China’s first in-person meeting with Pacific island foreign ministers demonstrated Beijing’s willingness to talk the talk with little substance to back it up. But in a time of regional uncertainty, Pacific leaders showed they were still willing to listen, and the meeting’s significance was based more in attendance than in outcomes.

The third China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (CPICFMM) was held from 28 May to 29 May in Xiamen. The Pacific Islands Forum deputy secretary general, Desna Solofa, was in attendance, along with foreign ministers from 11 Pacific states who acknowledge the One China Principle. The first two meetings, held online in 2021 and 2022, reflected China’s intent to broaden engagement with Pacific partners across areas such as security and economic development.

The first meeting’s joint statement was notable for its inclusion of a commitment to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, accompanied by strong statements from Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Wang claimed the AUKUS agreement would create risks of nuclear proliferation and ‘introduce an arms race and damage regional peace and stability.’

At the second CPICFMM, China’s pursued a sweeping regional agreement. Leaked documents indicated China was seeking to reach a region-wide security deal with Pacific countries, including areas such as policing and cybersecurity as potential avenues for cooperation. When the deal failed to reach consensus, China sought and signed several bilateral agreements with individual Pacific island countries.

This year’s joint statement and list of measures contained the standard commitment to the One China Principle and a reiteration of support for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. This stance is hypocritical, considering China’s fast-growing nuclear weapon stockpile and their inconsiderate dummy-warhead missile launch over the region last year.

China also made a not-so-subtle dig at the United States for its abandonment of the Paris Agreement, stating: ‘we deeply regret a certain major country has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement’. It followed this criticism with a $2 million commitment to regional climate efforts. When compared to Australia’s $1.3 billion commitment, it’s clear that there isn’t always a lot of substance behind the words.

China’s 200 ‘small but beautiful’ projects were also included in the list of measures. Indeed, some of these projects may be useful, given that the region needs financial and capability support to deliver things such as schools and other light infrastructure. But the overall support to the Pacific has shown that the region is more of an afterthought than a key partner, in comparison to other regions that China has hosted for similar meetings, such as Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.

China has stated its intent to establish new cooperation mechanisms for humanitarian aid and disaster relief and hold additional meetings to advance police cooperation, indicating that Beijing will keep pushing to provide alternatives to current regional security models. It’s likely that these initiatives will conflict with, rather than complement, initiatives that were created under the direction of and are supported by the Pacific Islands Forum and other regional bodies, such as the Pacific Policing Initiative and Pacific Response Group.

Again, none of these announcements are particularly new, nor do they have sufficient financial commitment or support to significantly alter the region. But the audience that China managed to bring to Xiamen is noteworthy when partners such as the US are pulling away. Pacific leaders are clearly willing to hear what China has to say, and Beijing is investing heavily in bringing Pacific populations on board as well.

Local Pacific media outlets published more than 30 articles on the meeting. Publicity was further backed by significant coverage from Chinese embassies on Facebook and X. While few of these articles received great traction online, there was a concerning shift in approach from articles on previous meetings: nearly a third of the articles published by Pacific media outlets were republished from or sponsored by China Global Television Network, a state-run media outlet under the control of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda department.

These CCP-backed articles appear to be capitalising on gaps in support for local media, formerly filled by the US. Engagement through local media outlets has proven to be an effective channel for influencing local opinion on geopolitics, so it’s only a matter of time before China’s narrative gains strength in this space.

Events like this serve as reminders that China will keep pushing its agenda in the Pacific and will seek to undermine traditional partnerships and initiatives across the region. While none of the meeting’s announcements appear groundbreaking, it’s important to be aware of how information around support is communicated and received.