Tag Archive for: corvettes

Are missile cruisers a better option than corvettes?

The navy is under-gunned for the strategic circumstances Australia faces. For years, commentators have criticised its existing and planned platforms for possessing too few missile cells. Many of them have suggested that the best remedy is to commission a significant number of small warships or corvettes. They argue that small, fast, manoeuvrable ships would be effective in the narrow straits and shallow waters on Australia’s northern approaches. Other experts question this assertion. Despite the unsettled nature of the debate, it is believed that the surface fleet review about to be released by the government endorses a fleet of corvettes. But, historically such ships have not delivered the potent strategic impact Australia needs.

This is evident if we compare Australia’s experience in the two world wars. In 1914, at the onset of  World War I, the centrepiece of the Australian fleet was the battlecruiser HMAS Australia. It was essentially a lightly armoured dreadnought–the tier 1 combatant of the time. Its mere presence deterred German naval forces in the Pacific from carrying out their war orders—to raid Australian shipments to Britain of food, gold, and wool. The German commander, Vice-Admiral Von Spee knew that Australia alone outclassed his squadron which did not possess a comparable warship. If he encountered the battlecruiser, his ships would be quickly overwhelmed, and his men fruitlessly sacrificed. He chose to evacuate the theatre, charting a course across the Pacific in the hope of getting home. His squadron was eventually destroyed at the Battle of the Falkland Islands by the British battlecruisers Invincible and Inflexible—confirming that Spee’s fear of Australia had been very much warranted.

By contrast, Australia possessed no significant deterrent when war broke out in the Pacific in 1941. HMAS Australia had been scuttled as per the Washington Naval Treaty. The RAN was comprised of two heavy cruisers, some modern and some obsolete light cruisers, and some old destroyers. Most of which were assisting the British navy in the Mediterranean. At this stage, the air force was under-developed. So, the Imperial Japanese Navy could enter Australian waters with relative impunity. Its incursions into the South Pacific and north-east India Ocean are too numerous to recount. Ultimately, Australia relied upon American naval power to blunt Japan’s southern offensive at the Battle of the Coral Sea and at the Solomon Islands.

These examples demonstrate that a first-class navy, with an appropriate number of tier 1 combatants can deny the waters surrounding Australia to adversaries. A second-class navy cannot. Although technology has changed, I am convinced that this lesson of naval history still applies. Today, the key issue is the cost-effective deployment of lethal anti-ship missiles across Australia’s north to manifest the strategy of denial recommended by the defence strategic review (DSR). Here, corvettes fall down in terms of missile-carrying capacity. I believe Australia needs missile cruisers.

As warships grow in size, they become more efficient missile-carrying platforms. The table below compares the tonnage, crew numbers, and missile cells of leading corvette, destroyer, and cruiser designs. Probably the best armed corvette in service today is the Israeli Sa’ar 6—a derivative of the German K130 Braunschweig class. If the government chooses to commission corvettes for the RAN, they will have to be even more potent to achieve the missile-carrying efficiency of its existing air warfare destroyers (AWDs). However, the AWDs are only equivalent to America’s tier 2 combatant, the new Constellation class frigate. The gold standard is South Korea’s Sejong the Great class destroyer or America’s retiring Ticonderoga class cruiser which requires only 2.7 crew per-missile cell and just 78.7 tons per missile.

Class Type Missile Cells Crew Displacement (t) Crew/ Missile Tons/ Missile
Braunschweig Corvette 4 65 1840 16.3 460
Sa’ar 6 Corvette 16 70 1900 4.4 118.8
Constellation Frigate 48 200 7291 4.2 151.9
AWD Destroyer 48 186 7700 3.9 160.4
Arleigh Burke Destroyer 96 300 9500 3.1 100
Sejong the Great Destroyer 128 300 10600 2.3 82.8
Ticonderoga Cruiser 122 330 9600 2.7 78.7

These metrics are important because naval personnel are a scarce resource, especially for a medium sized country like Australia. Cost is always a factor and tonnage gives a rough indication of price. Consider that the RAN would have to put three Sa’ar type corvettes to sea to equal the number of missiles deployed aboard one AWD. This would require 210 sailors–24 more than one AWD. For argument’s sake, consider that it would take eight Sa’ar types to match the missile capacity of a Ticonderoga, requiring 560 sailors—230 more than a Ticonderoga. This may be why countries like South Korea and Japan are contemplating ‘arsenal ships’ for ballistic missile defence and conventional deterrence. If armed with Block V Tomahawk missiles which have a range of 1500km and an anti-ship capability, a fleet of missile cruisers would cost-effectively provide Australia with missile dominance over its northern approaches.

