Tag Archive for: ASPI Washington DC

America needs to out-innovate TikTok

Innovation is the best way to win the TikTok battle. Many liberal democratic states have banned the Chinese-owned platform from government devices, including the members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Despite this, TikTok remains the world’s most downloaded app, continuing to outcompete competitors, such as Meta, in a space they have traditionally dominated. Like all Chinese technology companies, TikTok’s parent company ByteDance is answerable to the Chinese Communist Party, distinguishing it from companies in Western countries.

A global society-wide ban would be the silver-bullet solution, but for various reasons—including legal risks and economic liberal cultures in some countries, and fear of Beijing in others—such comprehensive action is unpalatable and unlikely. The US government needs to work in partnership with—not in opposition to—the private sector to encourage the creation of alternative platforms. The technology driving the success of TikTok’s algorithm is here to stay. In the absence of an immediate ban or acquisition of TikTok by an American company, the US government should be devising ways to nurture a competitive US-owned alternative through investment incentives.

Analysis by ASPI and other social media researchers has revealed a simple answer for why TikTok is outperforming US alternatives: TikTok’s algorithm makes it more attractive. It produces a more personalised user experience than other platforms. The closest competitor is Instagram Reels, where, anecdotally, a large portion of the content is recycled TikTok clips.

Understanding how TikTok’s interest-based algorithm functions is the key to grasping the risks of the platform but also the secret to developing alternatives.

TikTok’s algorithm works in two reinforcing ways.

First, it learns by tracking users’ preferences based on how they engage with the content, such as what they ‘like’, how long they watch, their comments and their preferred content themes. For example, as tech guru Eugene Wei attests, TikTok learns not only whether a user prefers a diet of 20% news videos, 30% fashion videos and 50% celebrity gossip, but also how to alter the balance and how to introduce new preferences to the passive consumer. As an interest-based model, it operates independently of other users’ preferences, unlike social networking platforms Facebook and Instagram, which recommend related content based on user connections.

The result is an addictive, curated experience, which US Federal Communications Commission commissioner Brendan Carr described as ‘digital fentanyl’. The demand for this addictive social media experience is, unfortunately, not going to go away. Worse, the experience is being administered to American TikTok users by China.

The second way the algorithm works is by learning the characteristics of viral videos—what makes them popular—and providing those lessons to independent TikTok content creators—many of them users themselves—by identifying music, hashtags, and video formats and features likely to appeal to viewers. As a cycle, these TikTok functions can identify and predict the content that consumers crave before they even know they want it.

The algorithm collects data on user patterns and creates new ones. By design, TikTok sorts and categorises users’ social, economic and political preferences, and can either reinforce or alter what users see and hear over time. In other words, TikTok has the potential to become a weapon of mass persuasion.

That an adversary or affiliated company can influence what a large number of Americans see constitutes a national security problem, particularly when considered in the context of the broader threat of malign information and cyber sabotage that China poses to the US and closely aligned nations such as Australia.

American allies, partners and some US officials have expressed concerns about the variety of ways in which sensitive TikTok user data might end up in the hands of the CCP. One Quad partner, India, has outright banned TikTok. In early August another Quad partner, Australia, announced findings by a parliamentary committee, which assessed that the Chinese-owned apps TikTok and WeChat could corrupt ‘decision making, political discourse and societal norms’, contributing to foreign interference—one of Australia’s most pressing national security concerns. This focus on the potential for behavioural and political manipulation that the TikTok algorithm enables is the primary threat, though most concerned Americans stress data security—arguably a more manageable problem.

In the US, state governors have joined federal officials in banning the use of TikTok on some government-owned devices over concerns about data misuse. In December last year, federal representatives Mike Gallagher and Raja Krishnamoorthi, alongside Senator Marco Rubio, introduced a bipartisan bill to ban TikTok in the US along with other social media affiliated with China or Russia. In May, Montana governor Greg Gianforte signed a bill making his state the first one to outright ban TikTok. However, US tech companies have pushed back in support of TikTok against these measures. The concern from the industry is the substantial risk of retaliatory action from Beijing that could force US tech companies to sell off foreign assets or comply with state censorship.

TikTok says all US user data is stored in Virgina, Singapore or elsewhere beyond the reach of Beijing. But as ASPI senior analyst Fergus Ryan points out, the location of the data is immaterial if it can be readily accessed from China. ByteDance has admitted on multiple occasions that its employees have access to US TikTok user data and, under pressure, has introduced safeguards such as ‘Project Texas’, which purportedly isolates US user data so only US-based ByteDance employees have access. However, this policy doesn’t alleviate all concerns. For example, some US-based ByteDance employees are very likely Chinese nationals. And, as reported in Forbes, as many as 300 ByteDance and TikTok employees either previously worked for or currently work for Chinese government-run news media outlets such as Xinhua and China Radio International.

