Strategist Posts Archive - Page 1192 of 1209

Taking stock of RAMSI

27 November 2012

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)—an extensive (and expensive) Australian-led state-building intervention under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)—has been operating in Solomon Islands since July 2003. It’s about to undergo a significant transition in its structure. As such, it’s an appropriate time to take stock of the mission’s achievements and failings to date, and perhaps more importantly, evaluate Solomon Islands’ prospects in a post-RAMSI future.

In October, RAMSI’s Special Coordinator Nicholas Coppel revealed plans for the transition—the most significant since the mission’s inception. Coppel announced that from 1 July 2013 RAMSI would become a compact police capacity-building operation. Its military contingent will be sent home and its governance programs will be integrated into the bilateral development assistance programs of participating countries, mainly Australia and New Zealand.

Crucially, Coppel claimed that these changes were warranted because of the progress made by Solomon Islands since RAMSI’s deployment. This is consistent with RAMSI’s ‘exit strategy’, as defined in the 2009 partnership framework (PDF) signed between the Solomon Islands government, RAMSI and the PIF. In the agreement, RAMSI’s exit is not focused on a date, but is conditioned upon the attainment of particular performance benchmarks, set out in the document.

RAMSI is often viewed by international and domestic observers as one of the most successful state-building interventions. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s influential Development Assistance Committee described its security system reform approach as ‘good practice’ (PDF). Read more

The declining USAF tactical fighter fleet: should we care?

26 November 2012

Andrew Davies’ graph of the week about the elderly USAF tactical fighter fleet raises several issues. But before that it is worthwhile looking at the big US Defense budget picture below. The two big peaks are the Reagan defence build-up and Global War on Terror (GWOT) 2001–2014. Most of the current USAF fighter fleet was acquired in the Reagan years leading to, as Andrew noted, a fleet that is steadily aging.

The graph suggests that it’s unlikely that the USAF will again build a Reagan-era size fighter force. Reagan cut taxes and increased spending. This led to bigger deficits, which in turn led to raising taxes and cutting spending in the elder Bush’s presidency and the Clinton years. This worked, the US Federal budget went into surplus. But today, with the ‘fiscal cliff’ looming, it seems that the US is once again moving towards raising taxes and cutting spending. As the graph indicates, the Obama administration plans to constrain defence spending over the next five years. US defense spending will still be roughly half the world total, but a big Reaganesque increase looks unlikely.

There’s no joy for the USAF in all this and the USAF fighter fleet will just continue to shrink and grow old. There are those who think that the size of the Cold War fleet is still appropriate. But most wars since the Berlin War fell (excepting the 1991 Desert Storm campaign) have used relatively few USAF fighters, as vital to mission success as they were. The Precision Guided Munition (PGM) revolution now means that fewer aircraft can do the work of the larger iron bomb fighter fleets of the Reagan era. Read more

ASPI recommends: Stirring from beyond the borders? American military assistance and defense reform in Indonesia

26 November 2012

As I mentioned in last week’s ‘ASPI suggests’, there’s a useful paper from CSIS Jakarta researcher Evan Laksmana that looks at the history of US military assistance to the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) and the effect this has had on Indonesia’s ongoing defence reform process. The state of Indonesia’s military reform is of key interest to Australia, as we steadily expand defence cooperation and increasingly look to Indonesia as a key state in our Asian Century White Paper strategy. Knowing what components of US military assistance work, which don’t (and why) will help inform our military engagement under the Defence Cooperation Program.

In dealings with post-dictatorship Indonesia, the US and Australia will naturally seek to aid the defence reform process, which includes facilitating the observance of new norms and governance, as well as helping with force modernisation. While these are sound goals in broad terms, it’s not immediately obvious how foreign military assistance can be translated into defence reform and the building of democratic civil-military relations.

The academic literature doesn’t shed much light on this topic, which is why Laksmana’s paper is a valuable contribution. It examines the historical and ideological development of US military assistance, the history of US military engagement with Indonesia (from the Cold War to today), and the implications and future challenges for Indonesia’s defence reform. He chronicles the shift in US foreign military assistance from a Cold War mentality to one aimed at promoting professionalism, democratic ideals and human rights. Read more

Graph of the week: why the US Air Force needs the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

25 November 2012

This week’s graph is a case of a picture that is worth $200 billion. Produced by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 2009, it shows the number of tactical aircraft procured by the US Air Force (USAF) every year since 1975, and the average age of aircraft in the inventory.

From 1978 to 1991, when production of the F-15 and F-16 ‘teen series’ strike fighters and the A-10 attack aircraft were in full swing, the annual buy averaged well over 100 aircraft. In terms of maintenance of overall fleet size and modernity, that was about ‘break even’. As the graph shows (click to enlarge), the average age of aircraft in the fleet hovered around 11 years throughout that period.

