Tag Archive for: Chief of the Defence Force

Talking to the chiefs: Ray Griggs (part 1)

Image courtesy of the Department of Defence.

In 2002 Ray Griggs, then captain of the frigate HMAS Arunta, took his ship to the Persian Gulf to help enforce UN sanctions against Iraq. The Anzac-class frigate was equipped with eight air defence missiles and a dated conventional radar system.

Arunta is back in the Middle East now with 32 missiles, a front line helicopter and phased array radar system developed in Australia—one of the world’s best. ‘It’s a fantastic radar, amazing!’ says Griggs, now vice chief of the ADF. ‘The frigate’s got Harpoon and a whole lot of other things we did not have then.’

The dramatic increase in the potency of Australia’s frigates, and in their ability to defend themselves, after a highly effective upgrade illustrates the growing maturity of the ADF and its ability to do much more with existing platforms while preparing to take on billions of dollars’ worth of new equipment, Vice Admiral Griggs tells The Strategist.

‘You can see the progression there,’ says Griggs. ‘We’ve been an ADF on operations since East Timor in 1999. We rolled out of East Timor pretty much straight into Afghanistan and then into Iraq, and then back into Afghanistan and now back to Iraq along with a continuous naval contribution since 1990.’

‘Along the way we’ve fundamentally learned the lessons of the “fitted for but not with” era and the ADF is significantly more capable, in relative terms, that it was 15 years ago.’

The vice chief is the Defence organisation’s ‘senior joint champion’, a role given many more teeth, or greater bite, after the First Principles Review’s strong focus on integration and interoperability of the Army, Navy and the RAAF and all of their personnel and equipment. The review nominated the vice chief as the officer running the project that’s intended to make the ADF a more effectively ‘joint’ force. Previously it lacked an organisationally strong champion, says Griggs.

Such capabilities include ensuring the benefits of the ‘fifth generation’ Air Force are harnessed across the whole ADF with ‘enablers’ such as extensive networking to allow personnel and their equipment to communicate rapidly and in great detail. Such projects, crucial as they are, lack the obvious scale of major developments and they have sometimes languished as a consequence.

‘As we move into the era of fifth generation capabilities such as the Growler [electronic warfare aircraft], the P8 [Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft] and the Joint Strike Fighter, their integration across the ADF is crucial,’ says Griggs. ‘Fifth generation is not about an aircraft but a whole system.’

Apart from the obvious benefit of improving the coordination on operations of units from the  Army, Navy and RAAF, ‘jointness’ is also crucial because the cost to the taxpayer of duplicating capabilities across the three services isn’t sustainable, Griggs says.

Griggs also feels that the commonly used term, ‘joint’, underplays the role of Defence civilians. While those in the armed services deliver ‘kinetic’ effects, the input of those in defence intelligence, for instance, is just as crucial, he says. ‘I prefer the term “integrated” because that’s what we are trying to achieve. We’re not trying to do things jointly, we’re trying to achieve an integrated effect and the big shift, to fifth generation, brings a truly networked approach to how we go about our business.’

‘We’ve talked for 10 or 15 years about network centric warfare,’ says Griggs. ‘Now we have capabilities that completely rely on the network working as an integrated whole.’ That makes the joint force much more effective. ‘There’s very little we do that’s single service orientated.’

And using fifth-generation technology to gather intelligence on operations, and in preparing for ADF operations, demands a significant amount of information be fed to it so that it can do its job effectively. ‘So the whole notion of intelligence mission data drives a team effort to produce and use the data and to disseminate it.’

In the Middle East, the RAAF’s Air Task Group is directed by Australian troops when it carries out strikes in support of Iraq forces on the ground. ‘You can’t have a radio network for the army and another for the air force,’ says Griggs. ‘It’s got to be integrated, all linked together.’

Griggs says the ADF is engaged in two major integration challenges. One is to ensure it has horizontal integration across the force so the different parts of it can talk to each other and work together. ‘In a defence of Australia scenario that’s absolutely crucial because that’s how we would fight—as an ADF. But 98 percent of the time we operate in coalitions so, while it’s important to have horizontal integration, it’s also important to have it in a vertical sense in the coalition.

It’s absolutely crucial that the RAAF’s Air Task Group in the Middle East is completely locked in to the coalition command and control structure, says Griggs. ‘And it’s important that our frigate in the Middle East is locked in to the (US) Fifth Fleet structures and that it’s interoperable with other nation’s ships.’

‘Effective integration is a massive force multiplier.’