Detractors will likely argue that large ships are too vulnerable in the age of space-based surveillance and missile warfare. This is far from certain. First, large warships are inherently more survivable because they have space for defensive systems whose effectiveness is currently being demonstrated in the Red Sea. The cruisers would be part of a ‘system-of-systems’ and a taskforce with smaller assets providing an outer layer of protection and helping to detect, identify, and target enemy combatants. Next to the AUKUS submarines, equipping the RAN with missile cruisers would be the best possible enhancement of Australia’s defences in the short to medium term.

Enhancing the RAN surface fleet: the return of the arsenal ship?

The analysis of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet that flowed from the defence strategic review (DSR) has been presented to the government but no decisions on new capabilities will be announced until 2024. That’s likely to align with the release of the national defence strategy and probably the 2024–25 federal budget. In the meantime, Australia’s strategic outlook continues to deteriorate and time is not our friend.

The fleet review has generated intense public debate about so-called Tier 2 vessels, specifically the potential role, value and risks should the RAN acquire corvettes to complement so-called Tier 1 vessels, such as the Hobart-class air warfare destroyers and the planned Hunter-class frigates. The Hunter’s future is uncertain pending the government’s response to the review.

One side of the debate calls for a bigger navy with a large number of smaller vessels armed with long-range missiles. There’s also recognition that building more Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels that are seriously under-gunned and incapable of contributing to high-intensity naval operations makes little sense for a navy committed to ‘deterrence by denial’.

The DSR suggested a traditional ‘high–low’ mix comprising the three Hobart-class ships and however many Hunter-class frigates are eventually acquired (if any), or an alternative to the Hunters. These Tier 1 ships would be complemented by a larger number of smaller corvette-type vessels armed with missiles. It’s pretty much more of the same, with the lower-end-capability vessels much more heavily  armed than the Arafura class, which were originally envisaged in the 2020 defence strategic update.

Such an approach appears to exclude consideration of the benefits of acquiring larger vessels with greater long-range firepower—what might be termed ‘Tier 1 plus’ or ‘Tier 1 heavy’. That would not  have to be at the expense of a fleet of missile-armed corvettes. Adding a third tier that mirrors Tier 2 but strengthens the RAN’s ability to strike with greater weight of fire at longer range should be debated.

The first justification for Tier 1 plus is our strategic context, which the DSR notes is driven by major-power competition and the growing risk of conflict. The DSR identifies China’s rapid military modernisation as a key issue, saying it’s occurring ‘without transparency or any reassurance of strategic intent’.

Among Australia’s allies, there’s great concern that China intends to take Taiwan and then dominate the Indo-Pacific with a blue-water navy. That possibility should give pause to any naval planners opting for smaller and less-well-armed vessels, even in greater numbers.

China’s ability to extend and intensify its anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) envelope is clear. Chinese aircraft, surface warships, submarines and land-based rocket forces can direct long-range anti-surface-warfare weapons against RAN ships. China’s A2/AD capabilities are growing rapidly along with a ‘sensor to shooter’ kill chain, employing space, counterspace, electronic warfare, cyber and autonomous systems that can operate at increasing range. The addition of swarming lethal autonomous systems raises the prospect of multiple threats operating in many dimensions at very high speed and great range.

