Strategist Posts Archive - Page 1193 of 1209

Reader response: of course we have a choice

20 November 2012

Cam Hawker asserted here recently that if conflict broke out between the United States and China, Australia would automatically be at war since we host US Joint Facilities on Australian soil. Cam is right to raise the issues of abandonment and entrapment in Australia’s alliance relationship, and it is important for decision-makers in both Canberra and Washington to hold clear understandings of Australia’s strategic choices in a possible future crisis. To this end I applaud Cam for forcefully arguing such a provocative line.

Yet, leaving aside the unassailable fact that declarations of war on behalf of Australia may not be made by other countries, Cam’s arguments remain false for several reasons.

First, America does not have the capacity to conduct offensive operations against an adversary from the Joint Facilities. There are no Okinawa-style super bases here and hence few local Chinese targets. The mere fact that Joint Facilities exist in Australia is immaterial—as of late 2011, 92 countries permanently host more than 10 US service personnel, with 13 countries having more than 1,000 (and prior to the Marine rotations through Darwin, Australia was not among these).

Second, the Joint Facilities are not targets for China. After the Joint Facilities were first established, the Office of National Assessments judged that it would increase the probability of a nuclear attack on Australia in the event of a general nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, it was believed the Joint Facilities would strengthen America’s nuclear deterrent, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear conflict overall. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, China does not have thousands of excess ICBMs targeting every conceivable American facility across the globe. Instead, China preserves a minimum-deterrence second strike capability, for retaliation against US mainland cities. Read more

Doing the right thing is the right thing to do

19 November 2012

There’s an old maxim in military affairs: ‘lose moral authority, lose the war’! It’s most often quoted in the context of the conduct of armed forces towards third parties, most notably the civil population living within a theatre of operations. Occasionally, the maxim applies to one’s enemies, who may be spurred to fight on against those they consider to be a morally debased opponent. For example, fighters based in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan have been incensed by the use of unmanned drones, which they consider to be the coward’s weapon of choice.

However, there’s a further context in which the maxim applies—in relation to the quality of leadership displayed within one’s own ranks. One might suppose that it is with this in mind that US Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, has asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, to review the quality and character of ethical instruction made available to senior officers—a task given added urgency in the wake of scandal surrounding the recent resignation of David Petraeus as Director of the CIA. Read more

Fasten your seatbelts: nuke talks are about to get very bumpy

19 November 2012

Diplomats at the UN in New York have revealed that a long-awaited conference on establishing a WMD free zone in the Middle East has been cancelled. The meeting was due to take place in Finland next month, and was supposed to bring together representatives from across the Middle East—including Israel and Iran—to begin discussions on ridding their region of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

The cancellation of an international conference might not sound like ground-breaking news, but it’s far more significant than many people will realise. Its roots go all the way back to 1990, when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of the zone, primarily as a way to deal with Israel’s nuclear weapons program. In 1995, the goal of creating the zone became embedded in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) review process when negotiators struck a series of political bargains to help drum up support for the NPT’s indefinite extension. A number of states in the Middle East had been reluctant to support the treaty’s extension, because their commitment not to develop nuclear weapons and to remain within the treaty would put them at a permanent disadvantage unless Israel, which has never joined the treaty and is widely known to be an undeclared nuclear weapons state, disarmed. Eventually, they were persuaded to drop their reservations. In return, all NPT parties pledged to ‘exert their utmost efforts’ to ensure that a ‘zone free of all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems’ was established in the Middle East. Read more

AUSMIN: Happy talk?

18 November 2012

A glance at the AUSMIN 2012 communiqué reveals an obvious but important point: the alliance actually does stuff. It has moving parts and decisions lead to real actions, such as cooperation between military forces. Our strategic engagement with the US is built on a substantive and substantial defence and intelligence relationship which has got busier in recent years. Even in what is branded a year of consolidation after 2011’s pivot, new layers of cooperation were added in 2012, with the announcement of a C-band radar being relocated from Antigua to Exmouth in Western Australia.

