Tag Archive for: INF

China and nuclear restraint

China increasingly finds itself depicted as the bête noire of nuclear arms control. The US government has said the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty collapsed because of Chinese actions outside the treaty and not merely Russian violations inside it. Moreover, President Donald Trump has proposed transforming the current strategic nuclear arms agreement between the US and Russia—New START—into a trilateral agreement which covers China’s strategic nuclear forces as well.

On its face, arguing for a more energetic Chinese role in arms control is an easy task. Certainly, China’s conventional missile inventory has developed in leaps and bounds since 1987, when the INF Treaty first went into effect. And in broader geopolitical terms, today’s landscape looks considerably different to the one upon which the arms control regime was originally constructed. In the long run, arms control agreements will become less credible, and less strategically meaningful, if they can’t adapt to reflect the shifting power distribution of the international order.

Besides, arms control has upsides for its participants: it locks in power, rather than merely locking it down, and it reduces the risks of unregulated strategic competition. As Tong Zhao, a senior fellow at Carnegie, argues in the latest issue of Arms Control Today, ‘Over time, China’s own interest will align with arms control for several reasons … [T]he major-power competition between Washington and Beijing is going to be a long-term reality … [I]t is in no one’s interest, including China’s, to allow this competition to become completely uncontrolled and unregulated.’

But that’s a minefield in which we should tread cautiously. A central issue at play concerns the form of controls and regulations, not simply their presence or absence. Western publics, and arms controllers themselves, are familiar with a certain sort of nuclear restraint. That’s the version where formal agreements are hammered out in painstaking—almost litigious—detail around a negotiating table before final signature by senior political figures. Such treaties are written with extraordinary care and have, over time, made an important contribution to nuclear strategic stability.

But that doesn’t leave much space for other forms of restraint. The Asian nuclear order, for example, typically relies on voluntary self-restraint. It doesn’t turn upon finely wrought treaties outlining strict numerical limits on particular weapon systems, counting rules, compliance schedules and verification provisions. Restraint is, instead, demonstrated by small arsenal sizes, slow development of a full nuclear triad (of land-based and sea-based missiles plus strategic bomber aircraft), and declaratory policies which emphasise a reluctance to cross the nuclear threshold.

China is a good example of that Asian model of nuclear order—hence its small nuclear arsenal, few nuclear tests, no-first-use commitment, tolerance of large numerical asymmetries vis-à-vis its possible nuclear rivals, and slow development of its nuclear triad. In a manner characteristic of that Asian order, Chinese nuclear weapons sit in the strategic background rather than the foreground.

What we’re witnessing, then, is the collision of two separate and distinct models of nuclear restraint: on one hand, what we might call the ‘Euro-litigious’ model; on the other, the model of voluntary self-restraint. China may have few runs on the board in relation to the first model, but it has plenty in relation to the second.

So why might China want to sit around the arms control table? Two possible reasons: process and outcomes. Let’s start with process. Sitting at the same table as the US and Russia as the world’s third major player would suggest American and Russian recognition of China as a nuclear peer. That’s a big step up for China—and one that’d throw a wrench into US alliance relationships in Asia. (Tokyo, in particular, would be upset by American recognition of China as a nuclear peer.) But those gains would come at a price, because buying into the Euro-litigious model would devalue China’s own approach. Worse, some would see it as evidence that Beijing might still be drawn into a gradual acceptance of Robert Zoellick’s ‘responsible stakeholder’ standard.

Let’s turn to outcomes. True, the outcomes of negotiations could both shape the nuclear arsenals that China’s potential rivals deploy and enhance strategic stability and predictability. But what might any ‘final agreement’ look like? SALT and START have really been about numbers, about capping and reducing large strategic-range nuclear arsenals—and China doesn’t have one to begin with. Would China be locked into a separate and smaller cap than the other two? Beijing would be sure to see any such outcome as merely one more form of ‘containment’ of China. China’s voluntary acceptance of numerical asymmetry is one thing; the codification of that asymmetry into a formal treaty would be quite another.