Naval vessels are slow compared to aircraft and more easily detected by space-based or near-space-based sensors. If a vessel can be detected, it can be tracked and, ultimately, attacked and sunk. Naval stealth is not very effective and small corvettes will be just as detectable as major surface combatants. In an age of anti-ship ballistic missiles, and soon hypersonic cruise missiles, the smaller combatant with fewer missile launchers for defence and attack is likely to be more vulnerable than a larger platform with more powerful sensors and greater firepower that may include directed-energy weapons.

South Korea has floated a concept for a Tier 1 plus warship it’s calling the joint strike vessel. It would have significantly more virtual launching system cells than the current 48 on the Hobart class—though the designer of the Hunter, BAE Systems Australia, has suggested increasing that to 96 or 128. The US Navy’s Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyers have 96 cells and China’s Type 055 Renhai class cruisers have 112.

Those promoting a Tier 2 solution argue that a greater number of smaller surface combatants could be distributed lethally through the archipelago to Australia’s north. But these are not the days of World War II torpedo boats hiding among islands to attack an enemy fleet at night. Small combatants are likely to be vulnerable to missile attack once they’re detected. That threat will only increase with swarming autonomous weapons and surveillance platforms with increasing range and endurance.

In contrast, the notional Tier 1 plus warship could potentially be seen as an arsenal ship with minimal crew and maximum firepower to defend other vessels in a taskforce. They’d be equipped for long-range strike with Tomahawk land-attack missiles, long-range loitering munitions and ultimately hypersonic weapons. Directed-energy weapons could include high-energy lasers able to engage even hypersonic targets. Smaller ships will lack such capabilities because their size constrains both firepower and energy for sensors and systems.

The RAN also faces workforce challenges, like the rest of the Australian Defence Force. Relying on a greater number of smaller ships such as corvettes is likely to demand more personnel than a small number of large strike vessels exploiting automation to reduce their human complements. There’s also the possibility of autonomous systems, including uncrewed surface vessels. Naval planners need to consider how crewed surface combatants, large and small, will work with uncrewed systems on the surface, in the air and under the waves. There are challenges here, and naval officer Jennifer Parker expertly addresses these risks.

The greatest risk in the surface combatant analysis is that planners fall back on orthodox and traditional approaches to future naval capability rather than being prepared to embrace new ideas. The arsenal ship concept was floated by the US Navy but never went beyond the conceptual stage. South Korea is being more innovative and daring. Australia has a choice: will it adopt more of the same or embrace a navy for the future?

Corvettes and the RAN surface fleet debate

Last month, in my article ‘To corvette or to not corvette: the defence strategic review and the Tier 2 surface combatant’, I outlined some of the debates and one specific option for the independent analysis team of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet to consider. Rowan Moffitt has provided an insightful and robust response. While his points about range and firepower are important, his argument overlooks some key issues about the strategic and capability realities we face.

In reply, I want to make one thing exceptionally clear—my argument boiled down to this: to meet the defence strategic review’s requirement for an enhanced-lethality surface fleet, minimally armed offshore patrol vessels and patrol boats won’t cut it. Instead, Defence should consider replacing the OPV build with a fleet of much more capable combatants, and a corvette or light frigate option should be seriously looked at.

To meet the DSR’s speed-to-capability imperative and the requirement for a large number of smaller vessels, I noted that the Luerssen C90 corvette should be considered. I made the point that, based on the Luerssen data sheet, in a range of areas the C90 may well provide a capability similar to or better than (16 versus 8 vertical launch cells, for instance) the current Anzac-class frigates. Given the lethality requirement, missile capabilities are important and small ships can pack a punch. Russian corvettes of just 1,000 to 2,000 tons’ displacement, for example, carry Kalibr cruise missiles with a 900-mile range.

Moffitt’s argument about off-the-shelf options is well made, but I’m yet to see a corvette, frigate or destroyer option in service that meets the RAN’s needs. The question then becomes more about minimal modifications or about trade-offs to achieve a minimal viable capability in the shortest possible time. The suitability of the Seahawk helicopters for the C90 also needs to be offset by questions about how much capability a corvette or light frigate needs. Is it a lily pad, a short-term host for a large helicopter with minimal armament and maintenance options? Or is there a requirement (as opposed to a want) for a full Seahawk capability on a small surface combatant?

