Tag Archive for: Australian Space Agency

India-Australia cooperation on technology 

India recognises that its ambition to be a global power cannot be achieved unless it becomes technologically advanced. Indian leaders have known since independence that technology is key to developing the country and are very conscious of the need to catch the next technological revolution.

​India invested heavily in leading edge technology including in nuclear research and outer space, and in research and educational institutions such as the Indian Institute of Technology. These efforts have become even more intense over the last few years both because of growing competition with China and India’s partnership with many technologically advanced countries.

India hopes that Australia, like many other Indian partners, will help New Delhi acquire the technologies it needs through direct transfers and collaborative work. With Australia in particular, collaborative research is the primary focus of Indian expectations.

One aspect of this is related to joint policy initiatives to safeguard the two countries and the region from predatory practices by adversarial great powers, specifically but not solely China. India wants to deepen cooperation with Australia and others in the Indo-Pacific to safeguard against cyber attacks and to provide political support to ensure free choice for countries in deciding their technological futures.

There have been concerns about China ​pressuring and incentivising many smaller countries to accept Chinese- designed and -built telecommunication networks, which carry significant vulnerabilities for the countries involved and the entire region. Such international policy collaboration has been a fruitful area of cooperation which should be continued and deepened.

More directly, India would like to deepen bilateral technology cooperation in areas such as cyber security and space.

In the cyber security domain, this could include the two taking the lead in developing regional digital resilience, instituting better cyber security practices, and enabling trusted value-based supply chains that remove disruptions and vulnerabilities and enhance cyber security across the region.

Similarly, sharing of critical intelligence—on threats and vulnerabilities—before a cyber security incident can occur, can be done through institutions like CERT-IN. Developing regular dialogue between institutions like the CERT and its counterparts could be a useful track. This could kick off as a collaborative venture between the Indian and Australian CERT organisations, but once it is up and running, it could be expanded to involve other like-minded partners including in the Quad. Such a dialogue can also be used to share information on new tactics and trends and new targets of cyber attacks. Strategies for responding to cyber attacks could be developed to make cyber security professionals in India and Australia more aware of trends and able to improve mitigation measures. Given the threat levels that India and Australia face, the two should also develop a joint threat and vulnerability index. This should not necessarily be a public document but could be shared between the cyber security agencies of the two countries. Some of these are already being discussed in the annual India-Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue, five rounds of which are already been held.

Space has become increasingly contested, reflecting tense political relations among the great powers. India and Australia, like many other countries, are deeply dependent on space to facilitate both their civilian economies and their national security agencies. This is potentially under threat because of the way space politics is developing, and in particular because of China’s activities in space.

While there is some preliminary cooperation between the two countries, this could be significantly enhanced. Australia can utilise India’s much larger space launch capability and its remote sensing technology. Australia’s experience in developing its space sector and specific space technologies could be of significant help to India. Creating linkages between private sector partners, especially startups and small- and medium-sized enterprises in India and Australia can be particularly meaningful in instituting a sustainable and more durable supply chain across the space sector.

Given the significant dependence on space in both India and Australia, any satellite disruptions, whether intentional or not, could have security and economic implications. The two countries can work on developing better redundancy measures, including through encryption measures on satellite data transmitted to and from satellites. The two can also collaborate at the political level in developing international consensus around safe and secure practices in space to ensure its continued viability for peaceful purposes.

Another area where the two countries can collaborate is on supply chain resilience in critical materials. China has tried hard to control these supply chains but permitting such controls would represent a serious vulnerability to both countries. Both India and Australia can also cooperate to generate wider coalitions that would help build consensus on developing standards, best practices and norms in the technological realm.

