Policing, public trust and the perils of performative oversight

The Canberra Times‘ recent series on ACT Policing raises serious questions – not just about police conduct, but about the integrity of public discourse on policing.

At a time when public trust in law enforcement is fragile, the greatest danger may not be misconduct itself but how it is portrayed.

Trust is the lifeblood of policing. Without it, officers cannot do their jobs effectively, and communities become less safe.

There is no excuse for police abuse of power. Every allegation must be investigated with rigour and transparency. But these investigations must be fair, thorough, and grounded in the reality of frontline policing.

The overwhelming majority of ACT Policing’s 100,000-plus public engagements each year are conducted with professionalism and restraint. Officers deal with violence, mental health crises and social collapse. They are often not just first responders, but the last safety net when all others fail.

Critiquing a use-of-force decision from the comfort of a courtroom or newsroom is easy. It is much harder to make that decision in a dim hallway, amid chaos, with limited information and a split second to act. That reality must inform our commentary. Oversight must acknowledge operational complexity, not ignore it.

Yes, we must scrutinise. But we must also resist the rise of gotcha journalism that privileges outrage over truth.

Reporting isolated cases of misconduct as indicative of systemic rot distorts reality. It erodes public confidence. It undermines the trust that allows police and the community to work together. And, most dangerously, it suggests to the public that accountability does not exist when it does.

ACT Policing is already subject to multiple layers of independent scrutiny.

Professional standards, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, coronial inquests and judicial oversight all play a role.

These mechanisms are working. Those incidents that have come to light and are under investigation are not evidence of failure but of function. Cameras and complaints do not signal the absence of accountability. They reflect a system actively engaged in it.

More bureaucracy is not the answer. Adding another oversight body may provide a veneer of action, but it risks duplication, confusion and reduced effectiveness.

We need better resourcing of existing mechanisms, stronger public communication, and procedural consistency. The current system can be improved. However, reform should be based on evidence, not performance politics or social media pressure.

Civil settlements are not admissions of guilt. Not every complaint will end in prosecution. And yes, some complainants will remain dissatisfied. But dissatisfaction is not the same as injustice. The rule of law means fairness for all parties, not just the loudest voice.

Police must be accountable to build and maintain trust, but they must also be treated fairly. Justice requires both scrutiny and context. The community deserves transparency, but it also deserves truth unshackled from sensationalism.

If we care about the safety of our communities and the integrity of our institutions, we must stop reducing policing to headlines and start engaging in serious, balanced reform. We need less theatre and more substance.

Once public trust is lost, it is not easily regained, and no society can afford to police without it.

Susan Thomson

Creating an alternative to China’s dominance is hard. But this step will help

Australia’s future prosperity will not be built on nostalgia for past booms.

It’ll be forged in the critical supply chains of tomorrow. That’s why Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s announcement of a $1.2 billion Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve, should Labor be re-elected, is an essential move.

The reserve is smart, pragmatic policy targeting both supply and demand aspects of Australia critical minerals sector. Executed properly, it will shore up Australia’s economic and geopolitical interests in the face of the global energy transition, geopolitical fragmentation, and economic coercion.

Although it’s an important step, if policymakers and industry leaders are serious about delivering sovereign capability, they must build durable partnerships and plan for market instability.

Building a resilient and competitive alternative to China’s critical minerals dominance is a global strategic challenge. It’s a task far bigger than Australia alone can solve.

It demands deep, sustained co-operation with like-minded partners, particularly Japan, the United States, South Korea, India and the European Union.

While calling the announcement visionary may be a stretch, it’s a crucial addition to Australia’s long-term strategy. It signals a serious move beyond simply mining and exporting raw materials, toward making Australia a reliable supplier of refined, high-value minerals.

The reserve’s structure mirrors recommendations made at ASPI’s Darwin Dialogue meetings in 2023 and 2024. It’ll operate through two key mechanisms: government-backed offtake agreements and selective stockpiling.

Offtake agreements are already a familiar tool in the mining sector.

The innovation here is that the Australian government will become the buyer, anchoring investment, setting stable price limits, and smoothing market volatility for producers and customers alike.

Stockpiling will complement this by building reserves of priority minerals to sell strategically into trusted domestic and international markets rather than simply holding resources in reserve.

Together, these mechanisms will stabilise supply, support market confidence and direct value chains away from politically coercive actors.

China’s dominance in the global critical minerals sector results from decades of deliberate policy.

Early action, subsidies, export controls and aggressive price manipulation have created structural dependencies that cannot be overcome through goodwill alone.

There have been few viable options but selling into Chinese-controlled markets.