Over the past few years, ByteDance has increased the number of foreign workers brought to the US from a few dozen to more than 500 employees through US visa programs. The homelands of these foreign national employees are not publicly known, though logic suggests that many of them are likely from China and India. Senator Tom Cotton has asked Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas for a breakdown of these visa holders’ nationalities, revealing a possible point of access for China to tap US user data. TikTok may not allow China-based personnel to access this data, but it could allow US-based Chinese nationals to do so on behalf of the CCP.

Creating a compelling reason for users to see the risk TikTok poses continues to be a challenge. Finding another platform to replace TikTok without ties to adversaries and with adequate data-protection measures, and that can be subject to trusted regulatory frameworks in the US and legal recourse, is an alternative that policymakers need to consider.

Commentator and journalist Matt Yglesias’s insightful analogy sets its right: ‘We wouldn’t have let a Soviet company buy NBC in 1977 and we shouldn’t let a Chinese company own a company that plays a similar content distribution role today.’ Risk-averse elected officials keen to maintain voter support may prefer to avoid banning TikTok the way India has done, but the US should play to its own strengths in big tech and social media to encourage the innovation of an alternative platform that naturally overtakes TikTok in popularity.

Assuming that a ban of the app is unpalatable to Americans right now doesn’t necessarily mean surrendering to a social media diet planned by Beijing. Innovation through competition is still what the US does best. It’s time for America’s social media entrepreneurs to roll up their sleeves and offer TikTok users something better.

Look beyond the Washington beltway for why AUKUS matters

Last week, US President Joe Biden, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced the pathway for AUKUS that will deliver nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Canberra will purchase three to five Virginia-class SSNs from the United States before buying eight newly designed, UK- and Australian-built ‘SSN AUKUS’ subs. The deal outlines new docking, training and rotation agreements that will provide the US with a more robust strategic hub in the Indo-Pacific.

The three leaders have promised that the submarine project will create jobs, educational opportunities and investment for all three countries. While the announcement is welcome in its bold strategic vision, it remains scant on details and does not address the elephant in the room: the weakness in the combined defence industrial capacity to produce so many boats in so little time with so few resources.

Recent discussions about a lack of industrial capacity to support the AUKUS submarine project highlight the continuing difficulties facing the trilateral technology security agreement. Leaders in Washington, Canberra and London all express the will to make nuclear attack submarines a reality for the Australian Defence Force in order to deter China in the Indo-Pacific. But the hard work of building submarines doesn’t happen in the national capitals. Regional, state and local politics and markets—including debates about sourcing of raw materials and development of skilled labour pools—require attention.

Public pressure is the force necessary to untangle the Byzantine knot of regulations frustrating the sharing of classified and otherwise sensitive know-how, and will make or break the program. While platitudes around ‘mateship’ and the strength and history of the US–Australia alliance sound comforting, the fundamental groundwork to make AUKUS a success will require previously unimagined levels of political and financial investment in the locales where SSNs are designed, constructed and maintained.

As ASPI DC Director Mark Watson noted recently, ‘regardless of the strongly stated political and military support for AUKUS, members of Congress could begin to take a more ambivalent view if it comes at the expense of US operational readiness’, even when the strategic logic is compelling. Moreover, if policymakers don’t provide incentives and benefits—jobs, educational opportunities or tax breaks—to get rank-and-file voters onboard, the American, British and Australian publics will be unlikely to make the necessary sacrifices and investments to see the deal through.

Failure to seek public support among key populations and to explain why AUKUS matters beyond the strategic area of the Indo-Pacific reveals a misunderstanding of what is required. For example, while US congressional committees and Oval Office staffers make key decisions on the future of nuclear submarines for Australia, American taxpayers will, at some point, demand evidence of a return on their investment.

Without that dividend, Australia’s requirement for a long-range submarine capability will remain unmet. And American interests in linking industrial bases and integrating defence supply chains to share the burden of countering China through ‘collective efforts over the next decade’ will founder. US officials, Australian and British diplomats, and supportive strategists and researchers must make these arguments now.

The term ‘subnational diplomacy’ refers to the engagement of non-central governments in international relations and can include the foreign policy efforts of states and cities. We’ve seen negative publicity regarding subnational diplomacy in Australia in the case of the Victorian government’s aborted agreement with China on a proposed Belt and Road Initiative project in 2019. But for countries such as Australia and the US, these sorts of relations are commonplace and generally constructive. As Washington’s prime characteristics are partisanship and a short attention span, it’s no wonder that many promising bipartisan projects falter when campaign seasons begin or when other pressing foreign or domestic issues distract policymakers from following through. A subnational campaign to drive home the importance of AUKUS could help overcome these perennial structural problems.

