Over the past four years, the world, including the greater Asia–Pacific community, has observed with interest and some concern, the re-emergence of Russia as an ambitious great power aiming to establish itself as a principal pole of influence. There are growing debates in the international relations and strategic affairs community about Russia’s strategic intentions and new policy directions, including in the Pacific. While the majority of the ongoing debate has been about the nation’s regional foreign policy and the ambitious strategy to position Russia as a global power and energy superpower, there has been little discussion about its regional defence policy.

During the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific-Indian-Ocean strategic theatre (APIOST) was of secondary importance. Nevertheless, the Far East and the Pacific played a very significant role in Soviet strategic calculus. The prospect of an all-out war with the United States and its allies in the Pacific; a strategic stand-off with China between the 1960s and 1980s; Soviet engagement in Asia, the Pacific and Africa; plus a range of other factors signified the importance of what seemed to be the USSR’s secondary front in the Cold War.

Throughout the 1990s, Russia’s main strategic concerns were directed towards the West and the South where the nation faced a range of geopolitical challenges, including the expanding North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); weakening influence over Central and Eastern European buffer states, the Baltics and some other former Soviet republics; and threats of separatism and ethno-religious terrorism in the North Caucasus.

More recent concerns have included Ukraine’s and Georgia’s declared intention to join NATO; the US decision to deploy operational anti-ballistic missile systems in the Czech Republic and Poland; and growing criticism about Russia’s ‘managed’ democracy. This had led to an asymmetric response by Russia, including several defence-driven measures such as the test launch of new ICBMs, SLBMs and surface-to-surface missiles, and a unilateral moratorium on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

From a security perspective, Siberia and the Far East have seen little geo-political change, besides Mongolia’s departure from Russia’s sphere of influence. Russia’s Far Eastern basic military stature as a secondary front has remained relatively unchanged since the Soviet period. In fact, with the improvement in relations with China (with which Russia shares an extensive land border), Japan (despite the ongoing dispute over the Southern Kurils or the Northern Territories), South Korea and, to some extent the United States, the strategic military status of the Far East has declined relative to other strategic zones.

Military power in Russia’s East, long the basis of the Soviet claim to regional influence, declined drastically after 1991. In 1992, Russia completed the withdrawal of its 100,000-strong contingent from Mongolia. Part of this decline was by design—in accord with the 1997 border troop reduction agreement between China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan—and part was justified by a reduction in the perception of threat in the region. However, much of the reduction in Russian military power east of the Urals has been driven by a funding crisis. By 1999, the regional grouping of forces had been reduced by 200,000 personnel; nearly 600 tactical missiles had been destroyed; the Russian Pacific Fleet (RPF) submarine force had fallen by over 75%; and the overall number of surface combatants had fallen by 47%.

On the other hand, the Asia–Pacific region has witnessed Russia’s aggressive invasion in the defence technology market. Currently, Russia’s principal partners in the arms export business come from APIOST: China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, South Korea and Vietnam. More recently, Pakistan expressed interest in acquiring Russian military hardware. Russia continues to view military-technological cooperation as an important element in its regional strategic and defence policy.

However, after 2000, slow but steady progress has been made to upgrade Russian military capabilities deployed in the area, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Among other measures, Russia has undertaken a modernisation program for the defensive posture of the Southern Kurils, signalling that it does not plan to abandon these islands in the near future. In addition, Russia plans to deploy a brigade armed with new Iskander-M SSMs and a second fighter regiment equipped with Su-27SM improved Flanker multirole aircraft in 2008; recently announced its decision to invest 9 billion roubles in the infrastructure upgrade of the Rybachiy strategic submarine base (Kamchatka Peninsula); and is developing a new-generation Borey class SSBN, the first of which will be in the field by 2010.

However, the most ambitious program announced this year aims at restoring the RPF’s fallen power. Russia’s future Pacific naval power—a nation’s principal power projection instrument—will involve the formation of the largest and most potent naval grouping in the Russian Navy, housing at least half of all SSBN forces and having three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in its order of battle.

These measures demonstrate growing concerns in Russia about the fragile regional geo-strategic landscape and fears of a major regional confrontation that may harm Russia’s security interests. Whilst touring the Far East in April 2007, Vice-Premier Sergei Ivanov—who is tipped to be a favourite in the 2008 presidential elections—spoke openly about the unstable regional security environment, prospects for a major conflict in the Pacific, and the subsequent need for Russia to respond.

Currently, Russian primary strategic concerns include the absence of an articulated regional security framework involving all major players—similar to the Russia–NATO Council for example; ongoing instability surrounding North Korea; plans to deploy ABM elements in the Pacific; proliferation of WMD; the nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia; and the security of exclusive economic zones and key maritime communications. Longer-term concerns include China’s geo-political game and the status of the US as superpower.

Putin’s Russia in the twenty-first century is as ambitious as ever. Despite continued appreciation of dynamics in Europe and the Middle East, and the realisation of their economic and political importance, the APIOST is of growing significance for the nation. The APIOST acts as a new, strategic gateway for the booming Russian economy and its ever-powerful resource sector, as well as an arena in which Russia may claim back its status as a global and Pacific great power. The reconstruction of Russian military power in the Pacific pursues the goal of supporting the country’s economic ambitions, defending its national interests, and shifting the strategic balance in Russia’s favour.

It is time to stop thinking about Russia as a troubled, unstable and vast but nuclear-armed geopolitical periphery, and to start including it as a player in the global strategic calculus. Failure to do so may lead to serious misjudgements when making major foreign policy decisions.