Tag Archive for: ADF

Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world

For more than a decade, which has included the 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2022 federal elections, ASPI has helped to generate ideas and foster debate about Australian strategic policymaking through Agenda for change, a wide-ranging collection of analyses and recommendations to assist the next Australian Government in its deliberations and planning.  

Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world continues in its tradition by providing focused and anticipatory policy advice for the 48th Parliament of Australia. The agenda strives to highlight, and present solutions to, the most pressing questions that our next government must consider in order to advance and protect Australia’s national interests in a more disordered and challenging world. 

This edition reflects five interrelated aspects of Australia’s position in 2025, focused on the need to:

  • defend Australia
  • navigate our place in a new world (dis)order
  • reform our security architecture and policies
  • secure our critical infrastructure
  • protect and use our natural resources. 

In 2025, that means equipping the next government for the reality of the contest in which our country is engaged. Since the previous edition of Agenda for change in 2022 we’ve seen:

  • Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and public confirmation of the China–Russia ‘no limits’ partnership
  • change in Australia’s policy towards China, with a focus on ‘stabilisation’, accompanied by reduced economic coercion against Australia but a ratcheting up of military intimidation, including an unprecedented PLA Navy circumnavigation of Australia
  • heightened aggression by China against the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Taiwan
  • a lowering of the national terrorism threat level to ‘possible’ in 2022, before it was raised back to ‘probable’ not quite two years later 
  • the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the resulting war in Gaza and an increase in politically motivated violence in Australia
  • the rise of artificial intelligence, including the landmark release of ChatGPT in late 2022 and then DeepSeek in 2025
  • the return of Donald Trump to the White House, bringing tension among allies and question marks over the future of the US-led international order.

Each chapter in Agenda for change includes a limited number of prioritised policy recommendations, which are intended to be discrete, do-able and impactful. Although, when dealing with some of the more existential challenges facing Australia, the recommendations are necessarily and similarly expansive.

In addressing that extraordinary range of developments, ASPI has drawn on a wide range of expertise for the 2025 edition of Agenda for change. The views expressed are the personal views of the authors and don’t represent a formal position of ASPI on any issue, other than a shared focus on Australia’s national interests. 

Tag Archive for: ADF

Underinvestment in ADF reserves weakens our security

A larger, enhanced Australian Defence Force reserve component is vital to Australia’s security. However, it has been largely overlooked in discussions around achieving greater self-reliance and meaningful capability in short order.

Around one third of the total strength of the ADF is composed of reservists. Despite this, the ADF reserves are rarely mentioned by defence commentators and national security experts who are, quite rightly, calling for rapid enhancement of the ADF in terms of numbers, equipment and resilience.

Even at current resource levels, which are modest and spread across several different programs and services within Defence, the ADF reserves are a very cost-effective force multiplier. They provide key elements for homeland defence and contribute to federal responses to natural disasters. Some vital capabilities within Defence, such as health support and medical services, rely on specialist reserve personnel every day. Many otherwise vacant positions in the permanent force are currently filled by reservists, keeping routine operational, administrative and logistic functions of the ADF machine ticking over.

The Defence Reserves Association contends that if even an additional 1 percent of the annual Defence budget were directed to the ADF reserves, the effect would be transformational, potentially creating a much larger, more capable reserve force with greater readiness. For example, doubling the strength of the army reserve would enable it to both meet homeland defence tasks and support the permanent forces if they were committed to combat operations. This concurrency would be vital in any national defence emergency.

In the navy and air force, the reserve element is mostly composed of ex-permanent personnel filling gaps in the full-time structure, together with some specialists in areas such as health. The re-establishment of separate reserve units within the navy and air force is sorely needed to protect base facilities, support other vital infrastructure for fleet assets and aircraft, and provide personnel to replace combat losses.

Another imperative is the expansion of the army’s Regional Force Surveillance Units that operate across the Australia’s northern arc from the Pilbara to Cape York.  These units are predominantly staffed by locally based reservists, with many indigenous Australians serving in the patrols that monitor some of our most exposed and remote coastlines. They deserve the best equipment the nation can provide, especially for mobility and communications.

The 2023 Defence Strategic Review recommended a strategic review of the ADF reserves. This was completed by Defence late last year and has been endorsed by the government. The review report included some good recommendations, such as improving conditions of service for reservists and creating new reserve capabilities in cyber and space.

It also recommends expanding the successful gap year scheme, where young Australian men and women enlist for a year in the ADF and can then elect to continue to serve—and many do. The annual gap year scheme is usually oversubscribed, which shows that there are plenty of young Australians who are willing to serve in the ADF if the settings and incentives are right. An example of such an incentive is relieving higher-education debt for reservists bringing key qualifications and skills to the ADF.

The Defence Reserves Association, which provided a submission to the ADF reserves review, supports the review’s recommendations. However, it also urges more ambitious targets for the overall number of reservists and the accelerated growth of key reserve units and capabilities.

For the ADF to grow, it must resolve its recruitment issues. Its current model of outsourced testing and processing is failing. The recruiting function should be returned to the ADF and, in the case of the reserves, to individual units. This could be trialled in selected reserve units where it was successful for decades with modest resources. Current recruiting shortfalls are not due to a shortage of Australians motivated to serve their country—they are primarily a result of a broken process that causes lengthy delays between initial interest and eventual enlistment. Reverting to an approach based on unit and parent services may help to fix the current recruiting crisis, and piloting this approach in the ADF reserves is a low-risk option.

In the current strategic and security climate, we must invest more in our reservists. There are compelling reasons to engage more Australians in some form of part-time military service through the reserves, such as the potential to grow our capability, strengthen national cohesion and improve operational resilience. With strong leadership at the national level and adequate resourcing this goal can, and should, be realised this decade.

Australian Army Chief searches for a new ‘theory of the army’

The Australian Army needs a clearer sense of self. With no warning time for conflict, the army must cap its ongoing transformation with a new ‘theory of the army’ that enables civilian leaders to choose the appropriate response to a given threat.

To do this, the theory will have to explain the army’s distinct institutional personality and principles. This should include how it sees itself organisationally, its interests in operationalising new weapon systems, and its interservice relationships, as well as how it will preserve its focus and specialisation within the integrated, focused force.

In his April address—the third in a series of four keynotes on the state of the army profession—the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, outlined the aims of this new theory. It will build on what the army already is, and what it wants to be: a littoral fighting force ready to compete and fight to secure strategic land positions and logistics supply lines, and protect remote airfields and ports in northern Australia, the Pacific islands and the archipelago to Australia’s north.

However, littoral manoeuvre is designed for high-end scenarios and violent stabilisation missions. If a crisis were to escalate to war, the army would have to figure out how to deploy ground troops and materiel forward inside adversary anti-access and area denial ranges. And supposing army units and formations would be prepositioned, many grey-zone or hybrid threats would put Australian soldiers in harm’s way. Accordingly, the new theory will have to spell out for the Australian public how the army intends to deter adversary forces from greater distances, and how it will manoeuvre, fight and resupply on islands with scant infrastructure or local capacity to supply military needs.

The army that begins a war will not be the same one that sees the end of it. Considering this, the army and society must both have the will and the capacity to sustain forces at war. As the Deputy Chief of Army, Major General Chris Smith, argued in a 2024 ASPI report, armies rely on multiple areas of society and the defence industrial base to perform in a prolonged fight.

Cooperation between the army and broader society will be a focus of the Chief of Army Symposium, to be held on 26–27 August in Canberra. But Stuart is yet to explain how large numbers of fresh recruits (likely including conscripts) in a major war help to optimise the army for littoral manoeuvre.

