Tag Archive for: Defence Cooperation Program

Indonesia steps up defence relationships, but stays non-aligned

Indonesia has recognised that security affairs in its region are no longer business as usual, though it hasn’t completely given up its commitment to strategic autonomy.

Its biggest step was a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed with Australia in August 2024. The agreement acts as a de facto status-of-forces agreement, providing for the presence of foreign forces in Indonesian territory, traditionally an uncomfortable idea for the country.

Jakarta has also stepped up specific defence cooperation with other countries over the past five years, notably with Australia. The United States has also become a closer partner.

While China’s strengthening presence in Southeast Asia is an obvious factor in Indonesia’s diversification of defence relationships, Jakarta declares no policy of trying to counterbalance Beijing. Moreover, it is still far from tying itself down in close and permanent security relationships. Instead, Indonesia adopts a more nuanced approach.

Indonesia lacks a formal strategy to navigate great power competition. However, its impartial stance—rooted in what it calls its ‘free and active’ foreign policy—has resulted in a hedging strategy, balancing economic ties with China and strong political relations with the US and its allies. Meanwhile, Indonesia is expanding its global engagement through active participation in regional and international organisations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the United Nations, and through south-south cooperation.

Following its cautious foreign policy, Indonesia avoids alliances with great powers. This approach has allowed it to maintain neutrality and stay ‘defensively active’ for decades. Yet, Indonesia has begun to break from this tradition.

Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence aims to increase the defence budget from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP. In recent years, Indonesia has signed several arms acquisition deals. These include buying 42 Dassault Rafale fighters from France for $8.1 billion, 12 drones from Turkey worth $300 million and 24 Sikorsky S-70M Black Hawk helicopters from the US.

In the past five years, Indonesia has deepened various bilateral defence relationships. Australia has become a prominent partner, engaging in 48 defence diplomacy activities. These activities saw steady growth throughout the past five years, with the 2024 DCA as the pinnacle of their cooperation.

The 2024 DCA between Indonesia and Australia is their greatest commitment yet to enhancing defence collaboration and addressing shared security challenges. For Indonesia, it is historic as it allows military drills and mutual force operations within each other’s territories. For Australia, this agreement offers better operational proximity to potential flashpoints, such as the South China Sea.

Although yet to be a status-of-forces agreement, the DCA reinforces previous arrangements. It establishes a legal framework to enhance military cooperation and joint activities between the two countries. The agreement also includes provisions for enhanced educational exchanges and closer maritime operations.

However, this agreement does not signal Indonesia’s alignment with any bloc. The country continues to balance its relationships with major powers, staying true to its principle of strategic autonomy.

In 2023, Indonesia elevated bilateral ties with the US to a comprehensive strategic partnership, expanding defence cooperation, including joint exercises such as Garuda Shield. Simultaneously, Indonesia reinforced diplomatic ties with China and the two countries issued a joint statement in 2024 claiming ‘common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims’ in the South China Sea. This sparked controversy among maritime law and international relations experts. It appeared to contradict Indonesia’s long-standing policy of strategic denial regarding China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Additionally, Indonesia has sought to diversify its defence partnerships by engaging with other Global South middle powers, including Turkey, India and Brazil. Indonesia’s recent decision to join BRICS is also motivated by its willingness to enhance cooperation and collaboration with other developing countries.

The depth of the Indonesia-Australia DCA reveals several key aspects of Indonesia’s approach. First, as great power competition increases, Indonesia is moving beyond its ‘defensive-active’ strategy. Indonesia is now integrating bilateral strategies alongside multilateral approaches to better navigate the evolving security landscape.

Second, Indonesia’s deepening ties with Australia through the DCA serve as a regional safety net in its hedging behaviour. Consequently, Indonesia must reassure other countries that the DCA with Australia aims to enhance cooperation and doesn’t signal alignment with the West.

Finally, while it has shown adaptability in recent years, defence capacity remains crucial for Indonesia to maintain its independence and increase its bargaining position in the geopolitical landscape.

The DCA, alongside global engagement and enhancing defence capacity, indicates Indonesia’s shifting strategy to face the increasingly competitive environment while maintaining its strategic autonomy.

Army and International Engagement: opportunities and challenges in a changing strategic environment

Australian Army officer Lieutenant Lachlan Joseph (left) makes a fishing lure, while People’s Liberation Army of China officer Lieutenant Huang Jin Long updates his journal during the survival phase of Exercise Kowari 2014 in remote Northern Territory bushland.

Army has a unique role in the conduct of International Engagement. Within the Indo-Pacific, land forces tend to be dominant and influential pillars of the national establishment, increasing the strategic significance of Army to Army relationships. Notably, our region includes six of the ten largest armies in the world, and the vast majority of military chiefs are army officers.