All these debates come back to fundamental trade-off questions that revolve around all capabilities. It serves to highlight that there are no easy options for the RAN’s surface fleet no matter which way we turn.

To be crystal clear, I never argued that a C90 could or should replace the Anzacs—the current, and much troubled, Hunter-class frigate program has been put forward as their replacement (and that is a whole other debate).

In essence, Moffitt’s argument is for a larger number of larger vessels: it’s an all-big-gun proposal. The demand for larger surface combatants has long been a feature of the debate over the RAN’s post–World War II surface fleet mix. The failed destroyer light program and the precarious Hunter frigate program are two key examples. The Hunter, whose design is still not complete, has apparently grown to more than 11,000 tonnes. In the past, that would have put it in the weight class of a heavy cruiser rather than a frigate.

A larger number of larger vessels also does little to meet the DSR’s requirement for the navy to provide a much greater regional presence in the age of strategic competition. And it does little in the face of the reality of the navy’s acute workforce crisis.

Such an approach also overlooks the need for a fleet balance that reflects a broad range of tasks required of the RAN and the fact that, as history has shown, in times of major conflict demand for smaller vessels is significantly higher. To provide just one example, Australia built 60 Bathurst-class corvettes in World War II: 56 for the RAN and four for the Royal Indian Navy. This reality doesn’t, though, overlook the need for major surface combatants and the long lead time it takes to build them, but serves to highlight the utility of these smaller vessels.

In relation to his assessment of the littorals and archipelagos to our north, Moffitt’s approach echoes a call for a focus on sea control via an everything, everywhere, all at once approach. His characterisation of blue- and brown-water combatants overlooks the fact that, of course, the RAN will need some platforms that can operate in blue water, but also that these vessels are not optimised for and not always ideally suited to operations in archipelagos. Given the fact that the DSR identifies these archipelagos as the key maritime terrain, it only stands to reason that consideration should be given to platforms that are ideally suited for such an operating environment.

A focus on so-called blue-water vessels also does little to enhance the focus on asymmetric denial and overlooks the development of the Australian Defence Force as an integrated force, the increasing role of airpower and (especially) land power for sea-denial operations in a maritime environment, and the DSR’s requirement for the ADF to develop asymmetric capabilities.

While we disagree in some areas, there’s significant merit in a number of Moffitt’s arguments, including the need for major surface combatants with requisite firepower, but his article offers little in the way of answers to the dilemmas that the RAN’s surface fleet faces. Pivoting to building only US ships such as the Arleigh Burke–class destroyer is simply not feasible given the time, cost and other factors—something that the DSR makes abundantly clear and Moffitt highlights. It also overlooks the effectiveness of European designs, such as the German MEKO 200 frigate (the base design for the Anzacs) and the fact that the next batch of US frigates, the Constellation class, is being developed by Fincantieri, whose FREMM frigate was named as one of the two most viable designs for Australia’s future frigate by the Defence Capability and Investment Committee (the other was Navantia’s modified F100).

Moffitt and I certainly also agree on some key issues, including that we need to build ships that meet our needs as closely as possible and that preferably already incorporate the combat-related systems we operate now, that chopping and changing wastes time and money, and that firepower is key.

But perhaps to push this debate further, we should be considering other, more asymmetric options. One potential way to address the firepower issue and enhance the capability of the existing fleet, especially our Hobart-class air warfare destroyers, may well lie in options currently under development such as Austal’s autonomous Spearhead-class EPF (expeditionary fast transport) or Lockheed Martin’s OUSV (optionally unmanned surface vessel).

Austal has promoted a version of its current EPF equipped with 96 vertical launch cells, while the Lockheed Martin proposal uses the Mark 41 vertical launching system hidden in 40-foot shipping containers. Both options would significantly increase the RAN’s firepower at a relatively low cost compared with building new major surface combatants (the money would have to come from somewhere, though). The attachment of, for instance, a 96-cell autonomous EPF to a Hobart or Hunter would radically alter its firepower—something well worth debating for the wicked problem that is the RAN’s surface fleet mix.

