Tag Archive for: ASEAN

New frontiers of Southeast Asian space diplomacy

Southeast Asian countries were formerly peripheral to debates on space governance. They had nascent space programs and modest capabilities, and their policy interests focused largely on civilian applications.

But this is changing. Growing reliance on space-based infrastructure for national development, disaster resilience and connectivity has pushed countries to take a more proactive role in shaping the global space agenda. The April 2025 session of the United Nations Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on the prevention of an arms race in outer space marked a turning point—one in which Southeast Asian voices were heard more clearly than ever.

While Southeast Asia is not formal bloc in space diplomacy, a shared regional voice is emerging. Most countries in the region consistently advocate for the peaceful use of outer space, oppose its weaponisation and emphasise that space must remain accessible to all states regardless of their size or level of technological sophistication. Joint statements from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have underscored these shared principles, calling for multilateralism, transparency and inclusive development in space. The region increasingly presents itself as a consensus-driven and rule-abiding constituency committed to responsible space governance, even as individual countries build their capabilities.

This growing unity of voice coexists with posture variation between states. Indonesia, for example, has long advocated for legally binding mechanisms. In statements at the OEWG and other forums, it has warned that voluntary norms must not substitute for treaty-based regimes. Indonesia has consistently framed space as a peaceful, shared domain and opposed its weaponisation. Yet it also recognises the domain’s strategic value. Jakarta’s defence policy calls for the development of military space capabilities, and the government is exploring a national space command. These dual commitments—normative leadership and strategic readiness—mirror Indonesia’s broader foreign policy tradition of balancing principle with pragmatism.

This was seen in Indonesia’s October 2024 statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). While reiterating peaceful intentions, it also referenced the draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space. The controversial proposal—backed by China and Russia—is not supported by all NAM members. The reference suggested Indonesia’s willingness to push for ambitious legal outcomes, even at the risk of internal divergence.

Malaysia has taken a similarly principled yet institutionally focused path. Its 2022 Space Board Act established a domestic regulatory framework and prohibited the deployment of weapons in space—an unusual step for an emerging space actor. Internationally, like Indonesia, Malaysia has advocated for transparent and inclusive negotiations on a binding arms-control mechanism. But it has been more specific, having stressed the need to regulate space technologies, especially given their dual-use nature. While Malaysia advocates for transparency in military use of space, they do argue that such activities must not compromise national sovereignty.

The Philippines, though relatively new to the space domain, has emerged as one of the region’s most normatively ambitious players. Despite its limited capabilities, Manila contributed substantively to the OEWG, including a working paper on the principle of ‘due regard’. With Germany, it highlighted emerging threats such as kinetic anti-satellite weapons, directed energy weapons, and cyber intrusions. It also raised concerns over proximity operations conducted without consent—an issue of growing relevance as on-orbit manoeuvrability increases. The Philippines’ interest in the US-led Artemis Accords and its alignment with transparency, confidence-building measures and legal frameworks reflect its broader diplomatic tradition: rules-based, West-aligned and institutionally driven.

Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam round out the region’s increasing engagement in space diplomacy. Singapore has been a pragmatic bridge-builder, supporting voluntary norms while being open to long-term legal mechanisms. At the OEWG, it voted for resolutions backed by Western powers and the NAM, calling for convergence and cautioning against fragmentation. Thailand and Vietnam have shown similar pragmatism. Thailand has encouraged international legal models that promote equitable technology and data sharing, while Vietnam has endorsed transparency measures and reaffirmed its opposition to weaponisation.

These differences in approach do not amount to disunity. Rather, they underscore a maturing regional diplomacy in which Southeast Asian states pursue shared normative goals through varied means. Importantly, ASEAN has helped foster this cohesion. Through joint statements and informal coordination, regional mechanisms have enabled countries to articulate common positions anchored in peace, equity, and legality, while also maintaining national flexibility.

Many Southeast Asian states still fear that the space domain could become another theatre for strategic competition. Their preference remains for inclusive, consensus-based processes that preserve the centrality of the UN and resist hardening of rival blocs.

Southeast Asia may not be a unified actor in space diplomacy, but it is no longer on the margins. The region’s increasingly coordinated, principle-driven approach offers a middle path grounded in legalism, equity and multilateralism. As global rivalries extend into orbit, Southeast Asian perspectives are not just relevant—they are essential to a peaceful and rules-based space order.

China’s geopolitical dominance game in the South China Sea

For all the talk about the South China Sea’s complexity as a security issue, its geopolitical significance to China is simple: China wants to condition Southeast Asian states to subordinate status. Southeast Asian countries would do well to consider this when assessing Beijing’s motivations and behaviour.

I was in Singapore earlier this month to participate in the International Maritime Security Conference, organised by the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies. The conference was part of IMDEX Asia 2025, a biennial congregation of sailors and warships from around the region, hosted by Singapore’s navy. This edition included senior representatives from Australia, Britain, Canada, China, India, France, Japan, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, the United States, and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

It’s common for speakers at regional conferences to present the maritime environment in terms of complex, cross-cutting transnational security challenges, such as illegal fishing, critical seabed infrastructure, marine pollution, cyber, climate, autonomy, energy exploration and others. (The list expands continually.)

The importance of cooperation and adherence to international law remains a staple theme of such gatherings. Yet advocates of regional maritime cooperation struggle to name new initiatives. The widely referenced Malacca Strait Patrol, for example, is two decades old. It is also telling that the lexicon of power and competition has gradually crept back into session titles. Phrases such as ‘geopolitical implications’ and ‘armed conflict’ were an uncommon sight at maritime conference agendas 15 years ago. This is no longer the case.