For now, Stuart has affirmed that the army’s review of three priority areas—jurisdiction, expertise and self-regulation—will provide a benchmark for the army alongside the other professions. Assessing these challenges will require the army to define the character of the unique service the army provides to Australian society; balance technological advancements with the army’s ability to maintain, teach, evolve and adapt its body of warfighting and professional knowledge; and reinforce its ethos and command accountability in the heat of battle.

As the potential for major power war in the Indo-Pacific and risks of war increase, so too must collaboration between the government, the military and the population. The army has enjoyed the advantage of being ‘out of contact’ with the adversary during its transformation from an  ‘expeditionary force’ to a force optimised for littoral manoeuvre with a long-range land and maritime strike. But this advantage may not last for much longer.

Australians will have to wait to see details of the army review and the resultant theory of the army sometime in 2026, when the service will celebrate its 125th birthday.

Stuart made clear that the army is more than just the soldiers and capabilities that prepare land power and provide protection to the ADF in competition and war. The army also acts as a bridge between the government and the whole of society and industry, helping strengthen national preparedness and resilience.

Many soldiers are already being trained to fight from landing craft, in jungle environments and on remote shores, and are promoting healthy civil-military relations. This is encouraging, but the army must get its new theory right. If it doesn’t, future governments will struggle to understand the strategic character of the army and align political ends with the appropriate military means.

The ADF isn’t nearly fast enough. It must rush into the cheap-drone revolution

The Australian Defence Force isn’t doing enough to adopt cheap drones. It needs to be training with these tools today, at every echelon, which it cannot do if it continues to drag its feet.

Cheap drones have changed the way armies fight on today’s battlefield, and Australia is already years behind in adopting this new technology. In July 2023, the government’s Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) laid out the challenge to industry to develop sovereign small drones for ‘training, surveying, photographic, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes.’ Noticeably, strike was not listed as a requirement. Following a fly-off a year ago this month, three vendors signed $2.2 million contracts to provide 3,000 drones each weighing less than 2 kilograms and having a range of 5 kilometres, all for a price of $5,000 each.

This is a step in the right direction, but it is a baby step. Our adversaries aren’t being so timid. Neither are our allies. In the time ASCA has taken to admire the problem, Ukraine has built an entirely domestic drone industry and is now iterating thousands of cheap drones each month. Other Baltic countries have become fast followers. Countries without large defence primes are already producing lethal cheap drones with four times the range ASCA asked for, at a fifth of the price.

According to the World Bank, Australia had the world’s 14th largest economy in 2023; Ukraine’s ranking was only 57th. Ukraine is also fighting a war for survival. There is simply no excuse why Australia can’t develop cheap drones faster. Ukraine has no advantage over Australia, except that it lacks the illusion there is plenty of time to do this.

Cheap drones have changed the character of war in as machine guns did more than a century ago. While they will not replace tanks or artillery, as some have predicted, they are ubiquitous on today’s battlefields. They are revolutionising intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, all tasks ASCA is focused on. They are also revolutionising strike. Cheap drones augment major platforms in fascinating, and lethal, ways—if our militaries know how to use them.

The unmatched proliferation of cheap drones on today’s battlefield has been driven by the same forces which created the Industrial Revolution. In the mid-19th century, British economist William Jevons identified that, counter-intuitively, improved efficiency in coal engines drove not a need for fewer of them and lower demand for the fuel but an increase in that demand. Dubbed ‘Jevons paradox’, this same underlying force is accelerating today’s ‘fourth industrial revolution’. The paradox helped make computers logarithmically more powerful, while also vanishingly lighter, which has given rise to the cheap drones that are now infesting the field of battle.

This is nothing like the bespoke, lumbering, high-end acquisition process that defence is accustomed to. It requires a completely different development and acquisition philosophy. Such programs as AUKUS Pillar 1 should continue to build their Birkin bag platforms, but at the same time, the ADF needs to also embrace the Shein of strike. These new, fast-fashion tools empower the smallest echelons of the battlefield in ways most Western forces haven’t begun to understand. We need to start building them and training with them immediately.

Cheap drones aren’t only quadcopters, either. There are ground drones employed in logistics, medical evacuation and mine laying. Meanwhile Ukraine’s sea drones—uncrewed boats—have terrorised the Russian fleet so badly it had to abandon its ports in Crimea for the eastern fringes of the Black Sea. While questions remain on just when Australia will receive how many of the AUKUS Pillar 1 submarines, for the cost of a single Virginia-class submarine Australia could buy more than 24,000 of the Ukrainian-made Sea Baby maritime strike drones, which have a range of over 1,000 kilometres. That’s deterrence by denial that Australia could be manufacturing on its own within the next two years.

Australia’s defence readiness—a critical assessment

In the week of Australia’s 3 May election, ASPI will release Agenda for Change 2025: preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world, a report promoting public debate and understanding on issues of strategic importance to Australia. This is an article from the report. The full report can be read here.

The ADF is at risk of being caught in a no-man’s-land, neither doing enough to deter aggression, nor being ready for a conflict today, nor investing in capability and technology in a way that will prepare us for a future one. Australia needs to build up its mass through an increased defence and industry workforce, produce more munitions in high volume at low cost, invest in autonomous systems and reverse the strategic mistake of cutting national space capabilities. Those changes are needed for us to both continue being a genuine partner for our most important security ally, the US, while also investing in our own self-reliance.

No matter who wins the election, Australian defence policy will focus on the release of the next National Defence Strategy (NDS) and Integrated Investment Program (IIP) in 2026. Our threat perceptions will continue to be dominated by the need to deter China, given its accelerating defence capabilities and intent to project military power into Australia’s environs and willingness to challenge Australia’s security interests across the region. The strategy and the plan must be focused on how Australia can be both defence ready now and plan for an uncertain future.

The next government needs to confirm that the key focus for the ADF is deterrence and war fighting to ensure the defence of Australia and to support our key allies and partners in Indo-Pacific stability. That includes deterring while preparing for the possibility of protracted high-intensity major-power war within our region that would likely see Australia come under direct threat of attack and include war fighting in domains such as space and cyberspace.

A growing risk of war

With that in mind, the ADF needs to be ready to burden share with regional allies and partners to a greater degree as part of a coalition, and with the US as our vital strategic ally. The latter is particularly important, especially given the dramatic changes now occurring in the foreign policy of the US under the Trump administration. A greater focus on burden sharing can mitigate risks and ensure that the US remains committed to its critical defence and security relationships, including those with Australia, such as ANZUS and AUKUS.

But Australia faces some challenges in this regard. The opportunity cost of AUKUS, both in terms of Pillar 1 and the optimal pathway for acquiring nuclear-powered but conventionally armed submarines (SSNs), and critical technology cooperation in Pillar 2, absent a significant boost in defence spending, generates the risk of insufficient funding to sustain other critical ADF capabilities separate from AUKUS. It could also see an inability to ensure ADF readiness for major-power war in the short term—within this decade—in favour of preparing for possible threats in the medium to long term. Without boosting defence spending significantly higher than currently planned for in the 2024 IIP and in Defence Portfolio Budget Statements, AUKUS could risk unbalancing, rather than focusing, the ADF.

The 2024 NDS notes the rapid growth of China’s military capabilities in the region:

In line with its growing strategic and economic weight, China is improving its capabilities in all areas of warfare at a pace and scale not seen in the world for nearly a century. This is happening without transparency about its strategic purpose … (1.28)

At the same time as it rapidly builds up its military power, China is adopting a much more provocative posture in the region, for example in the South China Sea, particularly against the Philippines, as well as unprofessional actions by the PLA against ADF deployments in international airspace and waters. China recently deployed a naval taskforce into the Tasman Sea that conducted live-fire drills without advance warning and subsequently circumnavigated Australia. That followed aggressive Chinese actions against an RAAF P-8A Poseidon over the South China Sea.