Supply chains that depend overwhelmingly on a single actor, particularly one willing to weaponise economic relationships, are inherently insecure.

Labor’s proposed reserve accepts this reality and offers a practical response.

Australia cannot assume that action alone will be sufficient. The uncertain trajectory of US industrial policy only reinforces the need for Canberra to work harder with Japan, South Korea, India and the EU.

Building joint stockpiles, pursuing shared downstream investments and integrating offtake arrangements will be essential if Australia and its partners are to create a genuinely diversified and resilient supply chain.

Genuine engagement with Australian industry leaders who have fought to stay viable in a hostile global market will be equally important.

Companies such as Lynas Rare Earths, Iluka Resources and Arafura Rare Earths have hard-earned experience navigating the commercial, technological and political challenges of critical minerals supply.

Their operational knowledge, market intelligence and risk management lessons will be crucial in shaping a strategic reserve that is commercially realistic and strategically effective.

These companies know firsthand the difficulties of competing against state-backed Chinese giants that benefit from subsidies, price manipulation and market coercion.

Despite these distortions, they’ve built capabilities that are globally competitive.

Ignoring their experience would be a strategic mistake.

The proposed reserve fits neatly into the broader Future Made in Australia agenda. It complements the $7.1 billion in production tax credits designed to reduce production costs and strategic investments in Australia’s advanced battery and solar industries.

This layered approach to supply, demand and value-add is exactly what Australia needs.

In time, Australia must pursue co-investment strategies with trusted international partners, moving beyond simple export models to building integrated supply chains.

Strong partnerships with industry will also be essential to scaling up capability and de-risking future investments. As will investment into educating and training the necessary workforce.

The next government should continue to implement critical mineral policy not just as a national security imperative but one that would be seen by the US and other allies as in their interests too.

The critical minerals sector offers Australia a once-in-a-generation opportunity.

It is a chance to move beyond the traditional resource economy and lead in enabling the global energy transition and building high-value technology ecosystems.

The Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve is a smart foundation and a necessary one.

But Australia must act decisively, build strategically, work with trusted partners and listen to its battle-hardened industry leaders if it’s to fully realise this moment’s economic and strategic promise.

Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world

For more than a decade, which has included the 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2022 federal elections, ASPI has helped to generate ideas and foster debate about Australian strategic policymaking through Agenda for change, a wide-ranging collection of analyses and recommendations to assist the next Australian Government in its deliberations and planning.  

Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world continues in its tradition by providing focused and anticipatory policy advice for the 48th Parliament of Australia. The agenda strives to highlight, and present solutions to, the most pressing questions that our next government must consider in order to advance and protect Australia’s national interests in a more disordered and challenging world. 

This edition reflects five interrelated aspects of Australia’s position in 2025, focused on the need to:

  • defend Australia
  • navigate our place in a new world (dis)order
  • reform our security architecture and policies
  • secure our critical infrastructure
  • protect and use our natural resources. 

In 2025, that means equipping the next government for the reality of the contest in which our country is engaged. Since the previous edition of Agenda for change in 2022 we’ve seen:

  • Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and public confirmation of the China–Russia ‘no limits’ partnership
  • change in Australia’s policy towards China, with a focus on ‘stabilisation’, accompanied by reduced economic coercion against Australia but a ratcheting up of military intimidation, including an unprecedented PLA Navy circumnavigation of Australia
  • heightened aggression by China against the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Taiwan
  • a lowering of the national terrorism threat level to ‘possible’ in 2022, before it was raised back to ‘probable’ not quite two years later 
  • the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the resulting war in Gaza and an increase in politically motivated violence in Australia
  • the rise of artificial intelligence, including the landmark release of ChatGPT in late 2022 and then DeepSeek in 2025
  • the return of Donald Trump to the White House, bringing tension among allies and question marks over the future of the US-led international order.

Each chapter in Agenda for change includes a limited number of prioritised policy recommendations, which are intended to be discrete, do-able and impactful. Although, when dealing with some of the more existential challenges facing Australia, the recommendations are necessarily and similarly expansive.

In addressing that extraordinary range of developments, ASPI has drawn on a wide range of expertise for the 2025 edition of Agenda for change. The views expressed are the personal views of the authors and don’t represent a formal position of ASPI on any issue, other than a shared focus on Australia’s national interests. 