Southeast Asian analysts and security practitioners know that the regional security environment is deteriorating, but they remain reluctant to acknowledge the source of the problem head-on. Some have convinced themselves that great-power competition between the US and China is their primary security challenge, rather than domination by the latter. This manifests in a collective view that conflict avoidance is ASEAN’s primary security objective, more than order preservation—though these are not necessarily mutually exclusive aims. Nowhere is this more evident than in the South China Sea.

In geopolitical terms, the South China Sea is best thought of as an arena. The core game within this arena is between China and Southeast Asia. Beyond access to seabed resources and any intrinsic significance of the sea itself, China’s strategic purpose is to establish dominance over Southeast Asia through repeated conditioning.

Australia, Japan, the US and some European countries are also players in this game. They recognise that their own security will suffer if China successfully resets its relations with Southeast Asia in hierarchical terms, at the expense of respect for sovereign equality and international law. They rightly fear that China aims to eject the armed forces of non-littoral states from the South China Sea, hence their preoccupation with freedom of navigation. But these nations also rely on political support from Southeast Asian countries to legitimise their presence to a significant degree.

In relation to the South China Sea, Southeast Asia’s core group of states is composed of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The latter two are Southeast Asia’s frontline territorial claimants and are most directly exposed to Chinese pressure tactics. Vietnam’s geography makes it uniquely vulnerable to any impediment on navigation or commercial activity in the sea. China’s current focus is to isolate the Philippines as far as possible within ASEAN, since Manila has publicly defied Beijing’s attempts to establish dominance and has revived its military alliance with the US. Chinese participants at the conference made this focus clear.

Brunei and Indonesia do not have territorial disputes with China, but Beijing claims overlapping jurisdiction within both countries’ exclusive economic zones, based on its dashed-line claims. Jakarta has long maintained that it has no maritime boundary dispute with Beijing, as it has treated China’s claims as without legal foundation. So the admission to ‘overlapping claims’ in last November’s joint statement during Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s inaugural visit to Beijing was a surprising concession to China’s dominance game. Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry maintains that its position on the South China Sea is unchanged. But if Chinese firms can pursue ‘joint development’ based on the November statement, Beijing can claim to have eroded Jakarta’s resolve.

Brunei has proceeded more cautiously on the question of overlapping maritime boundaries. But, in February, Brunei and China jointly agreed ‘to cooperate in the development of resources in mutually agreed areas, on a without prejudice basis to legal positions of the respective countries under international law’. Such development could include joint fisheries activities or hydrocarbons extraction. Whatever form it takes, China is likely to treat such overtures from Southeast Asian claimants as tacit concessions.

Malaysia occupies a middle position among ASEAN claimant states. China claims Malaysian-occupied territory in the Spratly Islands and disputes Malaysia’s jurisdiction within significant portions of its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. China behaves less aggressively towards Malaysia than it does towards the Philippines and Vietnam. But China’s coast guard maintains a continuous watch inside Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone and exerts physical pressure to deter Putrajaya from developing untapped seabed energy resources within Chinese-claimed areas. One Malaysian participant at the conference floated a proposal for Malaysia to pursue joint energy development with China, without formally acknowledging disputed jurisdiction—similar to Brunei. This is a personal view, not reflective of Malaysian government policy, but Chinese participants will perceive it as further evidence that Southeast Asia’s collective resolve is weakening.

The rest of ASEAN has lower, less direct stakes in the South China Sea. Cambodia and landlocked Laos are already dominated by China to a considerable degree. Singapore, though not a claimant state, relies heavily on freedom of navigation and actively facilitates access for the US Navy and its allies, including Australia through the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Thailand and Myanmar, especially, are less invested. Their main interest is the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct. Frequently dismissed as irrelevant, the code nonetheless serves Beijing’s interests as a useful conditioning tool, since it binds the whole of Southeast Asia (except East Timor) into a seemingly endless diplomatic process. The code’s torturous lack of progress repeatedly demonstrates to ASEAN’s members that negotiations on a draft code have no practical constraint on China’s strategic activities.

China’s quest for dominance in the South China Sea is not about resources nor any single maritime issue; in essence, it isn’t about the sea at all. Beijing’s geopolitical aim is to condition Southeast Asian states, individually and collectively, into accepting subordinate status. If it can achieve this without fighting, the likelihood is that the South China Sea will remain tense but stay below the threshold of armed conflict.

With the standout exception of the Philippines, things are currently trending in Beijing’s direction. Indeed, from Beijing’s perspective, ASEAN’s collective trajectory might be summarised as ‘losing without fighting’.

Australian policy does need more Asia—more Southeast Asia

The international challenge confronting Australia today is unparalleled, at least since the 1940s. It requires what the late Brendan Sargeant, a defence analyst, called strategic imagination. We need more than shrewd economic manoeuvring and a tough assessment of defence capacity. Despite immediate election concerns, this is a time to question long-established assumptions about how Australia is positioned in the world. The Trump chaos, for all the damage it is bringing, could help Australia develop a fresh international identity.

Eight decades ago, between the fall of Singapore and the 1951 ANZUS Treaty, Australians could no longer put trust in the British Empire. Also, despite America’s large contribution to the Pacific War, there was no certainty of a United States security guarantee for the future. Analysts on both sides of politics increasingly began to think about a regional identity for a more independent—potentially more lonely—Australia.

The American alliance then allowed Australians to postpone such an accommodation with Asia. Now, in the words of Heather Smith, speaking at a 1 April security forum convened by Malcolm Turnbull, the post-Cold War order has collapsed ‘along with the norms and values that have underpinned the US-Australia relationship’.