Setting Australia’s space priorities

Australia is an Indo-Pacific country with a democratic ethos. Its role in shaping the discourse on strategic policy—in areas such as representative governance structures, the rules-based international order and responsible space development—is well documented. Australia is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue along with three major democratic, space-faring nations (India, Japan and the US) that is aimed at ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Outer space is now a key strategic domain. More than 72 nations have established space agencies, and many have created new institutions to support their private space sectors and elevated space to the level of critical infrastructure. It is in this global context that Australia can play a vital role as a middle space power in scaling up space development and use. Other middle space powers like Japan have taken cutting-edge decisions to support space mining activities on the moon and invest in promising technologies like space-based solar power.

Australia established its space agency in 2018. On its website, the Australian Space Agency highlights its focus on supporting the development of the domestic space industry and taking the lead in national and international space collaboration. As for its funding priorities, Australia’s G’day Moon project is partnering with NASA to fly ‘an Australian-made, semi-autonomous rover to the Moon’ by 2026 as a step towards establishing a sustainable human presence on the moon and supporting future missions to Mars.

Australia has also created a space infrastructure fund worth $19.5 million. In October 2022, the government announced that it would spend nearly $1.2 billion on locally made satellites. Last month, Skyraft, an Australian space company, launched five air-traffic-management satellites aboard a Falcon 9 rocket as part of a larger constellation of 200 satellites that will be built over the next two years. Australia is also developing its own spaceports.

Australia’s 2019–2028 civil space strategy identifies four strategic pillars: ‘open the door internationally; develop national capability in areas of competitive advantage; ensure safety and national interest are addressed; and inspire and improve the lives of all Australians’. The strategy aims to create 20,000 jobs in the Australian space sector by 2030.

These are important pillars, but to bat successfully for the future space economy and signal to the wider international audience why they should consider partnering with Australia to build a democratic space order, Australia needs to set a space vision that embraces the changing discourse on space and focuses on its development and use. Space is now a critical domain in international strategic competition, and what happens there will help determine which country emerges as the lead nation in the 21st century. China signalled that shift in thinking in its 2015 military doctrine and 2021 white paper on space, as well as through President Xi Jinping’s speeches and policy statements. Without recognising this systemic change, Australia stands to lose out.

In this context, what should Australia’s space priorities be?

For one, Australia should set a space vision of development and utilisation. An Australian space policy should state that Australia is interested in investing in its space program because of the central role space plays in sustaining its critical infrastructure. It should make clear that this focus extends from low-earth orbit to the moon and beyond. This strategic mapping matters because if Australia wants to benefit from a US$1 trillion economy in space by 2040, scaling up its ambitions now by setting the right strategic framework and vision will create the institutions and develop the skills base and immigration policies necessary for building that space ecosystem.

Second, Australia should set a 10-year strategy focused on developing core space priorities. These priorities should include building a sector that benefits both its civilian space program and its national-security-related space apparatus. On the civil side, supporting projects that build supply-chain mechanisms in fields such as automation, robotics, artificial intelligence, 3D printing and large-scale mining will add to the nation’s attractiveness as a space power. Australia is a leader in mining, and taking lessons from its mining sector to outer space will leverage Australia’s strengths for the future space economy. On the national-security side, securing its space assets and being able to use its space systems and institutional structures to strengthen Australia’s defence preparedness are key.

Finally, Australia should take the lead in scaling up space cooperation through the Quad. Space will be a game-changer in the Indo-Pacific. Australia can play a pivotal role in bringing the members together to establish a Quad vision for a free and democratic space order. The four countries possess some of the most advanced space capabilities and have increased their investments in their civilian space programs. They have all established defence space agencies, space forces, space domain mission units and space commands, which could enable joint strategic threat assessments and interoperability between their space services. Such cooperation would not only address one of Australia’s space strategic priority of building international partnerships, but also ensure Australian leadership in crafting the rules-based international order in space. This is absolutely vital given the rise of China and its aspirations to write the rules of the road for space development and utilisation and to establish Chinese-led institutions and a permanent presence on the moon in cooperation with Russia.

