Tag Archive for: cooperation

Asian governments must work together to address water insecurity

The world is facing an imminent water crisis. A recent report from the Global Commission on the Economics of Water warns that global demand for fresh water is on track to outstrip supply by 40% by the end of this decade.

The sharing of water resources between states can exacerbate geopolitical tensions. Water is inherently linked to economic development, climate change and population growth, and it can move across political boundaries and fluctuate in volume throughout the year. Access to and control over waterways and bodies of water can provide strategic backing and domestic stability to a country. That in turn can give it leverage over others and a greater influence on military projection and trade.

In Asia, much of the water comes from the Tibetan Plateau and the surrounding Hindu Kush-Himalayan region known as the ‘Asian water tower’, the source of 10 major rivers. The area holds the world’s third-largest reservoir of snow and ice after the Arctic and Antarctica and provides fresh water to nearly 2 billion people, or around 25% of the global population.

But it’s still not enough. More than 50% of the global population live in Asia, but the region’s freshwater supplies only stretch to 3,920 cubic metres per person per year—less than any continent other than Antarctica. The impacts of climate change, rapid population growth and competing demands for water from households, agriculture and industry are putting increasing pressure on Asia’s limited water resources.

The problem is exacerbated by mega-hydroengineering projects such as hydropower dams on major cross-border rivers. As well as imposing a sense of power and nationalism, these projects can increase fears of water scarcity in riparian states, increasing competition for access to and control of resources. China, an ‘upstream superpower’ and regional hydro-hegemon, has built many hydropower dams on cross-border rivers while neither adopting an independent transboundary river policy nor signing an international transboundary-governing water treaty. This has alarmed countries downstream. But China isn’t alone—India, Tajikistan and Laos have also pursued an engineering-focused approach to domestic water management much to their neighbours’ concern.

On top of this, Asian countries have to worry about climate-change-induced weather events worsening water stress, water pollution and groundwater exploitation, which significantly destabilise water, food and energy supplies.

In 2022, the Yangtze River basin drought in China affected an estimated 900 million people across 17 provinces. It also threatened the overseas industrial supply chain, particularly to Europe and the US, as factories shut down and water levels in China’s rivers became too low for ships to move. The Yangtze carries annual cargoes of more than 3 billion tonnes, so the drought forced China to substitute large numbers of trucks to do the job.

Water stress will worsen in the coming years. Under current trajectories and trends, freshwater resources will continue to diminish, intensifying competition for resources in individual countries and across borders. Ongoing national projects to divert water, such as China’s Red Flag River project, will further impact supplies in neighbouring countries.

The region isn’t doing enough to address this issue—policies are weak and there’s a lack of robust collaboration between governments. Asian nations must treat water as a common good and improve water management practices, not only to tackle the current crisis and meet future demand, but also to avoid creating socioeconomic instability and political turmoil.

Domestically, countries need to garner institutional support, improve water efficiency and invest in alternative solutions such as water reuse for potable and non-potable supplies. They also need to build frameworks that acknowledge water’s central role in shaping economic, socio-cultural and environmental changes, as well as increase public awareness and set up education programs.

Regionally, governments must coordinate policies, collaborate on joint projects and share real-time data. This is particularly important in dealing with extreme weather events such as floods, because it will allow riparian countries to better manage domestic resources and reduce risk exposure to cross-border stresses. It will also help ease tensions between upstream and downstream countries and encourage riparian countries to avoid overdependence on cross-border water resources. Bilateral and multilateral organisations in the region should also make water cooperation and related diplomacy initiatives a leading priority.

Water insecurity is set to become one of the major geopolitical issues of this century, particularly in Asia. Governments must act now and adopt a more radical approach to valuing and managing water supplies.

AUKUS will redefine government–industry partnerships

Australia’s defence and technology industry will be tested like never before by the AUKUS partnership in managing the torrent of sensitive information flowing from partner countries and in defining the shape of the agreement itself.

Whatever form the agreement ultimately takes, it looks sure to usher in an unprecedented level of information sharing among Australia, the UK and the US, and their industry partners.

Storing and managing that information, much of which is likely to be highly classified, is set to be one of the major, albeit unspoken, challenges of the AUKUS arrangement.

