Malaysian–Australian relations: close to the limit (part II)

Exercise Bersama Lima 2011In my last post, I outlined the development of the long-standing defence relationship between Australia and Malaysia. While there is strong history between both militaries, the difference in the ways in which they are utilised accounts for, in part, the limit to how close a defence relationship there can be. Here, I examine additional factors impacting on Australia–Malaysia cooperation.

First is the issue of defence budgets; both countries are facing the issues of limited budgets for their militaries which in turn affects their capability for future training, particularly when having to deploy assets out of country. Indeed the RMAF’s non-participation at this year’s RAAF Pitch Black exercise in Australia was due to a lack of funding. It might be expected that both militaries may have to curtail some of their activities in the future in order to accommodate the budget.

Second, further expansion of training and cooperation may largely be moot due to the existing commitments of both nations. All three services of the ADF are heavily involved with Australia’s global missions and, with the presence of the US military in Darwin, the ADF will add additional joint exercise and training activities to its schedule and thus be limited in what it can provide in regard to other bilateral military cooperation and training. In Malaysia, the Royal Malaysian Navy and RMAF face the problem that their forces are undersized for patrolling Malaysia’s extensive maritime waters and airspace and as such are heavily committed, which limits the assets and personnel available for cooperation and training with foreign forces. The Malaysian Army, given its size, could easily accommodate an increased scope of military exercises with its Australian Army counterparts in the form of company- or battalion-sized mechanised, armour or artillery exercises. But the fact that both countries have sufficient training areas for such in their respective countries means that neither army can justify the costs of shipping heavy equipment and troops overseas for an exercise, particularly in an era of budgetary restraint. Read more

Strategy, politics and soldiers’ deaths

SGT Blaine Diddams, RAAF Base PearceThe loss of any soldier is terrible. When that death is at the hands of one of the very people they had been sent to mentor, the psychological impact is even more telling.

Late last year I was in Afghanistan at the time of the second ‘green on blue’ attack, when three Australians were killed and others wounded. Because I am a journalist, I wasn’t informed at first; although it didn’t take long to work out what had happened, particularly when I saw soldiers carrying loaded weapons and wearing body armour in the mess. Nevertheless, I respected the army’s desire and didn’t report what had occurred, even though this meant that when the news was initially released back in Australia I’d been comprehensively ‘scooped’.

That was irrelevant. The needs of the families to be informed first far outweighed the requirement to be ‘first’ with the news. It was just a matter of keeping things in perspective. Unfortunately, such perspective appears to increasingly be missing when it comes to dealing with casualties—which are an inevitable cost of the decision to go to war.

This week, Prime Minister Julia Gillard had the awful task of announcing an Afghan National Army soldier had killed three more diggers (although the spin-masters insisted it was a person ‘wearing an ANA uniform’, as if he had infiltrated from the outside). It was quite understandable she held a press conference to convey her sincere regret. Her sober comments were utterly irreproachable. But then she abruptly cancelled her attendance at the Pacific Islands Forum and immediately returned home …  and to do what, exactly? Read more

Malaysian–Australian relations: close to the limit (part I)

Bersama Lima 2011It might actually be said that Australia is Malaysia’s closest military cooperation partner. The close defence relationship between our countries is one that has come about due to various factors, including the common security umbrella of the Five Powers Defence Arrangement (FPDA) and a long legacy of Australian presence and sacrifice on Malaysian soil, in both World War II and the communist emergency. And we can add to that the long period of bilateral military training, exercises and cooperation that the two countries have had.

Australian military officers have long been serving in various training capacities in Malaysia and as such have built close relations with the Malaysian officers they have trained. In 1989, the current Australian Chief of Defence Force, General David Hurley, served a posting as the Mechanised Infantry Adviser, Australian Army Project Team Malaysia. Among the Malaysian Army officers he worked closely with while in Malaysia was the current Malaysian Chief of Defence Force, General Tan Sri Zulkifeli Mohd Zin. As well, numerous Malaysian officers have undergone initial and advanced training and education in Australia, and, at the same time, Australian officers have been regular fixtures in student classes of the Malaysian Staff College. Similar exchanges and training have been carried out for NCOs and enlisted ranks. All this has fostered a strong personal tie and bond between the militaries of both countries. Read more

Reader response: what the Secretary is really saying

Secretary of Defence Duncan Lewis

In his post on Duncan Lewis’ speech to ASPI, Peter Jennings gave us a good round up of the Secretary’s intent. Peter outlines three messages: match aspirations to the government-allocated funds; save and be efficient; and the inadequacy of our current structure and posture given future strategic circumstances. The first two are daily fare for Defence secretaries, and are what you would expect. The third might be the soldier-bureaucrat talking and I would like to offer my own interpretation to balance Peter’s.