For starters, entrenching the US–Australia alliance and particular projects associated with AUKUS at a state level can ensure Australia sells the importance of its interests to American voters. Australia has proposed investing $3 billion, mostly in America’s shipyards to expand and expedite production of the Virginia-class submarines. Australian policymakers will need to visit more than just Washington to discover the people who will be front and centre for AUKUS and who will help Australia meet its needs. Sending delegations that include officials and industry representatives from Australian states to boat-building cities in Connecticut and Virginia is a necessary next step.

Engaging on the ground means learning about and dealing with local politicians and community leaders. It also means dealing with labour unions, fabrication companies and the manufacturers of components beyond the nuclear technology that garners so much attention among DC tongue-waggers. State governments hold the purse strings on building new and refurbishing old shipyards or creating tax conditions and tax breaks for AUKUS-related investments. Collaborating with state governments, county officials and mayors will promote a smoother process of getting submarines quickly into the hands of Australian defence personnel. Moreover, robust subnational outreach opens the door to new investment opportunities for American companies and for Australian companies in the US to invest in Australia.

The demand for full-society cooperation and coordination is even more important for the second pillar of AUKUS, which promises cooperation on advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, cyber, quantum computing and undersea capabilities—and in which states such as Arizona, Michigan and Utah may play prominent roles. In these various fields, the private sector is often the lead innovator—and the lead investor. Commercial players working in conjunction with state and local governments is the way to fast-track the development of dual-use technologies and avoid ponderous federal bureaucracies and partisan DC politics.

Selling governors and mayors on the benefits of AUKUS investment—things they already want—coupled with a national security message is smart. Subnational engagement will pay dividends when the time comes for Australia to develop maintenance facilities for the new SSNs or to create new industrial hubs to support integrated AUKUS shipbuilding that combines the industrial bases of all three partners. Australia, too, will need workers, high-tech fabrication yards and access to vital materials. Standard-setting across shops and opportunities for cross-training workers—including apprenticeships connecting specialists in Groton and Newport News and experts in Barrow-in-Furness with trainees in Perth and Adelaide—will be important.

The all-of-country approach needed to meet the strategic challenges facing the US, the UK and Australia is an ‘integrated industrial base’ that benefits all three societies. The SSN AUKUS deal is a welcome step in the right direction. However, if the partners are serious about deterring China, subnational engagement—from the politician to the welder—is imperative.

AUKUS must focus on quantum policy, not just the technology

Governments are notoriously behind the curve when it comes to technology policy. But the AUKUS security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States is an opportunity for these like-minded partners to be first movers not just in quantum technology, but also in quantum policy.

Experts anticipate that scalable quantum technologies will arrive within five to 10 years, and that they will be highly disruptive to the commercial sector and to national security. The AUKUS partners are already working collaboratively on scaling quantum technology innovation and implementation, but there’s a parallel need to develop standards to address the potential regulatory, ethical, intelligence, commercial and legal implications of novel quantum technologies.

Take, for instance, how these new technologies might transform everyday computer processing. Quantum computing will enable complex problems to be solved very quickly, which will transform the work being done across a range of sectors, such as medical research, food security and climate change.

Quantum computers are different from conventional computers in many ways, but, critically, they store and interpret data in quantum bits, or ‘qubits’, rather than ‘bits’. Bits are the ones and zeros that get strung together sequentially to direct a computer’s processes. By comparison, qubits can exist as ones and zeros simultaneously, or in a state of suspension, which allows them to perform many calculations at the same time. The result is exponentially greater processing power. As Nobel Laureate Bill Phillips once observed, quantum computers are ‘more fundamentally different from current technology than the digital computer is from the abacus’.

Because scalable quantum technologies are just around the corner, the world must prepare for their arrival, but again, we find ourselves behind the curve. As a 2021 ASPI report, An Australian strategy for the quantum revolution, pointed out, if a quantum computer is developed without changing the encryption standards that underpin the internet, it will be catastrophic for network security because the existing security infrastructure will be redundant.

Of particular concern is the likelihood that quantum computers will be able to crack even highly resistant encryption. That would render vulnerable all public-key encryption that’s used around the world today for digital messaging and secure transactions such as online banking. Anne Neuberger, the US deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, has called quantum computing a ‘nuclear threat to cybersecurity’.

The AUKUS agreement is unique because it proposes practical technological engagement between the public and private sectors from the US, Australia, and the UK on the development of quantum technologies. Quantum technology is one of the eight advanced capabilities outlined under the AUKUS agreement’s second pillar, which focuses on advanced capability acquisition.

The AUKUS Quantum Arrangement announced last year will have an initial focus on quantum technologies for positioning, navigation and timing through trials and experimentation over a three-year period. The practicalities of the arrangement are expected to be made public later this month as part of the AUKUS pathways announcement, which will outline how the objectives of the agreement are going to be achieved, notably in relation to Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.