How to imagine today a more autonomous Australia? Escalating British, European and Canadian engagement has obvious advantages—but this can reinforce Australia’s otherness in our region. Gareth Evans is right to insist we have ‘more Asia’—but what does that really entail? What is the roadmap for a deeper Asian engagement? Japan will continue to be important—but an explicit tightening of security relations with Japan delivers to China an unnecessarily provocative message. Australia’s Indian engagement will grow, but may present a similar problem.

The obvious strategy for achieving ‘more Asia’ is to capitalise on the relationship in which both sides of Australian politics have invested most heavily: Southeast Asia.

This is not to say that individual Southeast Asian countries or their regional organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), offer Australia the type of economic or military advantage once gained from the United States, although ASEAN as a grouping is our second-largest trading partner and has a GDP larger than India.

Nor can we be confident we share values with Southeast Asians—or that we will not sometimes have tension with one ASEAN country or another. There has also been frustration with ASEAN institutions when it comes to getting things done.

Our ASEAN priority, however, should not just focus on practical endeavours. In identifying ASEAN as the framework for achieving more Asia, what matters is that their institutions are inclusive—embracing all major players in the region. In an increasingly fluid environment, they offer an established arena for engaging not just with Southeast Asian countries but also with Japan, India and South Korea—as well as China. In these institutions—sometimes on the sidelines of meetings—Australia can build bilateral or mini-lateral endeavours without provoking one major power or another.

There are no serious downsides to this ASEAN emphasis. Washington, Beijing, Tokyo and others recognise Australia’s long commitment to this part of Asia. Our early support for Southeast Asian nationalist movements, our status as ASEAN’s first Dialogue Partner, our founding membership of ASEAN-led institutions (the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, the ambitious Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership trade agreement, our vigorous practical cooperation across the region and our government’s declarations supporting ‘ASEAN centrality’—this record also gives Australia a claim to ASEAN’s continuing attention.

What we must avoid is claiming a leadership role. Australia’s long-term closeness to the United States sometimes enhanced our regional authority—and added to the prestige of our liberal democratic values. We need not back away from such values—and can expect they will still attract respect in parts of Asia. There is also reason for pride in the part Australia has played—certainly from the period of the founding of the United Nations—in developing an international rules system. The new era, however, will demand patient negotiation with non-liberal perspectives.

Although the liberal rules-based order faces resistance in Asia, there is nevertheless a strong commitment to rules and principles that facilitate international interaction. In a genuinely multipolar world, ASEAN’s consensus-seeking institutions provide an ideal forum for the type of give-and-take deliberation—negotiating across different normative frameworks—that will be a feature of rules development.

Inter-state relations more generally will require openness to ‘Asian values’. For instance, we tend to see Southeast Asians and others as hedging when they are unwilling to align with one power or another—and ignore the claim to a ‘principled pragmatism’ (as Malaysia often states). When Southeast Asian countries refuse to join an alliance, or to promote one ideological position rather than another—or when they accept the need to operate in a China-centred regional hierarchy—they are influenced by a heritage of foreign relations principles often different from Western traditions.

Working alongside our Asian neighbours—putting our point of view, of course, and acting where possible as a bridge to the United States and European states—Australians may also learn from Asian experience in handling major power ambitions.

Trump’s chaotic tariff policies provide an immediate opportunity. The whole region faces a common threat. With ASEAN leaders meeting to discuss a coordinated response, Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong speaks of strengthening ‘our network of partnership with like-minded countries’. ASEAN will reach out to China, Japan and South Korea—already indicating some willingness to set aside bitter rivalries between them. As a middle power with strong experience in trade negotiations (including through the Cairns Group)—and seven decades of intimate familiarity with America—Australia has much to contribute to Wong’s networking.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney recently called Canada ‘the most European of non-European countries’. Using the ASEAN framework to engage in tariffs, rules and other deliberations, could help build Australia’s post-America identity as the most Asian of non-Asian countries.

Myanmar’s scam centres demand ASEAN-Australia collaboration

China’s crackdown on cyber-scam centres on the Thailand-Myanmar border may cause a shift away from Mandarin, towards English-speaking victims. Scammers also used the 28 March earthquake to scam international victims.

Australia, with its proven capabilities to disrupt cybercrime networks, should support the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ efforts to tackle this kind of transnational organised crime. Doing so would also help ease pressure on Australian policing and cyber capabilities, which deal with thousands of cybercrime reports each year.

Myanmar’s border regions, particularly around Myawaddy, are infamous for scam compounds. Victims—often lured by fake job ads on social media—are trafficked to these sites. Upon arrival, they’re forced to hand over their IDs and mobile phones, and are then forced to engage in love scams, crypto fraud, money laundering and illegal online gambling. The United Nations estimates around 120,000 people are trapped in Myanmar alone, with another 100,000 in Cambodia and unknown numbers in Laos, the Philippines and Thailand.

For years, Chinese authorities ignored this criminal enterprise. But when Chinese actor Wang Xing disappeared, a viral plea from his girlfriend on microblogging site Weibo triggered action. Within hours, Xing was released, sparking outcry on the social media from families of 1800 missing Chinese nationals believed to have been trafficked.

Xing’s rescue highlights the power of grassroots mobilisation but also exposes the systemic law enforcement failures on the border. While Nay Pyi Daw tolerates these scam centres, the operations persist due to selective enforcement from authorities in neighbouring China and Thailand, leaving the power networks behind them unscathed.