But from 1992 onwards, as production of the 1970s designs ramped down, the average age of the fleet began a steady upwards climb, reaching 20 years a few years ago. The delivery of 187 F-22s between 2002 and 2009 had essentially no impact on that trend. (Incidentally, the RAAF’s 71 1980s vintage Hornets and 24 brand new Super Hornets produce about the same average age).

Source: Congressional Budget Office Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces (PDF), May 2009. Read more

Submarines: the silent service needs to make some noise

22 November 2012

As Andrew Davies noted here recently, the debate at the 2012 Submarine Institute of Australia (SIA) wasn’t over whether submarines should be built in Australia—that’s a forgone conclusion.

Speeches from both sides of politics (both Parliamentary Secretary Feeney and Defence Materiel Minister Jason Clare from the government side) and Shadow Defence Minister David Johnston made it very clear that the politicians are on board the move. DMO CEO Warren King, in speaking at the event dinner, was also enthusiastic about the program and the abilities of Australian industry to get the job done. Though none of them were willing to be the face and voice of the program, the right words were indeed there.

The decision to build 12 submarines in the 2009 White Paper came as a shock to many, even at the highest levels. Until Kevin Rudd’s RSL speech in Townsville, the number was firmly at six boats; six new boats to replace the six old boats. This magical doubling of the fleet (regardless of the actual boat chosen) has no strategic thinking behind it.

The doctrinal justification behind such a fleet doesn’t exist. And believe me, I’ve looked. And looked. And asked uncomfortable questions. Repeatedly. And the business case behind the announcement was even thinner. As we all know, thanks to Mark Thomson, the financial underpinning of the 2009 White Paper was laughable. Read more

Graph(s) of the week: some (qualified) good news on Collins

22 November 2012

In our Mind the gap paper earlier this year, Mark Thomson and I made the comment that a successful program to extend the life of the Collins class submarines would give the future submarine program a fighting chance of avoiding a capability gap in the second half of the 2020s.

At last week’s Submarine Institute of Australia 2012 conference, we heard for the first time in public from Defence officials who have been involved in the Submarine Life Evaluation Program (SLEP) which has been looking at the feasibility and mechanics of keeping the Collins class going. The news was generally good—there are no identified ‘show stoppers’ in such a program. And there seems to be a realistic opportunity to do a much-needed technology refresh of the submarine systems, and to fix the propulsion system issues that have plagued the fleet. Moreover, it’s thought that the additional duty cycle for the boats might be ten years rather than the eight of the first two.

If that happens, the availability of submarines might look something like the graph below (with the same somewhat idealised assumptions about the maintenance throughput of the Collins boats as in our earlier paper). A ten year extension of the Collins fleet life would give a reasonable amount of breathing space for the replacement program to deliver the first couple of new boats and trial them. That won’t be easy—we’ll have to manage the substantial industrial and fleet management overheads of having two different Collins configurations at the same time as developing and building the next generation boat. But provided that can be done, and barring a failure of the follow-on build to deliver a functional product, the capability gap we warned of would effectively disappear.

ASPI suggests

21 November 2012

Welcome back for the second round-up of news and articles in the defence and strategy world, coming to you from Jakarta.

Being in Indonesia, I’ve been naturally thinking a lot about reform of the Indonesian military and Australian military engagement. Evan Laksmana’s 2011 paper on American military assistance and defence reform in Indonesia identifies how limits in the design of military-military engagement can seriously hinder long-lasting reform. And there are lessons here for Australia.

This week’s capability piece is an essay from a serving USAF officer who argues that the service’s focus on high-tech stealthy aircraft (PDF) is the wrong path.

Social media is becoming an inextricable part of modern warfare. It’s also now part of a developing area of intelligence analysis called Dynamic Twitter Network Analysis which uses data from Twitter and other social media outlets to gauge public opinion in zones of insecurity and instability. And as the conflict continues between Israel and Hamas, both on the ground and (bizarrely) in the Twitterverse, here’s an Atlantic article that looks at whether this is a violation of Twitter’s terms of use.

This New York Times article on the demographics of the US electorate contains some statistics on the views of Americans on the relative merits of capitalism and socialism which might be surprising—although they mirror the Lowy Institute’s findings that ‘just 60% of Australians say democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, and only 39% of 18 to 29 year olds’.

While in the US, the Washington Post takes a look at the lifestyle of four star generals.

Journal roundup

From the people who brought you Infinity Journal, a free peer-reviewed online journal on strategy, here’s the new issue of the Journal of Military Operations. You’ll need to sign up to view their articles but if the quality is anything like Infinity, it will be well worth the effort.

