Instead of learning from Europe’s mistakes in the decade leading into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—underinvesting in defence, increasing trade with a strategic adversary and expecting the United States to disproportionately carry the security burden—Australia is at risk of repeating them.

To the frustration of the Australian government, the US’s demand that Australia increase its defence spending has imposed itself on the debate about Australia’s defence budget. And US President Donald Trump is not the only one getting involved: in an article in The Australian, China’s ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, warned Australia against increasing spending and following in NATO’s footsteps.

The government may want the focus to be on Australia’s capability needs, but, ironically, had Australia invested in necessary capabilities, the debate would not be playing out at all.

Europe waited too late to act. Australia can prepare now, before a crisis, whether across the Taiwan Strait or in the South China Sea. And such preparation may actually deter such crises.

The Australian government accurately insists that defence spending is increasing, but two main drivers should, and will likely, see an increase sooner than currently projected.

First, the trope of living in ever-changing but stable times has been undone by a combination of global conflict, Trump’s return, and rising security threats to Australia.

Second, what were once emerging critical technologies have now well and truly emerged and are being used in global conflicts. Many of these technologies increase our dependence on China.

Both factors are, of course, inextricably linked: authoritarian dominance in and abuse of critical technologies is an unprecedented threat to such nations as Australia.

Even as Canberra has worked hard to stabilise its relationship with Beijing, we shouldn’t kid ourselves that improved economic ties remove the security risk that China’s military and technological aims pose to Australia and the Pacific. Decades of close economic relations have done little to moderate Beijing’s behaviour towards its neighbours and there is no reason to believe this would change. The parallels with Russia’s pursuit of its goals despite economic entanglement with Europe should be glaringly obvious.

The situation in the Indo-Pacific is intensifying, with mounting military tensions over Taiwan and growing militarisation of the South China Sea. While China isn’t exactly the same as Russia, what does Beijing more closely resemble—Moscow or Canberra?

There is a reason Chief of Defence Force Admiral David Johnston remarked at ASPI’s June Defence Conference that ‘We’re having to reconsider Australia as a homeland from which we will conduct combat operations.’ Given the state of the world, this should not have been the wake-up call that it seemed to be, but Australia has not conducted combat operations from its territory since World War II. There is a reason the government so often repeats that we live in the most dangerous times since that conflict ended.

China’s military and technological rise led to the development of AUKUS, which is vital for the national interest of all three nations. But it isn’t a comprehensive military strategy with the investment across defence that is needed to deter or compete with China.

China’s spectacular growth permits it to expand its military capabilities enormously. It is demonstrating new military capabilities with growing frequency, including a long-range stealth bomber, new stealth fighter planes, new aircraft carriers and other capabilities. It is also rapidly building up its nuclear forces and space warfare technologies. Its aggressive behaviour is keeping pace, with naval and maritime militia activities increasing, including a circumnavigation of Australia earlier this year. Specifically, China’s increased naval profile as a result of its navy’s rising activism in the Indian and Pacific Oceans—areas where it traditionally did not have much presence—has strategic consequences that demand long-term strategic thinking and concrete action from Australia.

The deteriorated strategic situation and changing context of warfare—as seen in new technologies deployed in Ukraine and the Middle East—mean that Australia has no choice but to fund a mix of capabilities. Despite their cost and long gestation periods, AUKUS submarines are vital for Australia’s maritime security. But Australia must also adapt lessons from wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. Australia needs to pay particular attention to technologies such as first-person view drones and other types of remote-controlled vehicles, not only in the air but across all domains. Recent conflicts demonstrate the role of cheaper, use-and-throw drones, which are particularly important for a country such as Australia that, for demographic reasons, cannot rely on large forces.

These conflicts also demonstrate the importance of defence stores and logistics, including ammunition and artillery. Last week’s surprise announcement that Defence had cancelled an existing procurement to produce 155mm artillery was initially disappointing, but the commitment to determine what Australia needs and return to market suggests lessons have been learned.

High-intensity wars mean high rates of consumption of both low-tech and high-tech systems. Ukraine and Israel are rapidly depleting their air defence missile stocks, far faster than their adversaries are running out of surface-to-surface missiles. Moreover, their Western partners are themselves finding it difficult to ramp up production. This raises important concerns about the defence industrial base, which requires budgetary support too. Europe is learning these lessons after years of ignoring the looming danger.

Defence spending must obviously consider affordability, which is crudely linked to the size of the economy. So, Australia can never match the total defence spending of major powers such as the US or China, nor the spending of some regional partners including India and Japan. They all have larger economies and can spend more in absolute amounts. However, Australia is on most counts the world’s 12th or 13th largest economy, so that still should dictate a large defence budget. And as we’ve seen in Europe, the cost of defence spending must be considered against the cost of not maintaining sufficient capacity for deterrence, which only means higher and more urgent spending in the long term.

Unlike Europe, Australia could face up to the needs of higher defence spending while it still has time. The alternative is to rebuild defence while under fire, and as Europe is discovering, this option is even more expensive.