After public pressure, Chinese President Xi Jinping took action and met with Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra in February. Following the high-level meeting, Thailand immediately cut electricity, internet and gas supplies to five towns known for harbouring cyber-scam centres. However, these efforts remain largely performative as Myanmar junta-allied actors also position themselves as part of the crackdown, such as Saw Chit Thu‘s  Border Guard Force, despite its complicity in scam compounds. While more than 7000 people have been released, far more remain trapped. Syndicates continue to evolve, securing alternative electricity sources, switching to Starlink satellite connections, and potentially relocating their operations elsewhere.

China’s shifting approach towards Myanmar complicates matters. Its increased support for Myanmar’s military regime pushed the cyber-scam syndicates into areas controlled by the junta and its allied ethnic militias. Criminal activities accelerated and diverted their recruitment to English-speaking targets.

China’s response is also inherently reactionary and limited, doing little for victims in other countries such as Cambodia and Laos. While China’s diplomatic influence has led to some progress, victims from other countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, lack similar leverage to pressure host governments.

This calls for a more holistic and coordinated regional approach. It should focus on preventing modern slavery and combatting cyber and cyber-enabled crimes, and should include ASEAN as well as partners such as Australia.

ASEAN has a rudimentary structure to facilitate intra-regional intelligence sharing, joint investigations and coordinated rescue operations. ASEANAPOL and INTERPOL’s Singapore-based operations support coordination among regional police forces. While this has led to many arrests and seizures of assets, the overall effort falls short of dismantling criminal enterprises.

Last year’s launch of the ASEAN Computer Emergency Response Team was a positive move, strengthening the region’s ability to address cybersecurity incidents. But efforts to dismantle cyber-scam networks in Myanmar remain limited due to protection from junta-backed militias.

This situation should prompt greater Australian involvement. Australia’s offensive cyber capabilities helped disrupt cyber-crime networks, such as Lockbit and ZServers. In November, the Australian Federal Police, working with Philippine authorities, took down a major scam syndicate in Manila under Operation Firestorm, seizing digital evidence to trace Australian victims and disrupt global fraud operations.

With thousands of Australians falling victim to scam operations, Australia’s cybercrime-fighting efforts should prioritise taking down overseas scam networks. This could be done by strengthening skills and capabilities of cyber detectives and offensive cyber operators in the region, for instance through capacity-building workshops and mission-specific training. However, the government should also be prepared to use its political and economic heft to pressure host nations that allow such criminal activities, using tools such as ministerial interventions, attributions and cyber sanctions.

The Fifth ASEAN Digital Ministers’ meeting earlier this year stressed the need for international collaboration on implementing additional measures to prevent cross-border scams. While the roles of China, Japan, the United States and Russia were mentioned, Australia is not yet engaged. This is an opportunity for Australia to increase its collaboration with ASEAN, especially in the wake of the recent Myanmar earthquake, which scammers exploited through fake clickbait donations and malicious links.

Australia has committed to provide $2 million for Myanmar’s disaster response. Yet, targeted initiatives to address cyber scams would bolster defences against transnational cybercrime and create a safer global environment.

Trump could make Asia more united

US President Donald Trump has raised the spectre of economic and geopolitical turmoil in Asia. While individual countries have few options for pushing back against Trump’s transactional diplomacy, protectionist trade policies and erratic decision-making, a unified region has a fighting chance.

The challenges are formidable. Trump’s crude, bullying approach to long-term allies is casting serious doubt on the viability of the United States’ decades-old security commitments, on which many Asian countries depend. Worse, the US’s treaty allies (Japan, South Korea and the Philippines) and its strategic partner (Taiwan) fear that Trump could actively undermine their security, such as by offering concessions to China or North Korea.

Meanwhile, Trump’s aggressive efforts to reshape the global trading system, including by pressuring foreign firms to move their manufacturing to the US, have disrupted world markets and generated considerable policy uncertainty. This threatens to undermine growth and financial stability in Asian economies, particularly those running large trade surpluses with the US—such as China, India, Japan, South Korea and countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Currency depreciation may offset some of the tariffs’ impact. But if the Trump administration follows through with its apparent plans to weaken the US dollar, surplus countries will lose even this partial respite, and their trade balances will deteriorate. While some might be tempted to implement retaliatory tariffs, this would only compound the harm to their export-driven industries.

Acting individually, Asian countries have limited leverage not only in trade negotiations with the US, but also in broader economic or diplomatic disputes. But by strengthening strategic and security cooperation—using platforms such as ASEAN, ASEAN+3 (with China, Japan and South Korea), and the East Asia Summit—they can build a buffer against US policy uncertainty and rising geopolitical tensions. And by deepening trade and financial integration, they can reduce their dependence on the US market and improve their economies’ resilience.

One priority should be to diversify trade partnerships through multilateral free-trade agreements. This means, for starters, strengthening the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—which includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Britain and Vietnam—such as by expanding its ranks. China and South Korea have expressed interest in joining.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—comprising the 10 ASEAN economies, plus Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea—should also be enhanced, through stronger trade and investment rules and, potentially, the addition of India. Given the Asia-Pacific’s tremendous economic dynamism, more robust regional trade arrangements could serve as a powerful counterbalance to US protectionism.

Asia has other options to bolster intra-regional trade. China, Japan and South Korea should resume negotiations for their own free-trade agreement. Japan and South Korea are a natural fit, given their geographic proximity and shared democratic values. The inclusion of China raises some challenges—owing not least to its increasingly aggressive military posture in the region— but they are worth confronting, given China’s massive market and advanced technological capabilities. With the US putting economic self-interest ahead of democratic principles, Asian countries cannot afford to eschew pragmatism for ideology.

