Australia’s military relationship with China is now defined by strategic competition and opposing objectives. The days of friendly port visits, personnel exchanges and survival exercises are over. As tensions grow, even dialogue with China’s military has limitations—especially during times of strategic competition and crisis. Australia must get used to managing friction in our defence ties with China.

In a recent article published by the Lowy Institute’s Interpreter, James Laurenceson and Xi Chen suggest that reciprocal naval visits might help reduce tensions between the two militaries. Typically, Australia uses naval port visits as a tool of defence diplomacy to foster cooperation, support interoperability and strengthen regional partnerships. However, these goals are no longer objectives of our military relationship with China. The military relationship now falls squarely under the government’s China policy mantra: ‘disagree where we must’. Opportunities to ‘agree where we can’ are in short supply.

Port visits by Chinese navy vessels present serious concerns. Tactically, Chinese warships are equipped with sophisticated overt and covert surveillance technologies. These include long-range cameras, infrared systems and electronic monitoring equipment capable of collecting imagery, intercepting communications and gathering electronic signatures. Many vessels also carry towed array sonar systems, which can collect underwater acoustic data on our ports and naval traffic. Any Chinese naval presence in our ports would likely be used to extract intelligence.

Strategically, such visits offer China legitimate justification for deploying its navy to our region under the guise of diplomacy. This would signal to Pacific island nations that Australia accepts China’s military presence in its backyard. It would also hand Beijing opportunities to demonstrate its expanding reach and growing naval power—both to us and our neighbours.

Recent Chinese naval activity around Australia underscores this reality. Circumnavigation drills and live-fire exercises off our coast were meant to deliver a message: China can project lethal military power to our immediate vicinity. Through these displays, Beijing wants to make Canberra hesitate—not only about deploying defence assets further afield, but also about hosting US military forces.

Previously, Australia and China’s military relationship included port visits, personnel exchanges and survival exercises, but those days are long gone. Our defence establishments are now working at cross-purposes. Australia’s military seeks to reinforce international laws and norms that have underpinned decades of peace, economic growth and stability in the region. China, meanwhile, is using its military to reshape those very rules.

The Chinese Communist Party has increasingly deployed its military to enforce a new regional order. This includes dangerous and aggressive tactics in the South China Sea, such as harassing foreign ships, challenging established maritime rights and deterring foreign militaries from operating in international waters. China’s goal is to legitimise its sweeping territorial claims and undermine the rules-based order.

Similarly, China’s daily military actions around Taiwan are designed to force eventual unification by wearing down the island’s will to resist. These are not the behaviours of a military partner with whom Australia can cooperate. They are hostile actions that clash with our principles and interests.

Australia, by contrast, stands up for international law. This includes defending the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, rejecting China’s unlawful claims in the South China Sea and speaking out against aggressive actions around Taiwan. We also stand by smaller nations such as the Philippines, which routinely faces Chinese military and paramilitary coercion. These actions reflect core Australian values and a long-standing commitment to regional peace.

Dialogue with China’s military is still useful—but only up to a point. We should always keep communication channels open to reduce risks of miscalculation or misunderstanding. But we must be realistic: China’s vision for the region is fundamentally different from ours, and its approach to crisis management diverges dramatically from Western norms.

Recent research by the Asia Society highlights this divide. China’s military thinking relies heavily on theoretical models that assume it can tightly control escalation through military actions. Dialogue, in this framework, plays a secondary role at best. Beijing does not see communication as essential to managing conflict—it sees control and deterrence as primary tools. It expects opposing parties to recognise military signalling and act accordingly.

We should expect China to continue to prioritise military pressure and coercion over dialogue. That’s why we’ve seen Chinese forces release chaff near Australian aircraft, use sonar bursts against our ships and direct laser fire at reconnaissance planes. These actions are not misunderstandings; they are deliberate attempts to message and deter.

To manage this evolving challenge, Australia must continue to invest in understanding China’s doctrines, especially its increasingly opaque theories of deterrence and escalation. This includes studying how Beijing views power, control, and signalling during strategic competition and in a crisis. At the same time, we should continue efforts to maintain open lines of communication—but without illusions about what they can achieve.

We are entering a period where the defence relationship with China is no longer grounded in shared objectives or mutual trust. The divergence in values, strategy and intent is too wide. Diplomacy is important but it cannot substitute for vigilance.