Corvettes are not an option for Australia

Several recent articles, including one last week by the US Studies Centre’s Peter Dean, have promoted the need for corvettes for the Royal Australian Navy. They merit a response.

Dean writes that the defence strategic review calls for an enhanced lethality surface fleet and a greater number of Tier 2 surface combatants. What is a Tier 2 surface combatant? It’s not a naval term. It defines nothing and means nothing, except relatively. Paul Dibb’s defence capability review almost 40 years ago used the concept of tiered naval capability for the first time. Eight Anzac-class frigates were the result.

The Anzac frigates are second-tier ships relative to the destroyers in service back then. They were deliberately underarmed compared with their design capacity to save money in those benign times. The focus then was defending the ‘sea–air gap’ to Australia’s north, when we believed we had 10 years’ warning time of any need to fight. Now we have no warning time and great-power rivalry in our neighbourhood. The Anzacs have since been rearmed.

Apart from the Anzac frigates, now in their third decade of harder service than we expected, we have built three Hobart-class Aegis-equipped frigates, which only Australia calls destroyers. They are derived from the Spanish F100 class—‘F’ as in ‘frigate’. Being equipped with the US Aegis combat system doesn’t make them destroyers, as much as we might wish that to be so. Blue-water navies in our region (China, India, Japan, Korea, the US) all field destroyers that are half as big again as the Hobarts, with twice the firepower. That seems like a sensible benchmark for what a Tier 1 ship really is. We have none and have no plans to get any.

Dean says the surface fleet must be aligned with the 2023 review’s strategy of deterrence by denial and be able to carry out operations in the littorals and archipelagos in Australia’s approaches.

Those littorals and archipelagos cover more of the globe than the entire mainland of Australia and its exclusive economic zone. The area is vast and a very long way away from our naval bases. Even the sea–air gap is small by comparison.

Those distances and the waters they encompass really matter. They are the main factors that define the type of ship that will have any hope of achieving deterrence by denial, because no navy can deny anything where it has no presence. Without presence, persistent presence and lethality, there can be neither denial nor deterrence.

Dean identifies the definition of ‘Tier 2 combatant’ as a key question. He says the public debate over the requirement for a larger number of smaller vessels has largely settled on corvette/light frigate options and that ‘corvette’ has by and large become the de rigueur term in the debate for the Tier 2 surface combatant option.

What public debate? I’ve seen no comment from anyone with lived experience of naval operations in Australia’s context. Much of this coverage is influenced by overseas corvette builders.

Corvettes do not suit Australia’s needs, especially when we’re short of money.

Corvettes are a sensible answer for countries whose geostrategic circumstances make them suitable. Corvettes make sense for nations like India (for its coastal operations and close neighbours hostile towards them) and Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, which all exist in archipelagic geography. Australia has no use for small submarines for the same reasons.

Dean says an option to meet the review’s strategic requirements and its emphasis on speed to capability now, along with the navy’s needs and the ability to maintain continuous shipbuilding, could be Luerssen’s C90 corvette. He says its design would need to be modified to accommodate the RAN’s next-generation MH-60R Seahawk helicopter.

Modifying the C90 to embark the Seahawk and all its associated support systems and crew would require a major and invasive redesign of the ship, not a mere modification. The C90 is intended to carry two uncrewed aerial vehicles of around 300 kilograms each, or a small, crewed helicopter. A Seahawk weighs around 10,000 kilograms. Then there are its handling and traverse system (RAST), weapon magazines, maintenance facilities, crew space requirements and so on.

Buying ships needing major redesigns is expensive folly as the Hunter frigate mess shows. We should build ships that meet our needs as closely as possible and that already incorporate the combat-related systems we operate now. Long experience tells us that this approach will give us suitable capability on time, on budget and most quickly. Such solutions probably won’t come from Europe because mostly those designs have European systems that are not in service here.

Changing after a poor initial choice wastes time and is expensive. The Attack-class submarine is an example, and the sensible but premature replacement of the Taipan and Tiger helicopters will cost billions.