More inclusive partnerships will help prevent conflict in space

The release of the ‘Combined Space Operations Vision 2031’ in February marked an important milestone in the growing cooperation among space-faring nations. The aim of the CSpO initiative is to ‘[g]enerate and improve cooperation, coordination, and interoperability opportunities to sustain freedom of action in space, optimise resources, enhance mission assurance and resilience, and prevent conflict’. Its signatories are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the UK and the US.

The CSpO vision statement is a commendable step towards better coordination and cooperation in space. It effectively codifies existing cooperation, given that the involvement of the Five Eyes nations plus France and Germany represents a significant proportion of global military space power. Yet, two trends indicate that the vision could be more inclusive and yield stronger results in removing the perception of exceptionalism by considering a growing focus on the space capabilities—civil, military and commercial—of newer strategic partners like Japan, India and South Korea, as well as the increasing importance of commercial space to the military realm.

A ‘congested and contested space domain’ has become the common theme for all space-faring nations. Over the past 20 years, a conflation of technological maturity has reduced the cost of investment, enabling non-traditional enterprises such as SpaceX and Blue Origin to gain access to space for commercial purposes. The space industry has become a fundamental part of everyday life, from enabling navigation to facilitating communications and financial transactions, and opportunities are growing each day. Access to space is no longer the realm of just the most powerful nations on earth.

Increased societal reliance on space-based technologies, including for key underpinnings of modern economies, has only raised the strategic importance of the space domain. Over the past 10 years, US$264 billion was invested into the space economy, and that figure is expected to grow to US$1 trillion by 2040. In response, many states are establishing sovereign military space organisations. These will increase their space capabilities, including improving integration of space with other domains, and may also act as a deterrent. Given the potentially catastrophic effects of incidents in space for most nations, international partnerships and cooperation form the cornerstone of many strategies, an approach that the US has broadly supported.

Altruistic reasons aside, as the dominant nation since the end of the Cold War, the US has recognised that the growth of the space economies of many countries means that partners can complement the capabilities it has fielded over the years, while the establishment of other military space organisations can create resilience through partnerships. This is particularly important against the growing capabilities of China, which earlier this year demonstrated the ability to use its SJ-21 satellite to manoeuvre in orbit before pulling another one of its dead Compass-G2 satellites out of geosynchronous orbit.

There are limitations, however, to military cooperation in space. Some of them are necessary, but some are US own goals. In 2017, General John Hyten (then commander of the US Strategic Command) argued that the legacy overclassification of space systems must be relaxed to allow access to others, including ‘the French, the Germans, the Brits, the Australians, the Canadians’, for better integration and cooperation. Yet space systems and technologies remain some of the most sensitive and critical, not only due to their role in nuclear command and control and missile defence, but because they underpin US military superiority in all operational domains. Information security and the protection of sensitive technology remain key and reasonable concerns for the US Space Force and US Space Command—which in part explains the US’s cautious approach to allowing others to join this select group.

One area in which there’s a key opportunity to enhance partnerships beyond the existing Five Eyes, plus France and Germany, is in the commercial space sector. There are strategic and military benefits to be gained from expanded commercial cooperation with non-traditional partners. Commercial actors can help build a global collective hybrid space architecture and present an ever-complex challenge to any potential adversary in space. The US could potentially expand commercial elements of CSpO to other partner nations as an adjunct to the military effort. This could increase the collective commercial options available to military space organisations, reducing costs and increasing resilience for all.

Partnerships can also enable space resilience and foster growth in a post-Covid-19-pandemic world for all involved. An OECD paper developed for the 2021 G20 Space Economy Leaders’ Meeting notes that ‘space technologies can contribute to bridging the digital divide, monitor changing climate, extreme weather and the use of natural resources, and create new economic opportunities’. These are all matters reaching beyond traditional geographic borders.

