract processes, with an objective of improving regional social infrastructure and incentivising long-term skills development. Workforce shortages continue to hinder defence and infrastructure projects. Reducing red tape to improve social infrastructure and skills would help retain and increase a stable workforce in remote areas.

Strengthening these foundations will not only enhance northern Australia’s strategic readiness but also ensure that it remains a cornerstone of Australia’s national security and regional influence. It should be a key part of any national economic-security strategy.

Middle Arm project: the infrastructure enabler for Northern Territory development

Darwin’s proposed Middle Arm Sustainable Development Precinct is set to be the heart of a new integrated infrastructure network in the Northern Territory, larger and better than what currently exists in northern Australia.

However, the project’s success depends on coordinated financial support between the Northern Territory and federal governments. More attention needs to be paid to the current model of federal funding, which risks limiting the project’s development and reducing its benefits.

Developing northern Australia’s economic opportunities presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the rest of the country. The Northern Territory’s geostrategic position and its vast natural resources, including its renewable energy potential, world-class gas reserves and mineral deposits, help maintain Australia’s role as a key player in global energy and mineral supply chains.

The precinct, still in its early stages of planning, will be spread over 15 square kilometres of newly developed land and include common user infrastructure such as roads, renewable power networks, water supply, telecommunications, infrastructure corridors, a module offloading facility and a shipping channel.

The Northern Territory government is also developing a large pipeline of enabling infrastructure projects, each with some level of interdependency on the precinct. These include enabling infrastructure and new industries such as:

—A proposed ship lift facility in Darwin Harbour;

—Carbon capture, utilisation and storage facilities built around the existing INPEX (Ichthys onshore LNG) and Santos (Darwin LNG) gas facilities;

—Large-scale solar and hydrogen projects, such as the proposed solar farm associated with SunCable’s Australia-Asia PowerLink project;

—Water infrastructure projects such as the Adelaide River Off-stream Water Storage project and the return to service of the Manton Dam; and

—A marine industry park.

Although the Middle Arm project is a joint effort between the federal and Northern Territory and governments, federal support for it has changed over time.

In 2021, the Liberal government allocated $2 billion for the precinct. This would be granted to the Northern Territory government to fund the $1.5 billion common user marine infrastructure, $200 million road upgrades and a $300 million carbon capture and storage manifold.

The revenue generated from these assets would set the territory on a path of self-generated revenue, which would then fund critical infrastructure across the region including police, health and education facilities.

However, when the current Labor federal government took over in 2022, it switched the funding profile to an equity style arrangement of $1.5 billion for common user marine infrastructure, leaving the road upgrades and carbon capture and storage manifold unfunded.

The key difference between these two commitments is not the amount of funding, but the way in which the funding is given.

Under the previous Liberal-National federal government, the territory government did not have to pay back the money, which was intended as a grant. But with the current model of equity investment, the territory is expected to make a positive return on investment and pay back the funds with interest.

This means the territory will need to draw down on its self-generated revenue, which in turn will make it more difficult and costly to comprehensively develop the precinct and increase the risks for the territory. While the loan clearly demonstrates strong federal support for the project, it will reduce the benefits to northern Australia in the short term.

Another key element of the Middle Arm project is provision of strategic infrastructure corridors for transmission of feedstock and export products including gas, water and high voltage power. Energy availability and cost determines the capacity and economics of advanced industry. By combining energy generation, storage and energy-intensive industry in a single precinct, the project aims to unlock the territory’s capacity to progress further down the commodity supply chain.

Northern Australia’s lack of infrastructure and energy grid issues—despite producing most of Australia’s LNG—are consistent stymying factors for economic growth. The precinct’s concentration of supply and customers will reduce the inherent challenges of distance and localises infrastructure needs, allowing it to host manufacturing projects that are unfeasible across the rest of the territory.

A strong Northern Territory means a strong Australia. Despite the territory’s relatively small population and voice on the national stage, it is crucial for the country that it grows economically and develops into a more prosperous, strategically vital region.

The precinct is set to be a holistic, integrated network that combines big projects with infrastructure enablers, creating more favourable economies of scale. This type of systems thinking is vital for development in the north, but support from the nation remains crucial, and close attention must be paid to the terms of that support.