National food security preparedness Green Paper

Australia’s agriculture sector and food system produce enough food to feed more than 70 million people worldwide. The system is one of the world’s least subsidised food systems. It has prospered under a global rules-based system influenced by Western liberal values, but it now faces chronic challenges due to rising geopolitical tensions, geo-economic transitions, climate change, deteriorating water security and rapid technological advances. The world is changing so rapidly that the assumptions, policy approaches and economic frameworks that have traditionally supported Australia’s food security are no longer fit for purpose. Potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific is driving enhanced preparedness activity in Australia’s defence force, but that isn’t being replicated across the agriculture sector and food system in a coordinated manner. Food hasn’t featured as a priority in the public versions of the Defence Strategic Review or the National Defence Strategy. This has created a gap in Australia’s preparedness activities: if Australia’s national security and defence organisations are preparing for potential conflict, then Australia’s agriculture sector and food system stakeholders should also be preparing for this period of strategic uncertainty.

Food security is a pillar of whole-of-nation preparedness for an uncertain future. While current targeted preparedness efforts and resilience mechanisms are valuable, they aren’t sufficient. Stakeholders are calling for stronger, proactive national coordination from the government to empower and support private-sector action. Meeting that demand is essential to strengthening overall resilience. So, too, is understanding that Australia’s food security relies on a holistic and interconnected ecosystem rather than a fragmented supply chain. Australia is a heavily trade-exposed nation that exports 70% of production, so any disruption to maritime and other transport corridors or to the infrastructure needed to move food risks undermining both national food security and Australia’s standing as a reliable global supplier.

This work has been written and constructed as a Green Paper, not an academic publication. Informed by six months of consultations with government, the private sector and civil society, the paper combines applied policy analysis and real-world insights to promote deliberate conversation about protecting Australia’s food security with the same priority as protecting Australia’s national security. The Green Paper is divided into four parts. It also includes three case studies in the Appendix, which use a threat and risk assessment to analyse three critical inputs to the food security ecosystem—phosphate, glyphosate and digital connectivity—to help stakeholders evaluate the vulnerabilities in Australia’s food security ecosystem.

The intention of this Green Paper is to deepen understanding of food security as a key public policy issue, stimulate public discussion, inform policymaking and provide both government and key stakeholders with policy options for consideration. This Green Paper’s 14 recommended policy options have been designed to equip governments and the private sector with structured national-security-inspired assessment tools and a framework to continuously identify, prioritise and mitigate vulnerabilities. That includes options to centralise the coordination and decentralise delivery of preparedness activities, establish accountability and embed food security as a national security priority and a key element of Australia’s engagement across the Indo-Pacific.

Linus Cohen

The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia

Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian transnational crime groups. Once a domestic concern, Brazilian organised crime has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making Brazil the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade after Colombia.

While Brazilian organised crime previously posed little threat to Australia, this report, The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, examines how Brazil’s expanding role in global cocaine supply, rising criminal network sophistication, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian organised crime on Australian shores.

The report highlights how Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has become a major transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal, and economic systems. It explores Brazil’s geography and criminal networks with South American cocaine producers and examines the PCC’s global distribution networks, with a focus on how the Pacific is increasingly used to transport drugs destined for Australia. A recent case study demonstrates the prioritisation of the Australian market in these operations.

The report concludes with recommendations for strengthening police cooperation, enhancing financial surveillance, and proactively detecting and disrupting PCC activities. By addressing key enablers of the PCC’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, a coordinated approach will not only mitigate the immediate threat but also bolster Australia’s long-term defences against transnational organised crime.

PM’s timid reply to antisemitic terror is dangerous. Silence is surrender

Australia’s national resilience and social cohesion are under strain, with the most visible cracks seen in the alarming rise of antisemitism. Governments, most particularly the federal government, whose responsibility it is to lead national debates, desperately need to engage more forthrightly with the Australian public.

The discovery in Dural of a caravan containing explosives and, reportedly, an antisemitic message and the addresses of a synagogue and other Jewish buildings, is the latest shock that will heighten anxiety in Australia’s Jewish community and further inflame public tension.

We can give police some benefit of the doubt that they had operational reasons for secrecy about the caravan, but these decisions must be balanced against the need to confront the underlying problems of extremism and hatred, and to reassure Australians that we have national leaders who are facing up to them. If our politicians had been leading the conversations that we need, there would be greater goodwill for understanding operational decisions, rather than the fraying patience that we are seeing.

Instead of confronting extremism, radicalisation and the growing influence of ideological violence, policymakers have retreated into reticence, offering platitudes that fail to give the public confidence or deter those who seek to cause harm. This absence of leadership is a communications failure and a strategic miscalculation that threatens social cohesion and national security.

The federal government’s reluctance to educate and inform the public about terrorism and extremism is fuelling uncertainty and fear. Security agencies such as ASIO and the Australian Federal Police play a vital role in countering threats, but their mandate is to act once the danger has escalated to the level of criminality and national security risk.