The defence supply chain is already made up of thousands of businesses and tens of thousands of contractors, many of which struggle to find employees with high-level security clearances.

As the spectrum of AUKUS collaboration widens, supply chains will grow with it. And as they grow, they will become more vulnerable to attack.

ASIO has already identified AUKUS-related initiatives as a looming target for hostile foreign intelligence services. That should come as no surprise. But as the junior partner in the AUKUS agreement, Australia will bear the burden disproportionately as the importer of capability information.

Our US and UK partners will demand ever more stringent assurances around the transmission and  storage of sensitive data, and access to it.

Nothing will stop AUKUS collaboration faster than shoddy information security or major data breaches.

Network-resilience is an obvious part of this, but as the supply chains grow more complex, after-market cyber fixes will not be enough. New levels of security will require products to be both secure by design and sovereign, thereby insulating them from supply-chain shocks as well as ensuring higher levels of security.

AUKUS technology must also be developed in a manner consistent with values of the Australia, the UK and the US.

Vendors of dual-use products with both civil and military applications—particularly in the tech space—had better get used to thinking about what they do, not just as a commercial venture, but as a social good.

The main fault line in the so-called tech wars between China and the West is not about the type of tech we use to power our networks, run our satellites or store our data, but what we use it for. Is technology for surveillance, power and control, or is it for prosperity, democracy and human rights? These principles already guide cooperation among the Quad partners and they will be at the centre of future AUKUS collaboration.

A second challenge for industry is helping to define precisely what AUKUS is.

The first AUKUS pillar is a tripartite agreement to develop a nuclear-powered submarine capability for Australia. The second involves advanced cooperation among the three partners in areas such as hypersonics, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and advanced cyber.

But beyond that, little is known about the nature of the partnership, particularly the cooperation in advanced technologies. To some extent, these questions will be answered as the agreement matures.

But while governments will ultimately set the direction for AUKUS collaboration, it would be a profound mistake for industry to assume it has no role to play in shaping the future of this historic undertaking.

The priority areas for AUKUS collaboration have rightly been set by governments. But these research areas, while easy to define on paper, are vast in their potential applications.

Which areas of AI contain the greatest promise for national security? Who is doing ground-breaking work on undersea autonomous technology? Governments alone cannot answer these questions, nor should they try to.

The critical process of invention, refinement and commercialisation of these technologies will occur not behind the high walls of government, but in private companies and research organisations across the US, the UK and Australia.

A good deal of this creativity will occur in the usual places—universities and research labs. Some of it will happen in the defence and tech primes, which have both the existing capability platforms and the massive budgets needed to refine them to be fit for purpose.

But much of the innovation that will accompany AUKUS will happen in start-ups and mid-sized companies in the US, Australia and the UK and from across a vast array of defence, tech and cyber sectors.

The role of industry is central, therefore, not just in realising the potential of AUKUS, but in defining it.

Companies with an established presence in AUKUS countries will be well placed to help drive the development of new capabilities through investment in high-tech manufacturing and other key areas. They can drive the growth of a highly skilled workforce through the exchange of technology and skilled workers.

The challenge for governments will be to ensure they are nimble enough to recognise promising innovations when and where they occur and draw them into the AUKUS ecosystem.

To do this they can create a business and investment environment conducive to innovation, growth and collaboration. This means streamlining, and where possible harmonising, regulations across the AUKUS realm. Visas, security checks and export controls are all obvious places to start.

AUKUS is not just a new chapter in the history of government and industry partnership; it is a complete redefinition of it.

Coordination for competition: an enterprise-management approach to national security

The re-emergence of multipolarity in international affairs has reinvigorated our focus on great-power competition. The world of global relations is a complex adaptive system in which unpredictable interactions produce new challenges that we struggle to understand, much less counter, in a timely manner. If Australia is to compete effectively in this environment, agility, collaboration and a shared understanding will be required at all levels across the national security enterprise.

The threats to our national security cut across constitutional, departmental and legal boundaries. Blurred lines can create the ‘grey zone’ that potential adversaries will try to exploit. These challenges aren’t new, and Australia’s national security apparatus has proved highly adaptive in protecting the nation from similar threats. Nonetheless, much like the spectre of terrorism forced reconsideration of our approach to national security almost two decades ago, it is probably time for a similar review and adjustment to ensure Australia is best prepared to deal with contemporary security challenges.