Northern Australia’s economic revival can support defence readiness

Two blueprints that could redefine the Northern Territory’s economic future were launched last week. The first was a government-led economic strategy and the other an industry-driven economic roadmap.

Both highlight that supporting the Northern Territory is not just an economic necessity; it is a national security imperative. By aligning defence priorities and economic development, Australia can ensure the Northern Territory is a resilient and self-sufficient pillar of our national defence strategy.

The Northern Territory Government’s Economic Strategy 2025 sets out a determined investment plan to drive economic growth using the Territory’s natural resources, strategic location and emerging industries. It prioritises renewable energy, critical minerals, transport and digital connectivity, tourism, and workforce capacity building. These areas are intended to enhance trade links with Asian markets and achieve annual growth in gross state product that exceeds national GDP growth.

Simultaneously, the Darwin Major Business Group’s What the Territory Needs 2025 roadmap presents an industry-led approach to the Territory’s economic revitalisation focusing on defence, agriculture and critical minerals. By upgrading Darwin Port and expanding renewable energy projects, it seeks to establish the Territory as a trade and energy hub while aligning with national security priorities to attract federal funding and international partnerships.

Both strategies recognise the Territory’s role in Australia’s defence posture and the fact that the Territory’s economic strength underpins national security. Revitalisation of the Territory could reduce reliance on imports, sustain defence operations and reinforce Australia’s ability to project power in the Indo-Pacific.

But progress to transform Northern Australia into a hardened defence hub is slow and limited to enabling infrastructure contained within the defence estate. For example, Defence has earmarked billions over the coming decade to strengthen northern bases. Beyond this, secure energy, stable digital connectivity, reliable water supply and resilient transport networks are required to sustain military operations and accommodate extreme demand surges during joint training exercises.

Defence investment in the Northern Territory cannot operate in isolation. Without a strong economy to sustain it, Defence will struggle to reach its full posting potential. The Territory needs affordable housing, healthcare, education and job opportunities for defence families and industry. Otherwise, recruitment and retention will suffer, places such as Darwin and Katherine will continue to be considered ‘hardship’ postings, and the Territory will be unable to build the workforce needed to support a growing Defence presence.

Both economic strategies recognise that private sector investment must be mobilised alongside government funding. The industry-led strategy can ensure a faster, more agile approach to infrastructure development by using private capital, streamlining regulations and incentivising business. Encouraging the private sector to co-invest in dual-use infrastructure—ports, airstrips and logistics hubs—will create lasting economic benefits while supporting defence capabilities.

Unlocking the Territory’s vast critical mineral reserves and energy resources must also be framed in a national security context. The Beetaloo Basin’s gas potential and the Territory’s deposits of rare earth elements can contribute to energy security and domestic manufacturing growth and self-resilience. The Adelaide River Off-stream Water Storage project ensures reliable potable water supplies for defence bases, training areas and disaster response operations. This shows how infrastructure investment can serve both economic and military needs.

The Northern Territory has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to become Australia’s northern powerhouse for defence and critical minerals. But success will require sustained bipartisan support and collaboration between government, industry and Defence. The window for action is narrowing. As regional tensions rise and global competition for supply chain sovereignty intensifies, Australia must seize the opportunity to strengthen its northern frontier.

House of cards: northern Australia’s liquid fuel resilience

Northern Australia’s liquid fuel infrastructure is the backbone of defence capability, national resilience, and economic prosperity. Yet, it faces mounting pressure from increasing demand, supply chain vulnerabilities and logistical fragilities.

Fuel security is not just about stockpiling: it hinges on accessibility when and where it’s needed, diversity in suppliers and supply routes, and adaptability to changing circumstances to maintain a stable supply, even in times of crisis.

Australia should consider activating dormant fuel reserves, developing a domestic fuel refinery, hardening logistics chains and preparing contingency measures.

At first glance, northern Australia’s fuel security appears robust, with key Defence bases (HMAS Coonawarra, RAAF Darwin and RAAF Tindal) providing guaranteed demand. Meanwhile, regional economic activity is sustained by reserves at Melville Bay, Nhulunbuy and Darwin’s East Arm Precinct, which includes both Vopak’s commercial and Crowley’s eventual Defence reserves.

