Tag Archive for: non-alignment

Indonesia has good reasons to reject Russian aircraft basing

Indonesia has plenty of reason to reject basing of Russian aircraft at its air force base on Biak, an island north of New Guinea at 1,400 km from Darwin.

From Russia’s point of view, keeping aircraft at the Manuhua Air Force Base would add to its prestige and might also be helpful to its ‘no-limits’ partner, China.

Whether it has asked for such access is disputed. Defence publisher Janes, citing Indonesian government sources and documents that it had reviewed, reported on 14 April that Russia had asked to base several aircraft on Manuhua; this would be a step up from aircraft merely transiting through the airfield. A day later the Indonesia Defence Ministry said the report was ‘incorrect’. But the Australian, a newspaper, said in an unsourced 28 April report that the Australian government had known in February of Russian requests to use Indonesian airfields for long-range military aircraft.

No one has suggested Indonesia has accepted such a proposal. Acceptance would indeed amount to a huge change in foreign policy and would roil the strategic situation in the region. It is not clear that Indonesian leaders would want to engage in such drastic initiatives.

Moreover, Indonesia has always presented itself as non-aligned, and it is proud of this self-image. As the Foreign Ministry said on 17 April, ‘Indonesia has never granted permission to any country to build or possess a military base in Indonesia.’

Though one can quibble over the true extent of Indonesia’s non-alignment, at the very least, the superficial trademarks of non-alignment are important to the country. Accepting the Russian proposal to use an Indonesian air base would severely dent the country’s non-aligned stature.

Acceptance would upset Indonesia’s international relationships, including the one with Australia, with which it has have become increasingly close. Indonesia knows that Russian aircraft basing on its territory would not please Canberra. Indeed, Australia would consider basing Russian combat aircraft so close to Australian territory a seriously unfriendly act.

Other powers, including India, the United States and Japan, would also be displeased. These are all powers with which Indonesia enjoys good relations and hopes to deepen ties. Even India, which has good relations with Russia, would be concerned about the potential for such a move to enhance China’s power in a vital region, especially so close to the sensitive Malacca straits.

Russian aircraft flying from Biak could conceivably provide valuable wartime reconnaissance and targeting data for China. If Russia were not a declared participant in the war, China’s opponents, such as the US and Australia, could do little to stop this activity. Even in peacetime, the potential to offer such wartime benefits would increase Russia’s clout in Beijing.

A request to base aircraft on Biak, which Moscow’s ambassador to Jakarta has not denied, would be part of a pattern of Russian expansion. Russia has sought to extend its global reach. President Vladimir Putin wants to reassert the country’s traditional great power role, despite its much-weakened condition and its being bogged down in its war against Ukraine.

Russia has been increasing its activities in Africa and the Middle East, areas of traditional Russian influence during the Cold War. Though Russia suffered a setback in Syria last year, its ties with Iran have deepened, with Tehran becoming an important source for drones and ballistic missiles.

Regardless of the practical benefit that Russia gets from this, it clearly enjoys the prestige of global influence.

Though Russia does not have any direct interests at stake in Southeast Asia, Putin likely views a Russian presence in the region as necessary. Russia’s traditional friend in the region has been Vietnam. The Soviets had an important military base in Cam Ranh Bay, reportedly the largest outside their own territory. But the lean years after the Cold War saw Russia withdraw its Indo-Pacific presence.

Nevertheless, Vietnam continues to be an important partner, but it is also concerned about China and is increasingly friendly to the US and its partners. A US aircraft carrier visited Vietnam in 2023 and the country has reportedly agreed to buy F-16 fighters from the US. Vietnam and the region are worried about China’s aggressiveness.

No Russia in Papua: Indonesia’s quiet diplomacy speaks loudly

Indonesia’s low-key rejection of reported Russian interest in military basing in Papua says more than it appears to. While Jakarta’s response was measured, it was deliberate—a calculated expression of Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine of non-alignment, domestic political caution and regional diplomatic restraint.