As Zhao suggests, it might be possible to devise an agreement based on asymmetrical strengths—regulating China’s land-based missiles and America’s air-based ones, for example—or, alternatively, an agreement that meshes INF-range capabilities alongside strategic ones. But all three countries would probably want to think more carefully about those options. China and Russia would, I think, be reluctant to sign an agreement legitimising deployment of US intermediate-range systems which could target their homelands when their own intermediate-range systems can’t reach the continental US.

And that’s before we even get to verification. Would China accept the sort of detailed, intrusive verification that would have to be part of any agreement, when its own nuclear arsenal is so weak in comparison to America’s and Russia’s? Weaker parties typically rely more on deception than do stronger parties.

Those who favour drawing China into the more formalised arms control model typically deploy an argument about timeliness. The development of MIRV-ed missiles and China’s SSBN force means we should expect some increase in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal in coming years. But analysts argue over how large that increase might be. The director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency said in May 2019 that we could well see a doubling of Chinese warhead numbers—from, roughly, 300 to 600—over the next decade. That’s possible, but earlier DIA estimates tended to err on the high side.

Moreover, what would the increase mean? By itself, it wouldn’t invalidate the concept of voluntary self-restraint—because modernisation, for all nuclear powers, is typically about being able to continue doing tomorrow what they were able to do yesterday. Much of China’s modernisation program fits that description—it’s about ensuring China’s second-strike survivability and its ability to target an adversary with stronger missile defences.

Still, an expanding Chinese arsenal does imply a certain malleability to the concept of self-restraint. China has not traditionally relied much upon nuclear weapons to coerce other players. Its conventional and paramilitary forces are well placed to serve in that mission. And, of course, Beijing is happy to ‘weaponise’ economic ties and Chinese indigenous communities when it needs to. In short, it already has such a range of coercive levers close to hand that an expanding nuclear arsenal—in and of itself, regardless of final size—would suggest a less self-restrained Beijing in future.

Where does that leave us? Nowhere comfortable. Arms control is a form of strategic competition. China knows it has done well in the past from sidestepping that competition. Drawing it in can only be a long-term project—and Beijing’s certainly in no hurry.

Fears of nuclear rearmament as the INF Treaty crumbles

After foreshadowing the move late last year, President Donald Trump confirmed on 1 February that the US was leaving the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The 1987 agreement banned the US and Russia from having land-based missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. Specifically, the US suspended its compliance with the INF Treaty, and served formal notice that it will withdraw altogether in six months (the minimum notice period allowed under Article XV).

The statement released by the White House technically allowed room for the INF Treaty to survive, but only in the event that Russia destroyed ‘all of its violating missiles [and] launchers’.  The last ray of hope for such a prospect didn’t last the weekend: President Vladimir Putin followed America’s lead on 2 February by announcing Russia’s suspension of compliance.

To some extent, these events represented a natural continuation of Trump’s public frustrations with various Russian missile provocations. Indeed, the US’s anger at Russia’s non-compliance with the INF Treaty long precedes the current administration. President Barack Obama wrote to Putin in 2014, alleging Russia was in breach of its treaty obligations. For its part, Russia contends that the US has been violating the INF Treaty since 1999.

Even in this atmosphere of longstanding agitation, the US and Russia ending the INF Treaty has provided analysts with a surge of new reasons to believe that a new nuclear arms race may be underway. In a written statement, Trump said, ‘We will move forward with developing our own military response options’, underscoring his more bombastic line last year that, ‘We’ll have to develop those weapons.’

Unsurprisingly, Putin’s statement mirrored Trump’s: ‘They said that they are engaged in research, development and design work, and we will do the same.’ Putin explicitly denied that Russia would be ‘drawn’ into a nuclear arms race, but the implied threat is difficult to miss. Putin used the same statement to publicise Russia’s plans to construct a new medium-range supersonic missile.

