Australian Army Chief searches for a new ‘theory of the army’
The Australian Army needs a clearer sense of self. With no warning time for conflict, the army must cap its ongoing transformation with a new ‘theory of the army’ that enables civilian leaders to choose the appropriate response to a given threat.
To do this, the theory will have to explain the army’s distinct institutional personality and principles. This should include how it sees itself organisationally, its interests in operationalising new weapon systems, and its interservice relationships, as well as how it will preserve its focus and specialisation within the integrated, focused force.
In his April address—the third in a series of four keynotes on the state of the army profession—the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, outlined the aims of this new theory. It will build on what the army already is, and what it wants to be: a littoral fighting force ready to compete and fight to secure strategic land positions and logistics supply lines, and protect remote airfields and ports in northern Australia, the Pacific islands and the archipelago to Australia’s north.
However, littoral manoeuvre is designed for high-end scenarios and violent stabilisation missions. If a crisis were to escalate to war, the army would have to figure out how to deploy ground troops and materiel forward inside adversary anti-access and area denial ranges. And supposing army units and formations would be prepositioned, many grey-zone or hybrid threats would put Australian soldiers in harm’s way. Accordingly, the new theory will have to spell out for the Australian public how the army intends to deter adversary forces from greater distances, and how it will manoeuvre, fight and resupply on islands with scant infrastructure or local capacity to supply military needs.
The army that begins a war will not be the same one that sees the end of it. Considering this, the army and society must both have the will and the capacity to sustain forces at war. As the Deputy Chief of Army, Major General Chris Smith, argued in a 2024 ASPI report, armies rely on multiple areas of society and the defence industrial base to perform in a prolonged fight.
Cooperation between the army and broader society will be a focus of the Chief of Army Symposium, to be held on 26–27 August in Canberra. But Stuart is yet to explain how large numbers of fresh recruits (likely including conscripts) in a major war help to optimise the army for littoral manoeuvre.
For now, Stuart has affirmed that the army’s review of three priority areas—jurisdiction, expertise and self-regulation—will provide a benchmark for the army alongside the other professions. Assessing these challenges will require the army to define the character of the unique service the army provides to Australian society; balance technological advancements with the army’s ability to maintain, teach, evolve and adapt its body of warfighting and professional knowledge; and reinforce its ethos and command accountability in the heat of battle.
As the potential for major power war in the Indo-Pacific and risks of war increase, so too must collaboration between the government, the military and the population. The army has enjoyed the advantage of being ‘out of contact’ with the adversary during its transformation from an ‘expeditionary force’ to a force optimised for littoral manoeuvre with a long-range land and maritime strike. But this advantage may not last for much longer.
Australians will have to wait to see details of the army review and the resultant theory of the army sometime in 2026, when the service will celebrate its 125th birthday.
Stuart made clear that the army is more than just the soldiers and capabilities that prepare land power and provide protection to the ADF in competition and war. The army also acts as a bridge between the government and the whole of society and industry, helping strengthen national preparedness and resilience.
Many soldiers are already being trained to fight from landing craft, in jungle environments and on remote shores, and are promoting healthy civil-military relations. This is encouraging, but the army must get its new theory right. If it doesn’t, future governments will struggle to understand the strategic character of the army and align political ends with the appropriate military means.