Most worryingly, the Chinese Government has declared that the unification of Taiwan with the PRC is ‘inevitable’ and refuses to rule out the use of military force to achieve it. That means there’s both the opportunity for miscalculation that leads to conflict as well as a deliberate act of aggression from Beijing.

Further afield, the ongoing rapid shifts in US policy vis-a-vis Ukraine risk seriously undermining the unity of NATO and the security of Europe, and indeed the existence of an independent Ukraine. Against that strategic backdrop, China may feel emboldened to act more aggressively towards Taiwan and in the South China Sea.

With that troubling context in mind, what should the next government do immediately after the election to ensure that the ADF is ready to meet this challenge?

Is the ADF ready for war?

The first challenge is workforce—notably, addressing recruitment and retention, given the small size of the ADF (as of July 2023, it had 57,346 active duty and 32,049 reserve personnel). The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and the 2024 NDS and IIP both committed to increasing the workforce as a priority, but that will take some time, and the latest information suggests that efforts to boost the workforce are failing.

The workforce challenge means that Australia must constantly rely on a technological and qualitative advantage to ‘punch above its weight’. In past decades, that was relatively easy to achieve and maintain. In many key capability areas, particularly in missiles, space capability and naval and air combat capabilities, that edge has largely disappeared in the face of China’s rising military power.

Furthermore, constraints in the workforce, together with insufficient stockpiles of munitions and very limited industrial capacity, make it very difficult for the ADF to sustain high-intensity military operations over an extended period (of months or longer).

The continuing lack of sovereign munition production capacity poses a serious risk to Australia having the means to sustain high-intensity military operations and should be prioritised. The Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise is proceeding on a ‘crawl, walk, run’ basis, which means that the ADF can’t quickly produce or replenish key weapons capabilities, especially guided weapons in the short term, in the event of a major-power conflict occurring this decade.

Even with GWEO, the ADF will have only limited access to certain types of guided weapons. For example, GWEO will assemble only limited numbers of the short-range Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) from the end of 2025, which is hardly sufficient to undertake ‘impactful projection’. Other key guided weapons systems being acquired by the ADF, including the air-launched Joint Air to Surface Missile—Extended Range, the Long-Range Antiship Missile and sea-launched Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, which do have longer range, will be acquired ‘off the shelf’ in only limited numbers. Local production of Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) and its air-launched version, the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), may alleviate this challenge to a limited degree, but those weapons also only have limited range. The Army eventually intends to acquire the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), which has a 500-kilometre range, with future ‘increments’ extending that out to 1,000 kilometres, and able to be launched from the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, but it remains uncertain how many of those weapons will be acquired, or when they’ll enter service.

With the immediate absence of a sovereign weapons production capability that can produce large numbers of long-range guided weapons quickly, Australia remains dependent on foreign supplies of critical military capabilities, at least for the foreseeable future. Efforts towards sovereign production of weapons won’t see real capability suitable for long-range deterrence by denial and impactful projection for at least a decade. Current planning for GWEO to produce such weapons (that is, apart from GMLRS, NSM and JSM) is vague and ill-defined.

Integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), without which our northern bases are exposed to attack, should be made a top priority. This area has been underinvested in by the current government despite advice in the 2023 DSR urging the government to fast-track the acquisition of effective IAMD capability. The 2024 NDS and IIP did announce significantly increased investment into the ADF’s northern base infrastructure to prepare it to support high-intensity military operations, which is important but less effective if the bases can’t be defended.

Australia needs to move faster on deploying the ‘effectors’ of IAMD—specifically, missile interceptor systems. The government has supported the acquisition of a Joint Air Battle Management System under Project AIR 6500, after decades of delay, but won’t decide on the interceptor missiles until the 2026 IIP, despite commercially mature and operational capabilities being available now.

The ADF also must overcome the risk posed by a boutique and exquisite force structure that leads to a brittle capability for war. The small size of the ADF is apparent not just in personnel but in platforms. Greater investment in and operational acquisition of a range of autonomous systems—in the air, on land, on the oceans and under the waves—can partly address that lack of mass, but only if such capabilities are acquired in a manner that emphasises ‘high volume, low cost’ acquisition. In other words, autonomous systems can’t simply be acquired in the same way as expensive crewed platforms such as the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, or the Hobart-class Air Warfare Destroyer. Autonomous systems offer a path to a larger and more powerful ADF, but only if they’re acquired in a manner that allows mass rather than simply small numbers of expensive and exquisite platforms, absent humans as crew.

Another key area of vulnerability is the ADF’s outright dependency on US military and commercial space capabilities to support a strategy of denial. Denial requires an ability for impactful projection to hold an adversary risk at long range. Yet, the ADF can’t ‘strike deep’ if it can’t ‘see deep’, and the slow pace of development of sovereign space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and uncertainty over the future of sovereign satellite communications following the ‘redefinition’ of JP-9102 in late 2024 means that Australia continues to rely on foreign or commercially provided space support. Concerns that Australia could be denied access to vital space support, particularly in the event of dependency on commercial systems such as Starlink, are legitimate, and the government should mitigate this risk by properly funding sovereign space capability, including for launch.

The slow and steady pace of defence capability development, as suggested in the 2024 IIP, and the lack of sufficient defence spending—with investment only reaching 2.4% of GDP by the mid-2030s—need to be reviewed in the light of elevated risk to, at the very least, address the areas of concern in this chapter. A failure to do so—a drift forward in the hope that nothing adverse happens for at least 10 years—suggests an unwillingness to close the gap between the government’s perception of risk and its willingness to address that risk.

Editors’ pick: ‘On the value of military service’

This article was first published on 7 February 2025.

In January, I crossed the milestone of 24 years of service in two militaries—the British and Australian armies. It is fair to say that I am a professional soldier. Soldiering has consumed the whole of my adult life. Indeed, it has been a focus since I first put on an army cadet uniform at the age of twelve.

It is also fair to say that the reputation of my profession is under pressure, particularly since the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those wars have challenged the moral foundation of modern soldiering, combining with a sense that the military suffers from a toxic culture, a moral vacuum and poor leadership.

A belief has developed from those campaigns that military service is inherently damaging. This is not unique in history. A similar perspective grew during and after the Vietnam War, one that took a generation to work through.

There is some truth to this negative image of service. I fought in both Iraq and Afghanistan and have written of my own concerns about the morality of the two campaigns. I have seen toxicity in culture and have experienced poor leadership. I have also, at times, likely been guilty of being a poor leader myself.

But this hard truth can exist at the same time as another truth: that I am undoubtedly a better person for my military service. Soldiering has not somehow suppressed my compassion and humanity; it has sharpened them. It has not diluted my values; it has constructed them. It has not fractured my family; it has strengthened us.

Put simply, I wouldn’t be the human I am today without the British and Australian armies.

So, I believe there is deep value in military service. Sometimes this gets lost. My aim in this article is to reflect on and remind of this value. This is not an article about certainty of employment, subsidised housing, or money (although all those certainly helped my family and me to weather wars, the global financial crisis and a pandemic). Instead, I want to talk about the intangibles. The things that really matter. The things that have made me who I am today.

A life of service and purpose

The name ‘military service’ is the right one. ‘Service’ has a dictionary definition of ‘the action of helping or doing work for someone’, and, in military terms, that ‘someone’ is the nation.

The idea of service as being at the core of the military profession is well embedded in history and culture. The rank of sergeant, for example, dates to the 13th century and is traced back to the Latin word serviens, meaning the ‘one who serves’. The motto of the Australian Army is ‘Serving the nation’. The idea of service is at the core of the oath of allegiance of the Australian Army. The mantra of Britain’s Royal Military Academy is famously ‘Serve to lead’.

This is no minor commitment. In 1962, the Australian-born General Sir John Hackett introduced the idea that military service involves a ‘contract of unlimited liability’. Soldiers agree to commit everything to the nation, up to and including sacrificing their own lives and deliberately taking the lives of others. Arguably, there is no profession that matches such a level of commitment. Few soldiers realise the scale of this when they join: it takes a few years, and often a few operations, for it to sink in.

