In the week when Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met counterparts at the G7 summit in Ottawa, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto went to St Petersburg to deepen ties with Vladimir Putin. The optics of the two visits highlight the differing ways Australia and Indonesia are engaging with a rapidly changing international order. Just a month after Albanese described Indonesia as Australia’s ‘nearest of neighbours and closest of friends’, the contrast could not be more telling.

But Australia should not interpret Prabowo’s visit as a sudden shift in Indonesia’s foreign policy or a setback in the bilateral relationship. It just confirms that Jakarta and Canberra view the international order through different lenses. Those differences are likely to widen.

Indonesia maintains a longstanding relationship with Russia on defence and foreign policy. Prabowo’s visit to Russia was by all accounts productive for Jakarta. Indonesia and Russia agreed on agricultural cooperation, nuclear energy and trade. There are also indications that the two sides may be exploring cooperation on developing a spaceport on Biak, an island north of New Guinea; this would reportedly be for civilian purposes. While this proposal is different from reports in April that Russia was seeking aircraft basing rights in Biak, this space project could nonetheless mark an expansion of Russia’s presence in the region and raise broader strategic concerns.

The decision to visit Moscow instead of attending the G7 was almost certainly Prabowo’s own. Foreign policy has become more centralised in his presidency, with decisions increasingly shaped by the president’s personal preferences rather than institutional deliberation. Foreign policy officials are aware of the reputational risks associated with visiting Russia amid its ongoing war in Ukraine. A different leader might have timed the visit differently or balanced it with a visit to the G7 as well. But Prabowo appears to have made a calculation that reflects both his style of leadership and Indonesia’s broader foreign policy interests.

The visit does come at a time of growing frustrations about US foreign policy. In April, President Donald Trump slapped a 32 percent blanket tariff on imports from Indonesia. To that, add Washington’s cold shoulder to Indonesia’s plea for an economic agreement so that would extend US tax credits to Indonesia’s nickel industry, a core component of the country’s downstream industrialisation plans. Because of large Chinese investments in Indonesia’s nickel ecosystem, US officials indicated that cooperation was unfeasible.

Another factor is the ongoing war in Gaza and a perceived inconsistency in how Western countries have responded to international crises. While Indonesia has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it has not shown the same level of public concern for the plight of Ukrainians, reflecting a degree of selective empathy in its own foreign policy. The Palestinian cause holds far greater emotional and political resonance with the Indonesian public. The war in Gaza, Israel’s attack on Iran, and the strong support for Israel by many Western governments, have eroded Indonesian public perceptions of Western credibility on human rights.

Indonesia isn’t turning away from the West. While it sometimes lacks coherence in execution of foreign policy, it is pursuing what it views as a balanced and independent approach. This is anchored in its long-standing commitment to non-alignment and strategic autonomy.

Under Prabowo, Indonesia has seen a qualitative deepening of ties with both Russia and China, reflected not only in high-level visits and new agreements but also in Indonesia’s decision to join the BRICS grouping, a clear signal of its intent to position itself among the world’s emerging powers.

Among major powers, Russia carries the least political baggage for Indonesia. Unlike China, it poses no direct challenges in the South China Sea nor stirs public anxiety about regional dominance. Unlike the United States, it is not associated with past interventions in Indonesian affairs nor with perceived double standards on international issues.

However, this increasingly transactional and leader-driven foreign policy may introduce new risks. The growing personalisation of foreign policy under Prabowo brings a degree of unpredictability in how Indonesia engages the world.

For Australia, this means accepting that while bilateral ties have grown, particularly in defence and economic cooperation, they will continue to be shaped by divergent global outlooks. Strategic convergence is not essential to strategic alignment.

Australia and Indonesia have managed to establish a productive bilateral relationship despite their differing international perspectives. Their Defence Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2024, is an example of deeper cooperation on shared interests.

Australia should not foster an unrealistic sense that its partnership with Indonesia is akin to those it has with such close non-allied friends as Japan or Canada. But a relationship of trust between good friends, with the understanding that both parties have closer friendships with others, is a worthy strategic objective.