Beyond trade, Asia must build on the cooperation that began after the 2008 global financial crisis. The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation, which provides liquidity support to its member countries (the ASEAN+3) during crises, should be strengthened. Moreover, Asian central banks and finance ministries should work together to build more effective financial-stability frameworks—robust crisis-management arrangements, coordinated policy responses and clear communication—to stabilise currency markets and financial systems during episodes of external volatility.

Trump is not the only reason why Asia should deepen cooperation. The escalating trade and technology war between the US and China is threatening to divide the world into rival economic blocs, which would severely disrupt global trade and investment. But there is still time to avoid this outcome, by building a multipolar system comprising multiple economic blocs with overlapping memberships. By fostering economic integration, within the region and beyond, Asian countries would be laying the groundwork for such an order.

In an age of geoeconomic fragmentation, Asian countries could easily fall victim to the whims of great powers. But by strengthening trade partnerships, reinforcing financial cooperation, enhancing strategic collaboration and building economic resilience, they can take control over their futures and position Asia as a leading architect of a reconfigured global economy.

ASEAN cyber norms need broad stakeholder engagement

As Malaysia assumes the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2025, the government wants to make its mark on the region’s cybersecurity cooperation framework. Malaysia is keen to develop the third iteration of the cybersecurity cooperation strategy, which will guide ASEAN’s collaborative efforts in cyberspace. But to be truly effective, cooperation must remain a multistakeholder affair.

The landmark release of ASEAN’s cyber norms checklist in October last year, championed by Malaysia and Singapore, translated the United Nations’ eleven norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace into practical steps. ASEAN member states now have a structured way to implement cyber norms, focussing on political endorsements and safeguarding critical infrastructure.

However, the real challenge isn’t adoption; it’s implementation. Making these principles work in the real world requires more than government buy-in; it demands broad cooperation across sectors and countries.

As I have argued, one of the biggest hurdles is embedding these norms into the operations of defence, law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Southeast Asia’s cyber capabilities are expanding, but transparency remains a sticking point. Militaries, intelligence agencies and law enforcement are embracing cyber tools, but are reluctant to discuss operations and strategies. These institutions see cyber norms as constraints rather than mechanisms for stability. Without transparency, trust erodes as states struggle to gauge each other’s cyber intentions and capabilities.

Recognising these challenges, in August 2024, ASPI brought together experts from Australia, ASEAN member states and Timor-Leste in a civil society dialogue in Kuala Lumpur sponsored by the Australia-ASEAN Centre. Discussions on the shifting cyber threat landscape, regional progress on cyber norms and strategies for strengthening cooperation highlighted one thing—transparency, information sharing and collaborative threat assessments reduce misperceptions and strengthen trust among ASEAN members.

But governments cannot implement cyber norms alone. They must collaborate with those who build, manage and depend on digital infrastructure and with those who advocate for digital rights, privacy and cybersecurity. Private sector actors, particularly technology firms that manage critical information infrastructure, need to be engaged to ensure that cyber norms are not only socialised but policies or initiatives that come out of them are practical, enforceable and aligned with the rapidly evolving cyber landscape. Industry-driven initiatives, such as sector-specific security standards for critical infrastructure, can support government-led efforts by introducing adaptable and enforceable cybersecurity measures.

Academia and think tanks also play a role by supporting capacity-building programs and offering research and policy insights that help shape decision-making. They can help assess the success of policy measures, including progress in norms operationalisation, and can function as informal intermediaries between governments seeking to communicate issues indirectly.

For ASEAN’s cyber norms to take root, multistakeholder engagement must be institutionalised through regular dialogues that include government and non-government actors. ASEAN has long used these mechanisms to navigate complex security challenges. Applying them to cyber governance will ensure that all member states, regardless of their cyber capabilities, have a say in shaping the region’s approach to cybersecurity.

Beyond dialogues, ASEAN needs a regional model of cyber norms maturity to measure their progress in implementing UN cyber norms. Such a model would consider factors such as cybersecurity infrastructure, legal frameworks and policy development. A structured roadmap would enable ASEAN states to move from basic compliance to advanced implementation, creating a stronger, more cohesive approach to cybersecurity.

Engaging local stakeholders is just as important. Cyber norms shouldn’t just be the domain of policymakers; they must resonate with businesses, academics and local communities. Bringing small and medium-sized enterprises, universities and civil society groups into the conversation ensures that cyber norms are implemented in ways that are practical, relevant and responsive to local challenges. Regular feedback loops will help refine these norms over time, keeping them relevant and adaptive.

In addition, discussions on cyber norms must break out of traditional security silos. Cybersecurity challenges intersect with issues such as environmental protection, trade, human rights and even cultural heritage. ASEAN should take a broader, interdisciplinary approach and incorporate insights from diverse fields to craft comprehensive solutions. For example, protecting critical infrastructure, such as submarine cables, shows that cyber resilience is interconnected with economic and environmental stability.

As a long-standing ASEAN partner, Australia has a key role to play. Recognising that cyber threats do not respect borders, Australia has been a strong advocate for regional cybersecurity cooperation in Southeast Asia. Australia can offer technical expertise, capacity-building programs and legal assistance to help ASEAN member states bridge cyber capability gaps and build a resilient digital ecosystem.

ASEAN’s adoption of the cyber norms checklist is a promising step, but real progress will depend on sustained implementation, capacity-building and advocacy. Multistakeholder collaboration, including between ASEAN and Australia, will ensure these norms move from paper to practice. Through inclusive engagement and cooperative action, the region can take decisive steps toward a secure, resilient and rules-based Indo-Pacific cyber landscape.