The broader responsibility – explaining the ideological drivers of extremism, reinforcing shared values, and setting clear boundaries of acceptable conduct – belongs to the government. Yet, time and again, the government has abdicated this duty, preferring to let ASIO’s annual threat assessment stand as the only authoritative voice on extremism in Australia. That is not enough. National security is not just about neutralising threats but about preventing them from taking root in the first place.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hardly lifted anyone’s morale when speaking defensively about the discovery of the caravan during two radio interviews on Thursday morning. On ABC radio, he failed to mention antisemitism at all. He refused to say when he’d learnt about it, describing that as “operational details”, and refused to say whether the national cabinet had discussed the investigation. Most of his commentary was about what the police had said and done. The closest he gave to an expression of the government’s view was by saying: “We remain concerned about this escalation.”

It wasn’t until a press conference later in the day that Albanese said, unprompted, that there was “zero tolerance in Australia for hatred and for antisemitism” and that he wanted “any perpetrators to be hunted down and locked up”.

One of the core failures underpinning this crisis is a misinterpretation of tolerance. Australia prides itself on being an open and inclusive society, but inclusivity does not mean tolerating the intolerable. Support for terrorist leaders and groups is not free speech, nor is it a legitimate expression of diversity – it is a direct threat to social stability. When governments fail to call this out unequivocally, they enable a dangerous dynamic by which extremists feel emboldened, and the broader population grows resentful and anxious. An anxious public is not a resilient one.

While the rising cost of living is at the forefront of most Australians’ minds, physical and social security must remain the government’s highest priority. People need to feel safe, and that safety is reinforced not just by policing, but by clear, decisive leadership.

The government’s approach – avoiding public discussion for fear of inflaming tensions – belongs to a bygone era. Excessive reticence was a flawed strategy even before social media, but now, in an age in which digital communications dominate every aspect of our lives, it is a liability.

Government hesitancy leaves a vacuum that is filled by those who want society to break. Without direct and frequent public engagement, we give ground to those who distort facts, push dangerous ideologies and promote violence.

ASIO head Mike Burgess was left swinging in the breeze last September after he told the ABC that the organisation assessed entrants to Australia for any national security risk, which might not cover someone who had only expressed “rhetorical support” for Hamas. Amid the political controversy that followed, the government should have swung in quickly and stressed that the wider visa check would, of course, include rhetorical support for Hamas but that this wasn’t ASIO’s job. That failed to happen, leading to days of public anger and confusion.

Equally dangerous is the government’s willingness to indulge in false equivalencies. Responding to attacks on Jewish Australians by condemning “all forms of hate” or vaguely mentioning “antisemitism and Islamophobia” is both politically weak and strategically harmful. Each act of violence or intimidation should be condemned for what it is – without hedging, without lumping disparate issues together, and without fear of offending those who sympathise with extremists.

This failure of clarity extends to the review of Australia’s terrorism laws, where there is discussion about removing the requirement for an ideological motive. Instead of diluting definitions, the government should lead the discussion on what ideology is, why it matters, and how it fuels extremism.

The government’s refusal to deal with reality is at the heart of this crisis. There is no neutral ground when it comes to national security. Attempting to placate all sides by responding too slowly and downplaying threats only emboldens those who seek to justify intimidation and violence.

Everyone accepts that history and geopolitics are complex – not least in the Middle East – but there is no justification for bringing foreign conflicts onto Australian streets. Like it or not, the federal government’s faltering responses have facilitated a false equivalence between Israel and Islamist terrorist groups, emboldening extremists who now see Australia as a battleground for their ideological struggles.

Australians can see the world is unstable and don’t appreciate being dismissed or misled. The government’s failure to engage honestly is backfiring. Public trust erodes when people feel their concerns are ignored, and social cohesion weakens without leadership. To maintain our national resilience, the government must step up, speak clearly and reassert the values that make Australia a safe and united society. Silence is not a strategy – it’s a surrender.

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 10

The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 10, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months.

Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include:

  1. Northern Australia and Defence,
  2. Developing Northern Australia,
  3. Northern Australia new policy opportunities,
  4. Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities,

Articles are authored by a range of experts across these varied topics.

Volume 10 also features a foreword by The Hon Lia Finocchiaro MLA, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Finocchiaro calls readers attention to the Northern Territory’s unique place in Australia’s defence history, its enduring strategic importance, and the Territory’s defence capabilities.

The 34 articles in this Compendium provide practical policy options which government could implement in the short term. Facilitating both the security and economic prosperity of northern Australia.

Isabelle Bond