Despite this Cold War rhetoric, the geopolitical balance between the US and Russia in 2019 is clearly incomparable to that between the US and the Soviet Union. World Bank data shows the nominal annual GDP for the US in 2017 as US$19.3 trillion, compared with US$1.6 trillion for Russia. America’s military budget is 10 times bigger than Russia’s. Talk of an ‘arms race’ belies the asymmetrical balance of power.

This dynamic helps explains why—for all the talk of belligerent Russian breaches—it is the United States that’s driving the destruction of the traditional nuclear order. Putin, after all, suggested to Trump in February 2017 that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) be extended. The new American president comprehensively rejected the overture. Whether New START will survive its 2021 expiration date is deeply unclear.

Admittedly, we can’t be sure whether the Trump administration’s agenda for dismantling arms agreements is reflective of a wider strategic objective, as opposed to an ideological distaste for international agreements. For example, Reuters reports that when Putin raised New START in 2017, Trump had to pause to ask his aides what the treaty was—before quickly panning it as ‘one of several bad deals negotiated by the Obama administration’.  Trump’s proclivity for axing international agreements is well documented.

In any case, America’s haste to end the INF agreement shouldn’t be considered without reference to the geopolitical elephant in the room: China, and President Xi Jinping’s nascent missile program. Never bound by the INF Treaty, China has quickly developed an arsenal of nuclear missiles as part of its wider efforts to scale up and modernise its military.

There can be no doubt that the latent Chinese threat has helped galvanise senior American advisers. Trump’s national security advisor, John Bolton (a longstanding China hawk), has reportedly told US allies that the INF Treaty puts America in an ‘excessively weak’ position against Russia ‘and more importantly China’. For what it is worth, Bolton is also a critic of New START, describing it as ‘unilateral disarmament’ on the part of the US.

One of the most important things to watch following the US exit from the INF Treaty will be whether Washington begins to scale up its own arsenal of missiles in the Pacific. Beijing released a statement on 2 February denouncing the ‘regrettable’ US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, but rejected the possibility of China’s joining any new treaty on intermediate-range weapons.

Even in the context of the Pacific power balance with China, however, it’s not obvious that scrapping the INF Treaty confers any real advantage on the United States. The INF Treaty only limits ground-based missiles, and the US doesn’t enjoy significant access to much land around China. Placing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in a country like Japan would be an operation laden with risks and complications (especially compared with sea- and air-launched missiles).

No matter the US strategic agenda, the demise of the INF Treaty is a blow both to the Cold War arms control architecture and prospects for global disarmament. Relations between Russia and the US will perhaps suffer a rupture, but look to the Pacific as the real harbinger of troubles to come.

After the INF Treaty: whither arms control?

Rod Lyon’s recent analysis on the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia concludes with a sober warning of more intense nuclear competition on the horizon. So what might that future look like?

The decision to pull out was made in response to clear violations of the treaty by Russia. From 2008, Russia has been developing, and then from December 2016, deploying, the 9M729 ground-launch cruise missile (NATO designation SSC-8), which has a range of 482 to 5,471 kilometres—well within the range of 500 to 5,500 kilometres proscribed by the INF Treaty.

There are also concerns about Russia’s RS-26 ICBM, which was tested in 2012 and 2013 to ranges below 5,500 kilometres. Although there’s disagreement over whether the RS-26 is INF compliant or not, the fact that it has been tested to ranges beyond 5,500 kilometres would imply that it’s an ICBM, and thus not countable under the INF Treaty (though it would be countable under New START). The type of payload may also contribute to different flight profiles; tests of multiple warheads or a payload to evade missile defences are possibilities.

This uncertainty has led the US to conclude that the RS-26 doesn’t violate the INF Treaty, but the missile presents a dilemma. It may be an ICBM, tested to different ranges depending on the payload carried, but more disturbing is the prospect that Russia could develop an undeclared IRBM force, in violation of the INF Treaty, while passing the missile off as an ICBM.

Once the US gives formal notice of its withdrawal from the treaty, it will take six months to come into effect. Washington would have that window of opportunity to try a diplomatic approach to bring Russia back into compliance, while at the same time making a strong case to its allies that Russian non-compliance with the treaty is the key reason for the US withdrawal.