Crowley’s East Arm facility will, when complete, be the linchpin of the region’s fuel security, holding 300 million litres of jet fuel, 90 percent allocated to defence operations. By comparison, RAAF Darwin’s 12 million litres and RAAF Tindal’s 14 million litres are fully committed to military use, while HMAS Coonawarra contributes 6 million litres of diesel for naval readiness. Civilian infrastructure supports industry and local communities, including reserves such as Vopak’s 174 million litres, Melville Bay’s 30 million litres of commercial diesel and Nhulunbuy’s estimated 20 million litres.

This dual-purpose system attempts to balance military preparedness with economic necessity, yet these figures tell only part of the story. The apparent stability of northern Australia’s fuel network is an illusion: the system works well only without supply disruptions or rapid demand increases.

90 percent of all liquid fuel is imported and northern Australia remains highly vulnerable to supply disruptions. Seasonal flooding can sever road links between Darwin, Tindal and the air force’s bare bases (RAAF Curtin, Learmonth and Scherger). This shows up a fragile logistics network that adversaries could exploit, or natural disasters could disrupt.

Australia’s national fuel security has been steadily eroding for years, with national stockpiles consistently falling short of the International Energy Agency’s 90-day benchmark. The 2022 Russia-Ukraine war highlighted these vulnerabilities. As global supply chains tightened, Australia’s limited reserves became more apparent. While additional storage alone couldn’t eliminate supply shocks, in a crisis it would provide an important time buffer.

The risks are particularly acute in the Top End. Disruptions in Asian refineries, blockages in key shipping lanes such, as those through the South China Sea, or a severe cyclone hitting Darwin’s port could cripple fuel supplies, leaving aircraft grounded, naval operations stalled, and communities isolated. The region’s dependence on limited road transport further amplifies the challenge, particularly when considering fuel delivery to the air force’s northern bare bases.

To address these vulnerabilities, Australia should activate Melville Island’s dormant fuel reserves; develop a domestic fuel refinery in the Northern Territory; harden the logistics backbone; and integrate Vopak and Nhulunbuy into a contingency network.

Just 80 kilometres from Darwin, Melville Island’s port and 30 million litres of existing fuel storage could be a valuable defence asset. With infrastructure upgrades, including new pipelines, tanker berths and integrated defence agreements, Melville could evolve into a dual-purpose hub, reinforcing Australian Defence Force operations and supporting regional economic activity. Increasing redundancy in supply locations enhances operational flexibility and minimises the risks posed by bottlenecks in a single storage site.

Australia’s dependence on imported aviation fuel is a glaring strategic risk, so it should consider a domestic fuel refinery in the Northern Territory. Even a modest refinery capable of processing 10,000 barrels (1.6 million litres) per day could meet at least half of RAAF Tindal’s requirements. While refining capability is not a silver bullet, it would strengthen Australia’s self-sufficiency, ensure a baseline level of operational continuity in a prolonged crisis and reduce Australia’s fuel vulnerabilities.

The Northern Territory’s logistics backbone should be hardened, as it is highly vulnerable to seasonal disruptions: the 320 kilometre highway connecting Darwin and Tindal is a single, flood-prone artery. The government should consider paying for all-weather road upgrades, developing redundant transport routes and exploring alternative logistics solutions, such as a dedicated rail spur. Prepositioned fuel caches near the RAAF’s bare bases could provide a buffer in times of crisis, ensuring operational continuity when primary supply lines are compromised.

Finally, integrating Vopak and Nhulunbuy into a contingency network would establish a reliable fallback system. Nhulunbuy’s fuel capacity of 20 million litres presents a potential strategic reserve but is geographically isolated. Infrastructure improvements, combined with an ADF contingency agreement to access Vopak’s 174 million litres, could ensure continued fuel availability if Darwin’s primary storage and distribution networks were disrupted. A dispersed and resilient fuel network minimises single points of failure, reinforcing Australia’s ability to sustain prolonged operations.

Fuel security demands long-term commitment, but it would reinforce Australia’s defence capabilities. Without assured fuel supply, even the most advanced military platforms become useless.

Without further investment in supply chain resilience, infrastructure modernisation and domestic production, fuel shortages will continue to undermine Australia’s capacity to project force and sustain operations. It is time to double down on what works and strengthen what does not.