There’s a tension within the national security enterprise between horizontal collaboration and vertical accountability. Change will require new incentives and accountabilities focused on using whole-of-enterprise capabilities through interdepartmental coordination and integration within a common strategic framework. An increased focus on whole-of-government outcomes provides an impetus for cultural change. However, structural change will probably be required to reinforce such a cultural shift.

The establishment of the Department of Home Affairs is a good example of the federal government’s willingness to introduce new structures to enhance Australia’s national security outcomes. But there’s scope for more integration across agencies to focus and align their collective efforts in responding to evolving challenges.

The next iteration of the national security enterprise should reimagine interagency networking in ways that connect silos rather than break stovepipes. Central to this could be mechanisms for coordination that are designed to enable effective competition with potential adversaries through a ‘team of teams’ approach.

The Secretaries Committee on National Security is the interdepartmental mechanism for synthesising and presenting information to the National Security Committee of Cabinet. It plays a vital role in recommending national security priorities and approaches. But whole-of-enterprise synchronisation and a culture of interdepartmental collaboration can’t be achieved solely through this forum.

The concept of a national security adviser has baggage in Australia, and our system of government is unsuited to an American-style advisory role. Yet, the demise of the position in 2013 was a missed opportunity to build on whole-of-government efforts to channel the diffuse components of national power. While the American version has its flaws, the new challenges facing our national security apparatus potentially require a fresh look at the need for an appropriately resourced and empowered national security advisory function.

To suit Australian conditions, these staff could be led by a national security coordinator, a title that probably better reflects our requirement. This individual would offer national security advice, but their primary responsibility would be as the head of a team authorised to coordinate interdepartmental activity and ensure alignment across the national security enterprise.

The establishment of the Office of the Pacific within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is an important step towards improved cross-functional cooperation. The office is charged with ‘enhanc[ing] whole-of-government coordination [to] support Australia’s efforts to develop even closer ties with the Pacific’. However, its location inside a line agency gives the office ambiguous whole-of-enterprise authority and, while it will almost certainly provide enhanced interagency collaboration, it may not be the way to realise ideal interdepartmental coordination.

The 2017 review of the Australian intelligence community identified a need for greater coordination across agencies to deal with renewed competition and rivalry between major global powers. It also recognised that coordination requires bureaucratic heft and recommended the appointment of an experienced departmental secretary to the newly formed Office of National Intelligence to lead the coordination effort through an enterprise-management approach. This is a particularly salient recommendation when considering what a national security coordinator might look like.

The intelligence review acknowledged that the national intelligence community wasn’t broken. Rather than root-and-branch reform, it aimed ‘to provide a pathway to take those areas of individual agency excellence to an even higher level of collective performance through strengthening integration across Australia’s national intelligence enterprise’. Similarly, an enterprise-management function across the national security apparatus could restyle our highly capable departments as a world-class national security enterprise. The result would be an enterprise postured to maximise the use of all elements of national power to compete effectively in this new era of great-power competition.

The development of a national security strategy to sit at the apex of our policy framework might provide an opportunity to apply this approach. It could articulate Australia’s theory of security in a period of increasing uncertainty. It could also facilitate interdepartmental cooperation and collaboration, as successful drafting would require a cross-functional staff headed by an appropriately senior officer.

The drafting team would need the expertise and bureaucratic clout to ensure that a bold vision for Australia’s national security was pragmatically balanced with the need to gain whole-of-enterprise buy-in. This starts to look like the interdepartmental national security staff discussed above: trusted agents of their parent agencies, but collaborative and forward-looking enough to avoid departmental parochialism.

Australia has created effective joint interagency taskforces to address specific national security concerns before (Operation Sovereign Borders and RAMSI are two examples). But this proposal is about institutionalising the approach across government on a permanent basis, recognising that the demarcation between foreign and domestic threats in this new era of competition isn’t clear. The prospect of shared national security budgets is probably a long way off, but shared understanding, synchronisation of effort and unity of response could be prioritised now through an appropriately resourced enterprise-management function.