Dean says that the C90 is already in production for the Bulgarian navy and that Luerssen believes its base design provides robust, production-ready vessels that can be easily modified for Australia’s needs. He says this option would provide the RAN with a vessel as capable as, if not more so, the current Anzac-class frigate, but with a massively reduced crewing requirement.

The C90 being in production is irrelevant. It is not production-ready for Australia because it would have to be redesigned. But, more importantly, corvettes are not suitable for Australia. Unless, of course, we are on a wartime budget in a mobilised nation, as we were in World War II. We are neither today.

We need some clear, informed and experienced thinking about the naval force we require. Hopefully the independent analysis of the navy’s force structure will give us that, but I have my doubts.

Corvettes cannot satisfy any of the review’s requirements in Australia’s area of military interest. They cannot contribute anything worthwhile towards the objective of increased lethality or the strategy of deterrence by denial, nor will they add anything towards impactful projection.

The key matter for our combat ships is endurance in the operating environment they face. The main factor determining endurance is crew size and how the ships are supported on operations. Fifty years of driving down crew numbers to save costs has been one of the most debilitating false economies the RAN has suffered. Fewer crew means less endurance. That’s simple, unchanging and inescapable, but it’s been ignored with our modern naval acquisitions.

Examining Bulgaria’s purchase of two C90 corvettes is worthwhile. Bulgaria is smaller than Tasmania. It has one coastal frontier, on the Black Sea, about as long as the distance from Newcastle to Wollongong. Its maritime security interests extend about the same distance to seaward, an expanse of water smaller than the Gulf of Carpentaria. Anyone attacking it from the sea can come only from a single, narrow eastern approach. Corvettes make sense for Bulgaria.

Australia is surrounded on three sides by open ocean (the so-called blue water) and must operate there, as well as in the archipelago to the north (the so-called brown water). Blue-water navies can comfortably and effectively operate in brown-water areas as the RAN has always done, but brown-water ships—including corvettes—will fail quickly in blue-water operations.

If Australia is willing only to fund a brown-water naval combat force, let’s be honest about that. Buying brown-water ships and telling our people we have a lethal blue-water capability that can deliver impactful projection and deterrence by denial would be a very expensive delusion.

To corvette or to not corvette: the defence strategic review and the Tier 2 surface combatant

A key part of the government’s response to the defence strategic review (DSR) was the establishment of an independent analysis team to examine the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet and to report back to government by the end of September 2023.

The framework for the analysis team’s work comes from some clear DSR directives. The DSR calls for an ‘enhanced lethality surface fleet’; a greater number of Tier 2 surface combatants; and a fleet mix that considers capability needs, cost, schedule and risk as well as the need for continuous shipbuilding.

More broadly, the surface fleet must be aligned with the DSR’s strategy of deterrence by denial, the critical capabilities list and the focus on a denial strategy, as well as on operations in the littorals and archipelagos in Australia’s approaches. This needs to be married with the DSR’s call to get capabilities into service without delay, the streamlining of strategically important capabilities and an emphasis on minimal viable capability given the end of strategic warning time.

In terms of the work of the analysis team, a key question is: what is a Tier 2 combatant? As ASPI’s Jennifer Parker has expertly outlined, this is less about the nomenclature of naval vessels and more about the capabilities they deliver. That said, the public debate over the requirement for a larger number of smaller vessels has largely settled on corvette/light frigate options. ‘Corvette’ has by and large become the de rigueur term in the debate for the Tier 2 surface combatant option.

Opting for an ‘enhanced lethality’ surface combatant fleet raises the question of whether the navy’s offshore patrol vessel program should continue in its current form. With six of the intended 12 OPVs built or under construction by German shipbuilder Luerssen, the company has proposed to the government that it build the remaining six to a corvette design.

Options for ‘Tier 2’ surface combatant have been put forward by a number of companies, including Navantia and TKMS. Depending on the analysis team’s broader recommendations, the government will need to find funds for these vessels within the current naval shipbuilding program, carve out additional savings elsewhere within Defence, or allocate additional funds to pay for them.