Investment in the human domain requires time, commitment, proximity and consistency. With its fundamental capability being its people, Army-led cooperation can facilitate enduring relationships and achieve unique access and influence through effective employment of our human capital – the professionalism, agility and imagination of our people.

Today the Australian Army maintains relationships with its counterparts in over 40 countries, conducting over 120 bilateral and multilateral exercises each year. Army conducts senior leadership staff talks with 18 counterparts annually.

We have around 260 personnel permanently stationed overseas: completing education, learning languages and immersing in cultures, conducting liaison, capacity-building and capability development, and who return home with experiences and perspectives of best practice to contribute to the continuous improvement of our capability.  Reciprocal opportunities, hosted here in Australia, are another essential form of engagement with abundant potential

The Australia – Indonesia relationship is vital to us, and the relationship between the Australian Army and TNI is instructive. Army has developed a cohort of officers who speak Bahasa, who have trained and instructed at Indonesian military colleges and who have worked closely with Indonesian counterparts in training and military diplomacy. Likewise Indonesia has a significant number of professional and experienced officers with strong Australian connections.

Both countries are well-served by robust interpersonal relationships, developed over many years and which have facilitated constructive engagement during periods of political friction. In 2011, the Australia–Indonesia Defence Alumni Association (IKAHAN) was established, serving to strengthen dialogue between military and civilian personnel from the two countries. The initiative has served to broaden and deepen professional relationships, and represents an idea that might be expanded to cover other bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

The Australian Army plays a role in facilitating communication between China, Australia and other nations. The first joint Australia-China-US exercise, Exercise Kowari, took place in the Northern Territory in November last year. Australian, Chinese and US troops were placed in small mixed teams and, after some training, left to survive in the harsh and challenging environment of Northern Australia for an extended period.

This novel approach required soldiers from different cultures to work together and to depend on one another. That shared experience is extremely powerful. Such activities provide foundations and context for broader strategic level engagement. This excellent example of a value proposition will be repeated later this year.

Deeper strategic engagement through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan and the United States serves to highlight the trend toward multilateral relationships. Attesting to this, many senior leaders in this room have just returned from the Trilateral Senior Level Seminar in Townsville, a forum that facilitates dialogue between our Army, the Japanese Ground Self Defence Force, the United States Army Pacific and the Marine Forces Pacific.

The recent creation of this forum, and together with the trilateral field training exercise Southern Jackeroo, represents new territory for the furtherance of a key strategic relationship.

And there are numerous operational examples that serve to illustrate the return on investment in International Engagement. A vital element of any HADR (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief) response is the coordination of the many contributors in what is typically a complex, chaotic environment.

The ability to contribute effectively to a Multinational Coordination Centre, drawing on experience of previous multilateral HADR exercises, greatly assists a host nation in distress, and saves lives and alleviates suffering during the critical early stages of a crisis. This was certainly evident in response to the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in the Philippines, and most recently in Nepal.

Responding to the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 drew on the deep relationship with The Netherlands formed in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan, and the broader NATO relationship developed as a result of the ISAF contribution. You don’t know how important these relationships are until you need them. But building trust takes time, consistency and sincerity.

In considering this subject matter, I also reflect upon my recent assignment as Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, where I was privileged to work under General Vincent Brooks.

This unprecedented arrangement is the result of a powerful idea to promote stronger partnerships and to demonstrate trust and transparency, and to deepen professional relationships through the region. An extremely successful initiative which continues to provide great benefit, it is an exemplar of the principles of international engagement.

The complex nature of International Engagement subjects it to headwinds and challenges at every level. A small army with finite resources must balance efforts in this area with other calls upon its attention. But we must also appreciate that International Engagement complements force generation, force modernization and warfighting functions, and can help build readiness.

We must also be sensitive to the needs and constraints of partner forces. Well-intentioned engagement and assistance can rapidly overwhelm the will and capacity of smaller nations, particularly where multiple partnering relationships exist. We must avoid exceeding the capacity of other nations to absorb our assistance, and we must deconflict our efforts with others to prevent duplication and displacement.

The development of ADF’s amphibious capability is illustrative of the intrinsic link between international engagement, force generation and operational effect. From inception, the development of strategy, policy and doctrine has been informed and enabled through engagement with international partners. As the Amphibious capability comes on-line, it will provide unprecedented capability for the conduct of regional engagement, capacity building and disaster relief.

But these exciting developments in Army and Joint capability will also require us to focus expectations in terms of readiness, responsiveness and delivery.

Influence, understanding and trust on the international stage are the product of vision, strong leadership, perseverance and patience. Time and resources correctly invested in International Engagement can yield an asymmetric benefit, often when least expected and most needed.

To conclude, quite simply, a more strategic and integrated approach to International Engagement and security cooperation must be a core component of Army’s mission into the future.

This post is an edited version of the speech Major General Rick Burr delivered at the ASPI Army’s Future Force Structure Options Conference on 25 June 2015.