Northern Australia strengthens its role in economy and energy security

Each day, more than 160 airline flights carrying 13,000 passengers take off and land at Perth Airport to and from destinations across northern Australia. They ferry skilled workers to and from minerals and energy operations. Darwin and Brisbane airports also host air services to and from northern Australian resources hubs.

This provides a real-time indicator of the health of the Australian resources sector, which is overwhelmingly concentrated north of the 26th parallel.

In 2023-24, aircraft and passenger movements between Perth and Western Australian destinations exceeded interstate traffic for the first time, pushing the airport to new throughput records.

Despite price weakness for some minerals, the resources sector remains healthy. Northern Australia’s minerals maintain outsized importance in the national economy and for state and federal government revenues.

The Department of Industry, Science and Resources’ latest Resources and Energy Quarterly, released in December 2024, highlights the fact that the minerals and energy sector generates two thirds of national exports and 11.4 percent of GDP.

Northern Australia’s minerals and energy dominance makes it central to the national resources sector and thus much of the Australian economy. In 2023–24, the combined value of the top four exports from northern Australia—iron ore, liquified natural gas (LNG), metallurgical coal and thermal coal—was $261 billion, or 63 percent of total resource exports.

Northern Australia contributes almost all the nation’s iron ore exports, expected to total more than 900 million tonnes in 2024, or some 56 percent of global seaborne trade in the commodity.  Export value is about $140 billion. While iron ore prices are expected to soften in 2025, volumes are forecast to rise. The Pilbara remains by far the largest iron ore production centre in the world.

Metallurgical coal is northern Australia’s next largest export by tonnage, with the north contributing 46 percent of global supply. All 81 million tonnes of the nation’s LNG exports in 2023-24, worth $69 billion, came from northern Australia. This supply is vital to the energy security of economies such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

Exploration spending is the long-term bellwether for the minerals industry. According to S&P Global data, northern Australia hosts 803 of more than 2000 exploration properties in the country. Australia-headquartered companies operate 632 of them. Identified reserves and resources in exploration properties are valued at $14 trillion.

While data is unavailable on mineral and petroleum exploration spending for northern Australia as a region, there is an indicator in the trend in the Northern Territory, where mineral exploration budgets were up 86 percent in the five years to 2023-24. The search for deposits of critical and strategic minerals such as lithium, copper and uranium drove the rise.

S&P Global records 163 mines in northern Australia, including those under construction. Outputs include copper, lithium, zinc, phosphate, vanadium, manganese, rare earths, gold, and metallurgical and thermal coal. The 11 secondary processing plants in northern Australia produce refined products such as alumina and metals including aluminium, copper and zinc.

Northern Australia, with abundant land and sunshine, is already a major source of renewable energy, with high potential for very large-scale production. From the Pilbara to the central Queensland resources hub, mines and mineral processing plants are increasingly sourcing energy from solar generators, backed by coal or gas. Whether exports of electricity and products such as green hydrogen are viable and will find markets remains to be seen.

While northern Australia’s minerals and energy future and its national economic contribution remain very positive, the region faces challenges in sustaining and growing production. As a December ASPI report highlighted, the region is vulnerable to natural disasters, particularly as some of its infrastructure is inadequate in the face of severe weather events. The government needs to spend more to maintain vital transport links as well as energy and telecommunications services.

Federal and state project assessment and approval processes have improved during the past decade and must continue to do so while maintaining scientific rigor. Efficient coordination between levels of government and between agencies is vital.

New lower-cost LNG supply from the United States and Qatar puts pressure on Australian LNG projects and their host governments to control costs of both construction and operations.

Several critical minerals projects in northern Australia have been held back by depressed and volatile prices, largely due to market manipulation by the current dominant producer, China. Australia and like-minded governments are working together to underwrite the commercial viability of such projects so they can attract global financing and move to construction and operational phases.

The thousands of workers who commute by air to, from and within northern Australia are testament to the strength of the resources sector, but also highlight the region’s chronic shortage of resident skilled workers. More locally and regionally based workers will help northern Australia capture greater value from its industries. The liveability of the north’s cities and towns is key to attracting and retaining more people.