Apart from finding the funding for a larger fleet of Tier 2 surface combatants, the government will have to deal with the potential capability gap in the surface fleet caused by the cancellation of any part of the shipbuilding program and sequence the acquisition and build in a way that ensures the workforces at the Henderson and Osborne shipyards in Western Australia and South Australia are sustained.

However, there may well be an option that meets the DSR’s strategic requirements and its emphasis on speed to capability now, along with the navy’s needs and the ability to maintain continuous shipbuilding—Luerssen’s C90 corvette.

The C90 represents a very credible option for Defence to consider. Its base capability features in the Luerssen proposal include 16 vertical launch cells, eight anti-ship missiles, integration of a CEA radar, a hull-mounted sonar, a towed sonar array, torpedoes and a helicopter. The design would need to be modified to accommodate the RAN’s next-generation MH-60R Seahawk.

Most significantly, the C90 is already in production for the Bulgarian navy and Luerssen believes the C90 base design provides robust, production-ready vessels that can be easily modified for Australia’s needs. This option would provide the RAN with a vessel as capable, if not more, than the current Anzac-class frigate, but with a massively reduced crewing requirement.

The Anzac frigate’s capability requirements were originally set out in the 1986 Dibb review and the 1987 defence white paper. The latter noted the need for a second level of surface warship comprising vessels of lesser capability than guided missile destroyers and the frigates then in service. They would be ‘suitable for dealing with lesser forms of military pressure which could arise in Australia’s resource zones and proximate waters or in Australia’s area of direct military interest. A new class of vessel—a light patrol frigate—has been proposed for this level of capability. Eight ships will be constructed in Australia.’

  Anzac-class frigate MMPS C90 base design
Range In excess of 6,000 nm Estimate of 6,000 nm
Crew 169 68
Speed 27 kt 22 kt
Radar Original fit: Raytheon SPS-49(V)8 ANZ aerial search and long-range surveillance, Saab 9LV Combat Management System, Saab Sea Giraffe Target Indication Radar for air and surface search, Krupp Atlas 9600 Navigation RADAR, Saab9LV 453 Ceros 200 Fire Control Radar and Continuous Wave Illuminator 1 X 3D active phased array radar; Proposed CEA Radar integration; Saab Combat system
Sonar ThomsonSintra Spherion B hull-mounted bow sonar, Petrel Mine and Obstacle Avoidance Sonar system, towed-array sonar Hull mounted sonar 1X DSIT Blackfish HMS and towed array sonar 1 X TAS
Hull board All steel construction High-tensile steel
Torpedo 2 x Mk32 Mod 5 triple-mounted torpedo tubes Torpedo launchers 2X B515-3T
Gun 5-inch Mk45 Mod 2 automatic rapid fire gun, 4 x 50 calibre (12.7mm) machine guns Medium-calibre gun 1X 76/62 super rapid MF Oto Melara; secondary gun: 1 X35mm Rheinmetall Millennium
Vertical launch system Mk 41 vertical launch system (8 cells) 1 VLS Mk 41 (16 cells)
Helicopter 1 x MH-60R Seahawk Medium-sized navy helicopter
SS missiles 8 surface-to-surface missiles 8 surface-to-surface missiles
Sensors Raytheon SPS-49(V)8 ANZ radar, Saab 9LV 453 Target Indication Radar, Atlas Elektronik 9600 ARPA navigational radar, second Saab 9LV 453 Multi-purpose radar, electro-optical surveillance system, electronic warfare systems

The C90 option provides significant advantages. The company already has a contract with Defence for the OPVs, including a workforce and shipyard requiring limited changes to convert from building the OPVs to C90s. It also has an established and secure supply chain with local industry. In addition, the first of the OPVs were built at Osborne, and, if necessary, corvettes could be built concurrently in both Henderson and Osborne, delivering speed to capability and effectively engaging the Osborne workforce if this was required.

The C90 represents one of several options that the analysis team and Defence should consider as the Tier 2 surface combatant. While this is by no means an assured outcome, it does provide a significant platform for consideration and, in terms of speed to capability, it would be hard to beat.