While we don’t yet know whether standards development for quantum technologies will be, or is already, incorporated into AUKUS activities, the issue feeds into a greater concern that for AUKUS to succeed, increased transparency is needed around the activities of the Pillar 2 working groups. Private-sector entities—whose private capital is fuelling much of the early development of this game-changing technology—engaged in this work need to understand what the AUKUS partners are trying to achieve and where the rest of the ecosystem can be poised to support.

Many quantum technologies will have dual defence and commercial applications. Without open communication between the public and private sectors, it will be difficult to ensure that normative safeguards are developed and incorporated into the design process—and eventually the distribution—of these transformative technologies.

Crucially, parallel to the practical collaborative aspects of Pillar 2, the AUKUS partners should capitalise on the opportunity to consider the potential implications of quantum technologies and work with the private sector to prepare for the opportunities and challenges that will arise. The costs and risks of not doing so are significant. One is that the critical technology field may be ceded to state actors that are likely to put their interests ahead of the safety of the international community.

At the same time, though, mutually agreed norms won’t prevent abuses of quantum technologies. Yet without a sense of urgency and focus on the policy implications, the AUKUS partners will lose the opportunity to shape the standards by which the rest of the world will use this technology.

In the current era of strategic competition, shared understanding of the dos and don’ts for using and responding to critical and emerging technologies takes on additional importance. In an apparent effort to stack the deck in its favour, China has increased its influence on international technology standard-setting through lobbying tactics and strategic investment. It is therefore critical for like-minded public- and private-sector partners to collaborate in establishing allied, if not global, standards for a quantum future.

Industry and defence must gear up to deter China’s military build-up, says Marles

Harnessing resources from industry through to armed forces, Australia, the United States and their allies must together develop an effective level of military power in the Indo-Pacific to avoid ‘a catastrophic failure of deterrence’, says Defence Minister Richard Marles.

Opening ASPI’s new office in Washington, Marles expanded on the warning he delivered this week that China was engaged in the biggest military build-up ‘anywhere at any time’ since the end of World War II.

A catastrophic failure of deterrence looked like what’s happening in Ukraine, Marles said in answer to a question from ASPI Executive Director Justin Bassi.

That’s what happens when a power engaged in a military build-up thinks it worth the risk of utilising that power. ‘And we are seeing a catastrophe unfold in Ukraine. I think it’s really important that we are doing everything we can to maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.’

That, said Marles, rolled off the tongue easily, but it was a big challenge when it was happening in our own backyard. ‘I don’t have all the answers to it.’

But it was clear that the system of alliances was central.

‘From our point of view, the alliance with the United States has never been really more important, and that’s a big thing to say, because it has been very important over its life, but it’s probably been never more important than it is right now in terms of providing us with security and remains very much the cornerstone of the way we see the world,’ Marles said.

There’d been enormous progress over several decades in terms of the degree of interoperability between our defence forces, the extent to which Australians were embedded in the American system and vice versa.

‘We need to be building that level of seamless interaction within our industrial basis as well. And that’s been a big theme of the conversations we’ve been having this week.’

Marles said ASPI, in its third decade, was a leading think tank in Australia and an enormous resource to him as someone who did not have a background in defence and strategic policy. ‘But as it is always the case with us in politics needing to get on a horse pretty quickly, ASPI was fundamentally important to me in giving me the education I needed around strategic policy, around defence. And in so many ways, the product of ASPI is critically important, not only in informing the Australian public, but those of us in government who seek to play a role in this space.’

Washington was a centre of government, power and thought, Marles said, and it was important for ASPI to be there. ‘Square inch by square inch, there are more think tanks in this place than anywhere else in the world. And so it makes complete sense that ASPI would open its first office overseas right here to take the advantage of that, to be in the stream of that thought, to feed that back into Australia’s thinking around strategic policy.’

Marles noted an observation from Bassi that the flow of information in the ASPI Washington office would be a reciprocal process. ‘It’s not just about sucking in that information, it’s about inserting into the stream of thought here, how we see the world and the challenges that Australia faces and giving an Australian flavour to the nature of the discussion, which is so important, that takes place in this town.’

A gracious Marles acknowledged that the office had been approved by the previous defence minister, Peter Dutton. ‘I do want to acknowledge Peter Dutton, my friend, and my predecessor, as minister for defence. He made the decision and it’s often the case in the way our government works, that immediately after an election, you end up being the beneficiary, as the one who’s cutting the ribbon, of the work that was done before you. I’ve been through that process on the other side; it could be a little frustrating.’

In answer to a question from Bassi, Marles said having sources of quality, authoritative, reliable information and thought was profoundly important. The era of social media and fake news had sharpened the need for a think tank like ASPI to provide original and authoritative thought that could inform the way commentary, and ultimately information, was distributed to citizens.