Importantly, the inclusion of states other than traditional partners can also lead to the development of international norms appealing to most and prevent conflicts in space. In this context, participation in exercises such as Global Sentinel that provide a forum to build partnerships for integration of capabilities and exchanges of ideas could become a stepping stone to accession to CSpO membership.

Commercial space and its growing role in military space concepts offer significant opportunities. CSpO could play a useful role in facilitating engagement at the national and military levels with commercial organisations. If we’re serious that access to space is beneficial for all, preventing conflict by developing norms is fundamental. To do so, we must break through the traditional boundaries and ensure greater inclusion in the global space economy.

ADF space command is the right next step for Australian space power

Following the release of the 2020 strategic update and force structure plan, Australia’s defence organisation is taking some important steps forward in how it approaches the prospect of military operations in space.

There’s now a ‘space domain review’ underway within the Department of Defence in response to the organisation’s move to recognise space as a full operational warfighting domain, which is due for completion by the end of 2021. The question being considered is how the Australian Defence Force will operate in space, encompassing everything from strategy and force posture to capability development and organisational structures.

The most recent step in this process was the announcement by Chief of Air Force Mel Hupfeld that Defence is reorganising to become a truly integrated space-domain organisation, centred on a new ADF space command to be established next year.

Clarifying exactly what this means is vital. It does not mean establishing an Australian space force that is separate from and independent of the army, navy air force. Not even the US Space Force has evolved to that level; it’s still operating within the US Air Force, alongside USAF Space Command. The space command within the ADF will bring together the three military branches, along with civilian representatives from Defence, and potentially other government agencies, to ‘establish an organisation to sustain, force-generate, operate space capabilities and assign them to a joint operation command if needed’.

In making the announcement, Air Marshal Hupfeld said that, while space is a warfighting domain, ‘we’re not going to militarise space’. Some clarification on the nomenclature is useful at this point. Space has been ‘militarised’ since the dawn of the space age, when the use of satellites to support terrestrial military operations started in the early 1960s. Major powers have long had military space capabilities in the form of satellites for communications and for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. They have also developed satellites for positioning, navigation and timing functions, along with specialised functions such as missile early warning, geodesy and meteorology. Now, as the cost and complexity of space capabilities has fallen, more countries—and commercial actors—are developing and deploying militarily useful space capabilities.

The phrases ‘militarising space’ and ‘weaponising space’ have come to have distinct meanings. ‘Weaponisation’ of space implies the deployment of anti-satellite ‘counterspace’ technology designed to achieve space control by attacking an opponent’s space support capabilities. It’s likely that Hupfeld was referring to Australia not engaging in ‘space weaponisation’, while pursuing military space capabilities to support ADF requirements, such as new satellites for communications (Joint Project 9102B) and for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Defence Project 799 Phases 2 and 3).

Hupfeld also highlighted space domain awareness as an essential part of space control missions undertaken by the new space command. This monitoring activity can be done from the surface of the earth, such as at the hosted facilities at Exmouth in Western Australia, or through new capabilities, including space-based space surveillance that may emerge from Joint Project 9350 and commercial projects such as Innovor’s Project Hyperion.

Establishing a space command will be a good opportunity to centralise and sustain professional expertise, both uniformed and civilian, within the defence organisation. Rather than disparate individuals scattered through the organisation managing various projects, it makes more sense to concentrate expertise in a manner that ultimately establishes a permanent cadre of space professionals within Defence.

Space is a complex and fast-moving operational warfighting domain that demands constant thought and attention. The challenges Hupfeld alluded to with regard to adversary counterspace capabilities, and how Australia and its partners can respond, simply can’t be met properly if space is treated as an afterthought in defence planning, or if technical expertise is constantly lost due to redeployment of personnel.

Establishing a permanent staff for an ADF space command—and, indeed, going further to establish a formal career path for space professionals for uniformed and civilian defence employees—would lift Australia’s ability to manage both space capability acquisition and space policy development.