Accounting for accountability

Confronted with the First Principles Review’s 70 recommendations, it’s easy to lose sight of the forest for the trees

Confronted with the First Principles Review’s 70 recommendations, it’s easy to lose sight of the forest for the trees. Viewed from arm’s length, the two most important outcomes aren’t actual recommendations  but the decisions—one explicit, one implicit—to leave things as they are: to retain the civilian–military diarchy, and to preserve the shared services model for materiel and corporate support.

Those outcomes weren’t pre-ordained. There are some who’d like to see the diarchy done away with and the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) put in charge—either with or without a parallel civilian-led Defence Department. And there are others who’d like to see the services reabsorb the materiel sustainment and enabling support functions. In each case, the arguments hinge on clarity of accountability and its alignment with authority. A typical rhetorical question would be: How can a service chief, or indeed the CDF, be held to account for delivering military capability if they don’t control the resources needed for the task?

Although the First Principles Review’s first principle was ‘clear authorities and accountabilities that align with resources’, the review team members weren’t persuaded—most likely because they recognised the need to balance accountability with other competing factors. For the shared services model, it was the substantial efficiencies available through economies of scale and the central rationing of service levels. For the diarchy, it was avoiding the conflict of interest that’d arise if the military were the government’s sole source of advice about the military. I think the review made the right decision in both cases.

I’ve already made my views on the diarchy clear, so there’s no need to recount them, but the merits of the shared services model deserve explanation.

There’s no denying that the shared services model separates the service chiefs from the direct control of the resources needed to deliver the outcomes that they’re accountable for. In the most critical area—the sustainment of military platforms and weapons systems—the service chiefs already hold the purse strings and are able to make trade-offs between cost and the level of support they receive. And their ability to do so has been enhanced in recent years through cooperation with industry facilitated by DMO. In terms of garrison and corporate support, the capability managers don’t own  the budget, and service levels are largely set centrally. But this is no different from what happens in many parts of the private and public sectors.

The essential point is that the shared services model (even in its current form) doesn’t prevent capability managers being held to account for their performance in ‘raising, training and sustaining’ the forces under their command. With the improved monitoring and performance management promised under the One Defence model, the situation can only get better.

But there are limits to apportioning accountability in a complex organisation like Defence. Consider capability development. The review envisages service chiefs ‘having clear authority and accountability as sponsors for the delivery of capability outcomes to time and budget’. This is unrealistic. The acquisition phase of capability development will be executed by the new Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group as the agent for the service chiefs. It’s neither feasible nor practical for service chiefs to monitor and supervise the details of contracting, tender evaluation and project management. Conversely, the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group can’t control the level of risk that they’re directed to bear by the services and central decision-makers via the choice of equipment solutions. Capability development is a department-wide activity in which accountability rests with the diarchy and ultimately the minister.

Over the years, a great deal of attention has been placed on Defence’s structure and governance in an effort to ‘improve accountability’. One Defence continues the heroic quest. But in the final analysis accountability is something that one person imposes on another. And while structures and governance can facilitate or impede accountability, the real problem in Defence has been a systemic unwillingness to manage underperformance.

That unwillingness starts from the top of the organisation. No better example exists than the steady deterioration in the availability of the Collins-class submarines during the 2000s—a slow-motion crash which was only arrested by ministerial intervention.

The First Principles Review is alert to the problem; when discussing personnel management it says that ‘Defence has a sound performance management tool at its disposal, but is not using it effectively. We view this as a failing of leadership and management.’ Their remedy is a ‘transparent performance management system…that recognises and rewards high performance and introduces consequences for underperformance and failure to deal with it.’

In my view, it’s the single most important recommendation in the entire report.

The Canberra officer project (9): the slouch-hat mystique

PROBABLY GYMPIE, QLD, 1913. GROUP PORTRAIT OF MEMBERS OF REGIMENTAL STAFF, GYMPIE LIGHT HORSE.The slouch-hat mystique has great power in Australia. We’re about to salute a full-force expression of the slouch-hat aura as the centenary of Gallipoli commemorates the ANZAC creation moment.

These columns on the Canberra officer—military leaders made to thrive in the Canberra system—need to discuss the power effects of ‘legend’ as the symbols and stories of history are a potent element of any politics.