That contract, however, is not a one-way street. You get something remarkable in return: a sense of purpose. There is something special in waking up each morning knowing that my work that day—however hard—will support the defence of the nation and the future security of my children. I have always been paid well as a soldier, but that has never been the point. And I have certainly never worked to make someone else money. I may only nudge the defence of the nation forward an inch on a given day, adding only one more brick to the ramparts, but I will have served, and that has purpose.

Is this worth my death? That is a good question. I have had to ask it several times. So far, the answer has always been ‘yes’. But I am clear that the day it is not, the day I am not willing to accept unlimited liability, is the day I should hang up the uniform. But such a day seems a very long way off, given how much the military has given me so far in terms of service and purpose.

Australian soldiers establish a position after disembarking from a US Army Chinook with Afghan National Security Force partners in Afghanistan, 2012: Department of Defence.

A life guided by values

The second gift of my service has been a life guided by values. Armies have now shaped my values and behaviour for more than 30 years, without doubt the biggest influence on my sense of morality other than my parents. The language used has been pretty consistent. Service. Courage. Excellence. Compassion. Loyalty. Integrity.

None of this has been performative. Far from these ideas being some sort of corporate banner, I have understood from day one that both armies have expected me to live and display the values, tangibly, every day. Nor has this ever been a matter of being in or out of uniform; it is with me 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Perhaps not everyone sees it that way, but I always have.

Aristotle once said, ‘we are what we repeatedly do’—that we are our habits. So, it’s not surprising that those values are now deeply set. In fact, they reflect from top to bottom, most noticeably in the small things. I find myself being unfailingly polite. I open doors and always let others go first. I find it exceptionally difficult to lie or deceive, at least outside of very necessary deception in combat. I tend to look after others. Leaders eat last, always. Some might consider this all to be just old-fashioned. It certainly makes me a terrible businessman. But I am far happier this way, guided as I am by a clear set of values.

How does this work with violence, which sits at the centre of my profession? It helps square the circle. I have always been scared of becoming inured or desensitised to the violence, comfortable with killing. The values reinforced into me by the army have made sure that never happens.

Yes, it is my job to take life if required, in defence of the nation. But every life has value, and the cost of taking it must always be recognised. As Nietzsche wrote, ‘he who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster.’ The British and Australian armies taught me this. It is not something I can forget.

The camaraderie of leading and following

Armies are hierarchical creatures, so for the past 24 years I have led, and I have followed, in many teams. Being part of this relationship is the best day-to-day aspect of the profession. I have followed some remarkable people. Tank officers and cavalrymen who took me to war with style. Special forces officers who dared, and won. Fiery frigate captains bringing force from the sea. And, most recently, remarkable senior leaders who have given as much as four decades of their lives to service: almost a third of the history of the Commonwealth of Australia.

I have also led soldiers, sailors and aviators, in both war and peace: teams from as small as 11 to as large as 400. Leading has been the greatest privilege of my life. In his excellent book War in Human Civilisation, Azar Gat describes military groups as primary or fraternal groups. They are as close to family as you can get, without being biological family. Gat is entirely right; my service has allowed me to be part of many families, all of them rich and full of characters.

It is true that military command can be a lonely task. One of the joys, however, is that you never do it alone. As an officer you always do it as a team, paired with a senior soldier of suitable experience and character. The accountabilities of command are rightly all yours, but the burdens of command are shared. This is a wonderful model, born of hundreds of years of tradition and experience: one that also leads to lifelong relationships.

Those connections of leading and following go deep. In September last year, I travelled more than 26,000 kilometres from Australia back to Britain for a 10-year reunion of a particularly lively tour of Afghanistan, where I had been the officer in charge of a 130-strong unit for a nine-month stint. I was in Britain for less than 50 hours. I landed, borrowed my father’s car and by lunchtime was hugging and swapping stories in Warwickshire with the best of men and women.

Sitting in the late autumn sunshine, in a 16th-century English pub in Shakespeare’s county, I couldn’t help but think of how well the Bard captured the feeling of military camaraderie in Henry V; a bond born of shared hardship. Life somehow shone brighter in those nine months in Helmand Province, surrounded by violence and death. As King Henry put it in the play, those days would ‘na’er go by from this day to the ending of the world’ without us remembering them, or each other. We truly were a ‘band of brothers’—and sisters. And, as Shakespeare’s Henry said, ‘He who fought with me that day shall be my brother.’ This was my brotherhood—my family—of Afghanistan veterans.

Three of the family are no longer with us. One was lost on the tour, two in the decade since. But they were there at the reunion, in spirit if not in body. Their photos were carefully laid out on a pub table, resting on our squadron flag. Drinks were bought for them, and glasses raised throughout. Ours is a family for which the phrase ‘we will remember them’ is a promise, not a slogan. Such camaraderie is hard-earned. To be part of it is a privilege.

Tom McDermott in Afghanistan: British Ministry of Defence via author.

Visceral emotions and a true sense of perspective

Over the years, I have thought a lot about visceral emotions, the deep-set, intuitive and powerful ones that strike to your very core. Everyone experiences them at some time: the dual feeling of joy and terror at the birth of your first child, or the feeling of uncertainty and grief when you find that a loved one has died. But true visceral emotions are much rarer than people think.

My service has led to me experiencing many visceral emotions. You might think those were bad, and some were. The terror of hearing a burst of enemy machine-gun fire, followed by a ‘Man down!’ call on the radio. The eviscerating grief of hearing that a comrade is dead. Over the years, I have come to accept those moments as a reality of the profession, just as a doctor must learn to manage death. General William Sherman once said that ‘War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it.’ He is right. One thing I have learned is that two emotions are more dangerous than others: hatred, and disgust. Those are the gateways to revenge, an urge that must be guarded against at all costs.

But those difficult visceral emotions are genuinely offset by the positive ones. The first hug from my wife and then four-year-old daughter after nine months fighting in Afghanistan reached a scale of joy that is difficult to express. The feeling of collective achievement walking out of the back of a Chinook helicopter after a successful operation, the heat of the engines singeing the hairs on the back of my neck. The surge of pride watching one of my brother officers receive a medal from the Queen. Perhaps oddly, those positive emotions include the affirmation of actual combat. Winston Churchill once wrote, ‘nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at without result.’ That is true. The battlefield is the most challenging of human arenas. My experience is that one values life more having endured it.

Those emotions—the good, the bad and the ugly—have had an overall net positive effect. Above all, they have given me perspective. I tend to view life differently now. I have less interest in material things, in the trappings of wealth or success. I am not bothered by the small problems: the traffic, not being able to find a parking space, a lack of phone signal. I am very slow to anger. I am not religious, but I am more spiritual … as the saying goes, There are no atheists in foxholes.’ My use of language has changed. I very rarely use the word ‘hate’; I have felt the glimmers of true hatred, and I know what it really means.

Overall, the idea of a bad day has different context, when you’ve experienced days that are really bad. War has taught me that the Stoics were right, there really are only two things in your control: your thoughts and your actions. War asks you to have the serenity to accept the things you cannot change, the courage to change the things you can, and the wisdom to know the difference. These are lessons you carry for life.

Service, identity and citizenship

The passages above outline (however inadequately) what I have gained from service. The obvious final question though is, ‘Why do you still do it?’ Surely after 24 years, you’ve paid your dues and could do something a little more relaxing? Something a little less burdensome? A little easier on the family?

The simplest answer is that military service is my identity, and has been for more than half my life. I’m not sure how I would go without it. Writing in a different age, Samuel Johnson said, ‘Every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier.’ I don’t think that is the case today, but I know I certainly feel better for being one. I think identity is the reason why many soldiers find life hard after they leave the military: the niggling loss of the service motive that has underpinned each day in uniform.