Australia may not need a ‘space force’ like the US has, but the ADF space command should integrate easily with the US Space Force’s and USAF Space Command’s activities and planning at the highest levels. That interaction needs to include discussions about how best to respond to rapidly developing adversary capability and counterspace threats in the near-earth region of space and about the potential implications of major-power competition out to cislunar space.

There are other partners we need to strengthen our relationship with too, including the United Kingdom, which is establishing its own space command, and Japan, which is establishing a space squadron. Deepening and expanding our ties within the Five Eyes grouping, via the 2014 Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Initiative, for example, and through the Quad, are endeavours that an ADF space command needs to lead on.

It’s also vital that the ADF space command have an enduring connection with the Australian Space Agency and Australia’s commercial space sector. Harnessing our vibrant commercial space sector for satellite development, sovereign launch capability and ground segment support is an obvious step for Defence. The space command will need permanent civilian liaison from the Australian Space Agency.

An ADF space command centralises policy formulation and capability planning, enhances cooperation with like-minded allies, and energises networking with Australia’s rapidly growing commercial space sector. It can also contribute towards more ambitious opportunities for the ADF in using space. For example, there’s growing support in the space sector for Australia to develop the means to launch Australian-made satellites on Australian launch vehicles from Australian launch sites on a regular basis. That would be an indicator for a mature national space capability that could be transformational for ADF space operations. But that vision needs a coherent organisational core in order to be realised. An ADF space command that brings together and sustains expertise and skills is a logical and sensible step towards achieving this goal. In embracing a space command, Defence has signalled an important next step for Australia in space.

Commitment to Artemis Accords affirms Australia’s rising star in space

Australia’s star in the global space firmament is rising steadily. The Australian government signed the Artemis Accords in October, one of eight nations to commit to the agreement setting out principles for cooperation in civil exploration and peaceful use of the moon, Mars, near-earth comets and asteroids.

Formulated by NASA under the Trump administration, the accords establish a positive foundation for human space exploration in the coming decades and a common basis for cooperation in deep space. They are likely to be fully supported by Joe Biden’s incoming administration. Biden is also likely to support the Artemis project’s goals of a return to the moon and then on to Mars, though the landing of American astronauts on the lunar surface will probably be delayed from the current target of 2024 until later in the decade.

Australia’s signing of the accords signals that our space ambitions are expansive and ambitious. We’re set to be part of the human adventure that is just getting underway, and that will mark the beginning of the next phase in space exploration.

Space resource utilisation, on the moon and on resource-rich asteroids near earth, is a big focus of the accords. The potential to access valuable minerals will be a key aspect of global space activity beyond the low-earth orbit to geosynchronous orbit (or LEO to GEO) region in the next two decades. That will include mining lunar ice for oxygen and hydrogen to make rocket fuel and to sustain human-occupied lunar bases. Those activities will demand a sustained human presence on and around the moon, realistically from the late 2020s, to eventually get human missions to Mars, probably by the late 2030s.

There have to be principles in place guiding conduct to make that happen. An absence of regulation could leading to a ‘Wild West’ approach that would deepen competition, either between nations or between commercial entities. With that in mind, it’s interesting that China, Russia and India have yet to sign the accords. A failure to do so soon would suggest they’ve chosen a competitive, rather than a cooperative, approach.

Australia has confirmed its intention to work with the other key space-faring nations and to play a full role consistent with the accords. The accords recognise the 1967 Outer Space Treaty as a foundation for future activities and provide a sound basis to update space law and to emphasise transparency and cooperation by ensuring interoperability of space capability. That means Australian space companies need to think about how their products will ‘plug and play’ with their partners’ systems and how they will promote a coordinated and cooperative approach that provides guidance for developing Australian space capability.

Two key sections of the accords are section 10, on space resources, and section 11, on deconfliction of space activities. They state that ‘extraction and utilisation of space resources … should be executed in a manner that complies with the Outer Space Treaty’, and that such activity ‘does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty.’