The Quad foreign ministers joint statement: short and sweet

Today’s joint statement from the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting in Washington is short and sweet, particularly for those who have been arguing that the grouping should overtly embrace security cooperation.

The statement’s emphasis on ‘security in all domains’ is a noteworthy and welcome shift from the previous, awkward position that the Quad was not a security partnership, despite working together in health security, cybersecurity and maritime security.

This inherent contradiction was unnecessarily self-limiting and confusing but persisted because Quad members, including Australia, saw this self-constraint as necessary to assuage Southeast Asian sensitivities about counterbalancing or containing China.

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade should update its official description of the Quad, which is currently a ‘a diplomatic, not security, partnership’.

Also absent from the statement is any reference to ‘ASEAN centrality’. This is notable because past Quad statements have all dutifully replicated this diplomatic deference to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This ellipsis is an early indication that the Trump administration does not intend to pursue cooperation through the Quad only at a pace that is comfortable for Southeast Asian countries. In fact, ASEAN doesn’t appear to register at all as a policy concern among some members of Trump’s cabinet line-up.

While China is not named either, a joint commitment to ‘oppose any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion’ leaves little doubt that Beijing is the Quad’s common challenge. A subsequent reference to ‘strengthening regional maritime, economic and technology security in the face of increasing threats’ should remove any remaining doubt. Beijing will inevitably react to such bluntness. But the Quad’s belated embrace of security cooperation is welcome. After all, security is a public good just like other elements of the Quad’s agenda, and something which the four countries should openly aspire to strengthen, without fear of offending others in the region.

Defence cooperation is not mentioned directly in the joint statement as part of the Quad’s security agenda. But it is strongly hinted in the commitment that ‘rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty, and territorial integrity’ should be ‘upheld and defended’ in the Indo-Pacific. (Note ‘defended’.) The Quad navies already exercise together in the annual Malabar drills. It is likely that a military dimension to four-way cooperation will now develop within the Quad, not only in unwarlike activities as disaster relief but also focused on deterrence. This should not dilute the Quad’s collaborative agenda in other policy fields, such as supply chain resilience and maritime domain awareness, but rather complement it.

The fact that the Quad foreign ministers meeting was virtually Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first official activity will be read as a sign of President Trump’s willingness to back the quartet, which after all was revived in 2017 during his first term in office. This will come as a relief to Australia, India and Japan. And it underlines the Quad’s strategic utility not simply as a counterbalance to China but also as a means to anchor the US security role in the Indo-Pacific via a broad-based partnership with three of its most important regional partners, including its closest regional ally, Australia, and its most important one, Japan. India, which offers the heft as the world’s most populous country and democracy, will host the next summit of Quad leaders this year. Trump’s attendance in Delhi will be essential to maintaining the momentum.

This is a promising turn in the Quad’s fluctuating fortunes. It is tempting to inversely correlate the impact of joint statements with their length. The commendable brevity of this two-paragraph statement packs policy punches that were patently missing from some of the Quad’s recent, prolix pronouncements. When it comes to drafting joint statements, concision should be best practice: less means more.

Now that ASEAN has its cyber norms checklist, the hard work begins

Southeast Asian countries have made an important step towards operationalising UN standards on government cyberspace behaviour, but the job is far from finished.

On behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Singapore last week published a checklist of action points aimed at giving effect to the standards, which are called 11 norms and were endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2015. Now, the challenge is to put the action points themselves into practice, overcoming resistance inside Southeast Asian governments and encouraging other states to follow.

The importance of this should be clear in Southeast Asia, since it and the wider Indo-Pacific region are increasingly plagued by malicious cyber activities. Encouraging states to abide by accepted practices of responsible behaviour in cyberspace is urgent.

In 2018, ASEAN became the first, and still only, regional organisation to adopt the norms when they were endorsed in an ASEAN leaders’ statement on cybersecurity cooperation. The new checklist, promoted by Malaysia and Singapore, aims to break the norms down into practical, actionable steps.

For example, to support the norm of not damaging another country’s critical infrastructure, the checklist includes making supportive political statements and setting clear internal guidelines for officials’ use of cyber tools. Meanwhile, cooperating internationally to combat crime and terrorism online means that responsible agencies should have a regularly updated directory of points of contacts of overseas counterparts.

But the discussion so far is at the level of foreign ministries and cybersecurity agencies. Checklist items need to be implemented by the core institutions responsible for deploying cyber capabilities, including defence, police and intelligence agencies.

Getting them to commit to the norms checklist will be no easy task. Agencies building cyber capabilities are often inward-looking and focused on national security work rather than broader cooperation. So they are not too receptive to commitments that could constrain their activities. Governments will need to introduce these principles across agencies, demonstrating to domestic constituencies their relevance for regional stability and national security.

Furthermore, ASEAN’s checklist needs to be more than a set of guidelines; it must serve as a tool for diplomatic engagement with external powers. My assessment of open sources shows that Southeast Asia remains one of the most targeted regions for state-sponsored cyber campaigns, primarily by China and North Korea. Most suspected state-sponsored cyber operations in the region have been linked to China. This makes it essential for ASEAN to advocate its checklist beyond its members, encouraging adherence by irresponsible state actors. This will be especially challenging, as some actors are increasingly weaponising cyberspace to secure economic and strategic aims.

ASEAN has long hoped to use norms and principles—institutionalised in arrangements like the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and an eventual South China Sea code of conduct—to influence behaviour of other states. In the cyber domain, this could mean ensuring that the agreed commitments in the text serve as a benchmark for responsible behaviour. Irresponsible states, such as China and North Korea, are unlikely to immediately embrace the checklist. But even incremental shifts toward greater transparency and accountability would be significant progress.