But that simple answer isn’t enough. The second and better answer is because I am needed. The world is clearly a more dangerous place than at any time since I started serving in 2001—indeed, perhaps since my grandfather was in uniform in the Second World War. The return of great-power competition heralds a period of tension that could well lead to armed confrontation or war in the Indo-Pacific.

History tells us that we must prepare for the worst, and that a strong and capable military is a vital part of that preparation. I migrated to Australia to secure a better future for my children, and I believe that future is now under threat. My service in 2025 has more meaning than it did when I arrived in 2015. It is my contribution to securing my children’s future.

This brings me to my final answer: ‘I serve because I am Australian.’ This is a fine place to finish. Migrating to another nation in mid-life has been hard—a core change in identity that led me from being British to becoming Australian. I often reflect that, while I originally served to gain Australian citizenship, I have now become truly Australian due to my service.

My time in the Australian Army has fundamentally connected me to the nation. It has shown me all the different Australias: from Whyalla in the south to the red desert in the Northern Territory, from the beauty of Perth to the Atherton Tableland. I have been privileged to lead the oldest cavalry regiment in the Australian Army, with a history dating back to 1860. I have worn the Australian national flag on my sleeve every day for nearly a decade, a constant reminder of what the country has given my family and me. I would not be the Australian I am today without the Australian Army.

For me, this is one of the most under-recognised benefits of service: an appreciation of and connection to nation. The idea of patriotism is struggling in the modern age, but the definition remains clear: ‘the quality of being devoted to one’s country.’ I am far more devoted to Australia than I expected to be, just 10 years ago. Because I am an Australian soldier. Always.

Women in combat roles strengthen our defence force

The Ukraine war has been called the bloodiest conflict since World War II. As of July 2024, 10,000 women were serving in frontline combat roles. Try telling them—from the safety of an Australian lounge room—they don’t belong there. But that’s exactly what the now disendorsed Liberal candidate for Whitlam, Benjamin Britton, did last week when he doubled down on his claim that women didn’t belong in combat.

The idea of women in combat is not new; it dates back centuries. That this topic has re-entered mainstream political debate is dangerous and damaging. It risks undermining the morale of our defence force and stoking a culture war at precisely the moment when we should be focused on enhancing capability.

National security is a bipartisan priority, with both sides acknowledging the strategic uncertainty Australia faces: war in Europe, instability in the Middle East and China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific.

Yet instead of strengthening our defence capability, recent political discourse risks undermining it. The resurfacing of comments from Britton—calling for the removal of women from combat roles to ‘fix the military’—and a 2018 interview in which opposition defence spokesman Andrew Hastie claimed the ‘fighting DNA’ of close combat units was ‘best preserved when exclusively male’ do exactly that.

It’s important to clarify what combat roles actually entail. These are positions that engage directly with enemy forces—traditionally found on warships, in fighter aircraft and on the battlefield. But as the character of war has evolved across the five domains—land, sea, air, cyber and space—so too has the nature of combat. The lines are increasingly blurred, exemplified by growing recognition of drone operators as combat roles. Today, defining a combat role is far less clear-cut than it once was. Which only reinforces how ludicrous it is to exclude 50 percent of the Australian population from these roles.

Australia’s journey towards fully integrating women has been a long one. Women have proudly supported Australian military operations since the Boer War in 1899. In 1990, the chief of navy lifted restrictions on women serving at sea, with Royal Australian Navy women deploying in frontline roles during the Gulf War aboard HMAS Westralia. By 1998, the navy allowed women to serve on submarines.

In 1992, most Australian Defence Force roles were opened to women, with only a few exceptions remaining: clearance divers, combat engineers, infantry, artillery, airfield defence and special forces.

In 1992 the Royal Australian Air Force opened fighter pilot roles to women, though uptake has been slow because of cultural barriers rather than capability. Yet even before that, in 1990, female RAAF pilots were already flying C-130s in combat-related roles, and by 2000 women were serving as navigators in Australia’s F-111 strike aircraft.

While admittedly the nature of conflict across the domains is different, these are combat roles where women’s lives are on the line and the sacrifices are just as real.

The journey towards the inclusion of women in land combat roles in Australia has been slower. While ADF women have made key contributions to peacekeeping missions since the 1990s, it wasn’t until 2011 that the formal ban on women serving in land combat roles was lifted, followed by special forces roles in 2014.

This was despite the first woman earning her commando green beret as early as 1981 and women serving as combat medics alongside special forces in Afghanistan before the policy change.

But what of Britton’s specific comments? Setting aside his apparent misunderstanding of the broad range of combat roles, he expressed concern about ‘women’s hips’.

It’s true that studies in Australia and Britain have found that body armour designed for men can have adverse physical impacts on women. But these same studies conclude that such issues can be resolved through improved design. It’s not a reduction in protection, just a redesign to fit the body it’s intended for.

And what about the success rates of women in these physically arduous roles? In 2018, the director of workforce strategy for the army told a parliamentary committee that attrition rates for women in combat roles were broadly the same as those for men.

Likewise, the proportion of applicants, male and female, who fail to meet the physical employment standards for these roles shows no significant gender difference.

As for the so-called fighting DNA of close combat units—I’ve never served in land combat—it’s an experience that deserves the respect of a grateful nation. But based on my operational experience, from service at sea during the second Gulf War to chasing armed drug smugglers in the Caribbean, I can say this: the fighting DNA of a warship is strengthened, not weakened, by diversity of all kinds—including gender.

Australia faces the real prospect of conflict in our region. Faux culture wars such as this serve only to distract from the serious task of preparing our defence force for the challenges ahead.

Oliver’s struggle: a case study in the frustration of trying to join the ADF

If you’re a qualified individual looking to join the Australian Army, prepare for a world of frustration over the next 12 to 18 months. While thorough vetting is essential, the inefficiency of the Australian Defence Force’s recruitment process is inexcusable.

Communication between recruits and the ADF is disorganised and inefficient. The system seems designed to test patience rather than welcome recruits.

What follows is a case study. It’s the miserable experience of 22-year-old Oliver from Sydney, an entirely suitable recruit who struggled for 12 months to be recruited—by an organisation that says it can’t get enough people. (‘Oliver’ is not his real name.)

Oliver’s application process was so riddled with complications that he lost count. A particular issue was constant turnover of recruiters. Oliver went through four different recruiters in 12 months.

Twice, his file was reassigned without any notice, and on two other occasions, he had to personally track down his new recruiter’s details and make the first contact. He discovered that his recruiter was no longer handling his case only when his emails and calls began to go unanswered. Each time, he had to call the general recruiting phone line just to get an update on his application and find out who his new case manager was.

On top of that, poor record-keeping led to lost documents, adding unnecessary delays. But the most frustrating part was the medical clearance process, which became an administrative nightmare.

‘Every time I followed up [on the medical clearance], I’d find out they had either lost my documents again or hadn’t even checked them since last uploading them,’ Oliver says. ‘It felt like I was stuck in an endless loop of submitting paperwork with no progress.’

Recruiter turnover meant that each of Oliver’s follow-ups were with a new person with no understanding of his case, causing misunderstandings surrounding his medical history. Oliver had undergone leg surgery in the past, so he understood that some delay arising from it was inevitable. However, he didn’t expect simple administrative tasks to be mishandled so often.

For instance, he was required to complete a second pre-entry fitness assessment two weeks before his enlistment. When he arrived at the test location, he discovered he wasn’t on the list. His recruiter had forgotten to book him in, despite assuring him otherwise. Fortunately, the assessment staff, whom he happened to know, allowed him to take the test and promptly submitted his scores. Without their help, his enlistment date would have been delayed yet again.