That’s a declaration that signatories to the accords will honour the spirit and letter of the Outer Space Treaty and not seek to claim territory on the moon or to grab resource-rich areas of other celestial bodies for themselves. It’s a big step forward in shaping the debate over how to manage major-power competition in space, and puts pressure on states that haven’t signed up to the accords—including China, Russia and India—to play by the same rules.

China has been proceeding apace with its own space program, which includes plans to test technologies for mining asteroids and to set up a space station by 2022. In December, the Chang’e-5 lunar mission collected rock and dust samples from the moon and delivered them safely back to earth after planting a flag on the lunar surface. The big unknown is whether China will work with the accord states or simply continue to do its own thing. Setting one standard for the signatories and another for China could see international cooperation quickly unravel.

Section 11 sets out a framework for the deconfliction of space activities in line with the principles established in the United Nations guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. Adopted by the UN’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 2019, the guidelines are a natural place to start.

The accords are also consistent with Article IX of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty in their reinforcement of the importance of refraining from any intentional actions that might generate harmful interference. They emphasise information sharing and provide for the creation of ‘safety zones’, which signatories can declare in order to inform others about space activities such as the establishment of facilities on the moon. These are not declarations of sovereignty, however. The accords commit all signatories to ‘respect the principle of free access to all areas of celestial bodies and all other provisions of the Outer Space Treaty in their use of safety zones’.

The accords establish the principles that will underpin an effective and viable legal and regulatory approach for human space exploration. They will be the basis for further debate on space law and regulations needed to manage space activities, particularly now that humanity is preparing to return to the moon after an absence of more than 50 years.

It’s heartening to see Australia playing a direct and highly visible role in this space diplomacy through its space agency. That can open up all sorts of opportunities for Australia’s commercial space sector to contribute to NASA’s Artemis project and to other international activities on and around the moon, and beyond to the asteroids and to Mars.

Our support for the accords reinforces our rising status as a space actor and strengthens international cooperation with our key partners in space.

The government’s decision to look beyond a ground-based space program and embrace a role in the Artemis project is as important a step forward for Australia in space as the decision to establish the Australian Space Agency itself.

Small satellite constellations: agile, resilient and replaceable in a conflict

Australia’s 2020 defence strategic update describes a regional environment that will be more challenging for Australia and warns that the nation must be better prepared for the prospect of high-intensity conflict.

Central to this calculus are concerns over China’s behaviour in the region and its development of military capabilities that could degrade the technical and warfighting superiority of the US and its allies. While there’s much focus on China’s strike capabilities—exemplified by the testing of the carrier-killer DF-21D—the counter-warfare capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army and its capacity to blind or deceive our command and control and intelligence links are of equal concern.

Since January 2007, we have been aware of the PLA’s ability to destroy satellites with conventional weapons. We have also recently learned much about its ability to disable satellites using cyber or electronic warfare techniques. This has been well documented by the Pentagon and think tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In the high-intensity conflict envisaged by the strategic update, the Australian Defence Force should be prepared for disruption to the space-based services (communications, intelligence gathering, navigation and timing) it relies upon. These services are provided by large satellites in very high geostationary orbit (GEO) or by small constellations of large satellites in medium-altitude orbits.

Against a capable adversary in a high-intensity conflict, these large satellites will be targeted and held at risk. A response is to have a layered approach, with space services provided by a mix of large and small satellites in both high and low orbits.

Arguments that smallsat constellations in low-earth orbit (LEO) don’t provide genuine military capability have typically pivoted on questions of cost and capability. A competitive commercial space launch industry, and the involvement of big players in the smallsat market such as SpaceX and Amazon, mean the costs of producing and launching smallsats are falling rapidly. As miniaturisation, signal processing and antenna technologies evolve, smallsats can begin to offer serious military capabilities.