To support these efforts, ASEAN needs to develop robust confidence-building measures alongside the checklist. The measures can serve as reasons for dialogue, information sharing and transparency, helping government agencies—including those with authority over cyber capabilities—to build trust in the cyber domain. These measures can also be crucial platforms for reducing misunderstandings, managing tensions and fostering cooperation among states. Confidence-building measures should also be designed to cover either each of the 11 norms or combinations of them, allowing discussions that highlight either common or shared challenges in implementing and operationalising them. Another initiative could be devising the means of tracking checklist implementation.

Australia’s role in this context is instrumental. It has put much effort into cyber capacity-building in Southeast Asia, often working closely with ASEAN member states to raise awareness about the importance of cyber norms. Canberra should continue to use its diplomatic, technical and financial resources to support ASEAN’s efforts, particularly in promoting the operationalisation of the checklist at the national level.

The checklist is only a step on a journey. Implementation will determine its impact. Translating diplomatic principles into operational realities is urgent as cyber threats continue to evolve.

The road ahead will be marked by diplomacy, negotiation and gradual progress, but it is a road worth taking if Southeast Asia aims to create a safer and more secure cyber environment for all its people.

Typhoon relief is an opportunity for ASEAN to promote peace in Myanmar

Typhoon Yagi was a disaster for Myanmar last month, killing hundreds. But some good can come from it if the Association of Southeast Asian Nations uses the occasion to promote peace in the strife-torn country.

To facilitate humanitarian relief, military government and its armed oppositions have to negotiate a ceasefire. ASEAN should link international relief efforts to broader peacebuilding initiatives, creating a foundation for a longer-term dialogue.

If ASEAN acts decisively to mediate Myanmar conflict, it will not only help stabilise the country but also reaffirm the organisation’s role as an effective regional platform. Also, ASEAN members need to help resolve Myanmar’s civil war because the country has become fertile ground for hybrid threats and crime that present problems for the region.

Production and trafficking of synthetic drugs, primarily methamphetamine, thrives in Myanmar, in part with support by triads from China. Shan, an eastern state, is at the centre of the illegal trade. Armed ethnic groups are heavily involved in these activities, using the proceeds to fund their resistance to the government while facilitating transnational criminal operations that have spilled over into neighbouring Laos.

Another issue is illegal arms trafficking, with weapons being smuggled into Myanmar from conflict zones in southern Thailand, the Philippines, Syria and Afghanistan. A sniper rifle costs as little as US$220 in Myanmar, though ammunition is expensive. Meanwhile, cyber scam compounds are mushrooming within Myanmar’s porous borders, operated by transnational criminal networks.

And if Myanmar’s domestic conflict remains unresolved, the strategically located country could become a proxy battleground as the United States, China, Russia and other powers vie for influence in the Indo-Pacific. China already has influence over certain non-state actors in Myanmar, and its manoeuvres could destabilise ASEAN unity.

So, failure to effectively engage in peace negotiation with Myanmar so far not only diminishes ASEAN’s credibility but also weakens its ability to counter external pressures and address members’ internal strife.

Myanmar was suffering a humanitarian crisis even before Typhoon Yagi hit from the east. Floods and landslides resulting from the typhoon displaced hundreds of thousands in the Mandalay region and overwhelmed the country’s already fragile relief infrastructure. As millions remain in dire need of humanitarian aid, the Myanmar junta has called for dialogue at the end of September, offering a glimmer of hope for conflict resolution.

A 2005 precedent shows that a natural disaster can be a catalyst for peace. The eastern Indonesian province Aceh struggled to recover from a terrible tsunami in late 2004 that created common ground for both the Indonesian government and Aceh Freedom Movement to start peace talks, as both sides focused on helping victims rather than fighting.

ASEAN should take the chance by pushing for a ceasefire as a condition for improving international relief efforts, and it should aim to work from the ceasefire towards broader peacebuilding as a foundation for negotiations between the two sides over the longer term.

Indonesia and Thailand have initiated dialogues to address Myanmar’s conflict, but if ASEAN deployed pooled resources of its members, it might achieve more. In a joint statement issued at the ASEAN leaders summit on 9 October, the member states said the association would continue engagement with Myanmar. The next extended informal consultation between Myanmar delegations, the special envoy and interested member states is scheduled for December in Thailand.

Pre-coup ASEAN has already provided humanitarian assistance in Myanmar, through its ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management in Rakhine, a southwestern state. Moving forward, ASEAN can gather contributions from its member states, such as Thailand and Malaysia, and ensure that aid reaches the most vulnerable while it simultaneously pushes for meaningful political dialogue.

ASEAN needs to continue its implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, which seeks an immediate end of violence, dialogue among all parties, appointment of a special envoy and the parties in Myanmar facilitating humanitarian assistance and allowing the envoy to visit Myanmar to meet all of them. ASEAN must also enhance its engagement with influential actors, including China, India, Japan and the United States.

A unified ASEAN stance will be critical in preventing any single power from dominating Myanmar’s political landscape, thus preserving regional stability and the association’s strategic role in the region.

Finally, enhancing regional security through cooperation should be a priority. ASEAN must bolster intelligence-sharing and joint security initiatives to address threats emanating from Myanmar. Collaboration with international partners, such as with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, will be critical in dismantling criminal networks and curbing the influence of malicious actors involved in the conflict.