After everything he had been through, it was no surprise that his medical approval took six months: if they couldn’t even book a basic fitness test, how could he trust them to handle something as important as his medical history?

Prolonged uncertainty keeps recruits in limbo, disrupting their personal lives. Oliver, for instance, chose not to renew his residential lease for another year, because thought he might soon need to leave town for a life in the army. Instead, he moved frequently and cycled through jobs, always on edge: at any moment, he could be called and told to ship out. Had he known the process would drag on, or had he received a firm departure date, he could have signed the lease and avoided a year of instability.

His impression was that the ADF was indifferent to the hardship its process takes on applicants. This leaves a negative impression on recruits, already part of a generation less inclined to serve than their forebears were and sends a clear message that their commitment is met with bureaucracy rather than support.

Oliver, a dual citizen of Australia and the United States, became so frustrated that he nearly enlisted in the US military instead. In the US Army, recruits can receive up to US$50,000 (nearly AU$80,000) in bonuses, including a US$15,000 (AU$24,000) Quick Ship Bonus for those who start basic training within 30 days.

In contrast, the average enlistment process in Australia takes about 300 days—but it doesn’t have to. If Australia is serious about addressing its recruitment crisis, the first step is fixing a system that almost seems designed to push recruits away.

Oliver was finally accepted September 2024. He’s now in infantry.

If not for a determination to serve, which he had held since the age of 15, he likely wouldn’t have made it through the process. This begs the question: how many potential recruits, uncertain about enlisting, abandon their applications in frustration? Stories like Oliver’s seem countless.

The ADF’s failure to efficiently vet qualified recruits isn’t just a bureaucratic hiccup; it’s a fundamental flaw costing valuable soldiers. Fixing this requires prioritising high-performing applicants like Oliver, reducing bureaucratic hurdles and improving recruitment capacity. If Australia wants a strong, capable military force, it needs to start by proving to recruits that their time, dedication and service are valued—not wasted.

Looking back to look forward, 10 years after the First Principles Review

Exactly 10 years ago, the then minister for defence, Kevin Andrews, released the First Principles Review: Creating One Defence (FPR). With increasing talk about the rising possibility of major power-conflictcalls for Defence funding to increase to at least 3 percent of GDP, and questions raised about Defence’s ability to spend the money appropriated to it, it is the perfect time to assess whether Defence created the sustainable and enduring business model that the Review championed.

The FPR was commissioned in August 2014 by the predecessor of Andrews, David Johnston, as both an election commitment and a response to the 2014 National Commission of Audit’s recommendation for an efficiency review ‘as a pre-condition for setting any new funding profile for Defence under the White Paper’.

Conducted over eight months and chaired by David Peever, the FPR was an end-to-end review of Defence’s business processes, structure and organisation. It was designed to look forward to the challenges Defence would face in the 21st century and structured around the need for a sustainable and enduring business model. The combined effect of the review was supposed to be a more unified and integrated organisation, more consistently linked to strategy and led by its centre.

Key among the FPR’s recommendations were:

—Establishment of a strong, strategic centre to strengthen accountability and top-level decision-making. This would involve a new ‘One Defence’ business model, a streamlined top level management structure, establishment of a strong and credible internal contestability function, and a reduced number of committees;

—The establishment of a single end-to-end capability development function to maximise the efficient, effective and professional delivery of military capability. This included establishing the new Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) with reduced management layers, and transferring accountability for requirements setting and management to the vice chief and the service chiefs;

—The implementation of an enterprise approach to the delivery of services enabling corporate and military operations to maximise their effectiveness and efficiency. This would involve consolidation and standardisation in estate, information management, geospatial intelligence and customer-centric service delivery;

—The creation of a ‘One Defence’ workforce to ensure committed people with the right skills are in appropriate jobs, through the development of a strategic workforce plan for building a highly professional workforce across the Department and the Australian Defence Force; and

—The management of staff resources to deliver optimal use of funds and maximise efficiencies, through stripping back and simplification of overly complicated processes and structures, as well as the introduction of greater transparency, contestability and professionalism.

The review set out an ambitious agenda to ensure that Defence was fit for purpose and able to deliver with the minimum resources necessary. Most of the recommendations were implemented over two years.

At its simplest, the FPR sought to ensure that respective ministers, secretaries and chiefs of defence force would ask themselves every working day: Does this decision (or these options to government) strip back and simplify complicated processes and structures? Do they introduce greater transparency, contestability and professionalism? Do they enforce accountability and leadership?

Against these three questions, sadly, Defence’s implementation did not climb to the ambitions demanded by the review team. Despite the FPR’s intent to dethatch Defence’s hierarchy, devolve accountabilities to the lowest level possible and de-layer the organisation, Defence now has more senior executive service and star-ranked officers and organisational units than it did in 2015.

Committee structures have similarly reverted, though it should be acknowledged that the Investment Committee has been a positive advance for the organisation, though the burden on its members continues to be back-breakingly cumbersome. The behavioural change that is necessary to transform Defence seems to have broken on the rocks of institutional resistance.

The review highlighted ‘an organisational culture within Defence that is risk-averse and resistant to change’. The FPR authors were deeply focused on the risk culture of the organisation and many of their recommendations centred on practical ways to overcome this risk aversion. The simplicity and elegance of their recommendations were certainly lost on the upper floors of the Russell offices during the implementation process.

Defence’s failure to change—with concomitant failure to deliver—represents the organisation’s unwillingness to explore a different concept of risk management. This was also the case with Peever’s subsequent review of Defence innovation in 2021, which called for Defence to embrace a desire to improve (we think—the review was heavily redacted, including all of its recommendations).

Similarly, the concept of a single end-to-end capability development function has not taken root, with the contestability function failing to meet the aim of a ‘robust and disciplined contestability function to provide arm’s-length assurance to the secretary that the capability needs and requirements are aligned with strategy and resources and can be delivered’. Correspondingly, the transfer of accountability to the service chiefs appears to have frustrated the FPR’s aims for an integrated capability management process, in which all the fundamental inputs to capability (including industry support, facilities, ICT and workforce) are managed as a whole.

This has been particularly challenging for the capability managers within CASG, who no longer have all the levers necessary to effectively and efficiently manage the ‘smart buyer’ function. It appears that the common-sense approach to acquiring and sustaining capability—where the full process does not need to be followed when common sense says that the judicious use of a fast-track path is appropriate and risks are acceptable—has struggled. Few are the examples of innovative use of procurement practices, development of fast-track projects, or the creation of novel contractual relationships.

Skill development in CASG, and in Defence more broadly, continues to be a fundamental challenge. The Defence Workforce Plan didn’t emerge until 2024, and we are yet to see whether this plan will effectively deliver the required workforce, identify the critical skills gaps or build those skills and workforce strategies that place ‘the right people with the right skills in the right roles at the right time to deliver Defence’s mission’.

Defence is pursuing yet another strategic reform agenda, set out in Chapter 11 of the National Defence Strategy. It aims to deliver both strategic reform—the transformation of the core elements of Defence that deliver effects to achieve the strategy of denial—and enterprise reform—the transformation of Defence’s enabling elements that drive performance. In doing so, it could do worse than returning to the fundamental first principles that drove the FPR:

—Clear authorities and accountabilities that align with resources (empowering decision-makers to deliver on strategies and plans within agreed resourcing, while also holding them responsible);

—Outcome orientation (delivering what is required with processes, systems and tools being the means, not the end);

—Simplicity (eliminating complicated and unnecessary structures, processes, systems and tools);

—Focus on core business (Defence doing only for itself what no one else can do more effectively and efficiently);

—Professionalism (encouraging committed people with the right skills in appropriate jobs);

—Timely, contestable advice (using internal and external expertise to provide the best advice so that the outcome is delivered in the most cost-effective and efficient manner); and

—Transparency (behaving in a way that enables others to know exactly what Defence is doing and why).