The argument must be made that Russia’s recent operational deployment of systems prohibited by the INF Treaty demands that the US act to protect its national security and that of its allies, particularly given these weapons will likely target NATO states. The US should also use this period to make the case that the treaty does nothing to address the growing threat posed by China’s force of short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear weapons. The US can’t afford to ignore those growing capabilities within the PLA Rocket Forces.

Right at the moment, the overwhelming weight of opinion in the arms control community is that this is a very dumb move by Trump, clearly influenced by his hawkish US national security adviser, John Bolton, that will undermine a key foundation of arms control norms leading towards the goal of eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. The outrage from the US arms control community is clear on social media. The broad theme seems to be that the Russian violations don’t justify the US withdrawal and that, in doing so, Trump is inadvertently supporting Putin’s desired outcome—freedom to deploy large numbers of intermediate-range nuclear forces in order to threaten NATO, while the US takes the blame for everything.

The US withdrawal from the INF Treaty also reinforces the community’s fears that New START will not be extended in 2021. Trump implicitly alluded to the prospect of ending New START and expanding the US nuclear forces in recent comments, stating: ‘Until people come to their senses we will build it up … we have more money than anybody else by far. We’ll build it up … Until they get smart, there will be nobody that’s going to be even close to us.’

The vision, then, is a future of nuclear taboos coming unstuck as arms control falls apart. Given increasing tension between the US and China, as well as with Russia, the prospect of a rapid return to a nuclear arms race is the spectre in everyone’s minds.

Yet as Rod Lyon notes, arms control that is based on illusion—as he describes it, ‘on a diet of wilful blindness’—is not arms control at all. There’s a risk that maintaining a fiction of arms control with agreements that our adversaries then wilfully violate would leave the US, NATO and its Asian allies, including Australia, more vulnerable to nuclear coercion in the future.

Russia’s deployment of intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles, and the prospect of undeclared Russian IRBMs—absent any US response or similar capability—raises the prospect of increasingly unstable deterrence in a crisis and could encourage Russia to rattle nuclear sabres as part of a doctrine of pre-emptive de-escalation to force NATO to back down on its Article V commitment. How should the US respond to this threat, if the INF Treaty is, in fact, terminated?

Certainly the US does have the option even now to develop non-nuclear intermediate-range forces launched from air and naval platforms rather than return to ground-launched nuclear-armed intermediate-range weapons. Even arms control proponents who are critical of the Trump INF decision point out that the treaty doesn’t prohibit such dual-role intermediate-range air- and sea-based forces.

Yet those same opponents have campaigned vigorously against the Trump administration’s decision to proceed with eventual re-introduction of nuclear-armed SLCMs on US Navy submarines as announced in the 2018 nuclear posture review. They have also strongly attacked the proposed US Air Force acquisition of the long-range standoff weapon to replace ageing air-launched cruise missiles. So, on balance, they’d rather see the US without any intermediate-range nuclear forces at all—even if the Russians and Chinese have them—rather than upend an established arms control norm or retard progress towards nuclear abolition.

The rationale for their stance is a disdain for deterrence. That perspective conveniently ignores the evolving strategic outlook. Arms control cannot be allowed to supplant nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy in managing major-power relations. The post–Cold War days of seeing nuclear weapons purely through the prism of achieving nuclear disarmament and ‘global zero’ have now come to an end. In a more dangerous strategic future, dominated by major-power competition, arms control must evolve and be employed when and where appropriate to strengthen the credibility of US nuclear deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence towards NATO and US allies in Asia.

That demands an honest appraisal of an adversary’s nuclear forces and strategic intentions. At times, that may clash with the sanctity of arms control agreements and demand their reconsideration or even termination—they should not be sacrosanct and inviolable.

The US under the INF Treaty does have the right to withdraw from the agreement. It shouldn’t be required to remain in the treaty even if Russia is blatantly violating it and if the treaty itself is increasingly outdated against a rapidly worsening security outlook dominated by a rising and assertive China.