The daily stream of jets from major population centres to northern Australia, however, will remain the main source of skilled people that contribute so much to the national economy and its energy security.

Darwin is well-placed for an uncrewed systems hub

Australia often relies on overseas facilities for uncrewed systems’ maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), exposing the country to operational delays, escalating costs and potential security risks. To address this vulnerability, it should establish an MRO facility for uncrewed systems in Darwin.

Uncrewed systems, including drones, uncrewed aerial vehicles and uncrewed underwater vehicles, are transforming Australia’s defence, security and commercial sectors. They have a range of applications in defence operations, border security, environmental monitoring and industrial applications such as extraction of natural resources, including natural gas.

Darwin’s strategic location, existing infrastructure and proximity to major defence and commercial partners mean it is the ideal hub for maintaining these vital assets.

The city’s strategic significance, long recognised by Australia’s defence planners, makes it the natural location for a dedicated MRO facility. As the gateway to the Indo-Pacific, Darwin’s proximity to regional and global markets, particularly Asia, provides an unparalleled advantage for servicing domestic and international clients.

This places Darwin at the crossroads of Australia’s defence and commercial interests in the region, with clear benefits for its role as a logistics and maintenance hub for uncrewed systems. Furthermore, the city’s established infrastructure, including air and sea ports, rail connections and utilities, already supports large-scale defence operations and the growing defence footprint in the region, making it primed for expansion into a world-class MRO hub for uncrewed systems.

Australian uncrewed systems are largely serviced overseas, leaving them vulnerable to extended downtimes, longer repair times and increased risk in transportation. This reliance on foreign facilities compromises Australia’s operational readiness. It hampers the efficiency of industries, such as resource extraction, that rely heavily on uncrewed technology for monitoring, inspections and surveillance.

As the Australian Defence Force and commercial sectors increasingly deploy uncrewed systems, it is essential to ensure they can be maintained and repaired promptly to avoid delays in operations, whether they involve national security, disaster response or remote infrastructure management.

As uncrewed systems are central to the future of defence operations, creating an MRO facility in Darwin would strengthen Australia’s position as a key partner in the region, with the ability to service not only its own uncrewed systems but also those of allied nations. This strategic advantage would provide a competitive edge in defence readiness and international collaborations.

Moreover, Darwin’s potential MRO facility could support other government agencies, such as the Australian Federal Police, Home Affairs and the Australian Border Force. They all use uncrewed systems for surveillance, border protection and law enforcement.

The ability to rapidly repair and maintain these systems would improve agencies’ responsiveness and availability of capabilities, ensuring that they are always equipped to respond to emerging threats. Darwin could thus play a greater role in Australia’s broader security architecture, providing reliable, homegrown support to key domestic and international partners.

From a commercial perspective, establishing an MRO facility in Darwin would be commercially viable and a boon for local businesses.

With the growing demand for uncrewed systems in industries such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), telecommunications and mining, establishing a local MRO facility would significantly reduce the reliance on overseas service providers. This would cut transport costs and ensure faster turnaround of repairs, improving the operational efficiency of these industries.

It would also create a thriving commercial ecosystem around uncrewed systems in the Northern Territory. Local businesses would be able to engage with the growing global market for uncrewed systems, contributing to job creation and the region’s economic growth.

For this MRO facility to be commercially successful, it should be designed as a multi-use facility, capable of supporting not only defence and government sectors but also commercial enterprises. This approach would ensure financial sustainability through a diversified revenue stream.

Partnerships with commercial operators in the LNG, mining, and telecommunications sectors could provide steady demand for services.

Moreover, collaborations with international partners—such as the United States, Japan and other Indo-Pacific nations—could provide further opportunities for industry growth, turning Darwin into a regional centre for uncrewed system innovation and service.

Such collaborations could include joint research and development projects, knowledge sharing and training programs, further enhancing the facility’s global relevance.

Establishing an MRO facility in Darwin would have significant strategic, economic and operational benefits. It would enhance Australia’s defence readiness, reduce its reliance on overseas maintenance services and foster closer collaboration with key regional partners. A local MRO facility would strengthen Australia’s ability to respond to threats, contribute to the security of the Indo-Pacific region and support industries that rely on uncrewed systems.

