Beneath Taiwan’s high-profile fight for global recognition lies a parallel contest in capitals scattered across the Caribbean and the Pacific. This is Beijing’s relentless campaign to isolate Taiwan diplomatically—country by country—until Taipei is left with no country that formally recognises it and no international voice. Since 2016, Taiwan has lost the recognition of 10 countries to China; just 12 remain. The question is not whether that number will fall again, but which will be next.

In the 1970s, the United States, Australia and others switched recognition to China, signalling Taiwan’s diplomatic marginalisation. Though many maintain informal ties, the lack of formal recognition fuels a perception that Taiwan’s status is an unresolved question of the international order—an ambiguity that Beijing exploits to isolate it further.

In line with Beijing’s goals, every further diplomatic defection strengthens the perception that Taiwan is not a legitimate state but a breakaway province awaiting inevitable reunification. Each loss weakens Taiwan’s ability to advocate in international forums, reinforces Beijing’s so-called One China narrative, and signals to other countries that siding with Beijing is both lucrative and inevitable.

So, who is currently most at risk of switching recognition under pressure?

Haiti’s recognition is arguably the most precarious. Once Taiwan’s strongest foothold in the Caribbean, Haiti today is a failed state in all but name. With no functioning government, a shattered economy, and cities under the control of armed gangs, Haiti is desperate for security assistance and international support. In recent months, Haitian officials openly engaged with Beijing, hoping that China—as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council—will back a multilateral security mission. That engagement already skirts the diplomatic line of recognition.

While Taiwan continues to provide modest development aid, it cannot offer Haiti what Beijing can: immediate cash, infrastructure support and a vote at the UN to authorise a security mission aimed at stabilising the country. In Haiti, where authority is fractured and whoever emerges next in Port-au-Prince will be looking for fast and visible gains, switching recognition to the China is more than plausible; it’s likely.

Next in line is Saint Lucia, a country with a history of flip-flopping between Taipei and Beijing. After switching to China in 1997, it restored ties with Taiwan in 2007. But that reversal has always carried an air of fragility. The current government, led by the Saint Lucia Labour Party, has signalled a more pragmatic approach driven by the island’s reliance on tourism and agriculture, which makes it susceptible to external economic pressures. Saint Lucia recently sent a representative to a forum involving China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean states in Beijing. That was a diplomatic olive branch that Beijing welcomed.

While Taiwan’s relationship with Saint Lucia remains cordial, the signs are ominous. China has previously offered generous inducements to Caribbean nations, including debt write-offs, Belt and Road investment and development loans. If Prime Minister Philip J Pierre judges that China can offer more than Taiwan—or simply wants to diversify Saint Lucia’s options—a shift could come with little warning. Among Taiwan’s Caribbean diplomatic partners, Saint Lucia appears to be the state that is most actively hedging.

Even the Holy See, Taiwan’s sole diplomatic partner in Europe, presents a unique and symbolic risk. Although the Vatican has maintained warm ties with Taipei for decades, its ongoing dialogue with Beijing over the appointment of bishops has long raised fears of an eventual diplomatic shift. A broader agreement on religious affairs could increase pressure on the Holy See to sever formal ties with Taiwan. While the late Pope Francis was notably more open to rapprochement with Beijing, it remains too early to gauge whether his successor, Pope Leo XIV, will continue down that path or instead recalibrate the Vatican’s approach to China.

Eswatini, Taiwan’s last remaining ally in Africa, also sits on shaky ground. Its loyalty hinges entirely on the personal support of King Mswati III, one of the world’s last absolute monarchs. Taiwan has cultivated this relationship for decades, supporting health and education initiatives and extending symbolic gestures of friendship. But cracks are showing. In 2023, Eswatini quietly signed its first major infrastructure deal with a Chinese state-owned company—without recognising Beijing. This kind of transactional engagement may be a prelude to something more formal. What makes Eswatini especially vulnerable is the opacity of its decision-making. If King Mswati decides that China offers more—whether in aid, political backing or regime security—the switch could be sudden.

Guatemala and Paraguay—two of Taiwan’s key Latin American diplomatic partners—are showing signs of strain. Guatemala’s new president, Bernardo Arévalo, supports Taiwan but faces political instability that China could exploit with promises of investment and influence. In Paraguay, President Santiago Peña remains pro-Taiwan, but pressure from the powerful agricultural lobby and a competitive opposition open the door to a future shift, especially if economic conditions worsen.

In contrast, Taiwan’s Pacific diplomatic partners—Tuvalu, Palau, and Marshall Islands— have held firm against Beijing’s pressure due to shared democratic values, strong US ties, and long-standing development support from Taipei. Unlike China’s often debt-driven offers, Taiwan’s aid is seen as consistent and transparent. These countries are also wary of Beijing’s coercive tactics, such as Palau’s tourism ban, and current leaders have shown strong personal commitment to maintaining ties with Taiwan. While these nations have resisted Beijing’s overtures so far, Beijing is patient—and persistent.

Taiwan, to its credit, has responded by doubling down on high-level engagement, offering targeted development aid, and encouraging informal partnerships with democracies. But the stark reality is this: in the contest between Taiwan’s limited resources and China’s coercive toolkit, the ground is shifting. The next defection may not be a surprise; it may be confirmation that Beijing’s long game is working.

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