The radar will be the first low-earth orbit space surveillance network sensor in the southern hemisphere. A Pentagon media release rather dryly notes that the ‘C-Band radar can also significantly contribute to tracking high-interest space launches from Asia.’ This multi-million dollar decision will grow US-Australian cooperation on space matters at a time when space is becoming more and more critical to global security.

On this point alone, we might have expected Australian ministers to be spruiking the delivery of yet more tangible cooperation with the US. Not a bit of it. The post AUSMIN media conference was an amusing combo of muted Australian understatement and American enthusiasm. Bob Carr opened with: ‘AUSMIN concluded its meeting today very much in a spirit of business as usual, steady as she goes, no new strategic content or announcements but a matter of consolidation.’ Hillary Clinton countered with: ‘[b]ut if you look at what we’re doing, and Minister Carr gave a brief overview, it’s quite extensive’. Read more

Domestic and international challenges for the second Obama Administration

16 November 2012

On 6 November 2012, President Barack Obama won a convincing election victory. The Democratic incumbent beat the Republican challenger, Governor Mitt Romney, carrying virtually all of the battleground states that were the subject of serious contest. Only in Indiana and North Carolina, did the President lose Electoral College votes over 2008. This was a remarkable outcome given the sluggish performance of the US economy. The final result was Obama/Biden 332 to Romney/Ryan 206.

But while the Senate remained in Democratic hands, thanks to some poor Republican candidates in states such as Missouri, Virginia and Indiana, the House of Representatives is still under Republican control. This means that there’s still the potential for the politics of gridlock to dominate Washington, DC. In this, the first of two posts, I’ll comment on some of the domestic challenges facing Obama. These are important to Australia because of the impact they potentially have on US defence spending.

However, the President having been returned lends momentum to the Obama White House in pursuing an agenda which moves to avoid the ‘fiscal cliff’ which looms as of 1 January. This is a process mandated by law, by which over $600 billion is cut from the federal budget across the board unless Congress can agree upon a budget. Read more

Achieving victory

15 November 2012

Airpower enthusiasts have always faced three significant difficulties when it comes to converting unbelievers to their cause. Two of these have their antecedents deeply rooted in what occurred during the Second World War; the origin of the third objection is far subtler. In the light of Andrew Davies’ recent post, in which he unequivocally demonstrated the terrible effectiveness of the air offensive, it would seem worthwhile re-examining the actual record of strategic bombing.

Advocates have always held out the seductive idea that airpower could achieve victory without getting involved in a long, drawn out land campaign. It was, ironically, the mismatch between this vision and the far more limited accomplishments of strategic bombing that was the source of early disillusionment about its effectiveness. Although Germany suffered a great deal of destruction in the years before mid-1944, the air offensive was extremely costly in terms of resources. Additionally (and perhaps most crucially) it failed to significantly cripple the German war effort. It hadn’t lived up to its promises.

Then, in the final year of the war and just as the air campaign was beginning to achieve its long-promised results—the invasion of France stole the oxygen of publicity from the airmen. Indeed, after witnessing the tactical effectiveness of strategic bombers (the ones that didn’t miss the target and kill Allied troops) generals became reluctant to allow the aircraft to return to their strategic role. They wanted to task the bombers for operational missions. Even the most senior officers had no real understanding of the extent and effectiveness of the campaign.

Can’t we just build submarines?

15 November 2012

As you read this, the Submarine Institute of Australia will be starting to think about putting the chairs on the table at the end of its 2012 conference. As expected, given the level of interest in the multi-billion dollar future submarine project, it was very well attended, and there were lots of interesting perspectives.

Kicking off proceedings was the Minister for Defence Materiel, Jason Clare. His speech sent probably the clearest signal yet that the government is leaning towards the ambitious end of the spectrum of possibilities:

Like any big project there will be naysayers. There always is. In 1949, the Minister for Public Works and Housing, Nelson Lemmon responded to critics of the Snowy Mountains Scheme by saying:

“…those critics, in the main, will be people who have little faith. This Government has faith in its engineers, its people and the future of Australia.”

This statement is as true today as it was then. There will always be those who say that it cannot be done. Those who say just buy submarines from overseas. Those that lack the faith in what Australian workers and Australian industry can achieve. I don’t have those doubts. We can do this. And we will.