By capitalising on Darwin’s strategic location, existing infrastructure and growing importance in regional security, Australia can establish a world-class facility that meets its future needs and reinforces its role as a key player in the Indo-Pacific.

Darwin is key for undersea data links. We must promote their resilience there

Australia needs further investment into Darwin’s digital infrastructure to leverage the city’s proximity to Asia and support the resilience of international data flow through subsea cables.

Actions should include establishing an office to coordinate industry and government agencies, and it should build a substantial capability in Darwin to repair cables.

The importance of acting is underscored by Google’s November statement that it would lay a data cable from Darwin to Singapore via Christmas Island and by ongoing joint efforts by Australia, the United States and Japan to increase connectivity in the Pacific.

As subsea links, such as the existing Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable, become Australia’s digital lifelines, their security and resilience become paramount. Disruption to them would have profound consequences for both Australia’s economy and national security.

Darwin’s role in the Indo-Pacific digital ecosystem is growing ever faster, making the city increasingly central to global data flows. Vulnerabilities come with dependence on such infrastructure. Incapacitation of these cables—whether through physical damage or cyber threats—would severely affect Australia’s economy, security, and geopolitical standing.

The government’s current approach to managing subsea cable security lacks the coordination needed to address the growing challenges in this space. With multiple agencies involved, from the Department of Infrastructure to the Australian Communications and Media Authority, Australia needs a more unified and proactive approach to safeguarding these assets.

Given the national security stakes, Australia must establish a dedicated domestic subsea cable coordination unit to oversee construction, maintenance and security. This unit should serve as a clearinghouse, working closely with key government stakeholders, telecommunications regulators and private sector players—including major tech firms, such as Google and Meta. By integrating their expertise, the unit could ensure that subsea cables were shielded from physical and cyber threats, coordinating national security efforts and fostering a unified response to emerging risks.

As Darwin continues to evolve as a data hub, Australia’s capacity to swiftly repair damage to its subsea cables is becoming increasingly critical. To maintain resilience, the government must establish a local repair hub. This includes building up domestic repair capabilities, which could be achieved through partnerships with international cable operators or by developing local expertise within the Northern Territory. A dedicated repair ship, staffed with a rapid-response team based in Darwin, would be invaluable, ensuring that cable damage was addressed quickly to minimise disruption. This approach would further strengthen Australia’s position as a reliable player in the global digital infrastructure arena.

To support this growing digital infrastructure, Darwin’s physical and digital capabilities must also be scaled up. This requires robust terrestrial backhaul connections and investment by large cloud-service providers in world-class AI data centres.  We also need a regulatory framework that supports the increasing volume of data while addressing potential physical and cyber threats.

The Northern Territory offers geological stability and an advantageous position for connections to Singapore, itself an important node in the global submarine cable network. These advantages make it an ideal place for increasing Australia’s overall telecommunications and subsea cable resilience by diversifying submarine cable landings from clogged areas like Sydney and existing areas like Perth.

As the volume of data flowing through the region rises, so too must the capacity to handle it securely and efficiently. Strong, resilient infrastructure will not only bolster Australia’s own security but position the country as a reliable alternative to higher-risk regions. It will also attract investment and foster deeper international partnerships, particularly with allies such as the United States and Japan, who are already deeply engaged in securing subsea cable infrastructure.

Australia must also step up its role in the global dialogue surrounding subsea cable security. Given the interconnectedness of these cables and their importance to international trade and security, it cannot afford to act in isolation. Active participation in global initiatives is essential. For example, in September, Australia endorsed the New York Statement on Undersea Cables, which calls for international cooperation to safeguard the links.

By engaging in these discussions, Australia can share insights on emerging threats, establish best practices for protection and help shape global responses to subsea cable disruptions. This leadership would further cement Australia’s position as a key partner in global digital infrastructure security.

The time for action is now. Australia’s government must move decisively to secure the subsea cable infrastructure of the Northern Territory, ensuring long-term resilience and reliability.

With its strategic location in the Indo-Pacific, Darwin is poised to be a cornerstone of global digital connectivity, not only serving as a gateway for Australia but also reinforcing regional security and economic stability. By securing subsea cable infrastructure, Australia will pave the way for a secure, resilient and interconnected future, reinforcing both its national interests and its partnerships with key allies.

