Carl Ungerer’s piece is a timely reminder that terrorism remains a threat to Australian nationals and interests, that the US will retain a fixation on terrorism, that we face an inter-generational contest (including of ideas), and that the Southeast Asian dimension adds diplomatic complexity for Canberrra.

But there is one other issue that I think merits more focus in explaining the place of terrorism in Australia’s security outlook: how should we prioritise this threat against others (such as the coercive potential of some foreign militaries) and how should this influence the resource allocation decisions?

Some of the country’s key security thinkers and practitioners debate whether terrorism constitutes a ‘strategic’ threat and, accordingly, what priority it should hold as a factor driving our security posture. My view is that terrorism is not a strategic threat in the sense that it can wrest territory, subvert sovereignty or compel fundamental changes in the country’s external orientation or way of life. Yes, it can cause horrific loss of life. But terrorism has powerful effects on national policy directions only if a society and a government allow it to.

Enter the idea of national resilience. Australia should take its cue from the British model of counter-terrorism, not the American one. The UK approach has consolidated around a campaign to moderate public fear, put all emergencies in perspective, and deal proportionately with terrorism as one of a number of transnational threats (pandemic flu is another) that are far more likely to disrupt social order than destroy it. In thus downplaying terrorism as a ‘strategic’ threat, I don’t deny that there is a role for armed force—potentially military as well as police—in tackling it. In particular, there will be times, and the campaign in Afghanistan is one, when conventional militaries (using sometimes unconventional tactics) are needed to stabilise lawless zones where international terrorist groups might find sanctuary.

The strategic-or-not debate about the nature of terrorism can be a false dichotomy if it is waged to determine how much terrorism should matter in gauging what military capabilities a country needs. In Australia’s emerging debates over a national security strategy and a defence white paper, the relevant point should be that terrorism is an immediate and persistent threat to Australians, rather than whether or not it can or needs to be defined as the most important one. This immediacy and persistence are reasons enough to rate counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and stabilisation missions for the ADF as highly likely in the decades ahead, and allocate resources accordingly.