Observers of al-Qaeda are often faced with dire assessments that the jihadist movement is as strong as ever. Countless analyses by intelligence agencies the world over identify al-Qaeda as robust, and reconstituted despite the countless amounts of blood and treasure expended since 9/11. Assertions like these have been repeated so often, that it is almost taken for granted that al-Qaeda will remain a hovering threat for decades to come. But it is worth challenging the common wisdom—if for nothing else than to better tailor our strategies to defeat it.

Is al-Qaeda really as robust as we think? Recent worldwide trends suggest otherwise. Having alienated Sunni Arab tribes in Iraq and experiencing a backlash against its strategy of fomenting sectarian strife, al-Qaeda is on the ropes in the land of the two rivers. Saudi Arabia has turned against Osama bin Laden after a spate of al-Qaeda attacks targeting the kingdom. An unprecedented survey by ‘Terror Free Tomorrow’ reveals that Saudis now overwhelmingly reject terrorism, whether at home or abroad.

Innovative rehabilitation programs in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Malaysia have helped deplete the ranks of violent extremists. After years assuming that Pakistani extremist groups held the most sway, the recent parliamentary elections in Pakistan ushered in moderate political parties—particularly groups like the Awani National Party (ANP) in the Northwest Frontier Province, a stronghold of Pashtun militants and a destination for foreign fighters. 2006 and 2007 were the first years since 2002 where Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has been unable to perpetrate an attack.

Al-Qaeda is also susceptible to the same organisational vulnerabilities as any other outfit. Whether it reverts back to a top-down bureaucratic structure, adopts the strategy of ‘leaderless jihad’ advocated by Abu Musab a Suri, or relies on regional affiliates, al-Qaeda’s organisational models remain vulnerable to exploitation. The Australian policy community should be asking—How is al-Qaeda organised and aligned in the Asia Pacific? Just how vulnerable is al-Qaeda in the region and in what ways?

Al-Qaeda attempts to graft itself onto regional conflicts- as it has tried in Lebanon, Iraq, the Maghreb, Somalia, and Indonesia, among other places. But in most every case, al-Qaeda overreaches and gets into trouble whenever it tries to impose its leadership over indigenous insurgents. All politics is local and regional affiliates of al-Qaeda are almost always more concerned about conditions in their own locale and parochial goals rather than the grandiose world wide aims of al-Qaeda Central.

Al-Qaeda has experienced this dynamic with its main regional partner, Jemaah Islamiyah. JI analysts have pointed out factional rifts between the pro-al-Qaeda camp and the neo-Darul school over tactics. Unless we work with regional partners to widen these rifts further, this knowledge is of no use.

There is a fatal flaw in al-Qaeda’s ideology and message. It is an organisation that only stands against. It offers no positive message and is vulnerable to accusations of callousness and cruelty towards civilians. This is a serious PR problem for an organisation with a previously stellar PR record. Bin Laden’s deputy Ayman Zawahiri expended most of his latest discourse trying to refute it. But Western governments are tepid in their ideological response to al-Qaeda, believing they don’t have the moral authority to refute Islamic arguments. Al-Qaeda may use the language of Islam but it is no way a legitimate Islamic organisation.

Al-Qaeda is still a dangerous and ever evolving movement. The proliferation of European cells with direct links to Pakistan, the ease with which radical Islamist ideology spreads over the internet and al-Qaeda’s sophisticated propaganda machine are all deeply troubling. Instability and poverty in the parts of the Muslim world remain fertile grounds for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda retains a presence in the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, and, most critically, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghanistan– Pakistan border where they have reconstituted their organisation and efforts.

While we must never underestimate the enemy, we should be more attuned to its weaknesses in order to formulate better strategies to defeat it. Battling ‘the long war’ will require a long view. Part of that long view is honing in on al-Qaeda’s weaknesses, exploiting the fault lines between al-Qaeda’s aims and those of its regional affiliates and challenging its ideology. In the Asia–Pacific region, Australia has a large role to play in working with its neighbours to exploit al-Qaeda’s weaknesses. And Canberra remains responsible for deterring domestic radicalisation inclusively and without prejudice.