Perhaps the Secretary is saying, of course the Department will get on with fitting the ADF and other defence programs into the funding provided, and all the while achieving savings and efficiencies. That is a given, and no one denies any government the right to set defence’s expenditure levels.

The Secretary’s third message, ‘As things stand I don’t think that we are structured or postured appropriately to meet our likely strategic circumstances in the future’ was picked by Peter as very important, and I can only agree. But having stated how important it is for the Secretary to give a not so subtle message against ‘a more worrying set of strategic trends’, Peter then stresses the Secretary’s comments on the Defence Cooperation Program and on some vague statement about reducing ‘… risk by doing business differently’. Read more

The dragon in our backyard: the strategic consequences of China’s increased presence in the South Pacific

US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s decision to attend the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in the Cook Islands this week signals the growing strategic importance of the South Pacific. Clinton’s attendance may also be a response to China’s increasing presence in the region. The consequences of China’s advance in our immediate neighbourhood are most significant for Australia, which is facing a situation where it may, for the first time in more than 70 years, find itself with a power with interests not necessary aligned to its own in its backyard.

China has been active in the South Pacific for four decades, mostly driven by its competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. Although a truce (of sorts) has held for the last few years, China and Taiwan have engaged in ‘chequebook diplomacy’ to win the favour of South Pacific states. While this competition remains important, China now appears to have strategic interests in demonstrating its ability to project global power via its increasing influence in the region. And, regardless of their small size, each independent South Pacific state has a vote in international organisations, which China can seek to persuade them to use in pursuit of its interests.

China’s efforts to penetrate the South Pacific were given a boost after Australia and New Zealand’s attempt to isolate the Fijian regime after the 2006 coup. The Fijian regime responded by adopting an explicit ‘look north’ policy and sought a closer relationship with China, which other regional states have followed. After Australia and New Zealand supported Fiji’s suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum, the Fijian regime focused its attention on the Melanesian Spearhead Group, from which Australia and New Zealand are excluded. China seized this opportunity to gain influence, sponsoring the creation of the Group’s Secretariat, and building its headquarters in Vanuatu. Read more

Indonesia’s problematic defence procurement priorities

The defence budget of the Republic of Indonesia has seen a significant increase in 2012, reaching US$8 billion—an increase of 29.5% from the previous year. The funding increase is intended to meet Indonesia’s minimum essential force (MEF) requirements. One purchase will be the main battle tank (MBT) Leopard 2A6 from Germany. The final purchase of 100 units is the result of tortuous negotiations after an earlier sale of the same type of tank was rejected by the Dutch parliament, leaving the vehicles available for sale elsewhere. Indonesia is determined to boost its armour to the equivalent of the forces of Malaysia and Singapore, who acquired MBTs some years ago.

But behind the purchase of Leopard tanks, there are is a crucial observation; the concept of procurement of military capability by Indonesia is not particularly well-planned. The Indonesian Ministry of Defense and the Indonesian military’s (TNI) headquarters have both expressed interest in buying the MBT, for different reasons. For TNI, it is a step up in capability, as their current armoured vehicles include only light tanks. From the government’s point of view, it’s a chance to implement a government purchase scheme which, by eliminating the role of broker, will reduce the occurrence of corrupt practices.

But as the impact of financial crisis that plagued Europe took hold, Indonesia was offered an opportunity not only in the form of an offer to buy the Dutch Leopards, but also AH-64 Apache helicopters and F-16 Block 52 fighter jets (which would mean TNI would at least have weapon systems comparable to Singapore’s and Malaysia’s). But on the other hand, Indonesia’s military procurement strategies seem to be emotionally driven; Indonesia wants to be seen to be keeping up militarily with neighbouring countries. Read more

How are we educating our military?

Current CIA Director and retired US Army officer, General David Petraeus argues that the most powerful tool any soldier carries is not his weapon but his mind. According to Petraeus, promising officers should be sent to first-class universities to undertake PhDs and to learn from and mix with future civilian leaders. Indeed, civilian academics in US military academies and staff colleges have publicly criticised the anti-academic attitudes and policies of their institutions.

But what exactly what kind of professional military education (PME) is required to develop the mind of career military officers? What sort of war should PME prepare officers for? Is preparing our forces for ‘war among the people’ the order of the day or should war between conventional forces remain the cornerstone of defence preparations? For a new ASPI report, we took a look at these questions and more, in the Australian context.