Australia may view the lack of outrage or strong rhetorical pushback from Jakarta as a sign of ambiguity or even strategic hedging. But this would be a misjudgement of how Indonesia navigates great power competition. The country’s preference for understated diplomacy is not a weakness; it is a product of deeply rooted principles and historical experience.

In early April, media reports emerged suggesting that Russia had requested to base long-range aircraft in Biak, a small island in Papua. The Indonesian defence ministry quickly issued a brief statement rejecting the report. No grandstanding, no televised press conferences and certainly no escalatory rhetoric.

This kind of restraint has long been part of Indonesia’s playbook, and it extends beyond public statements. When Australia’s defence minister contacted Indonesia’s defence minister to seek clarification, Indonesia conveyed its position clearly and directly: the report was false and Jakarta had no intention of allowing such basing. The message was firm and delivered through quiet but unambiguous diplomatic channels. Though some foreign observers may find it unsatisfying, this approach allows Indonesia to preserve room for manoeuvre.

Indonesia’s ‘independent and active’ doctrine is more than a slogan. Indonesia’s recent decision to join BRICS—a group where Russia plays a prominent role—may indicate a gesture of alignment, but it is better understood as part of Jakarta’s broader interest in multipolar forums. Such engagement supports Indonesia’s non-aligned policy, allowing it to engage multiple powers while avoiding entanglement in blocs.

Nevertheless, when combined with other issues, such as the Biak basing reports, it is understandable that these developments may concern Canberra. This non-aligned stance has helped Indonesia weather Cold War pressures, regional conflicts and, more recently, the strategic tug-of-war between the United States and China.

This concern reflects longstanding patterns in the Australia-Indonesia relationship. The relationship has long been shaped by shared strategic interests, from maritime security and disaster response to regional stability, even as it has experienced periods of tension and recalibration.

Jakarta responded to the Biak report with a firm but calm statement, showing its typical diplomatic style. At the same time, it was careful to ensure that partners such as Australia would not misunderstand its silence as uncertainty. These geographic realities heighten Canberra’s sensitivities, but they do not change Jakarta’s steady posture. Long-range Russian aircraft stationed in Indonesia, if ever realised, would understandably trigger strategic concern in Canberra.

Jakarta’s restraint is not an invitation to doubt its alignment or question its reliability. It is a signal of how it intends to manage rising geopolitical pressure: by staying calm, avoiding theatre and asserting control over its own narrative. That narrative is grounded in sovereignty and, yes, in a form of regional leadership that values stability over spectacle.

Indonesia also understands that loud declarations can backfire, especially when domestic dynamics are at play. In fact, civil society observers and policy analysts have openly reminded the Prabowo administration to remain sober and uphold Indonesia’s long-standing non-alignment, cautioning against any defence postures that could invite strategic misperception.

The government is sensitive to how Papua features in both international and domestic political debates. Amplifying the Biak story could have generated unnecessary heat and risked politicising a defence matter that Jakarta was keen to close quickly.

For Australia, the key is not to misread silence as passivity or fence-sitting. Indonesia’s approach may not always align with Canberra’s expectations of strategic signalling, but that does not make it opaque. Instead, it calls for a deeper understanding of how Indonesia communicates intent: often subtly, often on its own terms.

The Australia-Indonesia relationship is stronger when both sides recognise each other’s strategic cultures. Australia prefers clarity and predictability in foreign policy, while Indonesia sometimes keeps its position flexible to reduce external pressure. These differences are not flaws; they are features to be managed with mutual respect.

Misreading Indonesia’s restraint risks reinforcing a false binary: the idea that if a partner isn’t loudly with us, they must be against us. The idea that Australia needs to ‘do business with partners who have friends we don’t like’ oversimplifies the complexity of regional partnerships. Such phrasing may be analytically useful, but it risks normalising transactional attitudes in relationships that require nuance, reciprocity and long-term investment.

Indonesia’s foreign policy is rarely that binary. It is calibrated, complex and designed for flexibility. Recognising this approach for what it is—not a lack of commitment, but a deliberate form of regional statecraft—can help Australia navigate its strategic partnership with Indonesia more constructively.