Tony Abbott got his symbols and his history wrong when he gave an Australian knighthood to the Queen’s husband. Yet the slouch-hat mystique is a sub-story of the Prime Minister’s ‘knightmare’. Abbott got grudging acceptance and praise for knighting two former Defence Force chiefs. Sir Peter Cosgrove and Sir Angus Houston are great Australians and their standing reflects the role and reputation of the ADF they led. Abbot misunderstood. What he could give to the ADF he could not give to Prince Philip—in the eyes of the Oz polity and much of the public. Read more

The Canberra officer (7): political nous and playing politics

Then Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, AC, AFC, returned the salute of Australia’s Federation Guard at the beginning of the Edinburgh Military Tattoo, which was held at the Sydney Football Stadium in 2010.

Previous posts in this series explored the Canberra officer project; Arthur Tange; the promised land of Jointery; taming the service chiefs; the Vice CDF; and CDF atop the diarchy.

The military venturing into politics is taboo: politicians command, generals obey, constitutional and military demarcations are clear. Well…yes, but…

Senior officers play against top politicians, often close to the hottest politics. The taboo can’t banish the political codes and tones and moves the ADF wields. To illustrate, consider a great Canberra officer who burnished rather than burnt his career by telling Parliament the truth about ‘kids overboard’.

Angus Houston was one of the best recent chiefs of Air Force, stepping up to be a fine chief of the Defence Force. Houston’s decade at the top proved he’s an excellent product of the Canberra officer project. Not least of his skills was political nous. Houston’s political intelligence is one of the project’s defining requirements, even if taboo. Read more

The Canberra officer (6): CDF atop the diarchy

Newly promoted General David Hurley AC, DSC is congratulated by Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston AC, AFC on his promotion and transfer of authority as the new Chief of Defence on 1 July 2011. Over the nine years of their tenures, they served with five different Secretaries of Defence.The headline gives you the guts of the idea. In the diarchy that runs Defence, the military man sits atop the civilian: the chief of the Australian Defence Force now looms above the secretary of the Defence Department.

Forty years ago, the situation was reversed. The civilian Secretary then mattered more than CDF in the power and precedence hierarchy. Saying that the Chief of the Defence Force out-equals the other half of the diarchy is offering a judgement about both relative and absolute shifts in the power of the two jobs that sit, co-joined, atop Defence.

The Secretary still matters hugely, not least because of his considerable statutory powers, especially over money. The current Secretary, Dennis Richardson, is one of the great public servants of his generation and I’ve written a couple of posts (here and here) to that effect. Read more

The Canberra officer (5): VCDF, from zero to zenith

Admiral Alan Beaumont AC RAN, was appointed VCDF in 1989. He was the first person to hold this position to then go on to be appointed CDF, serving a total of 6 years in these positions.

The Canberra officer project, like the art of strategy itself, is about the creation of power. And the position of Vice Chief of the Defence Force is a striking example of the project’s building effort.

In the 28 years since the Vice Chief job was brought into being, it has quickly gone from zero to zenith. From the moment of birth, this job has zoomed. The evolution of the Vice Chief position is one element in the battle by the Chief of the Defence Force to gather the power to match his title. 

In the way of the military, one of the tools in the Canberra officer project is the production of new traditions. And, yes, of course you can create ‘new’ traditions; politicians as much as the military do it all the time. In minder-speak, it’s about defining the history to support the narrative.  Read more

The Canberra officer (4): taming the service chiefs

"GEN Sir Phillip Bennett, royal governor of Tasmania, prepares to place a wreath at a memorial during a service, part of ceremonies commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea." (May 1982)

When the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force make a combined visit to the Prime Minister, it can mean coup, revolution or war. So when the three service chiefs met John Howard, in Sydney on Friday 4 April 1997, elements of all three were in the air. The conflict was all inside the Defence Force. The Chief of the Defence Force had staged a coup over the previous two decades as he’d been slowly absorbing the powers of the service chiefs. Within a week, the government was scheduled to release the Defence Efficiency Review, tipped as the most important reorganisation of Defence in nearly a quarter of a century. As a result the war over lines of command and power flared into open revolt.

The review marked another phase in the evolution of jointery, the taming of the service tribes and elevation of the Defence Force chief so his power matched his title. As the military shifted from the Old to the New Testament it created new names and identities—crucially, the Australian Defence Force and CDF (wonderful examples of the invention of tradition).

In this evolution, the Chief of Defence Force Staff in 1976 replaced the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee. From chairman to chief was a shift that mattered. Under the changes, the service chiefs were responsible to the Defence Minister, through the CDFS, for command of their services, but service chiefs still had the right of direct access to the Minister. Read more