The US military seems to recognise this. The Defense Department’s Blackjack program—a smallsat testbed run by DARPA, the department’s research and development agency—and recent awarding of a contract to Viasat to develop a Link-16 (warfighting tactical datalink)-capable smallsat constellation indicate that the US military believes LEO smallsats can provide warfighting capabilities.

Satellites in LEO have some key advantages. Because they fly closer to earth (200–1000 kilometres), they can move data quickly—33 times faster than satellites in GEO. That is so quick that Space X is banking on its LEO Starlink constellation providing an improved computer gaming experience. This advantage has an application in future high-end conflict where speed of data transmission could mean the difference between mission success and failure.

Smallsats are not invulnerable, and they can be targeted. But moving at speed in great numbers, and operating as a single meshed network, a LEO smallsat constellation has inbuilt resilience and will be harder to degrade. Smallsats can also be reconstituted more rapidly than larger satellites—with spares available in orbit or ready to launch.

It’s not inconceivable that in the future a smallsat constellation could be rapidly deployed to provide short-term, mission-specific support. This agility in deployment means smallsats can more easily be kept ‘evergreen’ as technology and threats evolve. Larger satellites with long lifespans cannot be refreshed easily.

Agility extends to coverage. Starlink promises high-speed broadband to anyone on the planet with a Starlink receiver. LEO smallsats can be deployed to cover areas with no service, or where service has been disrupted.

The Australian government has matched its appraisal of the strategic environment with a substantial funding commitment to defence. Spread over two decades, investment in space capabilities is $13.4 billion, of which $4.6–6.9 billion is for the provision of a ‘network of satellites to provide an independent and sovereign communications network and an enhanced space control program’.

With such a substantial investment, careful choices will be needed to ensure future space services are supported, and that they are resilient. The threat suggests a mix of space solutions, and services provided by satellites in both high and low orbits will be needed.

Australian industry is ready to help Defence and other government agencies develop and deliver this capability. Australia’s space companies are well placed to contribute to a sovereign smallsat supply chain; some, such as Skykraft, Myriota, Innovor, EM Solutions and Sabre Astronautics, are already progressing commercially viable smallsat-relevant capabilities. The time is right to harness the innovation and intellectual capital in our space companies into a truly national sovereign capability.

Defence has been conducting limited experiments with industry, but these efforts will need to be scaled up and accelerated if Australia is to realise a sovereign smallsat capability to support warfighters by the end of this decade.

LEO smallsat constellations promise to provide redundancy and agility in space. However, there are many questions we’ll have to answer before we can be sure of the feasibility of a sovereign smallsat capability. Establishing a robust test and evaluation program in concert with industry and academia, to include deployment of testbed constellations, should be a first step. In parallel, consideration should be given to including smallsat capabilities for the delivery of space services as one of Australia’s sovereign industrial capability priorities.

Defence is best positioned to lead this work but the utility of a sovereign smallsat capability would extend to a range of national missions—national disaster support, border protection, and support to Pacific neighbours—means it’s best viewed as a national endeavour. Other parts of government should contribute resources. Such an effort would be consistent with the Australian Space Agency’s civil space strategy and the agency is very well positioned to help establish what could be a flagship program.

Australia one step closer to a sovereign launch capability

Australia’s commercial space sector is moving quickly towards a bright future. On 19 September, South Australia–based company Southern Launch took an important step towards establishing a sovereign space-launch capability for Australia, with the launch of two sub-orbital ‘Dart’ rockets carrying an experimental electronic-warfare payload produced by DEWC Systems. The back-to-back from the Koonibba Test Range, near Ceduna, were important not only in demonstrating the potential for launching payloads into ‘near space’ with a sub-orbital trajectory, but also in laying the basis for a future orbital launch site operated by Southern Launch, at Whalers Way, near Port Lincoln.