A new economic policy agenda for Asia as challenges mount

The global economic landscape is changing fast. Scarring from the Covid-19 pandemic has weakened potential growth, making slower income gains the new normal for many countries. Geopolitical tensions—especially the trade and technology ‘ war’ between the United States and China—are threatening not only to halt globalisation, a key enabler of growth over the last few decades, but also to split the world economy into blocs. And the days of low and stable inflation seem to be giving way to structurally higher and more volatile prices.

Meanwhile, rapid digitalisation propelled partly by advanced technologies like generative artificial intelligence is continuing apace, and the effects of climate change are becoming more visible by the day. Taken together, these developments pose major challenges to policymakers worldwide. Those in the ASEAN+3 countries, the 10 ASEAN member states, plus China, Japan, and South Korea, are no exception.

During the pandemic, ASEAN+3 governments went all in to support their economies, not least by monetising fiscal deficits, a taboo in normal times. The unprecedented fiscal stimulus they pursued; including large amounts of direct assistance to households and firms, from cash handouts to fuel subsidies; was accompanied by large interest-rate cuts. For example, in the Philippines, cumulative cuts in the policy rate reached 200 basis points in 2020. Governments also pursued policies like debt moratoria and regulatory forbearance.

In the post-pandemic era, these measures are excessive, imprudent, and unsustainable. But lower growth, higher inflation, and more public debt—which surged from around 93% of GDP, on average, in 2019 to 100% in 2022 in ASEAN+3 economies—makes unwinding them difficult. Doing so while addressing the multifaceted challenges that lie ahead will require a carefully crafted mix of policies tailored to specific economies’ needs.

ASEAN+3 policymakers seem to recognise this. Despite facing broadly similar challenges, these governments have emphasised different measures, depending on their economy’s circumstances and policy space. For example, countries like Singapore and the Philippines sought to tackle inflation primarily through aggressive monetary tightening, with the former using exchange-rate targeting to reduce imported inflation.

By contrast, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand pursued more gradual interest-rate hikes, and used fuel and food subsidies to keep inflation in check. Meanwhile, China (where inflation remains low, and the post-pandemic recovery has been slower than expected) and Japan (with structurally low inflation) upheld accommodative policies.

ASEAN+3 countries also intervened in foreign-exchange markets. As the US Federal Reserve aggressively raised interest rates, fueling expectations that rates would remain higher, the US dollar appreciated, especially against currencies of countries with larger interest-rate differentials. Since rapid currency depreciation can compound inflationary pressure, making it harder for firms and households to adjust, several ASEAN+3 central banks used their international reserves to bolster their currencies.

But policymakers were careful not to overdo it and retained sufficient international reserves to meet their external obligations. More broadly, they seem to have managed to limit the fallout from pandemic and inflation shocks and, overall, ASEAN+3 remains a bright spot in the global economy.

This success has come at the cost of reduced policy space, however, and to withstand future shocks ASEAN+3 countries must now rebuild it. To this end, they should embark on fiscal consolidation and end regulatory forbearance, debt relief, and other extraordinary policies and programs introduced during the pandemic.

Many ASEAN+3 economies have already committed to rebuilding their fiscal space. Singapore has raised several taxes, including its goods and services tax, and Indonesia has implemented a comprehensive tax-reform package which includes a 2% increase in its value-added tax. Malaysia is rolling back broad-based subsidies in favor of more targeted support. And the Philippines has adopted a medium-term fiscal framework.

But there is much more to be done. In the short term, two priorities stand out: strengthening balance sheets in both the public and private sectors and building up financial buffers.

Though financial sectors in the ASEAN+3 countries remain stable, with ample liquidity and capital buffers, there are pockets of weakness in some economies and in many debt stocks have risen uncomfortably close to the threshold of sustainability. Macroprudential policies such as capital requirements, loan-to-value ratios, and debt-service ratios should be implemented or strengthened, and weak banks should be recapitalised. Some countries have already been pursuing debt restructuring, to ensure that viable borrowers can survive as debt-relief programs expire.

ASEAN+3 policymakers must also address longer-term structural challenges. Greater regional integration is essential, as it would increase countries’ resilience to the forces of fragmentation, reinforce efforts to mitigate climate change, and improve efficiency and productivity through faster digitalisation. Some countries might need infrastructure development, labor-market reforms, industrial policies, regulatory changes, and a concerted effort to boost foreign direct investment and trade.

The ASEAN+3 countries should waste no time preparing for the formidable challenges they face. The outlook for the global economy depends on their success.

Tag Archive for: ASEAN

Stop the World: TSD Summit Sessions: ASEAN, regional stability and disruptive tech with Dato’ Astanah Abdul Aziz

In the latest video edition of The Sydney Dialogue Summit Sessions, Bethany Allen, Head of China Investigations and Analysis at ASPI, speaks with Her Excellency Dato’ Astanah Abdul Aziz, Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN for Political-Security Community.

They discuss Dato’s career path and how her time as a diplomat within Malaysia’s foreign ministry led to her current role with ASEAN. They also explore the role of ASEAN and the value that it brings to the region – not just economic value but also in building relationships.

With growing tensions in the South China Sea, Bethany and Dato’ discuss how ASEAN can contribute to greater stability in the Indo-Pacific. They also talk about how ASEAN nations are working to address the rise of disruptive technologies, particularly artificial intelligence.

Dato and Bethany were both panellists at The Sydney Dialogue, ASPI’s premier policy summit for critical, emerging and cyber technologies, held on September 2 and 3. This special episode is the fourth in a series of podcasts filmed on the sidelines of the conference, which will be released in the coming weeks. 

Speakers: 
Her Excellency Dato’ Astanah Abdul Aziz 
Bethany Allen