Tag Archive for: behaviour

Signing of anti-satellite weapons ban a positive step for Australia in space

Space is increasingly a contested operational domain. A major contributor to this is the development and testing of counterspace capabilities (also referred to as anti-satellite weapons or ASATs) by some countries. ASATs are designed to destroy an opponent’s critical satellites in a crisis or during wartime.

China, India and, most recently, Russia have all tested purpose-designed direct-ascent ASATs, which are ground-launched missiles that collide with, or explode next to, a target satellite, physically destroying it. A Russian test in November last year created a huge cloud of space debris that directly threatened the International Space Station, China’s Tiangong space station, and numerous satellites. The debris cloud still threatens satellites, and the ISS recently had to shift orbit to avoid a collision with debris created in that test.

In February 2008, the US used a significantly modified version of its ship-based SM-3 surface-to-air missile to destroy a malfunctioning satellite in Operation Burnt Frost. This test highlighted the dual-role potential of ballistic-missile-defence capabilities for ASAT roles. The operation was undertaken in part to prevent an uncontrolled re-entry that could have spread toxic fuel to overpopulated areas, but also as a response to China’s test of a dedicated direct-ascent ASAT in January 2007. That Chinese test, like the recent Russian test, created a huge cloud of space debris that remains a threat to this day. China has subsequently operationally deployed a direct-ascent ASAT to target US and allied satellites in low-earth orbit. These developments were a wake-up call to the US and its allies that assured access to space was increasingly contested.

The reality of counterspace capabilities and space as a contested operational domain is reflected In the Australian Defence Force’s 2022 space strategy. The goal is to develop a space architecture that is resilient, can be defended if under attack and can be reconstituted if compromised. Defence is not under illusion that Australia can always enjoy assured access to space, or that space is a peaceful sanctuary untouched by terrestrial competition and conflict below. Resilient space capabilities and responsive and assured access to space launch are vital steps as Australia’s approach to the use of space for defence and national security gathers momentum.

Part of the solution to the challenge of counterspace threats is to raise the political, economic and potentially military cost of using ASATs to unacceptable levels through a strategy of deterrence by denial. Such a strategy requires resilient space architectures, a high level of space domain awareness to ensure attribution of activity and denial of opacity for would-be aggressors, and an ability for rapid reconstitution of lost capability in a crisis. The more sensitive issue of space-control capabilities—be they passive, such as an ability to shift orbits of a satellite under threat, or active, such as an ability to engage in non-kinetic direct defence of a satellite under attack—also needs to be considered in a way that is consistent with Australia’s commitment to be a responsible actor in space.

It is therefore entirely appropriate that Australia has announced that it will join a multinational ban on testing of destructive, direct-ascent ASATs to strengthen global norms of responsible behavior in space. As Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles explained: ‘Destructive testing of direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles threatens the security of vital systems in space, which Australia and other nations depend on every day. With this pledge, the Government is demonstrating Australia’s commitment to act responsibly to protect our national security interests.’

Joining the ban on testing of destructive ASATs is an easy move and a sensible step for Australia. Australia hasn’t been looking to acquire such a capability and has no plans to do so. Discussions about space control in Defence are occurring in the context of Australia’s interest in pursuing norms of responsible behaviour in space. We are part of the UN open-ended working group on responsible behaviour in space, and this move strengthens our commitment to promoting norms of responsible behaviour in space and, through diplomacy and legal mechanisms, reducing the incentive for states to pursue direct-ascent ASATs.

Australia will be joining the US, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and other liberal democracies in signing up to the ASAT ban. However, there’s no guarantee that other states will follow suit. Continued testing of destructive ASATs will only add to the congestion of space, further imperilling humanity’s ability to use this vital domain, not just for defence and national security, but also for broad international public-good uses.

One problem with the ban is that it’s a unilateral moratorium, not an international treaty. It’s relatively easy to join, but for those outside, there are no enforcement mechanisms. And, as demonstrated in the aftermath of Russia’s 2021 ASAT test, there’s little in the way of penalties beyond diplomatic demarches for such actions. Staying outside the ban is a low-cost policy option for some states, such as China and Russia, that are not answerable to, or less likely to be affected by, strong diplomatic language and minimally effective sanctions.

Another issue is that the ban applies only to destructive, direct-ascent ASATs and fails to address co-orbital ASAT capabilities, which some states are developing directly, or at least demonstrating the relevant technology for. It also doesn’t address ground-based counterspace capabilities such as uplink and downlink jamming, laser dazzling and cyberattacks on satellites.