Harnessing the means to compete in the grey zone requires effective interdepartmental coordination. Strengthening our national security apparatus through an enterprise approach to deal with contemporary and emergent threats provides this. It also ensures coherence across the national security apparatus should competition transition to conflict.

Cooperation for a new age of volatility

Managing an economy is not for the faint of heart. Policymakers must constantly monitor the ever-evolving global economic landscape, and anticipate lightning-fast changes that can breed volatility and uncertainty. As today’s political and economic turbulence attests, the impact of events in one place can be felt far and wide, but particularly in emerging economies.

To stay ahead of the curve, policymakers must put international cooperation above short-term national interest. And yet, in the last two years, protectionism, policy divergence and a lack of coordination have begun to pose serious downside risks to the global economy. A confluence of factors is creating a perfect economic storm.

For starters, the US Federal Reserve has tightened liquidity through its interest-rate hikes, while the US Treasury’s pro-cyclical expansionary policy (tax cuts and increased spending) has bolstered aggregate demand and pushed up the yield on 10-year Treasury bonds. Moreover, US trade policy vis-à-vis China and Europe has dampened global trade. As a result of this policy mix, the US dollar is appreciating, and capital flows into emerging economies are declining.

For countries like Indonesia, the danger now is that a full-blown US–China trade war could derail much of the socioeconomic progress that has been made in recent years. For decades, emerging economies have been tapping into international trade to boost growth and reduce poverty. Now, we must ask ourselves if this beneficial cycle is coming to an end.

Given that emerging economies are already integrated into global supply chains, these countries’ policymakers must be more proactive in shaping the trade architecture and advocating a global rules-based system. To maintain growth and stability amid volatility, they should focus on strengthening economic fundamentals, rather than on pursuing unsustainable quick wins. Even short-term issues should be addressed with a longer-term strategy in mind.

Above all, emerging economies need to find a common voice. Escalating rivalries threaten to make navigating the headwinds they face impossible. During the global financial crisis 10 years ago, policymakers from around the world had the political courage to pursue collective measures that staved off a global depression. There is no reason why the response should be any different now.

In fact, the international community came together to speak with a single voice as recently as 2015, with the conclusion of the Paris climate agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030. The SDGs were developed through a truly collaborative effort, one that embodied its participants’ optimism that poverty can be almost eliminated within our lifetime, and that all people can partake in the fruits of growth and prosperity.

A mere four years later, that optimism is difficult to sustain. The idea of the world speaking with one voice seems like ancient history. Cooperation has been replaced by zero-sum unilateralism, and political leaders have become increasingly preoccupied with myopic, pro-cyclical and populist policies at home. Even if their objective is to correct legitimate imbalances, policymakers must remember that rebalancing can have far-reaching spillover effects, especially when such adjustments bypass global rules.

In October 2018, Indonesia hosted the International Monetary Fund – World Bank Group Annual Meetings in Bali, where fiscal and monetary authorities from 189 countries converged to discuss many of the issues alluded to here. There was overwhelming agreement that the spirit of multilateralism must be kept alive.

In his plenary address in Bali, Indonesian President Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi) summed up the mood when he emphasised the need to shift from confrontation to cooperation. When global powers are preoccupied with competing among themselves, they fail to see looming threats that will affect us all. It is pointless to become the biggest power in a global economy that is sinking.

At a time when we are facing rising global threats, relations among the advanced economies are more strained than they have been in decades, and this has given rise to a number of new problems. As Jokowi has observed, today’s great-power struggles look like something out of the popular HBO series Game of Thrones. Consumed by rivalry, each ‘Great House’ is oblivious to the shared existential threat from the north. We in the real world must not make the same mistake.

Indonesia learned much from the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis and the collapse of 2008—namely, that we must remain focused on reforms and global cooperation. Hence, over the past two decades, Indonesia has undertaken important changes to strengthen its economic resilience and ensure that the economy is managed more prudently. As a result, the broad picture of Indonesia’s economy is still bright, even with dark clouds gathering over the global terrain.

In anticipation of a potentially long period of global volatility, the Indonesian government will continue to strengthen its policy mix in cooperation with other authorities—domestically and across national jurisdictions. At the same time, we will continue to build a stronger economic foundation upon which to sustain the momentum of growth, and to safeguard the poorest and most vulnerable in our society. At a time of deepening global uncertainty, we must focus on the common good—and pursue it together.

Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy: consequences in cyberspace

The role of cyberspace in contemporary grand strategy is undeniable. US–Russian relations are now plagued by debates of online influence operations, while China is formulating plans to become a ‘cyber superpower’.

As the strategic significance of cyberspace increases, more groups are exerting power through it. The potential for cyber activities to create misperception, miscalculation and even conflict between states increases as those groups become further emboldened.

Today, Australia released its first International Cyber Engagement Strategy, which sets out our ambitious cyber affairs agenda for the next three years. Cyberspace is an enabler of digital benefits, such as economic growth through digital trade and the achievement of sustainable development goals. However, those wins can’t be attained unless cyberspace remains a domain for cooperation and collective benefit.

For this reason, a central ambition of Australia’s strategy is to maintain a stable and peaceful online environment.

The rules have been agreed. We have established clear expectations for state behaviour in cyberspace. International law has developed over centuries, and while the domain may be comparatively new, the rules are not. As agreed in 2013 by the UN Group of Government Experts, international law applies in cyberspace (PDF).

Our new strategy makes a strong statement about exactly how we think international law applies to cyberspace, and commits Australia to periodically publishing updates on this position as technology and the global discussion evolve.

Existing international law can be usefully complemented by agreed norms of behaviour. The 11 non-binding norms (PDF) agreed by the 2015 UN Group of Government Experts establish clear standards of conduct. In 2015, the G20 also agreed that no country should conduct or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property for competitive commercial advantage. Those norms promote predictability, stability and security.

Along with risk reduction and cooperation measures, increasing transparency is a useful way to build collective confidence that agreed norms are being adhered to. Australia advocates a more mature and transparent conversation about what states are doing in cyberspace.

The history of military affairs reflects the history of technological innovation, and it’s unsurprising that more and more states are looking to add cyber capabilities to their military tool kits. In and of itself that’s not a concern—provided that states acknowledge that military activities in cyberspace are governed by the same set of rules as military activities in the physical domains.

The strategy sets out information on the conduct and authorisation of Australia’s offensive cyber capability in support of military operations in more detail than ever before. Acknowledgement that Australia and other states are developing cyber capabilities doesn’t contradict our commitment to maintaining a peaceful and stable online environment. In fact, acknowledging the existence of those capabilities fosters the understanding that, just like in the physical domains, states’ activities in cyberspace don’t occur in a vacuum. States have rights, but they also have obligations.

Recognition that states have legitimate rights to develop and use cyber capabilities must go hand in hand with recognition that states are obliged to ensure that their use of cyber capabilities fits with international law and norms of acceptable behaviour.

It’s important that there be consequences for those who act contrary to this consensus. We need to deter and respond to unacceptable behaviour in cyberspace.

Ultimately, these rules of the road only work if they are adhered to. And, increasingly, states are testing the limits. Whether it be flagrantly breaching basic agreements or incrementally undermining goodwill online, malicious actors are pushing the boundaries. State use of proxies is blurring the borders between state and non-state actors online, and cybercrime is further complicating the landscape.

A strong cyber security posture ensures that Australia can discourage, detect, respond to and contain malicious cyber activity.

There’s also a need to develop an architecture for cooperation among states. In implementing the strategy, Australia will do just that. We will work with partners to strengthen and coordinate global responses to serious cyber incidents. We need to respond to malicious actors in a timely manner, within the framework of international law. Achieving that cooperation requires creative thinking to build a flexible range of existing and novel response tools, and a nimble coordination mechanism to implement them effectively.

Australia’s responses to malicious cyber activity could include law enforcement or diplomatic, economic or military measures, as appropriate for the circumstances. That could include, but isn’t restricted to, offensive cyber capabilities that disrupt, deny or degrade the computers or computer networks of adversaries. Regardless of context, Australia’s response would be proportionate to the circumstances, would comply with domestic law, and would be consistent with our support for the international rules-based order and our obligations under international law.

Australia’s new strategy puts us at the forefront of international efforts to promote and protect a peaceful and stable online environment—on which we all depend.