So, how well is the ADF doing in developing the knowledge and expertise required by members of the profession of arms? The question is all the more important as Australia seeks to adjust its policies to both a complex and shifting global power balance and a potentially turbulent regional environment. The ADF needs the know-how to conduct both high-tech operations with top end platforms and low-tech conflicts which require military personnel to deal with local societies and cultures face-to-face. And the austerity surrounding the defence budget isn’t going to make it any easier to fund investment in PME—by definition, its pay-off will be well down the track. Read more

Lewis lullaby is tough love for Defence

Secretary of Defence Duncan Lewis

Defence Secretary Duncan Lewis’ speech to ASPI last week was a message (put nicely) to his own organisation to toughen up: stop squealing about spending cuts and start rebuilding the organisation to handle a harder strategic environment. According to Lewis, his speech was a homage to Sir Arthur Tange’s infamous ‘Tange harangue’, a speech delivered in August 1973 which tore strips off the three Services for their ‘triplicated’ ways of doing business. And although the Secretary assured the audience he wouldn’t repeat Tange’s words that is exactly what he did, but in a subtler way.

The Secretary’s speech deserves careful reading for the messages it contains both to Government and to Defence. The first was about money: ‘If you haven’t talked dollars you haven’t talked strategy’ Lewis said, quoting Tange. The speech repeatedly emphasised the need to match strategic aspirations to the available dollars. Australia’s strategy, Lewis said ‘needs to be tempered by reality, affordability, and informed by the thinking and tasking of other Government agencies.’ Frankly, this is a more realistic appreciation of Defence’s position than in Defence Minister Stephen Smith’s recent speeches to ASPI and the Lowy Institute. Lewis knows that it is impossible to keep cutting spending and expect that there will be no loss of capability. His message is that we need a strategy that fits what Government is prepared to spend. Read more

Taking a legal approach to Australia’s cyber threat

Most discussions of cyber security are couched in terms of protecting computer systems, especially those belonging to government and managers of civilian infrastructure. No doubt the forthcoming government white paper on cyber security will also include that sort of discussion. Based on the earlier public discussion paper, it will probably also take the opportunity to begin a more nuanced discussion between the government and the wider population about the expected behaviour of each in cyberspace. In most walks of life there is a contract—usually implicit—between the government and the populace regarding service provision and law enforcement. Cyberspace will be no different, and some parts of any compact will be familiar. But the ubiquity of the internet and the zeal with which we’ve all taken to it, there’ll be some important differences.

One interesting proposal of the cyber white paper is the agreement of a social contract tied to the concept of ‘digital citizenship’. It emphasises responsible use of the internet by encouraging people to respect rules of usage—the digital social contract—and assume responsibility for inappropriate behaviour.

Here, I think, we should tread carefully because behind the concept of ‘digital citizenship’ is the complex issue of internet governance. Using laws in the real world as an analogy, I think legal instruments can be created to police the internet to a certain extent, while safeguarding the civil liberties of all Australians; though, this is no easy task, especially now there are clear overlaps and intersections between social, economic, and national cyber security. ISPs and law enforcement agencies could partner to block users who disregard basic rules of usage of the internet. Read more

Piracy: a solution is possible

In mid-June I chaired an international conference in Perth aimed at developing responses to piracy and related crimes at sea. The meeting was sponsored by the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Defence, and a summary of the deliberations as well as some very useful background papers by Sam Bateman has been released by ASPI today.

Three separate regions accounted for the vast bulk of the 439 actual and attempted piracy attacks in 2011: Southeast Asia, in particular the eastern approaches to the Straits of Malacca; the Horn of Africa; and the Gulf of Guinea. In each region the causes of piracy differ. In Southeast Asia stealing and reselling tug boats is a major problem. Ships left idle and at anchor in the wake of the global financial crisis are easy targets for attacks. Off the Horn of Africa and deeper into the Indian Ocean, piracy is the by-product of political authority breaking down in Somalia. Fishing communities can turn to piracy for a livelihood and become vulnerable to more organised criminal elements looking to make money from ransoming ships and their crew. In the Gulf of Guinea, piracy frequently involves stealing oil from tankers in sophisticated operations built around avoiding tax payments and illegal bunkering.

The causes are varied but the solutions share some common features; tightening up the policing of harbours and ports, and boosting cooperation between national agencies and between regional navies and maritime enforcement bodies. The good news here is that collective action will work to reduce the problem. Close cooperation in Southeast Asia, for example, is reducing the number of serious acts of piracy (although ironically increased reporting of lower-scale incidents seems to obscure the scale of overall reduction). Read more