The ASAT ban is thus the start of a solution rather than an end to itself. It’s a step forward on a long path that is now being explored by the UN working group. It’s a good move for Australia to join the ban, but it needs to be followed by a concerted international effort towards a true multilateral treaty that is enforceable under international law. This should be the next step for proponents of space law that seek to reduce the likelihood that space moves from a contested operational domain to a warfighting domain at the outset of a future conflict.

The diplomatic rift in outer space

The night sky may look calm and tranquil, but the domain of outer space is on red alert, with all indicators pointing towards a distressing future.

Outer space affects all of us. It’s likely you seldom have a day in which you don’t depend on those satellites orbiting over your head. Hidden in plain sight, outer space has become a pillar of human civilisation. Examine any sector of society—communications, banking, agriculture, healthcare, emergency services or defence—and somewhere you’ll find the heroic work of our space infrastructure.

Yet these satellites, and everything that depends on them, are at risk.

Geopolitical tensions, strategic competition, the development of offensive capabilities, bourgeoning mistrust, misunderstandings and miscalculations, all served with a side of chronic diplomatic stalemate, threaten to knock down this pillar.

This week, the United Nation’s open-ended working group on reducing space threats will meet in Geneva for the second time. In the first session, in May, the United States, Russia and China agreed on three basic premises. First, outer space is vitally important. Second, outer space is facing urgent threats. And last, the legal and normative framework regulating the domain has become frail and outdated.

Yet how to fix this insufficient framework is where the US and its like-minded peers are locked in disagreement with Russia and China—one built upon decades of diplomatic impasses.

To understand the diplomatic rift between these space powers, it’s helpful to distinguish between space security and space safety.

In a nutshell, space security focuses on capabilities, as in the absence (or presence) of military-based threats in outer space. This includes ground-to-space, space-to-ground and space-to-space weapons such as anti-satellite missiles, orbital bombardment systems and proximity operations.

Space safety, on the other side of the same coin, focuses on behaviours and is concerned with the sustainable use of space. It’s about the presence (or absence) of responsible norms, behaviours and principles within the spacefaring community.

With this we get to the crux of the problem that has plagued decades of stalled meetings at the Conference on Disarmament and has once again reared its ugly head at this year’s UN working group meetings on reducing space threats.

The problem is: do we control behaviours by regulating our capabilities, or do we control capabilities by modifying our behaviours?

To illustrate the difference, consider anti-satellite weapons.

Anti-satellite missiles are designed to smash through satellites with their momentum. The debris from both the missile and the obliterated satellite forms into a large and dangerous cloud. This destructive horror of super-bullets disperses around the globe, indiscriminately endangering any satellites or spacecraft it encounters.

If you believe the best approach is to control behaviours by regulating our capabilities, you’ll likely favour a ban or a disarmament treaty for anti-satellite missiles.

Unfortunately, that approach is fraught with pitfalls. Outer space is a domain of dual-use technology. Snapping our fingers and magically ratifying a global ban on anti-satellite missiles won’t get rid of the threat. Even the most ostensibly civilian satellite can be programmed to manoeuvre into another satellite and destroy both—a rendezvous attack—which would have the same consequences as an anti-satellite missile. Without changing the behaviour of states, limiting their capabilities will only result in a horizontal shift of the problem.

A better approach is to control capabilities by modifying our behaviours. This means creating a transparent, precise and widely accepted framework setting out which behaviours are acceptable and which aren’t. The technology of anti-satellite weapons wouldn’t be banned, but states would be encouraged to shift their behaviour through the international community’s ire.

It may seem painfully slow to focus on space safety and allow progress to flow organically into space security, but it is the only way forward that stands a chance.

In fact, the proof of this method is already apparent.

In April, US Vice President Kamala Harris announced that the United States would no longer test anti-satellite missiles. Canada and New Zealand soon followed with similar pledges. This didn’t occur because of a ban on technology but through a behavioural shift that created a bottom-up, organic commitment to sustainability. Yet this behavioural change remains, for the time being, confined to a small group.

A decade ago, the European Union attempted to steer the global space sector with an international code of conduct that promoted responsible behaviours. Russia and China countered that effort with a draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space known as the PPWT. Unfortunately, the PPWT focused on capabilities, sheltering Russia’s and China’s irresponsible behaviours, and ultimately assisted in the code’s inglorious death.

Now a new effort to improve global behaviour in outer space is facing the same resistance. Russia and China are still trying to push the spotlight onto the PPWT and have lambasted the UN working group’s efforts as timewasting, politicising and discriminatory.

But it isn’t discrimination to call out unsustainable practices. It isn’t politicisation to pressure everyone to act responsibly. It isn’t a waste of time to place principles above capabilities.

The UN working group must succeed, despite the resistance emanating from Russia and China. It is, perhaps, the only way to steer outer space towards a peaceful and sustainable future.