In discussions with other attendees afterwards, it seemed that ASPI was seen by many as among those naysayers. Not so—we haven’t ever said that Australia can’t build a new design submarine. What we have said—and continue to think—is that we’re not yet convinced that we should.

Author response: Pine Gap and Australia’s strategic choices

15 November 2012

I anticipated that my recent post on Pine Gap and its impact on our strategic choices might provoke some sharp responses. So it was good to hear from a leading alliance scholar like Rod Lyon. Rod presents a considered case and a frank rebuttal. However, I remain unconvinced by his counter-argument. While it’s clear that Rod thinks I am wrong, he never quite gets around to explaining why.

My argument is that by hosting the Joint Facilities, including Pine Gap, Canberra has locked itself into a commitment to support any major potential military operations by the US against China or any other Asian power for that matter.

This choice is a perfectly rational one. The nature of alliances dictates that a smaller power seeking the security of a greater power must sacrifice a degree of autonomy in exchange for protection.

Any student of the alliance will know that its history is a history of Australian misgivings over the certainty of the US commitment. Hugh White once summed this up beautifully by saying, ‘we must rely on our friends, but we can’t rely on our friends’.

What better way to ensure the commitment of those friends than by hosting facilities that are vital to their own strategic posture? The flip side of this enhanced protection is enhanced commitment. This idea is not new, Des Ball wrote about it back in the 1980’s in books such The Ties that Bind, however it’s a matter seldom considered in the contemporary debate. Read more

The General, the writer and the Bureau

14 November 2012

One of General Petraeus’ trademarks, both as a military leader and during his relatively brief tenure as Director of the CIA, was his openness and accessibility for the press. As long as the boundaries of the email conversation were clearly defined in advance, he was known to spend many hours in email correspondence with members of the press. Once confirmed in the job of CIA Director, he was the first in that role to install an open internet connection in his office. This skill to communicate with those outside the military ‘bubble’ assisted his successful shaping of his positive public persona, and to a degree—either deliberately or otherwise—promote an image of a potential future President of the United States. So it’s ironic that a man so aware of the positive uses of the cyber domain appears to have been brought down in flames by that very medium.

As the drama of the Petraeus affair unfolds hour by hour, captivating political observers, some might not have noticed Google’s recent transparency report. Released this week, it displays an increasing number of government requests for the removal of online content and access to user details. The latest report demonstrates that up to the end of the first half of 2012 there were 20,938 inquiries from governments around the world. Those requests were for information about 34,614 user accounts.

These two stories are important and linked because they highlight the surveillance powers that governments now have at their disposal, and provide a lesson on how we should all be aware of our online activity. If a CIA Director can be caught out, what hope do the rest of us have? Read more

The Sheriff comes to town

14 November 2012

President Obama’s decision to visit Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia later this week is a surprising but welcome affirmation of the US’s continuing commitment to its Asian ‘pivot’. It’s surprising because Americans will overwhelmingly think that Obama’s primary task right now should be to negotiate an outcome with Congress to prevent billions of dollars of programmed spending cuts from being implemented in early January 2013. By comparison, spending eighty hours in three Southeast Asian countries will seem like an odd priority to an American audience. It demonstrates just how personally Obama is committed to the Asia-Pacific and America’s engagement with it.

For Southeast Asia, the visit is deeply significant and all the more so because Obama has picked three countries in the region that fall closest to China’s orbit of influence. I take as my text here Sergio Leone’s magnificent spaghetti western, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly.True, the film is not often referenced on Asian security matters but stick with me, dear reader.

Obama will first visit Thailand—the Good in my analogy, because Thailand is a treaty ally of the United States. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta will also visit Bangkok on Thursday after AUSMIN. Reportedly, Thailand will announce a decision to join the Proliferation Security Initiative. The US will seek to reinvigorate an alliance relationship which has somewhat atrophied. We should expect an announcement highlighting increased cooperation to facilitate Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR) operations—these days the preferred way to initiate military cooperation at the softer end of the defence scale. Read more