Guidance for critical minerals policy from ASPI’s Darwin Dialogue 2024

Critical minerals are a focal point of international contention in an increasingly fracturing international system. These minerals underlie competition across civil and defence sectors and promise economic opportunity throughout their supply chain. Furthermore, they are vital to the clean energy transition, with minerals needed for electric vehicle batteries, solar panels and even wind turbines. Yet, their supply chains face extensive challenges.

Since ASPI’s inaugural Darwin Dialogue in 2023, Australian and foreign governments have begun implementing industrial policies to support domestic growth in critical minerals and downstream industries.

The Darwin Dialogue 2024 brought together high-level government representatives of Australia, the US, Japan and South Korea and senior representatives of other nations, academia and think tanks, held over two days in April 2024. It assessed the rise of industrial policies and discussed the next policy steps to achieve diversified supply chains, unlock investment in industry, protect industry from geopolitical risks, and deepen market environmental, social and governance considerations.

Australia’s critical mineral policy is principally shaped by the Critical Minerals Strategy, released in December 2023, and the Albanese government’s flagship industrial policy, Future Made in Australia, announced ahead of the Federal Budget 2024-25. It is further backed by close collaboration with state governments.

Implementing Future Made in Australia comes with significant costs, but industrial policies help navigate our geopolitical environment—especially in highly exposed sectors such as critical minerals.

In many respects, the rise in industrial policies is a targeted response to China’s dominance across supply chains. But it is also an attempt to stay competitive against policies implemented by allies—principally the United States’ dryly named Inflation Reduction Act (2022).

However, concerns remain around the strategic planning behind a Future Made in Australia. The government must stick to a clear, results-oriented strategy, making targeted investments to build a viable interconnected sector in collaboration with states and territories. Currently, there is a risk that investments could be process-oriented and perhaps disconnected.

Industrial policy is a double-edged sword: it protects and promotes domestic industry while also picking winners and potentially further fracturing the international trade order. It must be handled with caution. We must be careful about where we compete, where we cooperate and, importantly, with whom we do either.

Governments naturally focus on domestic industries and opportunities and selectively engage partners, but no single nation can build the necessary mineral supply chains alone. At the Darwin Dialogue 2024, there was broad consensus that national and transnational government interventions are unavoidable in the critical minerals sector—but they must be implemented carefully.

Overly focusing on domestic concerns instead of working internationally obscures pressing, near-existential challenges for the critical mineral sector. Current supply chains are insecure, and projected demand is likely to far outstrip supply of many critical minerals. This could constrain energy transition and building defence capabilities.

Rapid expansion of critical minerals production is needed. To achieve that, Australia and its allies must harmonise policies and build shared supply chains, rather than build domestic competitors that may cannibalise one another. Some competition is needed and unavoidable, but it must be proportionate.

Australia’s policy framework must work to attract new domestic and international investment sources, particularly since the Foreign Investment Review Board is rightly blocking Chinese investment into critical minerals on national security grounds. Policy options include unlocking superannuation fund investment, maximising use of free trade agreements and increasing demand by building joint stockpiles. We must also protect industry from politically driven price risks, noting that political risks are remarkably difficult to project or hedge against as they are external to the market.

Notably, unlocking new investment and developing new supply chains is not about bifurcating global trade or alienating any one nation from the supply chain. Doing so would be neither effective nor realistic. Rather, Australia and its allies must strive towards diversifying supply chains away from any singular, concentrated source or destination.

Furthermore, in developing these supply chains, Australia and its allies must maintain and extend high standards of environmental, social and governance performance. This means limiting harmful impacts of energy transition and building business models that are resilient to geopolitical or domestic social-licence risks over the medium to long term.

ASPI’s report from this year’s event, Darwin Dialogue 2024: Triumph through Teamwork, offers 11 key policy recommendations for government and industry to evolve Australia’s critical mineral policy framework.

It identifies ways to deepen minilateral cooperation with the US, Japan and South Korea across government and industry, secure new streams of funding for Australian industry, increase the number of graduates from Australian universities in fields related to critical minerals mining and processing, and improve market environmental, social and governance considerations.