How the ‘group’ can reduce the spread of Covid-19

In Australia’s Covid-19 response, the importance of expertise in medicine, biology and epidemiology has been on display. The pandemic appears to be heralding a pivot back to evidence-based ‘fact’, away from opinion and ‘truthiness’. Universities and medical research institutes are at the forefront of research to understand the biology of the virus, trial a vaccine, test potential treatments and model the spread of infections.

It has also become clear that behavioural change by every individual is necessary to reduce the spread of infection. Compliance with social distancing measures by 90% of people means the virus can be controlled in the community; compliance by 70% means it won’t be. Social and behavioural science is critical in this effort and needs to be better mobilised to support behavioural changes.

Some recent articles highlight insights from social and behavioural science that relate to threat, panic, culture, leadership and political polarisation.

A central idea is that reducing the spread of Covid-19 through behavioural change is a problem of the collective, which puts it in the realm of group psychology.

In social and behavioural science, there’s consensus that there are three main ways to change behaviour:

  • coercion—people receive rewards or punishments on dimensions that are valued by a community
  • authority—people follow the leader (or laws, customs, policies or norms) even when they don’t fully agree, because they accept the process that invests certain powers in a particular individual or body
  • persuasion—there’s a shared goal and the behaviour is believed to be right, valid and appropriate.

Often a combination of all three is in operation when efforts to change behaviour are driven by public policy. Persuasion is the ‘sweet spot’ because there’s shared purpose, which brings intrinsic motivation and self-reinforcing behaviour. Coercion is costly because it requires surveillance and enforcement.

The critical questions then are how do we foster persuasion and how can social and behavioural science be of use? How do we persuade people to engage in social distancing, hygienic practices (including washing hands and surfaces) and self-isolation, and to continue doing those things for many months?

Humans have an inbuilt (perhaps evolved) functionality that enables persuasion. It’s on display every time we support a sports team. It affects the way we perceive the world (who’s right or wrong), who we listen to, who we follow and who we help.

Humans can expand their self-concept to include others who are similar to themselves, or ingroup members. This is referred to as a social identity (in which the self is defined as ‘we’ and ‘us’), and contrasts with a personal identity (in which the self is defined as ‘I’ and ‘me’).

Importantly, the ingroup that’s most relevant to our behaviour can change (such as from home to work, on the sporting field or at the ballot box). The self-concept can include a few others like friends and family, a local community, an organisation, a nation or even humanity as a whole. Research has demonstrated that when there’s a shared social identity there is an increase in cooperation, following of group norms, helping, empathy, trust and, importantly, persuasion.

During this pandemic, persuasion and behaviour change will flow from the emergence of a shared social identity with a clear understanding of common (community or nation, not individual) fate. Because it’s a group, or herd, problem, it needs to be addressed at the group level. Political and policy leaders are central to the creation of a shared social identity and associated norms that are tied to a common purpose and underpinned by values like caring for others, supporting those in need and being responsible citizens.

Some leaders are crafting this sense of who ‘we’ are and what ‘we’ need to do better than others, and their efforts will need to be strengthened and maintained over the next several months. To act together, we need consistent and clear behavioural expectations, guides on how to act (such as spacing markers on shop floors for queueing) and the establishment and showcasing of those new norms. Influence is reduced where leaders behave badly, there’s political polarisation or messaging is inconsistent.

Importantly, successes need to be reinforced—when the right behaviour is on display it needs to be championed. Leaders should consider regular and widespread electronic messaging not just communicating what people should do but that people like them (in the same group) are doing the recommended behaviours.

People need to hear and see that others in the group are changing their behaviour and that the right behaviours are on the increase. On this front, every piece of news about fines being issued for noncompliance should be met with circulation of many examples of the right behaviour.

We also need reassurance that there is hope if we act as a collective. It has to be clear that acting together now, and for many weeks to come, means the end will be in sight sooner. There needs to be personal and collective efficacy—a sense that one’s own and one’s group’s actions will lead to positive change. In the past week or two, many of these strategies have been on show, but is the message getting through en masse? Can persuasion be maintained? Are there pockets of ignorance or even resistance? All members of the community need to be engaged in the solution or we will fail.

Nationally representative weekly surveys to assess Covid-19-related attitudes, compliance behaviour, mental health and wellbeing, coping and resilience will be informative in designing strategies to support behaviour change during this crisis. They’ll also help in identifying needs in the recovery phase. Who is coping and who isn’t? What predicts behaviour change? What’s the mental health impact and what supporting measures are needed? Are more cohesive local communities managing better? Are feelings of loneliness on the increase and what can be done? The foresight that comes from high-quality information will enhance both the management of and recovery from this pandemic.