Sticking with a journal theme, the Australian Defence Force Journal has released its latest issue (PDF), including an article from Strategist contributor Albert Palazzo as well as pieces on Japanese subs for Australia, ANZUS, Australian influence in the South Pacific and UAVs.

The new issue of the Kokoda Foundation’s Security Challenges has articles on ballistic missile defence and China’s multilateral engagement so get your hands on a hard copy unless you can wait until it’s available online. Previous issues are available online and contain articles by most of the well-known names in Australian strategy discussions.

Natalie Sambhi is an analyst at ASPI and editor of The Strategist.

Where in the world?

21 November 2012

During a recent Telstra-ASPI luncheon speech, Robert D. Kaplan took the audience on a tour of the ‘hot spots’ of insecurity around the globe. The crux of Kaplan’s presentation (and his new book The Revenge of Geography) is that in the globalised world of tweets, ‘likes’ and viral video, analysts have forgotten the enduring impact of geography, and the indelible effects it has had (and continues to have) on national and international security.

While this approach is useful to explain the development of the nation-state, with its linkage to geographical and territorial identity, today there is a range of non-state actors and transnational groups, whose motivations and actions aren’t as deterministic, and whose existence and structure are more virtual than linked to any discrete geography. To get a handle on these players, it’s perhaps necessary to broaden the notion of geography.

For example, an understanding of Yemen’s history, the role that its mountainous geography has played in its development (or lack thereof) and the challenges that this presents to the capacity of a central government to maintain any semblance of order would clearly make for a more sophisticated response from Western analysts and policymakers to cooperation with local bodies on the threat posed by al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. Together, a good grasp of the physical and human geographies of the area provide a firm foundation for the investigation of transnational terrorism, why it has emerged from there and its intrinsic characteristics. Indeed, seeking to gain such an understanding without a foundation in these matters seems deeply problematic and perhaps reminiscent of some of the recent failures of counterterrorism policy. Read more

Thinking unconventionally about gas

20 November 2012

The shale gas revolution might be upon us. Interest in shale gas has grown sharply due to the success of American producers, with the fuel now providing the U.S. with a third of its natural gas needs. Shale gas has put America in a position where it will soon be self-sufficient in gas and potentially a net exporter.

In October this year a milestone was achieved in terms of our path towards joining the ranks of global shale gas producers. Santos announced Australia’s first commercial production of gas from a shale well, and is talking big about the potential of trillions of cubic feet of gas trapped in deep shale formations in Australia’s Cooper Basin, which straddles Queensland and South Australia.

It’s got the pollies excited too. The South Australian Premier, Jay Weatherill, said at the on-site opening ceremony of the shale well that:

Natural gas from unconventional sources has been regarded as something that would happen in the future but today’s opening demonstrates that the future is happening today. This is the first step in the next wave of Cooper Basin development that will lead to natural gas from unconventional sources being increasingly used in households across SA and Eastern Australia more generally.

But it’s not without controversy. Gas is stimulated to flow from the low permeability shale rocks by injecting fluid consisting of water, sand and chemicals under high pressure into the shale reservoir to open up natural fractures and to create new ones in a process known as hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’. If the debate here on the development on shale gas follows that in the US and Europe, then it’s likely that industry will be pro-shale gas, environmental groups will be concerned about the impacts of fracking and cautious of claims of a reduced environmental impact relative to coal seam gas (that occurs at much shallower depth close to surface aquifers and in areas used for farming), and politicians will focus on regulation.

The Australian Government Energy White Paper released this month presents a sensible appraisal of the important role of gas generally in Australia’s energy future, and signals government is aware that shale gas is an important resource that needs to better understand in the Australian context. Read more

Obama’s second term: international challenges

20 November 2012

Beyond domestic concerns, which I wrote about last week, the second term Obama administration has to address a number of challenging international issues. High on the list of serious problems is Iran’s continuing effort to achieve a nuclear weapon.

During the campaign, President Obama made it absolutely clear that he would not accept a nuclear armed Iran. In this, he was supported by Governor Romney. The sanctions that have been imposed by the West upon Iran do appear to be biting hard. As well, the Iranian currency has dropped alarmingly in value, given the international isolation of Tehran. Senior American policy makers believe that the Iranians may be about to come to the table to negotiate.

Should Iran be prepared to negotiate seriously, the US and its allies will need to be focused on a comprehensive solution to reduce tensions in the Middle East. This will be occurring at a time when Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, approaches retirement and the next occupant of this critical role, possibly Senator John Kerry (Democrat, Massachusetts) will have big shoes to fill. Mrs Clinton has been the standout performer in the Obama Cabinet. Read more