This activity is occurring as other companies are looking to establish launch sites around Australia. Equatorial Launch Australia is establishing the Arnhem Space Centre at Nhulunbuy, near Gove in the Northern Territory, and there’s a push for a third launch site at Abbott Point, near Bowen in Queensland.

The development of launch sites is being matched by local development of launch capability. Gilmour Space Technology and Black Sky Aerospace are two leading contenders for producing the first Australian rockets suitable for orbital missions. Gilmour has a contract signed for a 2022 launch of an Australian satellite on its Eris rocket from an Australian launch site.

The Whalers Way site is optimal for deploying satellites into high-inclination (polar or sun-synchronous) orbits, with rockets flying out over the Great Australian Bight. These orbits are ideal for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tasks, such as those that would form the core of the Defence Department’s project for a sovereign space-based ISR capability (DEF-799 Phase 2).

The ‘orbitology’ is important to understand. Satellites placed in these orbits offer global coverage because they orbit the earth from pole to pole, while the earth rotates from east to west. That means that a satellite in a high-inclination polar orbit, particularly if it’s in a sun-synchronous orbit, will pass over the same location at the same time each day. Because satellites take 90 minutes to make one orbit, a constellation of several satellites deployed in such an orbit would ensure constant space-based surveillance of key focal areas relevant to Australia’s defence and national security.

At Southern Launch’s Whalers Way site, a launch vehicle such as Gilmour’s Eris could deploy a 215-kilogram payload into a 500-kilometre sun-synchronous orbit. Australian commercial satellite developers could produce a small satellite constellation for ISR purposes and deploy it via a series of Eris III launches from Whalers Way into a polar sun-synchronous orbit. That would give us a locally developed and sovereign-controlled space-based ISR capability suitable to provide the low-end component of a high–low mix for DEF-799 Phase 2. Other satellites in higher orbits could be developed or acquired for the high-end element of the capability.

For example, the trajectory for a launch from Whalers Way into a polar sun-synchronous orbit would enable a constellation of satellites to fly over key areas such as the South China Sea on a regular basis. They would provide near-constant surveillance of activities, including allowing monitoring of changes in activity and of deployments of military forces.

The Southern Launch site at Whalers Way is geographically secure and highly accessible to local infrastructure, including port and airport facilities at Port Lincoln. The low amount of air and maritime traffic over the Great Australian Bight means that range safety issues are reduced, permitting a greater number of launches than other locations.

The emphasis of Southern Launch is on small satellite launches, which is ideal for fast and responsive space access. Establishing a rapid cadence for launches will be important. Sticking with a traditional approach of depending on foreign launch providers means that Australian satellites have to wait their turn in the queue, and there’s no guarantee of a quick transition to the launch pad. Even in peacetime, Defence could have to wait months or even years for a single satellite to be launched. In wartime, or in a pre-war period, and if we depend on US launch providers, it’s likely US payloads would take priority and Australian satellites would be bumped further back in the queue.

With this in mind, it’s important for the Australian Defence Force to have rapid and responsive sovereign access to space. A local space launch capability, such as that being offered by Southern Launch and other companies, opens up a much better option of Australian satellites being launched on Australian launch vehicles from Australian launch sites on an as-needed basis. It also allows us to burden-share with allies, launching their urgent payloads as needed. We can contribute more as an alliance partner.

The ability to generate a rapid launch cadence will allow us to reconstitute any lost space capability must faster than if we remained dependent on foreign launch providers. Losing priority in a launch queue, even as our satellites are lost, means we accept quick degradation of Defence’s space capability from the outset of a conflict, with a commensurate decline in operational capability.

Yet we don’t have to accept an operationally limited space domain. Australian commercial space companies can support Defence through digital development and manufacture of small satellites that can be then launched quickly as needed on Australian rockets. With the US now considering how to apply digital development and fourth industrial revolution technologies to satellite manufacturing, adopting a rapid production line approach to space capability in order to build space resilience is an idea whose time has come.