India strives to render Pakistan strategically irrelevant to better focus its attention on China. But neither Pakistan nor China has an interest in allowing that to happen.

It’s  an ongoing saga of which we saw the most recent instalment some weeks ago, following late-April terrorist attacks at Pahalgam in Indian Kashmir. As an indicator of the broader military balance on the subcontinent, the recent confrontation suggests that even though India’s eye is on China for the long term, Pakistan is still a problem it cannot ignore.

A new policy brief by ASPI, released today, outlines the quantitative military balance between India and Pakistan.

By the numbers, the India-Pakistan military balance is fairly favourable to India. In every year since 1956, India has outspent Pakistan on defence (in real terms) by a factor of at least 4.5—even by a factor of 10 in the most recent budget. India’s armed forces field more personnel than Pakistan’s across the board, most prominently the land forces, which field 1.2 million active-duty soldiers against Pakistan’s 560,000.

While India’s army is very large, its equipment is dated. Its fleet of almost 4,000 main battle tanks, largely devoted to the western front against Pakistan, is composed mainly of Russian T-72s and T-90s. These are decades-old and demand costly ongoing modernisation. India’s armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, of various models in the Soviet BMP series, are likewise mainly of Cold War vintage. And he vast majority of India’s artillery is towed rather than self-propelled, though it’s complemented with a few hundred mobile multiple rocket launchers.

While India dwarfs it in some metrics, Pakistan is a considerable military power. However, its half-million-strong army has similar equipment issues. It fields a melange of 2,500 main battle tanks, largely Chinese in origin (bought wholesale or co-developed), that are in various phases of indigenous-led modernisation. The Al-Zarrar—the most common in Pakistan’s fleet, with about 500 in the inventory—is a heavily-upgraded Chinese Type 59, itself derivative of a Soviet design from the mid-1950s.

For mobility, Pakistan’s army depends primarily on armoured personnel carriers rather than infantry fighting vehicles, which are more capable. Most of the armoured personnel carriers are of various versions of the US-built M113. Pakistan does have more self-propelled artillery than India, likewise mostly American in origin, but this too is dated. Most are M109 howitzer in various versions and acquired in the Cold War.

Still, large-scale ground warfare between India and Pakistan seems unlikely for the time being. Recent confrontations, including in 2019 and this year, have played out largely in the skies—a domain where India’s ambitions still outpace its capabilities.

India’s air force, structured for a potential two-front war with China and Pakistan, is authorized at 42 combat squadrons, but it fields just 31. That gap isn’t closing anytime soon, as aging aircraft retire faster than replacements arrive. India still flies Cold War-era MiG-21s, though their retirement is imminent. Its also has around three dozen Rafales, a few hundred Su-30s and a growing number of indigenous Tejas fighters. The Tejas, while a subject of national pride, is a light fighter, arguably ill-suited for high-end missions against the numerically superior Chinese air force.

Pakistan’s 17 combat squadrons are a mixed bag: aging F-16s, Chinese JF-17s, newer J-10s and a few Mirage IIIs and Mirage 5s. Despite being outnumbered, Pakistan’s air force has held its own in recent air-to-air engagements, including those in 2019 and 2025.

At sea, India holds a clear advantage. It operates two aircraft carriers (each displacing around 45,000 tons), while Pakistan has none. The Indian Navy also boasts 12 destroyers and 15 frigates. However, its submarine fleet is a concern: of 16 attack submarines, only five are modern. The rest are old German Type 209s and Russian Kilo-class boats. India does have two nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, though these are unlikely to play a role in a Pakistan-focused scenario.

Pakistan’s naval assets are more modest: five older Agosta-class submarines, a dozen frigates, and some land-based maritime patrol aircraft. In sheer displacement and capability, India dominates the maritime domain.

Of course, numbers don’t tell the whole story. This snapshot doesn’t account for training, leadership or the strategic diversion of Indian forces towards China. Several Indian infantry divisions are deployed along the northern border, and the air force and navy must also split their attention between two fronts.

Still, the broad contours are clear: India enjoys naval superiority and a larger, though overstretched, air force. Pakistan, while outgunned, has shown tactical resilience. Crucially, India cannot afford to focus solely on its western neighbour.

Since the 1960s, Indian planners have worried about the possibility of collusion between Pakistan and China. This concern shaped key decisions—such as the timing of the 1971 war, which India is believed to have chosen to launch in December of that year partly to minimise the risk of Chinese intervention during the Himalayan winter.

Since 2010, Indian officials have spoken more openly about the two-front challenge, acknowledging that any conflict with Pakistan could be complicated by Chinese pressure in the north.