If Australia is to effectively meet the challenges it faces, the government and the public need to have confidence in the combat capabilities of its armed forces, the effectiveness and timeliness of Defence’s decision making and the efficient use of the nation’s treasure.

Peever and his team set up a strong and sensible plan to ensure Defence was able to meet these three demands. Sadly, because of culture, behaviour and bureaucratic malaise, the FPR proved less enduring than the review team—and the Australian public—needed it to be.

3 percent of GDP for defence is no stretch. We did 2.9 percent in the Cold War

Australia has plenty of room to spend more on defence. History shows that 2.9 percent of GDP is no great burden in ordinary times, so pushing spending to 3.0 percent in dangerous times is very achievable.

Budget watchers are quick to cite difficulties amid current pressures on revenue and expenditure. But historical data is more revealing than a nearsighted view down in the weeds of fiscal policy.

Australia just isn’t trying. For all the talk of deteriorating strategic circumstances, the defence share of GDP has been flat for half a decade, wandering between 1.9 and 2.0 percent.

The issues holding Australia back from spending more on its defence are largely political rather than economic.

The 2020 Strategic Defence Update identified an increase in geopolitical risks in our region and noted the possibility of Australia becoming involved in a major conflict without the formerly assumed 10-year warning time. As a result, successive Australian governments have made announcements about lifting defence spending through initiatives such as equipping the army with long-range missiles, expansion of the navy’s surface fleet and, most dramatically, AUKUS.

However, in terms of GDP, the proportion of total economic output that goes into current defence spending per year has not increased in recent years. It continues to hover around 1.9–2.0 percent of GDP. As shown in the chart below, Australia’s average defence spending as proportion of GDP since the Cold War ended has been 1.9 percent.

On 5 March, Elbridge Colby, head of policy at the US Department of Defense, called for Australia to spend 3.0 percent of GDP on defence. Various Australian defence and security figures, including former chief of the Australian Defence Force Angus Houston and former secretary of home affairs Mike Pezzullo have similarly called for defence spending to be lifted to 3.0 percent of GDP.

Economics writer David Uren recently explained that to lift defence spending to 3.0 percent, Australia would have to either take on additional debt, increase taxes or reallocate money from elsewhere in the government budget. All three of these options would be politically difficult.

While this is a point well made, the details of fiscal policy that usually absorb us become less useful for assessing the defence budget as we move into more unstable and dangerous times. History shows us that sustaining 3.0 percent of GDP spending over a period of time is quite achievable for Australia. The most recent example of this is the Cold War, particularly up until the 1970s.

Sources: SIPRI Military Expenditure Index and Australian government projections

As the chart shows, Australia could sustain average defence spending of 2.9 percent of GDP through the Cold War over 40 years from 1950 to 1991. (The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute dataset which the chart is based on only goes back as far as 1950, not quite the beginning of the Cold War.) This is very close to the 3.0 percent currently being advocated for. During the Cold War, Australia responded to the threat of communism expanding into South-East Asia by maintaining significant forces and often deploying these into various conflicts across our region.

This contrasts with the post-Cold War period from 1992 until now, where defence spending has averaged 1.9 percent of GDP. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and its Western allies quickly reduced military spending, enjoying a peace dividend due to reduced global geopolitical tensions. From 1986 to 1996, Australian defence spending dropped 0.6 of a percentage point from 2.5 percent to 1.9 percent of GDP. Over the next few years, defence spending remained consistently below 2.0 percent, even during the years of Australia’s involvement in the global war on terror and peacekeeping operations in our region. In 2013, defence spending reached its lowest share of GDP since 1938, just 1.6 percent of GDP.

The years since have seen great increase in geopolitical tensions, both in our region and globally. Yet defence spending as a proportion of GDP has increased only moderately and slowly since 2013, sitting at 2.0 percent in 2025. Under the government’s projections, spending will continue to slowly increase to 2.3 percent by 2033–34.

This is too little, too late. Under current budget restrictions, new defence announcements largely rely on cannibalising existing funding from sources declared to be of lesser priority, rather than on new funding. A recent example of this is the Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicle, which was cut from 450 vehicles to 129 vehicles, at a much higher per-unit cost.

The proportion of GDP should only be used as a rough guide towards spending on defence. What the money is spent on is important. However, the risk to Australian national security was no greater in the Cold War than it is now, and was arguably much lower. The fact that Australia for several decades maintained defence spending at higher levels than now shows that the country is capable of doing the same again.

China’s warships reveal more than a need to strengthen the ADF

Last month’s circumnavigation by a potent Chinese naval flotilla sent a powerful signal to Canberra about Beijing’s intent. It also demonstrated China’s increasing ability to threaten Australia’s maritime communications, as well as the entirety of its eastern and southern seaboards, where the major population centres and critical infrastructure are concentrated. In a major war, our civilian infrastructure is likely to be targeted, not just military bases.

The deployment further highlighted national resilience vulnerabilities that go well beyond the need to strengthen the Australian Defence Force’s capabilities, overdue and critical though this task undoubtedly is.

While the presence of a Chinese navy task group this far south was unprecedented, and a noteworthy demonstration of China’s reach and sustainment capability, it is important to stress that peacetime signalling through military presence and wartime operations are poles apart. As we are in peacetime, China’s naval flotilla was free to manoeuvre in close formation within Australia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and conduct live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea.

In a crisis or conflict, it is highly unlikely that China’s warships would venture so close to Australia’s continental coastline. Even with Australia’s current, inadequate military capability, the ADF would be able to hold a similar Chinese flotilla at clear risk of annihilation. Surface vessels approaching Australia are easily detected long before they appear in our vicinity, by surveillance systems such as the Jindalee Operational Radar Network. If the navy had not already intercepted a hostile surface action group in Australia’s maritime approaches, the air force would be tasked with responding.

However, such an effort would absorb much of the ADF’s combat capacity. It also assumes a free hand to operate from air bases, when those same, currently unhardened bases could be subjected to preparatory missile strikes launched by China’s long-range aircraft and submarines. China’s most capable warships have stand-off and air-defence weapons of their own, and could still pose a significant threat to ships and coastal targets.

China’s growing fleet of nuclear-propelled attack submarines would be much harder to detect than surface vessels. They would likely operate independently, further stretching the ADF’s resources. Even when threats are detected, gaps will remain in the ADF’s ability to respond to intrusions in our vicinity. After all, while Australia’s extensive continental and island territories create the world’s third-largest EEZ, our navy is and will remain significantly smaller than Japan’s or South Korea’s.

Monitoring and responding to incidents within such vast tracts of sea and air space is challenging even in peacetime. But gaps in capability can be narrowed if Australia invests with greater urgency and purpose to realise the focused, integrated force outlined in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review.

To defend the Australian homeland against China’s power projection, which is only going to grow in scale and frequency, the ADF needs to grow bigger, faster and more lethal. At the same time, Australia’s political and military leaders must avoid being lured into a defensive mindset. Beijing’s ‘I can play in your backyard, if you play in mine’ message is intended to do just that.

An Australia preoccupied with localised defence, less intent on shaping its surrounding region or developing the capabilities and forward posture needed for deterrence, serves Beijing’s interests more than Canberra’s. We need military flexibility, political will and strategic vision to help secure the region and defend ourselves.  We must remember that while China’s navy was sailing around Australia, it had other ships exercising in the South China Sea and near Taiwan. These remain China’s primary areas of military focus and should therefore be an ongoing focus for Australia’s deterrence efforts.

Even as Australia grapples with this unfamiliar challenge—a potential adversary that can project power from all directions and has every motivation to tie down the ADF during a conflict in East Asia—Canberra must continue to align its military efforts with those of our key allies and partners.