Well-known Australian individuals have lent their voices to amplify each theme of the strategy. The key messages of the international security chapter are outlined by Ambassador Feakin in a short explainer video, and echoed by Peter Jennings, our Chapter Champion for international security.

Home affairs: painting over the cracks?

If our domestic security agencies’ past operational achievements (see, for example, here and here) are anything to go by, the success of Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s Home Affairs portfolio seems inevitable. Turnbull could be forgiven for thinking that this once-in-40-years reform could be a lasting legacy. Unfortunately, such thinking underestimates the possibility that the creation of the portfolio will expose difficult-to-fix cultural and philosophical differences between agencies that have, to date, been ameliorated by the goodwill and leadership of individuals.

Anthony Bergin and Derek Woolner characterised the new organisation as a ‘blank canvas: it’s primed, with some tints already on the palette’. If that’s the case, then as the minister for home affairs–designate Peter Dutton prepares to paint his masterpiece, he may just notice that there are more than a few imperfections in the canvas.

Since 11 September 2001, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) have sought to break down communication silos. That has been especially tricky for the AFP, which has had to contend with the complications of working with an intelligence agency, including systems integration and security clearances.

While banter between the staff of our major domestic security agencies is healthy, it often masks nagging feelings of genuine interagency distrust. In my experience, while there have been plenty of executive efforts, interagency cooperation on domestic security has often been more reliant on interpersonal relationships than on structure or process.

The arduous post-9/11 AFP–ASIO journey will likely pale in comparison to the integration and security challenges of putting together the Home Affairs portfolio. One of the most difficult tasks will be developing a culture that nurtures trust and cooperation. With the influx of new agencies and functions into the Home Affairs portfolio, Minister Dutton would be better served by efforts to facilitate cohesive organisational behaviour that engage with and support each agency’s unique identity than by trying to forge a single portfolio-wide culture.

On the plus side, Minister Dutton has gained plenty of experience in dealing with those kinds of challenges following the creation of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and the Australian Border Force. The secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Michael Pezzullo, and the commissioner of the Australian Border Force, Roman Quaedvlieg, brought together two very different agencies to achieve both operational and strategic successes. But two years down the track, they still face a long and difficult road in building a new organisational culture. A key lesson learned is that this kind of change may take up to a decade to fully mature.

As a sign of unity in the senior ranks, Dutton could consider establishing a secretaries committee on domestic security. The committee could operate in parallel with the existing Secretaries Committee on National Security, providing a unified home affairs input to the National Security Committee of Cabinet and sending a clear message to the portfolio’s staff that cooperation is beginning at the very top. Significant work would need to be undertaken to clearly delineate the committees’ respective responsibilities.

One perplexing problem that Dutton will face relates to the tension between the Commonwealth, or national, perspective on organised crime and that of the states and territories.

The states and territories argue that they should be represented equally with the Commonwealth when strategy on multijurisdictional crime is being developed. In contrast, the federal law enforcement perspective is that the national organised crime threat is not simply an aggregation of the various states’ and territories’ interests.

To date, the AFP has been quarantined from that argument by the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC). The ACIC’s role has evolved into a focus on an ‘improved national ability to discover, understand and respond to current and emerging crime threats and criminal justice issues, including the ability to connect police and law enforcement to essential policing knowledge and information’. That function was developed to meet the challenges of multijurisdictional organised crime and the problems associated with coordination and communication between jurisdictions.

Until now, Australia has had no integrated national‐level strategic decision‐making entity that could truly guide operational law enforcement activity. The ACIC’s board has adopted an egalitarian approach that attempts to equally distribute efforts across the nation’s various jurisdictions. Unsurprisingly, the ACIC has struggled due to the absence of any centralised and sufficiently granular organised crime strategy-making or decision‐making entity.

As the minister responsible for Australia’s national law enforcement strategies, Dutton will encounter more than a few conflicts between state and territory jurisdictional priorities and those of the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the resolution of those conflicts, in the form of a clear national law enforcement strategy, is well overdue.

So, arguably, before Minister Dutton can start painting his masterpiece he’ll need to closely examine the fault lines between the tectonic plates of Australia’s domestic security agencies. And, as I said last month, he may need to conduct a more substantive review of each agency’s long-held strategy and policy assumptions to resolve those issues.