Also, the nuclear submarines we’re acquiring under AUKUS are flexible platforms that can be used for sea control. But their primary purpose is not, as sometimes portrayed, to protect and defend Australia’s vital trade routes and sea lines of communication. The massive investment to acquire them will be squandered if they are tied up in the defence of homeland waters or escorting high-value assets. Fundamentally, they are for projecting denial by taking the fight as close to the adversary as physically feasible.

But within the next decade Australia will only have one SSN in service, at best, while the fate of the life extension program for our six old diesel submarines of the Collins class hangs in the balance. China’s uninvited naval presence underscores that even if Australia had an operational AUKUS submarine fleet tomorrow, there would still be a need for a concomitant uplift in the ADF’s conventional capabilities across the board.  Unfortunately, the government has not approached this uplift with the requisite urgency. The opportunity costs of prioritising defence spending increases to fulfil our AUKUS Pillar 1 commitments have come home to roost.

Granted, improvements to the Royal Australian Air Force’s maritime strike capabilities are underway, as evidenced by the recent test-firing of an LRASM anti-ship missile by an F/A-18F Super Hornet, and an associated missile order from the US. The navy is also boosting its inventory of Mark 48 heavyweight torpedos. But the dollar value of such orders tends to obscure their relatively modest scale. For example, A$200 million buys 30 torpedos of the Mark 48 latest variant, based on a unit cost of A$6.7 million.

War stocks are chronically low across the ADF, despite the need to ‘sustain protracted operations during a conflict’ being designated as one of six priority capability effects in the 2024 National Defence Strategy. In addition to boosting its combat power, the navy needs to enhance its undersea surveillance capabilities in Australia’s approaches, to aid submarine detection efforts.

Mike Pezzullo has suggested that Australia acquire B-1B bombers as they are progressively retired from the US air force, and put them into service with Australia’s air force in an anti-ship role. This is a radical idea that deserves serious consideration. While expensive, it could be done on a timeline more relevant to our deteriorating security situation than AUKUS—though AUKUS should still go ahead.

Even then, Australia’s investments in maritime strike from the air will be worth nothing in a war if missile strikes render the air force’s bases inoperable. Base hardening needs to be done in parallel, just as China is doing on a massive scale. Equally, the government’s ambitions to invest in integrated air and missile defence, highlighted as a priority in the Defence Strategic Review, remain just that: ambitions.

In this context, the Australian Army can contribute to securing our surrounding waters and approaches by fielding anti-ship missiles on mobile launchers. This will make our coastal defence thicker, less predictable to enemies and more survivable. But it remains unclear how far down the track the project to implement this, Land 8113 Phase 2, has progressed.

China’s demonstration that it can project and sustain naval power into Australia’s surrounding waters has highlighted our lack of maritime resilience. As the late James Goldrick put it, defending a fortress is pointless without attending to its water supply.

As an island nation, Australia would face profound national sustainment challenges in a wartime environment where prevailing regional trade patterns would be massively disrupted. Shipping would be a key pillar of our national economic security, if not survival. In any prolonged maritime conflict, Australia would have to requisition merchant vessels to sustain the nation’s wartime needs beyond the short term. Australia’s nationally flagged fleet, comprising around 12 vessels and not a single tanker, is risibly inadequate.

The idea that Australia could depend solely on market forces for imports needed for national survival is dangerously complacent, especially given China’s growing dominance in international shipping and port ownership. The fact that the global maritime trading system has absorbed the impact of limited conflict in the Black and Red seas without breaking down owes much to good luck and some wrenching supply-side adjustments.

This is not simply a question of ensuring that Australia maintains maritime imports of essential commodities from across the oceans. Coastal shipping, although out of sight to most of the population, is vital to Australia’s economic functioning. Road haulage is no substitute for bulk transportation by sea. Much of Australia’s critical infrastructure, including our two remaining oil refineries, is vulnerably situated near the coast. We lack the redundancy and stockpiles to absorb damage or cope with sustained supply disruptions. Australia is energy rich. We are a major exporter. But what counts more when it comes to the crunch is our continuing dependence on imported fuels, including 100 percent of our aviation fuel.

The government-commissioned report on a Maritime Strategic Fleet, submitted almost two years ago, needs to be revisited urgently. There is little evidence that its modest suite of recommendations has been adopted. The report assessed that 12 privately owned and commercially operated vessels under the Australian flag and crewed by Australians would be enough to meet emergency needs. This is highly questionable if there were a protracted maritime conflict in the Western Pacific. The strategic fleet needs to include dedicated tankers, as well as more cargo vessels capable of transporting refined fuel products (the navy has two replenishment ships of its own).

By comparison, the US has a fleet of 10 US-registered tankers in its Tanker Security Program. These vessels operate commercially in peacetime, but are essentially reserved for military use to support forward operations in wartime. They are not intended to keep the US’s lights on, or those of its allies. Australia’s need to secure oil and oil products will be far more acute, given our paltry fuel reserves and absence of domestic alternatives.  Deep pockets may not be enough to secure supplies on the spot market at the outset of a conflict, given the attendant competition and dislocation.

There is a case for Australia to consider acquiring its own cable-laying ship, to repair or replace fibre-optic seabed cables cut by an adversary at the onset of a conflict. Such ships are in short supply and their availability would be highly uncertain during wartime. An Australian-flagged specialised seabed cable support vessel would be a strategic asset that Canberra could make available to its closest allies and partners in the Pacific.

If the South China Sea and the major straits connecting it to the Indian Ocean are deemed too hazardous for international shipping, the long diversionary route around Australia will become crucial for Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan (unless it’s blockaded) and the US from a military standpoint. From a supply and sustainment perspective, Australia should benefit from such a major realignment of shipping flows. Calling into Australian ports would no longer require a long and tell-tale diversion from major shipping lanes. And, to some extent, there is still safety in numbers, provided shipping is directly or indirectly protected.

The importance of the coastal sea lanes immediately south of Australia provides a strong case for us entering into cooperative arrangements with countries such as Japan and South Korea. India would become Australia’s most obvious substitute source for refined products, assuming that Japan, South Korea and Singapore would be unable or unwilling to meet our needs. And trans-Pacific routes would be vital to maintain communications and reinforcement from the US.

But there are downsides. China’s naval strategists and planners have likely also realised that the southern diversionary route would become a strategic artery for the US and its regional allies and partners, not simply of local importance to Australia. This paints China’s uninvited naval circumnavigation in a more strategic hue.

Australia’s southern and eastern seaboards could become a target for the interdiction of allied supplies, as they were for Germany and Japan in World War II, on and under the surface (Germany mined the Bass Strait during both world wars). Western Australia would be of heightened interest as a military target, given the likely concentration of US, British and Australian submarines at HMAS Stirling. Australia would necessarily have to assume primary responsibility for the protection of shipping passing close to its shores, partly as a quid pro quo to ensure its own supply. This would mean fewer warships and other assets would be available to perform other tasks, such as repelling an invasion of Taiwan or relieving a blockade of the island.

Fortunately, the closer the shipping lanes pass to the coast, the easier they are to defend. A layered defence incorporating assets based on land, air and sea could extend area protection in sufficient depth so that direct escort would be necessary only for the highest-value strategic cargoes or military assets. All three services would need to play an active role in defending Australian coastal waters and approaches for the duration of the conflict. The creative use of uncrewed platforms could alleviate the burden on the navy and air force.

Sustainment during wartime is a whole-of-nation endeavour. China’s recent naval visit, while in no sense a cause for panic, should sound an alarm that echoes beyond Australia’s naval community and the ADF. The defence of the nation during a major conflict will require more than just capable armed forces to succeed, while civilian infrastructure could be exposed as our Achilles’ heel. Australia’s national resilience and readiness will be the main theme of ASPI’s annual defence conference, on 4 June.